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NARRATIVE 



OF 



Wfit ^SBav 



IN 



GERMANY AND FRANCE, 



IN 1813 AND 1814. 



BY LIEUT. GENERAL CHARLES WILLIAM VANE, 
MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY, G.C.B. G.C.H. 

COLONEL OF THE lOTH ROYAL HUSSARS. 



CAREY & LEA— CHESTNUT STREET. 
1831. 



1\C -£3 5 

.1-6 

/?3/ 



Gift 

Mias M. O. Oodman 

Msroh 1914 



TO 



THE OFFICERS 



OF 



THE BRITISH ARMY. 



Redeeming the pledge I gave in my Narrative of 
the Peninsular War, to introduce to the public a 
Second Volume, relative to the Campaigns of 1813 
and 1814, provided my first efforts should be sup- 
ported by the indulgence of my brother-officers; I 
now offer this additional tribute to those who have 
kindly considered my first book as not unworthy of 
their notice. 

Vane Londonderry, Lieut. Genl. 

Col. 10th Royal Hussars. 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



The following pages will be found to record, in an 
unbroken narrative, all those important military opera- 
tions which came under my immediate notice during 
the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. I felt that this could 
be done without compromising my own official respon- 
sibility, or breaking through the regard and considera- 
tion due to others. That which the soldier's eye has 
witnessed, surely the soldier's pen may fairly describe ; 
for, as I have already stated in my Advertisement to a 
former work, I was constantly in the habit of writing 
detailed statements of every occurrence. I did this, 
not merely in fulfilment of my public duty, but for the 
information of that individual to whose wise and digni- 
fied policy, not Great Britain only, but every nation of 
the civilized world, is, in my estimation, largely in- 
debted. 

I am free to own, and proud to record, that his aftec- 
tion was the solace — his good opinion the glory of my 
life ; and it is a source of honest pride to me at this 
moment that my communications, such as they were, 
and prepared always on the spur of the occasion, were 
considered by him worthy to be preserved. My letters 
to him form not merely the groundwork, but almost the 
entire substance, of the following pages. I have given 
them nearly verbatim, with the diflTerence only of adopt- 
ing a connected form, to avoid the inconvenience of 
those repetitions which must of necessity occur in de- 
tached and occasional communications. By doing this, 

A2 



VI ADVERTISEMENT. ' 

I am aware that I forego, in some degree, the advan- 
tage of that internal evidence which the letters in 
their original form would have carried with them. This, 
however, is a sacrifice which I am content to make, as 
it regards myself personally. 

No one, I am certain, can impeach the accuracy of 
the facts, or the sincerity of the opinions recorded in 
this Narrative ; though it is possible some question 
may be started as to the share of literary distinction to 
be awarded to the writer. 

In reference to my former Narrative of the Peninsu- 
lar War, I stated very explicitly the obligation I was 
under to a gentleman for the arranging my letters, and 
thus aiding my first efforts in submitting them to the 
press. In the present case I have no such statement 
to make. This work, such as it is, is written and com- 
piled wholly by a soldier, not by an author; and, 
whatever the amount of its deficiencies may prove to 
be, I must take them upon myself. There will proba- 
bly be no occasion to wait long for an estimate of them, 
as that vigilance which exercises itself in weighing the 
claims of any individual to be considered a writer of 
military history is always in full activity. 

There is another point upon which I wish also to 
be explicit. Many may suppose that some of the 
opinions advanced, or documents produced, might arise 
out of papers belonging to my late lamented relation, 
which may have fallen into my possession since the 
period of his decease. But the fact is, on the contrary, 
that all these valuable records are still in the hands of 
his executors, from whom his family have never hitherto 
received them. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 
Progress of the allied armies in the north of Germany at the commencement 
of 1813 — Active measures of the British government — The Hanoverian 
dominions — Alliance with Russia and Prussia— Various misrepresenta- 
tions — Heligoland — State of affairs at Hamburgh — Position of the allies — 
General Tettenborn— Regency at Hanover— Estimate of the French forces 
— Supplies from England — Brigadier-general Lyon appointed to command 
the Hanoverian and Hanseatic troops— Hanoverian levies — Bernadotte — 
Exertions of General Tettenborn — Capitulation of Thorn— Importance 
of Spandau — Force under Marshal Ney and General Sebastiani — Arrival 
of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia at Dresden— Extensive co- 
operation of Great Britain Page 13 

CHAP. II. 

Advance of the enemy— State of their troops— Exertions of the King of 
Prussia— Surrender of Spandau— Edict of the Prussian government— Ta- 
riff' of duties— Pleasures to check the advance of the French— Head-quar- 
ters of the allied Sovereigns— Position of the opposing armies at the end 
of April— Policy of Napoleon— The allies propose to pass the Elbe— Plan 
of operations— The French advance to Dresden— The allied forces cross 
the Elster— The Emperor Alexander— Plan of attack— Successes of the 
allies— Obstinate engagement— Retreat of the allies— Precautionary mea- 
sures-Results of the battle— Subsequent proceedings— Aifairs on the 

Lower Elbe 22 

CHAP. in. 

Force under Buonaparte— Numerical strength of the allies— Composition of 
the French army— State of the Russians— Character of the Cossacks- 
Grenadiers of the guard— Unnecessary attirail— Animation of the Prus- 
sian army— The Poles- I^ine of conduct pursued by the allies— Review of 
operations— The allied army crosses the Elbe— Attempts of the enemy- 
Buonaparte enters Dresden— Concentration of the allied forces— Affair at 
Weissig— The King of Saxony declares in favor of the French— The con- 
tending armies in presence of each other— Force of the enemy— Gallant 

action of General Barclay De Tolly— Successes of the allies 32 

CHAP. IV. 

Intentions of the enemy— General Miloradovitch withdraws from Bautzen 
—Observations on the position of the two grand armies— Reported move- 
ments of the enemy— Preparations of the allies— Battle near Bautzen- 
General Barclay de Tolly forced to retire— Gallant conduct of the Prussians 
under Blucher— Advantage obtained by the French— Retreat of the allies 
—Results of the battle— Heavy losses of the allies— Spirit of the army— 
The allies continue to retreat— Attempts of the enemy— Successful ma- 
nceuvre of General Blucher— Distinction conferred on Sir Robert Wilson 
—The French enter Breslau- Armistice— Anxiety respecting Austria- 
Review of the state of the allied army 40 

CHAP. V. 

Conferences— Ability displayed by the Austrian njinister— Effective state 
of the Prussian armv— Proceeding on the part of the French— Fortress of 
Spandau— Public feeling at Berlin— The landsturm, or local militia- 
Swedish troops— Their general appearance— Head-quarters of the army— 
The Sovereigns— and society at head-quarters— Observations as to the 
Prince Royal of Sweden— The Hanseatic legion— The armistice prolonged 
—The Russian German Legion— their complete state of discipline, fee- 
News of the battle of Vittoria— Hanoverian levies— Movements of Swe- 
disli troops— The Prince Royal's arrival at Berlin 59 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

CHAP. VI. 

British force under Major-general Gibbs — Hanoverian levies— Appointment 
of officers — The Prince Royal — Troops under his orders — Tlie Duke of 
Cumberland — Treaties of concert and subsidy vtith Russia and Prusaia 
— General Alexander Hope — Affability of the Prince Royal — His inter- 
view with the Duke of Cumberland — Removal of General Walmoden— 
The late Duke of Mecklenburg Strelitz— Adventures at Strelitz— Arrival 
of the Prince Royal at Berlin — Reports regarding the enemy — Letter from 
General Tauenstein — Intelligence from the grand head-quarters — Av- 
langements of the Prince Royal — Arrival of the Duke of Vicenaa — Dis- 
position of Napoleon's forces — Position of the allied army— Moreau — 
Austria declares war against France — Spirit of the Austrian troops — 
Slarch of the allies into Bohemia 09 

CHAP. VII. 

Movements of the enemy — Removal of the allied head-quarters to Prague 
— Count Stadion— Intrepid character of the Emperor Alexander — Dispo- 
sition of Austria — Prince Schvvartzenberg — The Breslau central commis- 
sion — Observations on the rupture of negotiations — Reply of Austria — 
Conduct of Caulaincourt — Confidence of Buonaparte — Count 3Tetternich — 
his course of proceedings — Review of the Austrian army — Fine appear- 
ance and discipline of the troops — Retreat of the French — Collection of 
the enemy's forces at Zittau — The French general, Jomenil — Intelligence 
of the defeat of Soult — General Blucher attacked by Ney and Marmont — 
Count Wittgenstein's corps — Advance of the grand armies tonards Dres- 
den — The enemy retires — The allies attack Dresden — they abandon the 
assault — their loss on the occasion — Advantages of the French — Fate of 
Moreau 80 

CHAP. VIII. 

Difficulties of the allies after their retreat from Dresden — Advantages of 
Napoleon — Causes of the late failure — Prince Schwart^enberg — Buona- 
parte's fortresses on the Elbe — Complexion of affairs — Operations of Gen- 
eral Blucher — Brilliant affair of General Sachen's corps — The Silesian 
army pursue the enemy — Successes of Blucher — Action near Toplitz — 
Bravery of the Russian guards — The Duke of Cumberland — Defeat of 
Vandamme at Kulm — The grand army encamps near Toplitz — Events 
in the north under the Prince Royal of Sweden — Repulse of General Bcr- 
trand— Victory obtained by the Crown Prince— Napoleon attacks the 
army of Silesia — Various military operations — Interests of the different 
powers 92 

CHAP. IX. 

Attack on the allies at Dohna— Severe contest— Count Wittgenstein retires 
— The Duke of Cumberland assists in the action— Bnonap'artc arrives in 
force from Dresden— Preparations for a general engairemcnt-The French 
retire — Advance of the allies — Brilliant cmip de vtain—Mau(sn\rcB of Na- 
poleon — continues his retreat — Partial action — Losses of Marshal Ney — 
Demonstrations before Kulm — Attack on the allied posilion—R( pulse of 
the enemy — Napoleon's horse shot under liim— He retires towards Dresden 
— Distress of the French army — Positions of the allies— Successes of 
Generals Platoff and Thielman— Affair near AUcnbiirg— Movements of 
the allied army — Reports of Napoleon at Leipsic— Position of the Rus- 
sian and Prussian armies — System of Prince Schvvartzenlwrg — Tidings 
of Lord Wellington's victories in Spain — Napoleons letters to the Em- 
peror of Austria— Exalted position of England— Policy of Prince Met- 
ternich— The Emperor Alexander's letter to Sir C. Stewart— Pros; rcss of 
the Silosian army— Plans of the Prince Royal of Sweden— Napoleon's 
niancEuvres on the f^ister- Bold project and decided movements of the 
allies— Concentration of the enemy towards Leipsic 103 

CHAP. X. 

Prosecution of offensive ojrerations- IMovcinents of the Silesian army — of 
the grand army — Loss of communications across the Elbe — Treaty with 
Bavaria— Intercepted dispatches— The enemy's demonstrations on the 
Mulda— Concentration near Leipsic— Movements of the Prince Royal of 
Sweden— Advance of the whole allied armv— Victory of Radefeld and 



CONTENTS. IX 

Lindenthal — Brilliant attacks of Blucher — Napoleon arrives in the field — 
attacks the whole line of the allies — forces part of their position by a 
cvup de main — unable to profit by it — The grand army resumes its posi- 
tion — Conversations with the Prince Royal— strictures on his movements 
—Letters to that Prince, and communications with General Blucher. 113 

CHAP. XI. 

Successes of the Crown Prince of Sweden— of General Walmoden— Con- 
centration of the enemy round Leipsic — Remarks on this movement — ■ 
Proclamation to the allied army — Preparations for a general engagement 
-^Description of the battle of Leipsic — its glorious results — The enemy 
routed at all points — Capture of Leipsic — pursuit and dispersion of the 
French army — Movements of the allied forces towards the Rhine — Pub- 
lic rejoicings — Tidings of the victory in England — Propositions of peace 
from Napoleon — Singular interview with the Prince Royal — Presented by 
His Royal Highness with the Swedish military Order of the Sword. . 125 

CHAPTER XII. 

Continued pursuit of the enemy — Line of march of the allies towards the 
Rhine — Unhappy fate of Prince Poniatowski — Attack of the retreating 
corps on Count Tolstoy — Extensive captures — Movements of Marshal 
Blucher and of the Prince Royal — Dresden evacuated by Gouvion St. Cyr 
— Motions of General Bennigsen — Collecting of the enemy near Erfurth 
— Progress and positions of the allied armies — Arrival of General Wrede 
— Active measures — The Silesian army overtakes and routs the enemy — 
Large capture of prisoners — Brilliant successes of Marshal Blucher — Dis- 
patches from Sir Hudson Lowe — Hot pursuit and narrow escape of Napo- 
leon — Disasters and sufferings of the enemy — Napoleon retreats on Frank- 
fort — Reports of General Wrede — of engagements at Hanau— Further 
progress of the Silesian army — Rapid marches, and heroic actions of the 
allies 135 

CHAP. XIII. 

Movements of the French armj' — Bold and masterly conduct of General 
Wrede — Amount of Napoleon's force — Skilful retreat of his commandeis 
— Taking of Hanau — Head-quarters of Napoleon at Frankfort — Contin- 
ued retreat — Position of Marshal Davoust with the Danes — March of the 
army of the north towards Hanover — New plans of the Prince of Swe- 
den — Brilliant conduct of the partisan-corps — Marshal Blucher's pursuit 
of the enemy — Occupation of Bremen — Entrance of the allies into Hano- 
ver — Plans of the Prince Royal— The Duke of Cumberland — Dissatisfac- 
tion of General Walmoden — Conversations with the Prince Royal of 
Sweden — Causes of misunderstanding among the allies — Public declara- 
tion — Proposals to Napoleon — Movements of the allied armies — Capitula- 
tion treated of with Davoust by the Prince Royal — Capitulation of 
Dresden — not sanctioned at head-quarters — Interview with Prince Har- 
denberg — Alliance between Great Britain and Prussia — Grounds of union 
between the great powers 145 

CHAP. XIV. 

Opening of the war across the Rhine — Measures adopted by Napoleon — 
Plan of the new campaign — criticised by the Prince of Sweden — Proposed 
movements of the allied army — Force in Germany — Motions of the Prince 
Royal — Discussion of negotiations — Alliance between the powers — Mag- 
nitude of the allied armies — Occupation of Holland — Embarkation of 
English forces — Successes of General Bulow — Concentration of the allied 
armies — Re-establishment of the Orange dynasty — Capture of the Ger- 
man fortresses— Surrender of Stettin, Dornberg, and Zutphen — The grand 
army under Prince Schwartzenberg — Marshal Bellegarde— Overtures to 
Napoleon — Proposed basis of peace — Position of Great Britain— English 
officers — Sir R. Wilson — Lord Burghersh — Active measures of the allies — 
General Blucher — Fall of Dantzic— Army of the Crown Prince — Success 
of the Danes— Report of the afl!air— Views of the Prince of Sweden — Af- 
fairs in Holland — on the Upper Rhine — Arrival of the Duke of Cambridge? 
— his public entry into Hanover — Rejoicings on that occasion 156 



X CONTENTS. 

CHAP. XV. 
The war in the north— Poeition of Marshal Davoust— defeated by Genera! 
Wahnoden — Progress and state of the campaign — Motives and objects of 
the Prince Royal— The Duke of Cambridge at Hanover — The Duke of 
Brunswick — Communication from the King of Prussia to the Crown Prince 
— Sir C. Stewart proceeds from Hanover to Holstein — Armistice with the 
Danes — Letters from the King of Denmark and Prince Royal of Sweden — 
Observations on the Prince Royal — Gallantry of the Prussians — Capture 
of Bois le Due — Denmark joins tlie common cause — Articles of peace — 
Operations of the grand army— Passage of the Rhine — Surrender of Dantzic 
— Positions of the allies — Buonaparte at Metz — Progress of the allies 
— The enemy at Chalons — Power of Russia — Reflections — Success of 
Marshal Blucher — Relative positions of the armies — The Emperor of Rus- 
sia enters Vesoul — Capture of Nancy — Surrender of fortresses on the 
Rhine — March towards the capital 168 

CHAP. XVI. 

British officers of distinction — their services in the common cause — Graad 
headquarters— Spirited conduct of the Prince of Wirtemburg — The ene- 
my retires on Chatillon — Junction of the allied forces — Toul carried by 
assault — Napoleon concentrates his forces — Relative positions of the ar- 
mies — Napoleon repairs to Chalons— his plan of the campaign — Move- 
ments of Marshal Blucher — Attacked by Napoleon — Severe action — Dis- 
positions of Prince Schwartzenberg — Movements of the enemy — Inter- 
cepted letter — Napoleon's views — The partisan corps — Estimate of the 
forces — Ineffectual efforts of Napoleon — his fearless exposure in battle — 
Retreat of the enemy— Intended march on the capital— Disposition of the 
French nation — Want of combination among the allies — Army of the 
Prince Royal of Sweden— Operations in Belgium— The English and Prus- 
sians attack Marshal Macdonald — are compelled to retire — Bergen-op- 
Zoom invested by the English — Advance and successes of General Win- 
zingerode— Assembly of plenipotentiaries at Chatillon— Presence of the 
allied sovereigns — influence the diplomatic body — Interviews and conver- 
sations with the Emperor Alexander — Policy of Russia — Prosecution of 
hostilities— Dis.solution of the congress of Chatillon — Character of Caul- 
aincourt, Due de Vicenza — Amicable disposition of the congress 190 

CHAP. XVII. 

Resources and genius displayed by Napoleon— Magnanimity under adverse 
circumstances — his position at Troyes, Lesmont, Bar-sur-Aube — Prince 
Schwartzenberg determines to attack — Preparations of the allies — Opera 
tions of Marshal Blucher— Napoleon takes advantage of his imprudent ad- 
vance-falls upon the corps of Sacken and D'Yorck— gains a decided victory 
over them— Engagement with Marshal Blucher— Sanguinary contest— The 
Prussians outmanoeuvred and surrounded— retreat with considerable 
loss— Rapid movements and manoeuvres of Napoleon— Prepares to attack 
Prince Schwartzenberg— The allies collect their forces— Blucher attacked 
with loss at Mery — Grand head-quarters— Successful attack by Princo 
Schwartzenberg— Loss of the Prussians— Battle at Laou— Retreat of the 
enemy — Positions of Napoleon — General engagement and defeat of the 
French — Efforts of Napoleon — Masked movements and successes of the al- 
lies—Combined advance — Losses of the French — Barbarities of the Cos- 
sacks — Singular incident, and unhappy catastrophe 201 

CHAP. xvin. 

Pursuit of the enemy— Junction of the allied armies— Successes of the Si- 
leaian armies — Position of the grand army — Partisan-corps — Rapid march 
of Napoleon to regain the capital— Progr(!ss of the allies— Concentration 
of forces — Actions with the enemy — Explosion of a magazine — Advance 
of the allies— they pass the Marne — Napoleon attacks Winzingerode, who 
is compelled to retreat— Movement on the rear of tlie allies— Bold decision 
of the Emperor Alexander — Allied march on Pari,'?— Sir R. Hill at Bour- 
deaux — Intercepted letter from the Empress Maria Louisa to Napoleon — 
Affair at Claye— Rapid movements of the allies towards the capital — 
arrive before it— Battle of Montmartre— Defeat of the French— Entrance 
of the allied sovereigns into Paris— Temper of the i)eople— Popularity of 



COKTENTS. XI 

the Emperor Alexander— Grand review in the Champs Eiyaees — Napoleon 
hastens towards Fontainebleau — The allies march to oppose him — The 
Emperor Alexander forms a cabinet — its preponderance — Absence of the 
Emperor of Austria — Talleyrand gained over — The provisional govern- 
ment — Due de Vicenza — D'Alberg, &,c.— Interviews with the Emperor 
Alexander 209 

CHAP. XIX. 
Emissaries of Napoleon — Opinion of the Due de Vicenza — Deliberations of 
the senate — Desertion of Marshal Moncey — Lord Wellington at Toulouse 
— Great battle — Abdication of Buonaparte pronounced by the senate — 
Direction of affairs by the Emperor Alexander — Absence of the English 
minister — and of the Bourbons— Anecdotes of the Emperor of Russia's 
conduct — New government — Appointment of French ministers — Deser- 
tion of Marraont and his army — followed by Kellermann, Victor, Nan- 
souty — Efforts to form a regency for the king of Rome — Offer of Elba and 
a pension to Napoleon — Declaration of the Emperor Alexander in favor 
of the Bourbons — Napoleon accepts the terms proposed— Abandoned by 
his officers — His army directed towards Paris — Colonel Lowe sent with 
dispatches to England — Considerations of the policy adopted towards 
Napoleon — Bold tone assumed by Russia — Concessions of the other powers 
— Alarm of Austria — Influence of Great Britain — Policy of Prince Metter- 
nich— Opposition to the designs of Russia — Appeal to a Congress at 
Vienna 218 

CHAP. XX. 

Strictures on the project of the Emperor Alexander — dangers to be appre- 
hended from it — its extreme unpopularity — opposed by the English gov- 
ernment — Influence and preponderance of the Russian policy — High char- 
acter of Great Britain — State of affairs at Paris — Publicity of events 
after its occupation — Lord Burghersh's memoir — Plans of ground and 
battles — The allied sovereigns prepare to visit England— her triumphant 
efforts — Recapitulation of military events — Last struggle oif Napoleon — 
His design to attack Paris — Prince Schwartzenberg assembles the allied 
army — Intrigues and treachery — Napoleon deserted by his officers and 
troops — Public festivities at Paris — Anecdotes of the day — The author 
repairs to Toulouse — The Duke of Wellington appointed ambassador at 
Paris— Napoleon presented by his marshals with the act of the senate — 
Signs the act of abdication — Departs for Elba — Peace concluded with 
France — Reception of the allied sovereigns in London — George the Fourth 
and the Emperor Alexander — Preparations for the European congress — 
Splendid military reviews — Opinion of the Duke of Wellington — Inter- 
views with the Emperor of Russia 229 

CHAP. XXL 

Military opinions, and basis of operations for the campaign of 1815— Sleet- 
ing of the great congress at Vienna — Tidings of Napoleon's escape from 
Elba — Tumult and dismay in France — Military conference and arrange- 
ments for the new campaign — Interesting military memoirs— Opinions 
of Prince Schwartzenberg — Views of Austria — Estimate of relative 
forces— Considerations and military sentiments of the Prince Field-Mar- 
shal, Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces; of the chief of the Prus- 
sian t^tat-major. General Knesebeck; and the military ideas of the Duke 
of Wellington on the approaching campaign in Belgium, sent from Brus- 
sels to Vienna 240 



Xll CONTENTS. 

APPENDIX. 

From Baron Haidenberg, Toplitz, 29th of September, 1813. Acknowledging 
how much the exertions of the Prussians were owing to England's aid 259 

Observations on the Trade between Great Britain and Prussia at the period 
of the Russian treaty with Great Britain in 1813 ib. 

Heads of the Arrangement touching the Armistice and Negotiations. . 261 

Conditions of equipment of the Hanseatic legion and other corps 263 

Copy of a Letter from Lord Castlereagh to His Royal Highness the Prince 
Royal of Sweden, dated London, March 23d, 1813 264 

Convention signed at Trachenberg, 12th of July, 1813, as a basis for the 
Operations of the Campaign 265 

Declaration Autrichienne, Aoiit, 1813 266 

Publication of Central Commission 269 

Evaluation approximative des Armies des Puissances Bellig6rantes. .. ib. 

Etat des Forces des Allies, transmis comme minimum par M. le Chancelier 
Baron de Hardenberg a son Excellence M. le Comte de Metternich. . . 271 

Note from the Chancellor Hardenberg to Lieutenant-General Sir Charles 
Stewart, dated Frankfort, 4th December, 1813 272 

General Blucher's disposition for the attack on the 16th October ib. 

Letter from General De Gniesenau to Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Stew- 
art, which shows the great importance of his having effected the changes 
narrated in the Prince Royal's march, October 15th, 1813 273 

Lord Castlereagh's Letter expressing the Prince Regent's entire approbation 
of Sir Charles Stewart's conduct, both political and military ib. 

The Prince Regent's permission for Sir Charles Stewart to accept and wear 
the Swedish Order of the Sword, conferred on him after the battle of Leip- 
sic, in a letter from the Prince Royal to His Majesty's Government. . 274 

Memoir from General Walmoden, Dannewitz, November, 1813 ib. 

General Gniesenau to Sir Charles Stewart, in which he states his plan for 
an invasion of Holland, October 31st, 1813 277 

General Gniesenau to Sir Charles Stewart, December 13th, 1813 278 

Statement of the entire Force and Condition of the Austrian Army, in the 
year 1814 279 

Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the King of Prussia, 
Stralsund, June 3d, 1813 280 

Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the King of Prussia, 
Stralsund, June 4th, 1813 281 

Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal to His Majesty the Emperor of Rus- 
sia, dated Stralsund, June 10th, 1813 ib. 

Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the Emperor of Rus- 
sia, dated Stralsund, June 10th, 1813 282 

Declaration of the Allied Plenipotentiaries 284 

Capitulation of Paris 285 

Letter to Sir Charles Stewart, sending the Order of the Garter to the Duke 
of Wellington 286 

Conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, April 11th, 1815 ib. 

Return of the Army assembled at Dijon in 1814 Sjisa 



ADDENDA. 



Letter from Prince Metternich to the Author, dated May 17th, 1815 289 

From the same to the same, dated May 18th, 1815 ib. 

Declaration drawn up by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers, and 

promulgated on Napoleon's escape from Elba 290 

Extract of a Letter from the Author, dated March 13th, 1815 291 

Letter from the Author, dated March 16th 294 

Ditto .... March 19th 295 

Ditto .... March 27th 296 

Ditto .... March 29th ib. 

Letter from Sir Henry Hardinge, Marcn 27th 297 



NARRATIVE 

OF THE 

WAR IN GERMAJNJY AND FRANCE, 

IN 1813 AND 1814. 



CHAPTER I. 

Progress of the allied armies in the north of Germany at the commencement 
of 1313 — Active measures of the British government — The Hanoverian 
dominions — Alliance with Russia and Prussia — Various misrepresenta- 
tions— Heligoland— State of affairs at Hamburgh— Position of the allies — 
General Tettenborn — Regency at Hanover — Estimate of the French forces 
— Supplies from England — Brigadier-general Lyon appointed to command 
the Hanoverian and Hanseatic troops — Hanoverian levies — Bernadotte— 
Exertions of General Tettenborn — Capitulation of Thorn — Importance 
of Spandau — Force under Marshal Ney and General Sebastiani — Arrival 
of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia at Dresden — Extensive co- 
operation of Great Britain. 

The successful progress of the allied armies against the 
Emperor of France, in the north of Germany, at the com- 
mencement of the year 1813, induced the British govern- 
ment to decide upon taking active measures in aid of the 
common cause in that quarter. It was therefore deemed ex- 
pedient, not only that the Prussian and Swedish efforts should 
be connected in one combined operation, but that His Majes- 
ty's Hanoverian dominions should be roused into action, and 
a fair opportunity afforded them of displaying that zealous 
attachment to the real interests of Great Britain, for which, 
on former occasions, they had been so eminently conspicuous. 

The most direct method of affording the desired assistance 
was obviously, in the first instance, to furnish military atti- 
rail in arms and stores ; and with these the Swedes, Prus- 
sians, and Hanoverians, were promptly supplied, in great 
abundance and variety. The next step was to place the sev- 
eral levies, for whose use these supplies were intended, under 
effective superintendence. For this service the writer of the 
following pages was selected ; and his instructions were to 
proceed forthwith to the north of Germany, charged, on the 
part of his Sovereign, with all the correspondence relating 
to the Prussian, Swedish, and Hanoverian armies, including 
an auxiliary corps of Russians attached to the forces, which, 
under the Prince Royal of Sweden, were about to commence 
a new series of operations from the southern shores of the 
Baltic. 

B 



14 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

The Prince Regent, acting in the name and on behalf of 
His Majesty, had determined at this period, when the powers 
of Europe were at length rousing themselves, and about to 
shake off the intolerable load of French oppression, to seize 
the first opportunity of renewing his ancient alliance with 
Prussia ; and by accrediting a minister at the court of Ber- 
lin, to manifest his desire that the friendly relations between 
the two powers should be restored. 

Lord Cathcart at this time filled, with great zeal and ability, 
the high and important situation of His Majesty's ambassador 
at the court of St. Petersburgh. To him, therefore, and the 
writer of this memoir the charge was assigned, (in their ca- 
pacity of accredited ministers at the head-quarters of the 
armies of the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia,) of making 
the British government acquainted with all the details of 
military arrangements and movements, including those of 
His Royal Highness the Prince Royal of Sweden, to whom 
Sir Charles Stewart had especial letters of authorization as 
to all matters of a military nature, although the political and 
diplomatic affairs connected with the court of Stockholm were 
conducted by Mr. Thornton, who, as the British minister at 
that court, attended the Prince Royal's head-quarters. 

It is not to the present purpose to enter into any statement 
of diplomatic transactions ; it is enough to say of those which 
preceded the treaty of alliance between Great Britain and 
the courts of Russia and Prussia, that they were brought to 
a conclusion in a manner highly satisfactory to His Royal 
Highness the Prince Regent, whose anxious purpose was 
solely to sustain the common cause, and not to pursue objects 
of separate aggrandizement. It would, indeed, be unfair and 
improper so to characterize the efforts which were made to 
remedy the inconvenience resulting from the intersection of 
different states ; an inconvenience which had been long felt 
and complained of in the Electoral dominions. No time, un- 
doubtedly, could be more proper for procuring a redress of 
this grievance than that, in which England was making ef- 
forts of such magnitude and importance in behalf of the al- 
lies. There could, indeed, be but one opinion as to the im- 
portance of the object and the fitness of the occasion ; and 
the transaction is adverted to for the sake of bearing testi- 
mony against the gross and shameful misrepresentations by 
which it has been sought to impress an opinion, that the great 
object of the grand alliance had been lost sight of, for the 
sake of securing His Royal Higlmess the Prince Regent's 
personal gratification in a point which was supposed to in- 
terest his private feelings. 

I will not assert that these were the most flagrant misre- 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 15 

presentations ever attempted ; for unhappily many such have 
gone abroad, and with but too much success, as will appear 
whenever the diplomatic history of Europe for the last twenty 
years shall be honestly written. My province, however, lies 
beyond the limits of diplomatic discussion. Duty, indeed, 
would forbid the necessary disclosures, even had I the incli- 
nation to unravel these state intricacies. But it better suits 
my taste and habits to confine myself to the single object of 
a military narrative. 

I sailed from Yarmouth on the 13th of April, 1813, in the 
Nymphe frigate. The winds being adverse, it was not until 
the 16th at noon that we made Heligoland. The return of 
the pilot-boat gave me an opportunity of communicating with 
the governor, Colonel Hamilton ; but the news he was able 
to furnish fell very short of the demand suggested by our 
anxiety to be made acquainted with the actual position of 
affairs on the main-land. 

The following day we ran up the Elbe. Off Cuxhaven I 
had an interview with Major Kinsinger, the commandant of 
a detachment which had been sent by Colonel Hamilton from 
Heligoland, to take possession of the batteries, after the town 
had been evacuated by the French. From Major Kinsinger 
I received the most encouraging reports of the success of the 
allies, and of the good disposition of the people in all quar- 
ters. 

The universal cry was for arms ; all ranks were animated 
with one spirit : for while the disasters which the French 
armies had experienced in quick succession emboldened the 
peasantry in planning and executing measures of annoyance, 
the wanton excesses committed by the retreating columns, 
especially in the neighborhood of Bremen, had roused a spirit 
of retaliation which could not be restrained. The actual 
state of affairs in Hamburgh at this moment was both critical 
and complicated. The town was occupied by a force of 2000 
men, under the command of an officer in the Russian service, 
Baron Von Tettenborn, who having been detached from the 
division of Count Wittgenstein, immediately after the Rus- 
sian troops liad established themselves in Berlin, pressed for- 
ward with such ardor and boldness, as to compel General 
Morand to retire from Swedisli Pomerania. Hamburgh was 
thus left open ; Baron Tettenborn having entered it on the 
18th of March, was welcomed by the inhabitants with every 
expression of delight, and proceeded forthwith to restore tlie 
ancient government. 

No event could have been more favorable for the further- 
ance of the operations then in progress. An opening wag 
thus afforded for direct communication between Great Britain 



16 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

and the north of Germany, of which our ministers lost not a 
moment in availing themselves: so that I found a British 
consul already in the full exercise of his functions, and the 
shores of the Elbe beginning to resume an aspect of commer- 
cial bustle and importance. Still it cannot be denied that 
this success of the Russians was the result of a lucky con- 
currence of circumstances, rather than of any well-concerted 
combination. The advantages obtained by the forward move- 
ment of Tettenborn's corps were, however, numerous and 
important ; and though its consequences were eventually 
disastrous, and most unfortunately compromised some of the 
best citizens of Hamburgh, it may perhaps be doubted whether 
the arrangements for opening the campaign could, under any 
other circumstances, have been carried forward with so much 
spirit and success. 

The general position of the allied armies, at the moment 
of my arrival, was as follows. General Blucher's corps, 
about 30,000 men, were at Zwickau, in Saxony; General 
Winzingerode, with 15,000, was on the right of the above, 
between Merseburg and Altenburg, his parties extending to 
Weimar. General Wittgenstein and D'Yorck having formed 
a junction, had crossed the Elbe at Dessau, and were known 
to be moving in the direction of Halle, with a force of not 
less than 40,000, in contemplation of an immediate attack 
on Wittenberg, in which there was a garrison of from 4 to 
5000 French. General Bulow, with a corps of about 10,000 
men, was observing Magdeburg. Such may be regarded as 
the general operations in this quarter at this period of the 
campaign ; but detached from, and in a certain sense inde- 
pendent of these, were the new formations under General 
Uornburg, on the Aller and Weser, that had already distin- 
guished themselves in a very brilliant manner. Add also 
among the latter General Tettenborn, who had pushed for- 
ward towards Celle, in the neighborhood of Bremen, with a 
force of about 4000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, having four 
regiments of Cossacks and two of dragoons. This officer 
proved himself a sanguine and active character, always 
ready for a movement en avant; and being by birth a Ger- 
man, he brought into the cause his full share of that national 
sentiment with which every German bosom now seemed 
animated. 

A combined object was now given to these desultory opera- 
tions, as General Walmoden had arrived for the purpose of 
taking the command of all the new levies on the Lower 
Elbe; General Tettenborn, and the zealous and indefatigable 
General Chernichelf, were placed under his orders : an ar- 
rariement highly favorable to the active system of operations, 



irv' GERMANY AND FRANCE. 17 

as I found that General Walmodeu had already concerted 
with General Tettenborn to press the enemy's left ; and 
calculating upon their force in cavalry, of which the Ft-ench 
had none in this direction, they were sanguine as to the 
result. 

The members of the regency of Hanover, assembled at 
this moment in Hamburgli, with Count Kilmansegge, a noble- 
man of much weight and importance in that country, at their 
head, were employed in re-establishing the civil authorities 
in the different towns as fast as the French left them. If to 
the details thus given, I add, that 7000 Swedes occupied 
Stralsund, Rostock, &c., and that the Prince Royal was daily 
expected with 10,000 more, I shall nearly complete the 
picture, which, with reference to the military objects of the 
allies, the north of Europe exhibited at the moment of my 
arrival. 

On the side of the French, aflairs wore a very different 
aspect. Beauharnois, the viceroy of Italy, had failed in an 
offensive movement from Magdeburg; and the failure seemed 
likely to lead to important results. General Vandamme had 
thrown himself into Bremen with 5 or 6000 men, and pro- 
ceeded to strengthen the fortifications ; but if the Viceroy 
retired from Magdeburg, it seemed improbable that a position 
could be held so far in advance, and that Davoust would 
})ersist in maintaining himself on the Aller, or attempt any 
line of operation beyond that of falling back, so as to insure 
his communications with the great mass of their force, which, 
to the amount of 70 or 80,000, was concentrated in the 
neighborhood of Frankfort and Wurtzburg under Marshal 
Ney. 

The force under Davoust and the Viceroy might be esti- 
mated at 40,000. Concentration was now obviously their 
policy ; for, finding themselves harassed in all directions by 
different bodies of Russian cavalry, their communications, if 
not wholly cut off, were rendered everywhere uncertain. 
Their garrisons also were completely shut up in the several 
fortresses where they had been lefl, and the 'morale even of 
their best troops became afl'ected. Thus while the boldest 
and ablest of the French commanders found full employment 
in concerting measures of defence, and securing their retreat, 
the word along the whole line of the combined armies was 
"forward !" and the most intelligent soldiers did not scruple 
to express a confident expectation that the French would be 
driven across the Rhine before the month of June. 

That England was in no respect wanting in exertion, will 
appear from the statement (Appendix, No. 1.) of arms, am- 
munition, and military stores, ordered for the Russian, Prus- 

B2 



18 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

eian, - and Swedish governments, and actually supplied for 
their use within the incredibly short space of two months. 
Great care was exercised in regulating their distribution, both 
as to their kind and degree ; so that no want should occur 
which had not been provided against. So ably were the 
energies of the government at home, seconded by the officers 
appointed to the several departments of this service, directed, 
that it is not too much to affirm that all the objects proposed 
by this extensive aid were fully accomplished ; and urgent 
as the emergency appeared, and general as the excitement of 
the public mind against the French proved, so that the call 
for arms was little less than universal, that call was never- 
theless so well replied to, that no individual was left without 
a weapon who had the strength or the desire to wield one. 
Brigadier-general Lyon v;as now intrusted with the command 
of the Hanoverian and Hanseatic troops; and received orders 
to place himself at the disposal of the Prince Royal of Swe- 
den, for the purpose of aiding in training the new levies. 
The Brigadier took with him about 460 men of the King's 
German Legion, with a large proportion of officers. The 
business of the storekeeper's department was conducted with 
praiseworthy activity ; and the several agents stationed at 
Stralsund, Colbergen, and the other places to which the 
consignments were addressed, showed a laudable zeal and 
ability. 

With regard to myself, my attention was called, in the 
first instance, to the formation of the Hanoverian levies. It 
had been intended to have fixed one general point o^rassem- 
blement ; but it was foreseen that it would be attended with 
much inconvenience and expense, thus to bring nearly all the 
population of the country to one quarter. As the neighbor- 
hood was now comparatively clear of the enemy, it appeared 
much more expeditious and advantageous to raise the corps 
in different places, and to conduct the business of training 
and arming on the spot where the recruits \\'ere obtained. 
My suggestions to this effect were immediately acted upon. 
Another object, but of niuch more commanding interest, was 
the movement of the Swedish corps, that already occupied 
Stralsund in considerable force, to a forward position ; and 
this, it was conjectured, would be increased by the arrival of 
the Prince Royal to about 11,000 f^trong. 

Of the negotiations and discussions which liad led to this 
decisive step of His Royal Highness, I shall say nothing ; 
but the presence of such a body of troops, under a com- 
mander so celebrated as Bernadotte, could not fail to have a 
powerful influence on the events of the campaign and the 
state of the country, more especially as I am bound here to 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 19 

remark, that throughout the Hanoverian dominions he had 
contrived to render himself popular, and enjoyed a high 
reputation. 

It next became my duty to ascertain, as speedily and ac- 
curately as possible, the military state of affairs at the Prince 
Royal's head-quarters, after his landing on the continent. I 
determined, therefore, to detach Lieutenant-colonel Cooke 
for this purpose : an officer of much zeal and talent, who, I 
had no doubt, would be able to recommend himself both to 
the Prince Royal and Mr. Thornton; or if Mr. Thornton 
should not have arrived from Stockholm, to make his own 
way through the difficulties with which such a mission was 
surrounded. 

Notwithstanding all my anxiety to get forward to Berlin, 
the first and main object of my attention, I was obliged to 
remain a day or two in Hamburgh. The time, however, was 
not unemployed ; for, at the pressing solicitations of General 
Tettenborn (acquiesced in by Count Kilmansegge on the part 
of the Hanoverian regency), I was induced to use my influence 
with General Lyon to augment the issue of arms to General 
Tettenborn from 3 to 5000 stand. It appeared that the Gen- 
eral could make use of these 5000 forthwith ; and that the 
Hanoverian levies, for whose use they had been originally 
destined, were at that moment by no means in such a state of 
forwardness as to require them. I was happy to find that this 
arrangement could be acceded to on the part of General Lyon, 
without prejudice to the service especially intrusted to him. 
I had thus an opportunity of obliging General Tettenborn, 
whose active exertions had afforded the greatest advantage 
to the common cause ; it being almost incredible how much 
he had done, and what a force he had brought under arms by 
a month's exertion. 

My journey to Berlin was performed Avith as much haste 
as possible; and prevented all observation on the state of the 
country, or the disposition of the people. I arrived there on 
the 22d of April, late at night ; and found a strong expecta- 
tion prevailing that the king of Prussia would join the Em- 
peror of Russia in a day or two at Dresden, having set out 
from Breslau for that purpose. I determined, in consequence, 
to continue my route immediately to head-quarters. An 
official communication had just been received, announcing 
the capitulation of Thorn to General Langcron on the 16th. 
The garrison, partly French and partly German, consisted 
of about 3000 men : the latter were allowed their parole, the 
former were made prisoners of war. It was farther said, that 
a very fine park of artillery had fallen into the hands of the 
allies. But an object of more immediate and pressing interest 



20 XARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

was Spandau : its locality made it of immense consequence 
to Berlin, and its fall was anticipated with great anxiety. 
The g-arrison had made proposals to surrender, and were at 
this time waiting for General Wittgenstein's answer ; but if 
the terms were rejected, an immediate assault was to be 
made on the place by the troops surrounding it, aided by those 
which could be collected in Berlin. 

The subject for General Wittgenstein's consideration was 
not, however, entirely of a military nature. An opinion pre- 
vailed, founded on the statements of the French themselves, 
that an enormous quantity of plunder was lodged in the place, 
belonging to the Viceroy of Italy. If the garrison w-ere al- 
lowed to go out with their baggage, all this would be retain- 
ed and secured ; whereas the General was very desirous that 
his Russians should get the booty. Under these circum- 
stances, there was little room to expect that any terms pro- 
posed would be assented to ; and the assault was daily looked 
for with no small interest by the inhabitants of Berlin, who 
would gladly have been relieved, at any cost, from so danger- 
ous and troublesome a neighbor. 

These circumstances afforded a good opportunity of con- 
vincing the allies, practically, what were tlie real principles 
and feelings with which Great Britain had entered on the 
contest. Intimations were not wanting, that the only rapid 
and certain mode of -effecting an object of the greatest im- 
portance to the safety of Prussia, viz. the recovery of her 
fortresses, was by money; and it certainly was reported from 
different sources, that some of the commanders would not be 
proof against large offers. In reply, it was at once declared 
that such measures on the part of Great Britain would be 
wholly out of the question ; that if the allied armies could 
drive the French over the Rhine, the fortresses would not 
long hold out; and that we had now but one object to look 
to, which was to aimihilate Buonaparte by force of arms, and 
not by treachery or gold. 

My nearer approach to the scene of operations, served to 
convince me that tiieir actual aspect was somewhat different 
from that which the sanguine anticipations of my Hamburgh 
friends had ventured to predict. At Settin, the allies had met 
with a slight reverse ; and it was believed that the French 
armies were advancing, as an intercepted dispatch from the 
Viceroy to Marshal Ney disclosed a plan of attacking Gene- 
ral Blucher's corps, which was advanced to Altenburg, where 
it was unsupported. General D'Yorck had, in consequence, 
made preparations to meet Beanharnois; and General Blu- 
cher was ready to encounter Marshal Ney, who was known 
to be at Eisenach ; while General Sebastiani's corps, chiefly 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 21 

cavalry, was at Coburg. The whole force under these two 
Generals was not less than 50,000 men ; and it was evident 
that their main army was debouching by the passes and de- 
files of the Thuringian forest. This forward movement could 
scarcely fail to lead to important results; and it became 
probable that within a few days the plains of Jena and Auer- 
stadt would become the scene of a tremendous conflict ; and 
if the allies were victorious, that the French must pass the 
Rhine. 

My arrival at Dresden was very happily timed. The two 
Sovereigns had entered the town on the preceding day : an 
event most propitious, inasmuch as it enabled me to carry 
into immediate effect the first and most important object of 
my instructions. His Majesty the King of Prussia having 
been with the Emperor the greatest part of the morning, as 
well as having attended a long service at church, it was not 
possible that he could grant me an audience on that day ; 
but Baron Hardenberg, the chancellor and first minister of 
state, gave me an appointment, and entered into a general 
communication in every respect satisfactory. 

It was at the moment of this Re-union at Dresden that the 
weight and importance of the grand military combination 
became developed. The career of Russian successes had 
enabled the army to march in the most rigorous winter from 
the banks of the Moskwa to the shores of the German Ocean. 
The barriers of the Oder had been passed, and the Rhine 
was now beginning to be considered as the probable limit of 
its victorious operations. Prussia was now incorporated in the 
consolidation of power against France. The King, whose 
courage and prudence had of late shone forth in a manner 
worthy of the descendant of the great Frederick, had been 
rescued by the affectionate loyalty of his people and army 
from the thraldom prepared for him ; and he now came for- 
ward from his comparative retirement at Breslau, to place 
himself at the head of the greatest national efforts which our 
and it may perhaps be said any, age had witnessed. 

Of the share which England was prepared to take in this 
great confederation, some faint idea has already been given ; 
and the immediate effect of her wise and liberal policy was 
found to be, that British commerce and British enterprise had 
now a channel again opened to them in the north of Europe. 
Our efforts were not alone limited to the supply of military 
stores, as before enumerated. The circumstances of the allies 
were such, as made it a case of absolute necessity that they 
should look to England for what has been truly called " the 
sinews of war ;" and it may not be amiss to state, what was 
then well known, that in addition to 500,000/., which was the 



22 NAREATIVE OF THE WAR 

charge of the Russian fleet, two millions sterling were des- 
tined to sustain the military operations of the Prince Royal 
of Sweden in the north of Germany, and two millions more 
were given as a direct aid to Russia and Prussia. In return 
for efforts of such magnitude, it was agreed, on the other 
hand, by the allies, that Russia was to employ (exclusive of 
garrisons) 200,000 men, and Prussia not less than 100,000, in 
active operations against the enemy. 



CHAPTER II. 

Advance of the enemy — State of their troops— Exertions of tlie King of 
Prussia — Surrender of Spandau— Edict of the Prussian government — Ta- 
riff of duties — Measures to check the advance of the French — Head-quar- 
ters of the allied Sovereigns — Position of the opposing armies at the end 
of April — Policy of Napoleon — The allies propose to pass the Elbe — Plan 
of operations — The French advance to Dresden — The allied forces cross 
the Elster — The Emperor Alexander — Plan of attack — Successes of the 
allies — Obstinate engagement — Retreat of the allies — Precautionary mea- 
sures — Results of the battle— Subsequent proceedings — Affairs on the 
Lower Elbe. 

To resume the detail of occurrences on my arrival at 
Dresden, it must be remembered that the Foreign-office in 
England at this period attached intelligent officers to the dif- 
ferent head-quarters and corps of the allied armies ; amongst 
them, Sir Robert Wilson was throughout the war conspicu- 
ous for his ability and gallantry. At the period I am now 
alluding to, when he was with the advance at Chemnitz, an 
officer, dispatched by him, arrived at Dresden on the 27th ; 
and announced that the enemy was moving on our left, and 
that their advance had reached Jena. In consequence of their 
approach, the allied army was concentrating itself on the 
Saale, between Merseburg on the right, and Altenburg on 
the left. Buonaparte was supposed to have reached Erfurth ; 
and it was in expectation that he would forthwith risk a bat- 
tle in the plains, that the allies now effected this concentra- 
tion. Marshal Kutusoff was unfortunately taken ill at this 
moment; but there were many able officers to supply his 
place, so that the general interests of the army were likely 
to be fully maintained. General Count Wittgenstein had 
removed his quarters from Dessau, while General Milorado- 
vitch's corps was thrown forward to Plauen to strengthen the 
left. 

Every moment gave indication of a serious conflict, but 
there was no feeling of apprehension as to the result : for 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 23 

though the amount of French force assembled on this side of 
the Rhine was not estimated at less than 160 or 170,000 men, 
numerically much superior to that of the allies, yet in their 
morale and composition they were so decidedly inferior, that 
a French general-officer had been heard to say, when looking 
at the new troops, " What shall we do with these sucking- 
pig-s !'" Their cavalry, too, was in every respect deficient. 
Still it was impossible not to perceive that the Emperor of 
the French did not play for so large a stake as the allies in 
risking a battle. If beaten, the Thuringian mountains were 
in his rear, and would enable him to escape without being 
annihilated by the superior cavalry opposed to him ; while 
the allies, if worsted, would find great difficulty in drawing 
off, having only one good bridge across the Elbe, at Dresden ; 
while the commanding point of Magdeburg was in the hands 
of the enemy. These considerations, however, did not check 
the forward movements of the allied troops ; and on the 25th, 
a corps of 15,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry defiled through 
Dresden in very fine order. 

On the 27th I was admitted to an audience with His Ma- 
jesty the King of Prussia, and had the honor of presenting 
my credentials. It was not possible to be received in a more 
gracious or satisfactory manner. In adverting to the position 
of military affairs, His Majesty dwelt much on the extraordi- 
nary efforts the Prussians had made : observing, however, 
that the effective force en campagne, at the moment, fell far 
short of the number to which his army would be ultimately 
brought by levies, now actually raised, though not yet entirely 
armed or fully disciplined. His Majesty concluded a very 
gracious conversation, by renewing the assurances of his de- 
voted regard and high consideration for His Royal Highness 
the Prince Regent. The morning of the 27tii brought us 
likewise the agreeable news of the surrender of Spandau. 
By the terms of the capitulation, the garrison was allowed 
to return to France, under an engagement not to serve 
against the allies for the space of six months. The artillery 
and every thing else contained in the fortress were to be 
given up. 

A point of considerable moment to the commercial interests 
of Great Britain came at this time under discussion. Amongst 
the immediate advantages to which we had a right to look as 
a requital for our great exertions, the destruction of Buona- 
parte's favorite continental system held the foremost place. 
An edict of the Prussian government, bearing date the 20th 
March, had formally declared the abolition of all those re- 
straints under which the commerce of the north of Europe 
had so long suffered ; but it was hardly to be expected that 



24 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

the remedies applied could be such as to prove at once equal 
to removing' the evils. Representations v^^ere made to me 
that a tariff of duties had been issued at all the Prussian ports 
of the Baltic, so oppressive in its provisions as to destroy 
British trade altogether, and especially to put an end to any 
exportation of corn from the Prussian territories. The chan- 
cellor. Baron Hardenberg, paid immediate attention to my 
remonstrance on this subject ; and I had the satisfaction of 
receiving his assurance, that the regulations of the tariff 
should be suspended, provisionally, until an arrangement con- 
jointly with Russia could be agreed upon. (See Appendix, 
No. 2.) 

The indications of offensive operations on the part of the 
enemy were not confined to the main army in front of Dres- 
den. General Sebastiani, with about 8 or 10,000 infantry, 
3000 cavalry, and a proportion of artillery, moved to the 
Elbe ; while Marshal Davoust advanced from Bremen, in the 
direction of Rotenbourg, on Harburg. These changes of posi- 
tion made it necessary for the detachment, dispersed through- 
out the Electorate of Hanover, to cross the Elbe : which was 
effected at Boitzenburg, Altenburg, and Harburg, without 
the smallest loss. Measures were taken to secure the navi- 
gation of the Elbe, and artillery and infantry were posted at 
all the points most capable of defence; so that a strong opinion 
was entertained at the Russian head-quarters that the enemy 
would find it difficult to press his advance, and impossible to 
maintain himself permanently at the mouth of the Elbe. 

The allied Sovereigns removed their head-quarters to 
Grimma on the 19th. Lord Cathcart on that day informed 
me it was his desire, as he was under the necessity of fol- 
lowing His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, that I should re- 
main at Dresden ; for the purpose of commencing with Baron 
Hardenberg, the Prussian chancellor of state, and the Rus- 
sian plenipotentiaries, the previous discussion of the impor- 
tant objects of the subsidiary convention with Great Britain. 
I was thus precluded from taking a personal share in the ac- 
tive operations of the following days. 

The details of these important occurrences reached me 
through the reports of those who directed or witnessed the 
movements. In giving them, however, I may observe, that 
my position afforded me some facilities for procuring as ex- 
tensive information as I should have enjoyed had I been my- 
self present, or stationed in any particular part of the field. 

A short recapitulation of the leading points in the positions 
of the opposing armies, at the close of the month of April, 
will make it more easy to give a clear account of the move- 
ments which followed ; and will impress more distinctly on 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 25 

the minds of my readers the progress of the combined ope- 
rations. The general position of the allied army was be- 
tween the Elbe and the Saale : the grand head-quarters being 
at Altenburg. Count Wittgenstein, with the Russians, had 
his head-quarters at Zwickau. Kutusoff's corps was some 
miles in front of Dresden ; General Miloradovitch, forming 
his advance, at Chemnitz. Next, as regards the Prussians, 
General Blucher's attention was directed to the mountains 
which bound Saxony on the side of the Thuringian forest, 
with his head-quarters at Altenburg. General D'Yorck was 
farther to the right, towards Dessau ; and still farther north- 
ward. General Bulow was observing Magdeburg. On the 
other side, the French army occupied the line of the Saale, 
from Saalfeld to the Elbe. The Emperor was at Naumburg 
on the 29th, and directed the operations in person. He was 
known to have brought all his available means to bear on this 
point of advance. The corps under the Viceroy of Italy 
r which had retired from Berlin); Marshal Davoust, who had 
abandoned Hamburgh and the Lower Elbe ; General Bertrand 
with reinforcements from Italy : and detachments of cavalry 
which had been ordered from Spain, and newly-mounted : all 
combined to swell the total of the French force, and joined 
themselves to the main army, which the Emperor's astonish- 
ing activity had reorganized, and which had accompanied 
him on his return to the scene of fresh operations. The esti- 
mate of the total amount of the several corps, which placed 
the French force somewhere about 150,000 men, was cer- 
tainly not exaggerated ; though, to say the truth, it is very 
difficult to come at any precise grounds of calculation. 

Napoleon's policy, at the moment, was to strengthen the 
impression which his sudden combinations were so well fitted 
to produce ; and with this object he spared no effort to am- 
plify his apparent resources. Those writers who have since 
recorded his exploits have taken an opposite line : they have 
thought to aggrandize their hero, by representing his means 
of offence considerably below my impression of their amount. 
Making due allowances, however, for opposite representa- 
tions, I think we may take the number I have given as a fair 
medium ; and say that, including the reserves which were a 
few marches in the rear under Marshal Oudinot, the Empe- 
ror of France commenced his operations with a force of 
150,000 men actually in the field. The reputed numerical 
strength of the allies would exceed this number ; but in that 
estimate were included the raw levies, but newly starting into 
military action ; and even from the troops which were in a 
comparative state of discipline, large deductions ought to be 
made for the corps left in observation of the several for- 

C 



26 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

tresses. The best opinions coincide in estimating the total 
force advanced beyond the Elbe at about 85,000 men : of 
which 55,000 were Prussians, and 30,000 composed the Rus- 
sian grand army. 

A strong- opinion prevailed at head-quarters, that the move- 
ment now about to take place of passing the Elbe by the al- 
lies was both critical and false: critical, as a defeat would 
involve circumstances of great disadvantage ; false, as in the 
case of a victory the inclosed country of defiles and gorges 
bordering the Saale, through which the enemy must retire, 
would prevent our superior cavalry from reaping the fruits 
of success. The more prudent plan of operations, in the 
opinion of many, would have been that of a defensive camp 
(as pointed out in the King of Prussia's memoirs) established 
between Wittenberg and Torgau. To force the enemy to 
pass the river, if he would fight with you, and thus compel 
him to a battle in the plains stretching from Wittenberg to 
the sea, would have been the direct advantage of this plan of 
operations ; besides acting on a temporary defensive one of 
this nature, would have given the Russian reinforcements, 
which were known to be within fifteen days' march, time to 
arrive; and thus the means for future offensive movements 
would be much increased. 

Such wore some of the views maintained by those whose 
aversion to the plan of operations resolved upon was a mat- 
ter of notoriety. Amongst these were so many names of 
eminence, that it is impossible not to suppose that political 
rather than military considerations had been allowed to influ- 
ence the decision which had been taken. The position of 
Saxony directly, and Austria remotely, must have influenced 
the councils of the allied Sovereigns : there were elements 
in the combination which lay too deep for mere military rea- 
soning, founded on a superficial or partial view of affairs. 

No reasoning, however, could have anticipated that any 
considerations would have induced the allies, whose chief 
superiority was in cavalry, to have withdrawn from the plain 
where that cavalry would have been available, to contend in 
villages flanked by masked-batteries, and strengthened by 
intrenchments and every aid of art. Both sides, however, 
were resolved on assuming the offensive ; and, while the 
French Emperor made his advance on the road from Erfurth 
to Dresden by way of Leipsic, the allies were making a par- 
allel movement on the direct road from Dresden to Jena. 
The French army crossed the Saale on the last day of April, 
possessing itself of Weissenfels and Naumburg; and on the 
same day the Prussian army was collected at Borne. On the 
1st of May it was at Kothen ; Count Wittgenstein, with the 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE- 27 

Russians, at Zwickau ; General Winzingerode observed and 
kept the enemy in check on the Flossgraben.* 

In the night of the 1st of May, the allied armies en masse 
crossed the Elster at Pegau. General Miloradovitch had 
undertaken to watch the enemy on the road from Chemnitz 
while this movement was effected on the right, as there was 
reason to apprehend he might push forward a strong corps in 
this direction, and thus get into the rear of the allied army. 
The remaining part of the Russian grand army had advanced 
from Dresden, by way of Rochlitz, to the Elster, and taken 
up a position to the rear of Wittgenstein ; and Blucher, with 
his Prussians, on the morning of the 2d of May, moved in 
the same direction to act as reserves. The allied Sovereigns, 
who had changed their head-quarters on the 29th from Dres- 
den to Grinima, were with the reserves. Their own con- 
spicuous courage and spirit of enterprise would, under any 
circumstances, have led them forward ; but at this moment 
the Emperor of Russia's presence in the field was a matter 
of no ordinary importance, as it served to allay certain feel- 
ings of annoyance which appeared amongst some of the older 
officers of the Russian army, in consequence of the nomina- 
tion of Count Wittgenstein as commander-in-chief upon the 
death of Kutusoff. 

It would be idle and improper in me to enter at large into 
the military feelings of a great power, who took at this period 
the most prominent and effective part in the war. In making 
the above allusion, I have only recorded it to show that so 
early as the period in question, it w^as necessary for the 
Emperor Alexander to use all that firmness, intrepidity, and 
tact, which pre-eminently distinguished the latter period of 
his brilliant career. 

The imperfect sketch above traced may be sufficient to 
give a correct idea of the relative position of the hostile ar- 
mies on the morning of the 2d of May. It will appear, that 
the leading divisions had passed each other in opposite an 
nearly parallel directions. Buonaparte, in his eagerness t 
make a dash on Leipsic, had extended his columns along 
the line of march ; so that while his advance was close upon 
Lutzen, his rear had scarcely cleared the deep valley of 
Griimsbach, on the road from Weissenfels to Leipsic. 

The united armies of the allies, which, as I have stated 
above, had crossed the Elster the preceding night at Pegau, 
were thus manoeuvring on his right flank ; and may be said 

* This operation was rendered memorable by the death of the Duke of 
Istria (Marshal Bessieres), who was killed on the Ist by a cannon-shot, in 
a smart conflict in advance of Weissenfels, near Posen. 



28 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

to have had the choice of time, place, and manner of conduct- 
ing the attack. The plan of it was nearly as follows : the 
enemy, it was perceived, occupied in force the villages of 
Gross Gorschen, Klein Gorschen, Rahno, and Kaya, which 
lie near each other, somewhat in the form of an irregular 
square, in the plain between Lutzen and Pegau. The ad- 
vance of the allies was intended for the purpose of driving 
the enemy from these villages, and bringing the brunt of the 
attack on the right of the enemy's position, which appeared 
to be parallel to the main road from Weissenfels, If the 
endeavor to turn his right wing should prove successful, the 
cavalry, it was expected, would have an opportunity of act- 
ing with advantage ; and the result would have been deci- 
sive, inasmuch as the line of communication with the rear 
would have been cut through. The plain is traversed by the 
deep channel of a rivulet, called the Flossgraben, which was 
crossed by the whole combined army in small compact 
columns ; and it served as a support to the right after these 
columns had deployed. 

It was now noon, and some of the Prussian troops had 
been for thirty-six hours on the march ; a halt was therefore 
ordered behind the heights, about a mile and a half from 
Gross Gorschen. These heights afforded a view of the 
enemy's columns in full march towards Leipsic, by the way 
of Lutzen. The appearance of our battalions disconcerted 
this design ; and their foremost troops, hastily recalled, could 
be observed retracing their steps, and drawing towards the 
villages in their centre, against which the main attack was 
now to be directed. The first line of the assailants was 
formed by the Prussians under General Blucher ; the second 
by the corps of Russians, which had been under the imme- 
diate command of Wittgenstein ; the Russian guard and 
grenadiers were in reserve, together with the cavalry of 
both armies. After an iiours rest the attack upon the vil- 
lages was begun ; and after a desperate resistance, Rahno and 
Klein Gorschen (whicli lie about a cannon-shot to the right 
and left of Gross Gorschen) were carried by two brigades of 
Russian infantry under General Ziethen. 

For several hours this success was maintained ; and our 
columns pushed forward, driving the enemy before them be- 
yond Kaya, which was in flames, and left unoccupied by both 
parties. It was now about six o'clock, p. m., and the allies 
had gained, by liard fighting, more than a mile of ground. 
The village of Staarniedn], on the enemy's right wing, was 
evacuated ; but the want of sufiicient force prevented the 
allies from occupying it, although the second line had been 
brought into action. It was obvious Napoleon considered that 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 29 

the fate of the battle would be decided by the possession of 
the five villages, and the obstinacy of the defence proved 
the importance he attached to them. By this protracted 
struggle the issue was in fact determined, as it afforded time 
to bring up General Bertrand's corps in support of the right 
of the French line ; while on the left, the Viceroy of Italy, 
who had brought back his troops almost from the very gates 
of Leipsic, was in sufficient force to baffle an effort made by 
Prince Eugene of Wirtemburg, with a corps of Prussian 
infantry, to turn the enemy's position by its left flank. This 
movement failed altogether : Prince Eugene, instead of out- 
flanking the enemy, was himself outflanked, and kept his 
place in the line only by an exertion of the greatest bravery. 

This was the state of things when the day closed : doubt- 
ful and hard-earned success in the centre was counterbalanced 
by the threatening aspect of both wings of the enemy's army, 
which was steadily advancing; \vhile no adequate force could 
be brought forward to resist them, formidable as they were 
both from numbers and from the comparative freshness of 
their troops: it thus became necessary to give up the point to 
which the attack of the morning had been directed. 

Before the resolution was taken to draw off the troops, a 
very gallant effort was made to snatch from the enemy the 
fruits of his success. As soon as the darkness of the night 
afforded a cover to the attempt, the whole force of cavalry, 
which had scarcely been engaged at all during the day, was 
ordered forward witli the hope of effecting a surprise, and 
driving the enemy from his ground at the moment he thought 
himself secure in its occupation. The attempt did not suc- 
ceed ; in the first instance, the advanced posts of the enemy's 
line were driven in without difriculty ; but the dense masses 
of infantry which were next to be encountered, and the con- 
fusion caused by a deep ravine in which several squadrons 
found themselves entangled, occasioned the failure of the 
plan. The assailants were soon dispersed in all directions; 
and the allies were not only unsuccessful in their immediate 
object, but lost the services of their cavalry at the critical 
moment when it became necessary to withdraw their columns, 
in the very front of a daring and successful enemy. The 
retreat was effected early in the morning of the 3d upon 
Borne and Altenburg. 

During these important events, from the 29th of April to 
the 2d of May, I had continued, most reluctantly on my 
part, at Dresden, in the preliminary diplomatic negotiations 
before detailed. I had made vain efforts to get away on the 
Ist; but it was not till the eveninorof the 2d that my wishes 

C2 



30 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

were so far accomplished as to enable me to set out for the 
Prussian head-quarters, which it was said were at Borne. 

I had the mortification to find, on my arrival the morning 
of the 3d, that the battle had been fought. I was met on my 
road by all the equipages and attirail of the army proceeding 
to the rear. Much confusion was observable. The roads were 
choked up with the immense train of carriages and baggage 
of every description. Precautionary measures were imme- 
diately adopted to protect the allied army from being hurried 
across the Elbe. Of the ten thousand remarks and observations 
to which such a battle gave occasion, amongst those who 
had been personally engaged in it, I shall mention only that 
the best opinions were agreed in considering that the French 
had, in a certain degree, been unprepared for the attack ; 
and were indebted tor the result to the steadiness with 
which the villages in the centre were maintained, and time 
thus afforded for calling in the force from the extremities of 
the line. 

The allies certainly had an advantage throughout the day; 
but the appearance of the Viceroy on the right at the close 
of the evening, when there v/ere no more reinforcements to 
bring up, changed the face of things. Night came on before 
any advantage was reaped, and the allies remained on the 
field of battle. It was observed, too, and the fact was of im- 
portance, that tlie greater part of the enemy's corps actually 
engaged were German troops, Westphalian and Bavarian, 
Some of the more sanguine calculators indulged an expecta- 
tion, that these would lay down their arms; but all accounts 
agreed that they fought with most desperate bravery. The 
question of comparative force was next the subject of 
much debate. The most probable conclusion at which I could 
arrive was, that Buonaparte had brought up about 110,000 
men ; the Viceroy 30,000, with 2500 cavalry and 1300 ar- 
tillery ; making about 140,000 men : this agrees nearly with 
the estimate given before. The French infantry was described 
as good, and the artillery well served ; but they had no flying 
artillery, and only little cavalr3^ 

With respect to the allied troops engaged, the corps of 
Wittgenstein, D'Yorck, Bluchor, and Winzingerode, would 
amount to near 60,000, including 20,000 cavalry : to these 
we must add, 9000 under Bulovv, 10,000 with IMiloradovitch, 
and General Massenbourg's division of about 25,000: making 
something more than 80,000 men disposable in the field. 1 
had, however, reason to believe, that not more than 20,000 
Russians and 50,000 Prussians, if so many, were engaged. 
The loss of the allies in killed and wounded did not fall short 
of 10,000 men, amongst whom were some names of note. 



IN GERxMANY AND FRANCE. 31 

Prince Leopold of Hesse Honlbourg was unfortunately killed : 
the Prince of Mecklenburg Strelitz, and the deservedly cele- 
brated Prussian General Scharnhorst, (whose services in 
organizing the landwehr had been so conspicuous), were 
amongst the wounded. The Prince died the next day at 
Pegau. General Scharnhorst lingered till the 28th of June : 
his loss was universally regretted ; and his country has since 
done homage to his merits, by the erection of a public monu- 
ment. General Blucher himself received a slight w^ound. 
Both the allied Sovereigns displayed the greatest courage. 
Not a single piece of artillery was lost, and but few prisoners 
were taken. Several of the enemy's guns and tumbrils, with 
about 6 or 800 prisoners, were carried off as the trophies of 
this daj^ 

That the actual superiority during- the battle had been on 
the side of the allies, may be inferred from the fact that the 
villages from which their columns were withdrawn, on the 
morning of the 3J, were not occupied by the enemy till late 
in the day. I returned to Dresden on the 5th : our opera- 
tions for retreat were conducted without haste. The allies 
marched on the 4th from Borne and Altenburg to Rochlitz 
and Colditz ; on the 5th to Bobeln and Nossen ; on the 6th 
to Meissen and Willsdorf. The rear-guard, under Milora- 
dovitch, was engaged on the 5t]i at Teffersdorf; on the 6th 
at Ertzdorf: and General Blucher had a very smart affair at 
Colditz, in fliiling back upon Meissen. Count Wittgenstein's 
head-quarters were established in Dresden on the 5th ; and 
the train of the utlirail continued passing without intermission. 
Some idea may be formed of the number, when it is stated 
that on one road 13,000 wagons passed in succession. It 
became now very evident that the line of the Elbe was to be 
abandoned. But before we enter into an account of the 
events which followed this resolution, it v/ill be necessary to 
cast a glance at the state of affairs on the Lower Elbe, and 
to trace the immediate effect of the battle of the 2d upon 
the operations in that quarter. 

We left General Sebastiani in rnovenient from his position 
on the Aller, and Atarshal Davoust advancing from Bremen. 
The precautionary measures, wliich \vere there rendered 
necessary to keep the navigation of the river unmolested, 
proved unavailing. Marshal Davoust, with 10,000 infantry, 
including the division of Vandamme, possessed himself of 
Ijuneburg, Harburg, and Stade; and established his posts at 
intermediate points along the left bank of the Elbe. A corps 
also, in number about 2500, was pushed forward to Cuxhaven ; 
which they entered, though not without considerable loss 
from the fire of some English gun-boats which opened upon 



32 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

their column in its advance. An attack on the island of 
Wilhelmsburg was, in the first instance, unsuccessful ; but it 
was renewed the next day with better fortune, and Hamburgh 
was in consequence exposed to the danger of bombardment. 



CHAPTER m. 

Force under Buonaparte — Numerical strength of the allies— Composition of 
the French army— State of the Uusdians— Character of the Cossacks — 
Grenailjcrs of the guard — Unnecessary a^irai/— Animation of the Prus- 
sian army — 'J'he Poles — Line of conduct pirsued by the allies— Review of 
operations— The allied army crostiRH the Elbi;— Attempts of the enemy — 
Buonaparte enters Dresden— Concentration of the allied forces — Affair at 
Weissig— The King of Saxony declares in favor of the French— The con- 
temJing armies in presence of each other — Force of the enemy — Gallant 
action of General Bniclay Da Tolly — Hiiccesses of the allies. 

The allies, ha vino- considered it expedient, after the battle 
of Lutzen, to repass tjie Elbe, it may not be irrelevant to 
discuss a little the plan of operations then thought best to be 
pursued. 

By the most authentic accounts, it appeared that Buona- 
parte's army comprised a ibrce of 110,000 men, including 10 
to 15,000 Bavarian contingents; the Viceroy's corps, com- 
posed of four division^!, amounted to 41,000; Ney's corps, to 
30,000 ; Davoust, Sebastiani, and Van(lan)me, to 24,000 ; the 
garrison of Magdeburg and Wittenberg, to 12,000: making 
in the whole a disposable ollensive force of nearly 200,000 
men; allowing out of the gross miml)er, garrisons for the 
fortresses. 

In addition to tlie above may be enumerated, the Saxon 
army at Torgau of 13,000 men. With so powerful a force, 
although its composition iniglit be very inefficient, yet if 
aided by the advantages of his strong fortresses on the Elbe, 
Oder, and Vistulii, there was litHe doubt of ]>iiona,parte's at- 
tempting to relrieve by offensive un)V(Miieiits his late dis- 
asters. 

To calculate next tiie nmnerical force of the allies, and 
their means of carrying on the war, or making resistance 
between the Eli)e and the Odor, becomes important. From 
the best information 1 could obtain, Wittgenstein's force, com- 
posed of Russians and Prussians now concentrated, amounted 
to little more than 00,000 men. tliongh increased to 80,000 
by tiio arrival of Barchiy do Tolly \silli his corps (l\irinef ; 
Bulow's corps, stated at 18,000, might have been raised by 
the militia, landwehr, and Count Woronzotf's division, to 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 33 

40,000 : to which may also be added, the armaments on the 
Lower Elbe, about 15,000 ; but then their composition could 
not be reckoned upon, or accurately stated. 

Of any means of increasing this force by that which could 
be derived from the blockades of the garrisons, there appeared 
no prospect, as in general the garrisons of the enemy in the 
fortresses were nearly double the blockading force. The re- 
inforcements arriving from the interior of Russia were highly 
estimated : Labanow's at 40,000 ; Tolstoy's at more than that 
amount, besides other corps. 

Having considered the general numerical forces of tlie con- 
tending armies, it may be right to make a few remarks on 
their composition and state of efficiency. The French army 
was chiefly formed of young troops, but possessed experienced 
and excellent officers. They had little cavalry ; but, to all 
appearance, an imposing and well-served artillery. Their 
old soldiers were distributed into 20,000 guards with Buona- 
parte, 10,000 with the Viceroy, and the same number between 
Ney and Davoust. In addition to the celerity of movement 
which always distinguishes a French army, their possession 
of so many strong places, both on the Elbe and the Oder, 
gave them a peculiar facility and security of operations; 
while the allies were reduced to a state of fluctuating uncer- 
tainty and difficulty with respect to their communications, in 
whatever direction their movements might be carried on. 

It was impossible not to observe that the state of the Rus- 
sian army was, at this period, somewhat on the decline, from 
the incredible fatigues and liardships it had gone through 
during two campaigns. The battalions were so weak, that 
three or four scarcely formed a regiment, and seldom ex- 
ceeded 250 or 300 men. The cavalry was fine and com- 
manding. Tlie horses, subsisting in a country abounding with 
forage, were in good condition : yet, in a retreat of some ex- 
tent, no advantage was taken of this superiority over the 
enemy; nor did it seem politic so to do, as the plains were 
avoided, and the grand army (excepting indeed Bulow's corps, 
which was then in a situation likely to be obliged to seek its 
safety in retreat on the shores of the Baltic), buried in the 
mountains and defiles that separate Saxony from Bohemia. 
A considerable portion of the Russian cavalry was composed 
of the Cossacks. 

It would be unbecoming in me to speak disparagingly of a 
description of troops which, on many occasions, signalized 
themselves greatly, especially when well commanded : nor is 
it my opinion that they are an inefficient body, when applied in 
a particular manner, on certain occasions ; for instance, in fol- 
lowuig up, harassing, and living upon the flanks and rear of a 



34 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

retiring army. From the observations I have made of these 
troops (which may be nearly assimilated to the Guerillas in 
Spain), I conceive that they are not formidable when a bold 
enemy advances; and being no longer buoyed up by their 
spoliations and hopes of plunder, they become careless and 
indifferent in their exertions. Having- little discipline, they 
spread much confusion and disorder along the line of march ; 
roaming in pelotons everywhere without control ; and lastly, 
being dispersed as bat-men and orderlies with every officer 
throughout the army. I should suppose it quite impossible 
to ascertain at any time, or with any accuracy, their effective 
amount. 

The regular heavy cavalry are undoubtedly very fine; the 
men gigantic ; horses good ; equipments superior, and in per- 
fect condition. The light cavalry are less striking in point 
of horses and general appearance ; but some of the hussars 
and lancers are good. The artillery seems particularly fine 
and well appointed : the horses to the brigades belonging to 
the guards are more round, compact, and perfect, than those 
in any other service. 

There is, however, a wide difference between the staple 
of the Russian army and the Emperor's guards. The latter 
are very select, both cavalry and infantry ; nothing, indeed, 
can be superior. The grenadiers of the guard are generally 
very tall men. The cuirassiers are equally large and stout: 
the discipline and well-dressed state of these men are very 
imposing. The whole appearance of a Russian army denotes 
hardihood and bravery, inured to any privations. They sub- 
sist well on black bread : few cattle are seen following the 
army. Their commissaries have little to do ; and the great 
burden of managing the commissariat, which is so irksome a 
task to a British commander on service, seems perfectly light 
and easy to a Russian chief 

Before I dismiss this hasty sketch of the Russian army, I 
cannot, as a military n)an, refrain from offering some remarks 
upon the enormous unnecessary altirail by which it is at- 
tended. The numerous baggages, wagons of all descrip- 
tions, &c. &c. exceed belief; and no general officer has less 
than eighteen or twenty orderlies, cavalry and infantry, which 
always follow him. In fact, I am persuaded the men out of 
the ranks, and the followers and military attendants in a 
Russian army, amount at least to one-fiflh of the total 
number. 

With regard to the officers, they are certainly brave men, 
and some of superior abilities; but the generality of them 
did not at this period possess those talents and resources found 



IN GERflJANY AND FRANCE. 35 

amongst their opponents, so long initiated in the school of 
Buonaparte. 

The general tone prevalent throughout the military officers 
of the Russian army was of a desponding nature. They 
thought they had done enough, especially as Austria had not 
declared herself, and Saxony continued to oppose them. The 
tide of their success seemed to them arrested, and they 
eagerly looked to their own frontiers. 

The soldiers of the Prussian army had, at this crisis, a 
higher and more animated feeling: they were fighting for 
their existence ; and every mile, if in retreat, raised a mur- 
mur of discontent. Their state of discipline was good, and 
their superior officers most efficient ; their cavalry fine, and 
artillery excellent. 

Had the enemy overrun their states, the means of increas- 
ing their army would not only have been doubtful, but, on 
the contrary, there must have been a considerable diminution 
of effective force for their garrisons. Colberg, Konigsberg, 
Spandau, &c. &c. must each have been supplied with a strong 
force ; and no strong reinforcements could have been looked 
for to the Prussian armies. 

Again, the Poles required consideration ; and from the in- 
formation I received, there was every reason to fear the 
enemy would have had an additional force from them of 30 
or 40,000 men ; and we should have had a hostile country to 
contend with, as Poland became independent. 

To return to the state of the campaign. — It must be con- 
sidered that the enemy had a superior numerical force imnie- 
diately mancEuvring upon the positions of the allies, sup- 
ported by two lines of fortresses, which could secure aU their 
operations : and under such circumstances, it would have 
been impolitic to have contended against them with inferior 
means, between the Elbe and the Oder, and thus risked the 
loss of the Russian army, by its being possibly cut off from 
its own frontier. For although it is to be remarked that, 
upon the noyau of this Russian army, they could raise one in 
their own country of 300,000 men ; yet, in the event of the 
loss of it and all the experienced officers, the military power 
of Russia might have been crushed for a generation. Was 
it possible then for the allies, without a fortress on either 
of the two rivers, and with inferior armies, to act on the of- 
fensive ] Were they .so to act, what would be their attempts, 
in which, from the nature of their position, they would not 
be foiled — in which they would not expose their line of com- 
munications ? And under such circumstances, what rational 
liopes of success could be entertained 7 

It is a melanclioly truth, that the allies, with the same 



36 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

fearless but incautious rapidity that urged Buonaparte to 
Moscow, hastened on to the banks of the Elbe and to the 
shores of the German Ocean ; calculating on the spirit of the 
countries they hoped ultimately to deliver, and on the chance 
of uniting Austria, Sweden, and Denmark, in one common 
cause: thus reckoning on the destruction of the French army 
to such an extent, that it would be impossible for Buonaparte 
to assemble another before the month of June at the earliest. 
Calculating with every sanguine view on these events, they 
rushed from the boundaries of Russia into the heart of Ger- 
many, leaving nearly all the powerful fortresses in their rear 
(two only of inferior notice having as yet capitulated) ; and 
now, too late, they found that Buonaparte, even in May, as- 
sailed them with nearly double the force they had collected. 
According to military calculations, indeed, should Austria 
not continue a decidedly hostile party, she would probably 
aim at compelling them to extinguish the flame in the con- 
federate states of Germany, which they had too prematurely 
and too rashly kindled. 

Even the policy of departing from Kalish was very doubt- 
ful ; but as to that of passing the Elbe, unsupported, with barely 
the means of fighting one battle (for want of ammunition 
was given out as the reason for retreating), there can be but 
one rational opinion of its extreme hazard. 

The enemy having passed the Elbe at Dresden, Meissen, 
Wittenberg, and Torgau, and having a direct line of only a 
few leagues to their main fortresses, Custrin, Stettin, and 
Glogau, could advance with security and rapidity. The al- 
lies, having collected on the Breslau road, had no alternative, 
if their flanks were turned, or if Berlin, and Glogau, and 
Custrin, were the enemy's line of march, but to attack them 
in flank, and risk every thing ; or make for Silesia, and as 
soon as possible station themselves behind the Oder. Had 
they fallen on the enemy immediately on their passage of the 
river, they might have occasioned them a momentary check. 
Had they collected their army in a central point at Torgau 
(instead of bringing every thing on the river Spree to a moun- 
tainous country, where the superiority of their cavalry was 
lost), and moved from right or left, as they might have been 
threatened, making their retreat, if necessary, on Frankfort, 
thus connecting their whole line of operation by having a 
central position, the advance would certainly have been more 
safe and advantageous. A ttic (hi pont could have been 
thrown up at Frankfort: from thence to the Vistula they 
might have retired under the protection of Marienbcrger, 
Plotyk, and Thorn, thus keeping the shortest and most direct 
line, )hey could certainly with less risk attempt any consider- 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 37 

able affair with the enemy ; but by the movement executed, 
it was to be feared that the enemy bearing in force on the 
right would leave no alternative but a direct and rapid re- 
treat. 

The allied army passed the Elbe on the 8th of May. The 
head-quarters of the Emperor and King of Prussia were es- 
tablished at BischofFswerde ; and General Wittgenstein, vidth 
the main body of the army, was marching on the great roads 
leading towards Bautzen. The corps of General Blucher 
passed the Elbe at Meissen (General Kleist's corps having 
put itself in communication with him), while General Bu- 
low's corps still remained on the left bank of the Elbe at 
Dessau to watch the enemy's movements. 

It redounds infinitely to the credit of the allied army, that 
during the passage of so formidable a river, with the enemy 
advancing upon it towards his own fortresses, the operation 
was conducted with perfect order, and that not even a car- 
riage or attirail of any kind was left behind. Some works, 
indeed, had been thrown up on the left bank to cover the 
bridges; and these, when the enemy had passed, it was 
thought proper to abandon. 

It was not accurately ascertained upon what points of the 
river the enemy was directing his principal corps ; and as he 
possessed the support of the strong fortress of Wittenberg 
on his flank, and it seemed uncertain what line of policy the 
Saxons would now adopt at Torgau, it may be easily imagin- 
ed how difficult, if not impossible it would ha^e been, with 
the aid of these places in the enemy's favor, for the allies to 
have prevented his forcing the passage of the river under a 
heavy fire of well-appointed artillery. 

On the night of the 8th, the enemy made attempts to re- 
establish the arches of the main bridge at Dresden ; but the 
Russian artillery w^as so well directed, tliat he failed in his 
object; but succeeded on the 9th in passing near Raditz. 
The ground being very commanding on the left bank, and 
favoring their establishing batteries of heavy guns, they pass- 
ed in boats, and covered themselves advantageously. 

The passage was very bravely disputed by General Milor- 
adovitch's rear-guard ; and the Russian artillery, after dis- 
playing the greatest coolness and courage, was only with- 
drawn from the impossibility of contending against the su- 
perior position and fire of the enemy. 

From the best authenticated accounts, Buonaparte had en- 
tered Dresden in person ; while Eugene Beauharnois' corps 
and Marsha] Macdonald's were stated to be immediately op- 
posed to us. On the 10th, the allied army continued its march 
on Bautzen ; and as it was deemed advisable to concentrate 

D 



38 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

the forces, General Blucher was ordered to Camenz, and 
General Kleist's corps to fall back upon him from Muhlberg, 
while General Bulow's retreat, if necessary, was directed on 
Roslitz. General Kleist's corps was attacked by an advanced 
g-uard of the corps of the enemy which liad crossed at 
Meissen, and moved by Konigsbruck ; and a sharp affair took 
place, in which the enemy made no impression. 

The spirit of the rear-guard of General . Miloradovitch's 
corps was also very conspicuous on this day at Weissig', where 
the enemy suffered considerably from the charges of the 
Russian cavalry. 

About this period, it was unfortunately ascertained that the 
Saxons remained favorable to the enemy. General Heilraan 
was deposed from his command, anil the fc^rtress of Torgau 
delivered up to Marshal Ney and General Regnier. The 
head-quarters of the allied army were moved on the 12th to 
Herrnhut, on the road to Gorlitz ; and the army took up a 
position near Hochkirch, a field already so celebrated in the 
Seven Years' War. General Miloradovitch's corps was again 
engaged, during the whole of this day, with the enemy, who 
sustained a very severe loss.* 

The whole army was in position on the night of the 13th, 
except General Bulow's corps, which still remained on the 
right ; and was in readiness to assist the landwehr and levies 
of the Prussian states, which amounted to above 40,000 men, 
and were daily increasing. General Miloradovitch was still 
in advance of Bautzen. General Barclay de Tolly's rein- 
forcements were expected to arrive in a day or two : several 
new corps of Prussians were come up, and the Russians re- 
ceived an accession of several thousand convalescents. The 
allied army remained in position on the 14th. The enemy 
made no apparent movement. General Sebastiani and Mar- 
shal Davoust v;ere reported to be moving on Magdeburg. 
General Miloradovitch having been pressed by the enemy in 
force, passed the river Spree on this day, and the enemy had 
taken up a position within cannon-shot of our advance. 

Up to the 17th, the respective armies had remained in 
presence of each other, without the occurrence of any event 
of importance. The allies had strengthened the position they 

* I cannot here refiaia from giving jiiiiblicity toa report made to nie by Sir 
Robert V\^jl3on on the lOtli, in the f iliowing terms, of a most njerilorious 
individual, and a much esteemed and dear relative of mine, the son of Sir 
Walter James, Bart., who was serving as a volunteer and attache to my 
mission with the armies: — " Mr. John Jrimos has merited and gained great 
eredit for hifl gallant zeal in yesterday's afl'air. All the generals, and par- 
ticularly Miloradovitch, express great admiration of him, and will slate 
his good Hervice to the Emperor." I afterwards learnt that General Milor- 
adovitch recommended Mr. John James to His Imperial Majesty for an Order 
of Went, which he obtained. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 39 

had taken up by many strong field-works and intrenchments; 
and seemed determined, in ardent hope and unabated confi- 
dence, to await the enemy's attack. The recent arrival of 
Genera.1 Barclay de Tolly's corps in the position, added con- 
siderably to their strength. The enemy had been reconnoitred 
on both flanks ; and it appeared that the great body of his 
army was assembled in this quarter, as no force had been 
stationed between the range of mountains which separate 
Saxony from Bohemia, and which bounded our left flank, 
though it was certainly possible for reinforcements to be 
passing on routes bearing on Custrin and Frankfort on the 
Oder ; but as yet there had been no such intelligence. 

It was difficult, from the nature of the country, to ascertain 
the force the enemy might have in motion. They occupied 
all the villages around. Patroles had apparently been made 
with a view to an attack, but it was delayed much longer 
than appeared to be necessary. 

On the night of the 17th and 18th, the enemy deboucheed 
in the direction of Luckau and Lubben on our right: the 
force was stated to consist of Regnier's corps. Intelligence 
having been also received that General Lauriston, with 9000 
men, would march to reinforce this detachment. Generals 
Barclay de Tolly and D'Yorck, with a strong corps, were 
sent to intercept and fall upon General Lauriston. General 
Barclay de Tolly fell in with the enemy about six o'clock in 
the evening of the 18th, in the neighborhood of Konigswartha; 
and a sharp contest ensued, which was put an end to only by 
nightfall, and in which the allies were completely successful. 
They drove back the enemy at all points ; took upwards of 
1500 prisoners, a general of division, and eleven pieces of 
cannon ; besides the enemy's loss in killed and wounded, 
which was considerable. 

General D'Yorck was engaged more on the right, and en- 
countered a strong force (supposed to be Marshal Ney's) sta- 
tioned for the support of General Lauriston's corps. He was 
in action from daybreak on the 19th till eleven o'clock at 
night, and with considerable success, though engaged against 
very superior numbers. A very brisk attack was also made 
on the same day by the enemy, who endeavored to possess 
themselves of the town of Bautzen. They manoeuvred on 
the left, but in reality aimed at General Miloradovitch's right, 
who sustained the attack most gallantly, with the assistance 
of General Kleist's corps, which was sent to his support. The 
conduct of the troops engaged was highly commendable; but 
two brilliant charges of Russian light cavalry were particu- 
larly conspicuous. 



40 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 



CHAPTER IV. 

Intentions nf the enemy — General Miloradovitch withdraws from Bautzen 
— Observations on the position of tlie two grand armies — Reported move- 
ments of the enemy — Preparations of the allies — Battle near Bautzen — 
General Barclay de Tolly forced to retire — Gallant conduct of the Prussians 
under Blucher — Advantage obtained by the French — Retreat of the allies 
— Results of the battle — Heavy losses of the allies — Spirit of the army — 
The allies continue to retreat — Attempts of the enemy — Successful ma- 
noeuvre of General Blucher — Distinction conferred on Sir Robert Wilson 
— The French enter Breslau— Armistice — Anxiety respecting Austria — 
Review of the state of the allied arniy. 

After the military movements on the 20th, and the attack 
on Bautzen by the enemy, his intention appeared to be to 
force the river Spree, and pass to some heights on the right 
of the allies : thus threatening General Miloradovitch's rear, 
and gaining advantageous ground from which his artillery 
could sweep the main position of the allies, and cover by its 
fire the dispositions tor the general attack. The conflict 
which ensued was bravely supported. A Russian battalion 
and some Prussian lancers, under cover of a battery, boldly 
advanced alone, and contested the heights in spite of the 
enemy's powerful efforts, until they were supported by Gene- 
ral Kleist's corps. 

In the mean time, on the extreme right, the enemy's corps 
followed Generals Barclay de Tolly and D'Yorck in their 
retrograde movement from their expedition against General 
Lauriston. General D'Yorck's corps entered the position in 
the evening of the 19th, but the night was spent before the 
Vfhole of General Barclay de Tolly's division was on the 
ground. 

General Miloradovitch repulsed the repeated efforts made by 
the enemy to force him on the left; and his columns, which 
had attempted to pass into the mountains, were kept in check. 
Finding, however, that General Kleist had fallen back into 
the main position. General Miloradovitch withdrew entirely 
from the river Spree and the town of Bautzen, and occupied 
the ground marked out for him in the general line. 

Previous to entering into a description of the battle about to 
ensue, it may not be irrelevant to make a few short observa- 
tions. Two great armies had now been tiirec days in presence 
of each other. The allies determined to meet the attack in 
the position they had chosen ; having weighed the conse- 
quences likely to result from a retreat, even to a more favor- 
able one at Gorlitz, against the advantages they now possess- 
ed : and they decided wisely, for every retrograde movement, 
in the present posture of affairs, prejudiced public opinion ; 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 41 

and the soldiers had already begun to lose something of their 
morale^ as the Russian troops were not fitted at this particu- 
lar crisis to support a retreat in the immediate presence of an 
enemy, although vigorous, orderly, and careful to avoid need- 
less exposure. The ground that had been selected for the 
battle was open, and adapted for cavalry in the centre. On 
the left flank, the mountains were not unlike those which flank- 
ed the left of the English army at the battle of Talavera ; 
and some strong batteries added to the security of this part 
of the position. It then extended through some villages, 
which are strongly intrenched, and the plain, to some com- 
manding hills on the right, rising abruptly, and aflbrding 
strong points of support. But the country beyond these was 
open, and intersected by roads in all directions ; and there 
appeared no impediment to the enemy's moving round the 
flank of the allies, if their columns of infantry could cope witii 
the masses of cavalry on the plain. 

At this period, reports of the enemy's movements were 
A'cry contradictory. Some affirmed that Buonaparte was in 
person at the camp opposite Bautzen ; that Beauharnois' corps, 
Marmont's, and the troopsof the Rhenish confederation, were 
with him ; and that he meditated an immediate attack : others 
conjectured that not more than 30,000 men were immediately 
in our front. There appeared some difficulty in the interior 
arrangements of the Russian army, between the Emperor and 
his Cfeneral-in-chief The Prussians were in much the same 
relation to their allies, as the Portuguese in the Peninsula 
were to the British ; and the King, depressed both from pub- 
lic and private misfortune, lived much secluded with his 
aides-de-camp and staff! At this period Count Stadion ar- 
rived ; and the ministers, it was understood, were busily em- 
ployed in framing terms of mediation and pacification ; so 
that it was generally believed that Austria would now come 
forward and join the alliance. Such were the actual circum- 
stances of the armies on the eve of the battle of Bautzen. 

At day-break, the position in advance of Wurzen and 
Hochkirch was attacked by the enemy, under the command 
cf Buonaparte in person, who, in fact, had assembled all his 
fjrces for this effort, and had not detached largely, as was 
supposed, to other quarters. 

The ground selected by the allies to resist the enemy's ap- 
proach on the great roads to Silesia and the Oder, was bound- 
ed, as I have before stated, on the left by the range of moun- 
tains which separate Lusatia from Bohemia, over which Mar- 
shal Daun marched to the battle and victory of Hochkirch. 
Some strong commanding heights, on which batteries had been 
constructed near the village of Teukowitz (separated from 

D2 



42 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

the chain of mountains by streams and marshy ground), 
formed the defence to the left of the position ; and beyond and 
in front of it, many batteries, defended by infantry and caval- 
ry, were stationed, on a ridge that projected into the low 
ground near the river Spree. It then extended to the right, 
through villages which were strongly intrenched, across the 
great roads leading from Bautzen to Hochkirch and Gorlitz ; 
thence in front of the village of Burschwitz, to three or four 
very commanding hills which rise abruptly in a conical 
shape : these, with the high ridge of Kreckwitz, were 
strengthened by batteries, and were considered to form the 
right point of the line. 

The ground in the centre was favorable for cavalry, except 
in some marshy and uneven parts, where their operations 
were impeded. Fleches were constructed, and intrenchments 
thrown up at advantageous distances on the plain : in front of 
which ran a deep rivulet, which extended round the right of 
the position. On the extreme right the country was flat and 
woody, and intersected by the roads above-mentioned, bearing 
towards the Bober and the Oder. General Barclay de Tolly's 
force was stationed here as a mancGuvring corps, especially 
to guard against the enemy's attempts on the right and rear 
of the allies ; and it was not immediately in position. 

The extent of the whole line was from three to four English 
miles. The different corps occupying it were as follows: 
Generals Kleist's and D'Yorck's corps in echelon, and m re- 
serve on the right ; General Blucher's, Count Wittgenstein's 
(commanded by General Riefski), and General Milorado- 
vitch's, formed on the left; and the guards and grenadiers, 
with all the Russian cavalry, were stationed in reserve in the 
centre. 

The enemy evinced early in the action a determination to 
press the flanks of the allies : a very strong corps had been 
stationed in the mountains on our left, which favored their 
plan of warfare ; but General Miloradovitch having anticipa- 
ted this mancEuvre, had detached Prince Gorshicoff'and Count 
Osterman with ten battalions of light troops, and a large 
corps of Cossacks, v/ith their artillery under Colonel Davidofl^ 
to occupy these hills. After a sharp skirmish in this quarter, 
and a distant cannonading on the- right, v/hich conmienced the 
action, the enemy began to develop his forces, and move his 
different columns of attack to their respective stations. 

The contest, in the mountains gradually became warmer, 
and was supported on their side by a very powerful line of 
artillery. The Prince of Wirtemburg's and General St. 
Priest's divisions of General Miloradovitch's corps were here 



IN GERMANY AND PRANCE. 43 

sharply engaged, and a successfiil charge of cavalry was 
made against some guns of the enemy. 

Buonaparte was now visible, on a commanding spot, direct- 
ing the battle. He deployed, in front of the town of Bautzen, 
bodies of his guards, cavalry, and lancers ; displayed heavy 
columns of infantry on the esplanade before it ; and brought 
up, in addition, a number of brigades of artillery, with which 
he occupied some advantageous heights between the position 
of the allies and Bautzen. 

These demonstrations denoted an effort in this direction, 
and a disposition was accordingly made with General Blu- 
cher's corps and the allied cavalry to meet it; but an increas- 
ing and a more severe cannonade on the right, made it no 
longer doubtful where the chief attempt was directed. 

Columns of attacii, under cover of a lieavy fire, were now 
in motion from the enemy's left, while others were filing to 
gain our right. General Barclay de Tolly was assailed by a 
very superior force, under Marshal Ney and General Lauris- 
ton, who, it was stated, directed the enemy's forces in this 
quarter ; and, notwithstanding the most gallant efforts, was 
forced to abandon the villages of Klux and Cannewitz : having 
been outflanked by the enemy, while they warmly engaged 
him in front, and occupied the heights surrounding the vil- 
lages of Rackel and Barutt. He determined, in consequence 
of the enemy's efforts, to retreat to the heights and batteries 
on the right of Wurzen, where the imperial head-quarters 
had been established, which answered the purpose of covering 
the main roads through Wurzen and Hochkirch to the rear. 

When it was perceived that General Barclay de Tolly was 
pressed by very superior numbers, General Blucher (after- 
wards supported by Generals Kleist and D'Yorck) was order- 
ed to move to his right, and attack the enemy in flank, whom 
they thus succeeded in checking ; and a most sanguinary 
contest now ensued. Too much cannot be said in praise of 
General Blucher's corps on this occasion ; and the Prussians 
in this eventful day, as at the battle of Lutzen, again evinced 
that ardor and prow^ess which never will fail them when 
headed by a king they love, and fighting for their country, 
their liberty, and independence. 

A charge of 4000 of their cavalry on columns of the enemy's 
infantry, which had carried the village of Kreckwitz, suc- 
ceeded completely; and the Prussians having again possessed 
themselves of it, displayed the greatest order and steadiness 
under a most galling fire. These gallant efforts, however, 
were arrested by the enemy's bringing up fresh troops ; and 
although partial successes were obtained, the general issue 
was uncertain. 



44 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR 

The enemy having" gained an advantage by General Bar- 
clay de Tolly's movements, lost no time in making every ex- 
ertion to turn it to account, by renev^^ing the attack also on 
our left flank, and assaulting the batteries that covered the 
conical heights, as well as those of Kreckwitz on the right. 
Having made themselves masters of the latter, and also of 
one of our batteries, which from its situation commanded the 
low ground on the right and centre of it, they thus, as it were, 
gained the key of the position. 

In every other part of the line, however, the allies firmly 
sustained the conflict ; but it had now become apparent, that 
the enemy had not only superior forces to attack at all points, 
but had also the means of prolonging their flank movements 
on the right : thus obstructing our communications, and 
menacing our rear. Although it would have been possible, 
by a general assault of the grenadiers and guards in reserve, 
to have recovered the heights of Kreckwitz, still the pressure 
round the flank on General Barclay de Tolly's corps would 
again have necessitated the abandonment of them ; as, when 
these troops moved to their point of attack, the centre, where 
the enemy still exhibited a powerful force, would have been 
endangered. 

It was only from such considerations that the allies were 
induced to change their position at five o'clock in the even- 
ing, having from day-break admirably contested every part 
of tiie field of battle. The superiority of numbers was on the 
side of the enemy ; but the firmness, ardor, and heroism dis- 
played by the allies, must have excited admiration and respect 
even in their enemies. 

The dauntless personal courage of the Emperor of Russia 
and the King of Prussia, who never quitted the field of battle, 
made the greatest impression on all around them ; and had 
not reasons of prudence, united with the most important con- 
siderations, prompted them to relinquish their ground, the 
most ardent and anxious desire was evinced by them by 
renewed attacks to sustain the position. 

It is very difficult, especially for an observer unacquainted 
with nmch of the detail, to do justice by description to this 
battle, and the extraordinary efforts made on tlie occasion. 
The determination having, however, been taken to place the 
army in a new position, the troops moved oiT about seven 
o'clock in the evening for the ground surrounding Weissen- 
berg. The enemy immediately opened a tremendous fire 
from the heights of Kreckwitz and the village of Cannewitz 
on the retiring columns; but every gun was withdrawn from 
the batteries, and the troops moved off' as at a field-day. The 
corps of Generals Barclay, D'Yorck, Blucher, and Kleist, 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 45 

marched off from their right to Weissenberg ; those of Gene- 
rals Wittgenstein and Miloradovitch from their left by Hoch- 
kirch. The retreat was made in echelon, covered by the 
cavalry, and was conducted with the most perfect order. 
General Kleist's corps formed the rear-guard of the corps 
moving on Weissenberg; and a battery of forty pieces of 
cannon, placed by Count Wittgenstein on the heights of 
Wurzen, impeded the enemy's advance. General Milora- 
dovitch covered the retreat of the troops on the line of Hoch- 
kirch. 

The allied army were in their new position at night. From 
the most authentic accounts, the force of the allies did not 
exceed 65,000 men : that of the enemy in the field was esti- 
mated at least 100,000. The loss on both sides was very 
considerable. The battle throughout was well contested : 
the troops performed their duty in the most intrepid manner ; 
but there w^as unfortunately some deficiency in management, 
which motives of delicacy and diffidence prevent me from 
dwelling upon. 

Count Wittgenstein, on all occasions, displayed great per- 
sonal courage ; but certainly he did not possess the general 
confidence of the Russian army, because perhaps he was not 
a Russian. They have most confidence in their own native 
good fortune and ability. 

While Kutusoff' was living, (said the military critics,) there 
was a great and scientific mind to guide the whole; but the 
talents of the new chief were not yet made manifest, and no 
implicit reliance was placed in the great directing power. 
There were the usual difficulties amongst the Russians as to 
their numbers; and it was impossible to procure a correct 
estimate. Barclay de Tolly's corps was calculated and de- 
clared at 18,000 men, but it barely amounted to 13,000; and 
having lost near 4000 in the action of the 20th, he had not 
more than 9000 men under arms on the 21st, when two 
corps, if not three, of the French army poured down upo 
him. If other misstatements are averaged in the same ratio, 
it may be calculated that the allies had not more than 65,000 
men in the battle. The enemy must have had from 110 to 
120,000 men. They showed much more cavalry than was 
expected; upwards .of 5000 were seen in front of Bautzen. 
Their artillery was most numerous; and their movements 
were made throughout with regularity and steadiness, not 
having the appearance of new troops. 

I early conceived our right would be the enemy's real point 
of attack ; and when the Emperor in the field was pleased to 
ask my opinion, as to renewing the combat and regaining our 
ground, I ventured to say to His Imperial Majesty, that I 



46 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

feared the position was gone the moment Barclay de Tolly 
moved; and unless he could carry his whole force there, 
which was now too late, recovering the heights immediately 
in our front could be of little avail. 

The retreat had hitherto been conducted with great suc- 
cess ; but the losses on the 20th and 21st (which could not 
have been less than from 15 to 18,000 men) were so heavy, 
that we were enabled only to bring our rear-guard into ac- 
tion. Barclay de Tolly's corps suffered most severely, and 
Blucher's was very much cut up. Miloradovitcb, Kleist, and 
D'Yorck, all sustained, on the former day, considerable loss; 
but notwithstanding these circumstances, it is just to state 
that the spirit of the army was unbroken ; its conduct and 
firmness continued unaltered and unabated ; and more was 
done for the common cause by fighting the battle, than if the 
allies had retired from the presence of the enemy without 
awaiting his onset. By its line of conduct the army was still 
pre-eminent for intrepidity and exertions, and respected by 
the enemy and the world : by a different course, the hopes 
excited would have been abandoned without an effort, and 
the Emperor of Russia might justly have fallen in public 
esteem. Many imagined, previous to the engagement, that 
Buonaparte would not venture upon a direct attack upon the 
position taken up by the allies ; but his great mass of force 
accounts for his having done so. 

It was now reported that Barclay de Tolly had been offer- 
ed the command (Wittgenstein not being in favor), but that 
he declined it. Miloradovitcb likewise desired to be relieved 
from the rear-gup„rd ; and Count Pahlen, an excellent officer, 
was appointed to it. 

The army continued to retreat on the 22d, in two columns, 
on the great road to Buntzlaii and Lowenberg. The enemy 
made an attempt to intercept the corps of General Milorado- 
vitcb, in which he completely failed. At Reichenbach the 
rear-guard took up a position, wliich was defended in the 
most obstinate manner against the enemy >5 advance, led by 
Buonaparte in person. The enemy showed a strong force of 
cavalry, and made several charges on that of the allies : one 
even into the town of Reichenbach, which was successfully 
repulsed, with the loss of some hundred killed, wounded, and 
prisoners; among whom were several officers. By bringing 
up a number of guns and a large force, and by outflanking 
our roar-guard, he obliged us to leave Reichenbach; but 
the rear-guard fell back to Gorlitz in the best order. The 
conduct of the troops, after their long service and unequal 
combat of the 21st, was beyond all praise. Throughout the 
late movements there was no loss, on the part of the allied 
army, of guns, tumbrils, or baggage of any importance. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 47 

General Bulow, whose corps had been joined by General 
Borstell's in the neig-hborhood of Belitz and Trebbin, (finding" 
that the enemy had withdrawn the corps of Marshal Victor 
in that quarter, for the purpose of his general operations 
against the allied army,) resumed the offensive, and pushed 
patroles to Baruth and towards Wittenberg. The enemy did 
not advance rapidly; and the army retired in perfect order 
on the 24th. The corps of Generals Barclay de Tolly, Blu- 
cher, D'Yorck, and Kleist, moved on Lignitz; those of Count 
Wittgenstein and General Miloradovitch in the direction of 
Jauer : but the latter had his advanced-posts on the river 
Bober, the enemy occupying Lowenberg, The allies moved 
in the direction of Schweidnitz: thus having communication 
by Czenstochau with the Vistula, and being enabled from its 
intermediate position to take every favorable advantage. ■ 

Considerable reinforcements were arriving daily. Up to 
the 31st, the retreat was continued on Breslau and Schweid- 
nitz. The imperial head-quarters moved from Jauer to 
Streigau on the 27th, and on the 28th to Schweidnitz. A 
new dislocation of the army having now been made. General 
Count Wittgenstein resigned the command of the combined 
forces (which he held after Marshal KutusofTs death until 
definitive arrangements were made) to General Barclay de 
Tolly ; and was himself appointed to the command of the 
Russians; General Blucher to the Prussians; and General 
Miloradovitch, being indisposed, had given up his command 
for the present to General Count Pahlen. It was at this 
time that the corps under the orders of General Blucher 
exnibited (against the division of General Maison debouche- 
ing from Hainan,) what may be justly considered one of the 
most distinguished cavalry attacks against solid squares of 
infantry that has been recorded during this war. The Prus- 
sian cavalry were dexterously concealed behind ground highly 
favorable to the accomplishment of their object. The eager- 
ness to attack was so great, that the signal was given before 
the enemy were sufficiently advanced, and the result was 
consequently not so decisive as it would otherwise have been; 
but notwithstanding the premature onset, twelve pieces of 
cannon and 1300 prisoners fell into the hands of the allies. 
Rome other partial exertions were crowned with considerable 
success on the 27th. 

It is due liere to a distinguished officer, Sir Robert Wilson, 
who was attached to the allied armies by His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment, to mention a marked distinction that was conferred 
upon him by Hia Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, in 
the camp in front of Jauer. It is so grateful a task to witness 
the merits of a brother soldier justly rewarded, and there 



48 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

was SO much in the manner in which this honor was con- 
ferred, that I shall stand excused for detailing such a signal 
testimonial of approbation, even at the expense of prolixity. 

The Emperor ordered a grand review of the troops in camp 
near Jauer. His Imperial Majesty went along the line, and 
was received with enthusiasm by the soldiers. Observing a 
favorable moment, when he was surrounded by his general 
and staff officers, and in front of the troops. His Imperial 
Majesty called Sir Robert Wilson to him, and addressed him 
in the following gracious speech : — " Sir Robert Wilson, I 
have duly appreciated the services, gallantry, and zeal, which 
have distinguished you throughout the war : in testimony of 
which I have determined to confer on you the third class of 
the Order of St. George ;" and then, as if desirous of doing 
it in the most gratifying manner, the Emperor directed Gen- 
eral Augerausky to take his cross from his neck, and he 
delivered it to Sir Robert Wilson. The gracious mode, the 
well-chosen moment, and the pride experienced by a British 
officer in seeing one of his companions in arms thus decorated 
in front of the imperial army, justify me in recording this 
event in my narrative. 

On the 27th, eight squadrons of Russian cavalry, half Cos- 
sacks, attacked near Gottesberg twelve squadrons of the ene- 
my's cuirassiers de Napoleon; and made 400 men and several 
officers prisoners : a partisan-corps also captured a large ammu- 
nition-park, and several prisoners. General Blucher's corps 
(Varmee retired on the 28th to Pruasnitz, on the Streigau 
river, while the main army took up a position near Schweid- 
nitz. 

The enemy, since the affair of Hainau, had not pressed 
General Blucher, nor had they attempted any thing in front 
of this part of the army ; it was therefore conjectured they 
were moving in force on our right, to put themselves in com- 
munication with Glogau : their advance, it was said, had 
reached Neumarkt. A report was prevalent, that Grand- 
marshal Duroc had been killed in the affair at Reichenbach, 
Buonaparte's head-quarters were, on the 31st, at Lignitz: the 
head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia and of the King of 
Prussia at Groditz. 

There was much reason to apprehend, from reports re- 
ceived, that a reinforcement of several hundred men, with a 
battery of artillery, on march from the Oder to join the main 
army, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, who were now 
on their march on Breslau. Woronzoffs cavalry fell in with 
a body of the French in the neighborhood of Dessau, and put 
them to the rout: they suffered considerably in killed and 
wounded ; among the former was a general officer ; and 500 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 49 

prisoners were taken by the allies, with a colonel and twenty- 
two other officers. 

General Bulow's active operations in the rear of the enemy 
deserved the highest commendation : he had pushed his par- 
tisan-corps in all directions, and had kept the enemy in con- 
tinual alarm on their flank and rear. General Zastroff, who 
commanded the Prussian landwehr in this neighborhood, made 
the greatest exertions ; and a very considerable force of this 
description was collected to act in combination with the al- 
lied troops now in position. 

The enemy having entered Breslau the evening of the 1st, 
the allied army could not remain in their position, and ac- 
cordingly marched at night in the direction of Neisse. It 
subsequently continued in its new position in the neighbor- 
hood of Schweidnitz until the 4th of June, when the armis- 
tice agreed on by the contending forces was made known. 
The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia fixed their 
head-quarters at a country-house near Reichenbach ; General 
Count Wittgenstein's and General Blucher's corps d'armee 
remained at Schweidnitz, and its neighborhood. General 
Barclay de Tolly had his head-quarters at Reichenbach. 

It appeared the enemy had detached a corps, immediately 
preceding the armistice, against Generals Borstell and Bu- 
lovv ; and a sharp affair occurred with the former, who fell 
back some short distance, having been greatly overpowered 
by numbers. Operations in the rear of the enemy, on the 
other hand, still continued to alarm him, and to be attended 
with success. 

Within the last few days, many prisoners had been brought 
in by various partisan-corps. A brilliant achievement of 
General Czernichoff's at Halberstadt, hereafter detailed, was 
also reported. 

It is difficult to give an adequate idea of the anxiety that 
prevailed at this eventful crisis with respect to the decision 
of Austria. The allied armies had thrown themselves upon 
her frontier : they had abandoned their main line of commu- 
nication by Kalisch ; had placed themselves absolutely in a 
cul de sac ; and had Austria not declared for them, it would 
be easy to calculate what the consequences might have been : 
on the other hand, if she declared in their favor, Buonaparte's 
position was equally critical. It was improbable he would 
have ventured so much as he did, if he had not been in his 
own mind quite sanguine as to the result. Austria, as a 
mediating power, was now in a commanding position. Two 
attempts to treat separately with Russia, it is said, had been 
made and rejected ; Buonaparte was doubtless engaged else 
where. 

E 



" 



50 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

The Austrian declaration, on the point of coming forth, 
was deferred from one day to another. It was first fixed for 
the 24th of May, then for the 1st of June, and was now post- 
poned till the 10th. A review of the state of the army, at 
this moment, may not be altogether superfluous. The Rus- 
sian force at the battle of Bautzen, including every thing, did 
not exceed 43,000 men. The . Prussians amounted to about 
25,000. Since the battle, the Russians, by Wittgenstein's 
return in camp on the 27tli, only amounted to 35,000 eflfec- 
tive men ; it may be asked what had become of all the forces 
that were held to exist ; and it is difficult to pronounce on 
the causes of the rapid reduction, independent of garrisons 
and besieging corps in the rear. Reinforcements were no 
doubt arriving, but many might be intercepted : and the 
enemy had taken 800 men, ten pieces of artillery, and a large 
number of tumbrils, that were moving towards Lignitz, igno- 
rant of present events. The great line of communication 
being abandoned, much exertion was necessary to turn off 
the reinforcements in time into the new direction. 

With regard to reinforcements expected, there were 
15,000 guards at Kalisch, and General Sachen's corps of 
10,000 men : eight battalions arrived on the 28th from Laba- 
noff^s corps. General Tolstoy's corps was as follows : eighty- 
four battalions ; twenty-five squadrons ; seventeen regiments 
(Basquirs) ; six companies of artillery : total number, 70,000 
men ; of these 50,000 were effective. A fever prevailed 
among the troops, occasioned by fatigue and exhaustion ; and 
tlieir effective strength became more doubtful. The head- 
quarters of Labanoff's corps, which was stated at 40,000, 
were at Biadacz. It was said that its divisions would arrive 
in succession ; but we prepared ourselves not to expect any 
large and sudden reinforcement. These were the principal 
great bodies of troops that were reckoned upon : of course 
there were other detachments, which would do little more 
than supply casualties. Prussia having withdrawn the block- 
ading force from Glogau, was now rated at between 22 and 
23,000 men; and siie required time before she could bring 
forward more troops. Good as were the materials, and great 
as was the spirit observable in this army, it was very much 
outnumbered by the enemy. Tlie want of order just now 
was also visible in it : as far as the means of subsistence 
went, there was an improvident waste among the Russians : 
a French army husband what they procure, though their 
wants are more exorbitant. A deficiency of ammunition ex- 
isted ; and the army could ill afford the loss of the supplies 
that were coming up. 

On retiring from Bautzen, there were two great lines of 



IX GEEMANl' AXD FRANCE. 51 

retreat open — to have proceeded to Breslau and Kalisch ; or 
to adopt the resolution of throwing- ourselves on Bohemia, 
keeping up our communications by Kosel and Czenstochau. 
The Emperor, with great magnanimity, decided on the lat- 
ter, wishmg to give the best chance of reuniting ourselves 
nearer to Austria. Every thing on the Kalisch line was 
abandoned ; and our new communication was now establish- 
ing by Oppeln, &c. The object, at present, was to gain 
time ; to delay the enemy, by making a demonstration of 
lighting, but still not to give him battle. A camp was take 
up in front of Schweidnitz; but if the enemy showed a dis- 
position to attack it, the intention was to have moved to the 
intrenched camp at Neisse, which had been some time pre- 
paring, and to have assembled all the landwehr and irregular 
force at Glatz, and there, if pressed, to have made a stand. 
In the mean time, the enemy appeared moving- all their threes 
on our right. The reinforcements that actually arrived after 
the battle of Bautzen were as follows : — six battalions of 
guards, 3000 ; three squadrons of cavalry, 900 ; garrison of 
Petersburgh, 3000 ; reserves of two divisions from Finland, 
twelve battalions, 6000 ; General Sachen, 7500: amounting 
in all to about 15 or 20,000. 

It may be difficult, perhaps, in a military narrative, and 
more especially when the writer professes not to enter into 
any details of the diplomatic transactions in which he liad 
the honor to bear a part, to advert with propriety to the great 
political questions that were now in agitation. Nevertheless, 
as the armistice — the decision of Austria in favor of the alli- 
ance — and the combinations that resulted therefrom, bore im- 
mediately upon the military operations of the moment, they 
cannot be passed over entirely without allusion to them and 
to their efiects. Of the policy of the allies in agreeing to 
the armistice, at this juncture, different opinions were enter- 
tained. 

Buonaparte, it was stated, could make greater efforts, du- 
ring the period of the truce, than the allies; and the general 
conduct of Austria led to a supposition that she was more 
anxious to dictate a peace than to incur all the dangers that 
might result from a ]>rotracted war in the centre of her own 
empire. On the other hand, the object of Great Britain was 
to preserve the allies from again entering into those separate 
treaties with revolutionized France, which had ahvays proved 
fallacious in tliemselves, and injurious to the common cause 
of Europe. 

The armistice was undoubtedly, at this moment, advanta- 
geous for the position of Prussia ; while the councils of that 
monarchy had been for a long time wisely and naturally di- 



52 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

rected towards Austria : and it is worthy of remark, that 
there was considerable lenity shown, in the acts of Napoleon, 
towards Prussia, which may be accounted for by his anxiety 
to conciliate Austria. As a proof of French amity to Prussia, 
no contributions had been levied in Breslau ; every thing' was 
paid for in money in Silesia, and the people in the Prussian 
states were at this period universally well treated by the en- 
emy. But there was not a shade of doubt as to the firmness 
of the King, and the perfect good faith and adherence of his 
Prussian Majesty to the system of the alliance. Various were 
the statements as to the terms of peace that Austria might 
attempt to negotiate with Napoleon. The allies vi'ere sup- 
posed to desire, first, aggrandizement for Austria and Prussia ; 
secondly, the separation of the duchy of Warsaw from Sax- 
ony and France ; thirdly, the cessation of the Rhenish con- 
federacy; fourthl}% the re-establishment of the old dynasty 
in Spain ; and fifthly, the independence of Holland : while 
Austria, it was believed, would be satisfied with the three 
last stipulations. 

The measures of aggrandizement Napoleon might possibly 
sanction; but the separation of the duchy of Warsaw, it was 
certain, he would never consent to. The disputants, on the 
actual posture of affairs, arranged themselves under two 
classes : those who doubted the part Austria would take, 
were pacificators ; those who believed she would come for- 
ward as a belligerent, looked with eagerness and confidence 
to the renewal of hostilities. 

The plenipotentiaries who had gone to the French head- 
quarters to effect some military arrangement of detail, were 
earnestly pressed to enter into further and general negotia- 
tions; but they resolutely refused to treat on any other subjects, 
stating that every proposition must first be referred to Austria. 
In an article in the Moniteur of the 25th of May, it was stated 
that Buonaparte intended to assemble a congress at Prague, and 
that Austria had assented to this arrangement. The hetero- 
geneous mixture in the article was amusing ; but it showed 
that Buonaparte was aiming at a continental peace. Austria 
had placed herself in a position in which she would have had 
he.au jeu at a general negotiation ; and however much Count 
Metternich was criticised, it must be allowed that, from the 
date of Buonaparte's having said in 1809 — "The House of 
Lorraine has ceased to exist," he had done more in a short 
time to elevate his country, than perhaps any other individual 
had ever accomplished : strengthening her on the side of Ga- 
licia; making the Pruth the boundary with Russia; with- 
drawing the Austrian contingent from France ; disarming 



IV GERMANY AND FRANCE. 53 

the Poles ; and ultimately superintending mainly the terms 
of negotiation for all the continental powers. 

The present policy of Count Metternich appeared to be to 
play his game with the allies against France. The council 
of Vienna believed their plans would be rejected by Buona- 
parte ; and that then being in full preparation, and having 
gained all the time they wanted, they could declare for the 
general cause. If, however, the terms settled by Austria 
were accepted by France, they would then be proposed to 
the allies; and if refused by them (from their adherence to 
the understanding with Great Britain and their first propo- 
sals), the war would continue, although it would, from di- 
minished means, assume a more defensive shape. On the 
other hand, it w^as urged that Austria's project, amended by 
France, would be received, and form the basis of the future 
plans of the allies. Austria having brought Buonaparte, by 
a menacing attitude, to consent to her individual objects, and 
to establish her mediation ; Russia and Prussia w-ould strug- 
gle to the last for all they could obtain : while England would 
be brought forward, and be included in the negotiations, not 
only from recent treaties, but as being the only power that 
could make any restitution at the general arrangement of the 
affairs of Europe. The allies likewise saw that a continental 
peace, without a maritime one, would never continue : and 
the alliance with England thus become more cordial. 

Every little circumstance that now occurred near the 
theatre of war was brought to bear, in one sense or othei-, 
upon the probability of Austrian co-operation, or the reverse: 
such, for instance, as the following. — Prince Schwartzenberg, 
on his arrival at Prague, called for a return of the number of 
1 S-pounders mounted : as this is an enormous large field-piece, 
few of them had carriages ready prepared. These were to 
be got, and to be put in order, and extra horses procured for 
them. Difiiculties were made : upon which he declared, that 
as the French had 24-pounders in order of battle in position, 
the Austrians must at least have 18-pounders. Fifty pieces 
were consequently put forthwith in a state of preparation, 
and 800 horses got for them. This fact, as soon as it became 
known, immediately created sanguine hopes. Another cir- 
cumstance, of like cliaracter, w^as also spoken of; two bat- 
talions of every Austrian regiment had, in the first instance, 
marched to assemble in Bohemia ; but on General Count Bub- 
na's last return from Dresden, the third battalions of each 
regiment immediately received orders to follow. This looked 
like being in earnest. 

In a contrary belief as to Austria, however, it was now de- 
clared that Prince Poniatowski's corps had arrived at Oglau, 

E2 



54 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

on the 2d of June, from Zwickau ; that he was continuing 
liis march to Waldkirchen ; that the Austrians did not im- 
pede his progress, and that he was even now directing his 
route so as to get into the French military line of operations. 

Some account of these Poles may not here be uninteresting. 
Prince Poniatowski stopped at Teschen, and dispatched Gene- 
ral Moyenski to Vienna, to gain intelligence of what liad ta- 
ken place on the Elbe. The Polish corps marched in five 
columns: their fire-arms, during the march, were conveyed 
in wagons which accompanied each regiment, in order that at 
each halting-place the troops might have them in readiness. 
The non-commissioned officers retained their arms, the cav- 
alry their swords and lances. Each column was composed of 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The whole amounted to 
15,000 fine, robust, well-clothed men. The Austrians re- 
ceived them with military honors, and great demonstrations 
of friendship. 

These troops would have proved a formidable addition to 
Buonaparte's force : indeed, had not Poland been wrested 
from French influence, a secure state of things could not 
have been enjoyed. Prussia was desirous that their King 
should have been declared Duke of Warsaw, and wished at 
once to have secured Poland. The Emperor dreaded Austria 
in this measure; and having also his own views, he remained 
passive. 

The state of the allied army was now nearly as follows: 
guards (reserve), 0000; grenadiers, 6000; and cavalry, 5400, 
under the Grand-Duke's command; Barclay's corps, 7500; 
Wittgenstein's, 12,000; Miloradovitch, 8000': Sachen, 7500; 
Prussians 21,000 ; Prussian reinforcement at Breslau, 5000 : 
total, 78,400. The Prussian landvvehr at Glatz were averaged 
at 20,000, and daily increased. The above amount included 
convalescents and reinforcements, and was made at the highest 
calculation. 

The army, with the cavalry and guards, had now taken up 
a position in echelon, with their front towards the Breslau 
and Brieg routes. The main body remained at Groditz, 
waiting the issue of events which were then pending. 

The loss of the French army since the opening of the 
campaign was estimated at 60,000 men ; but they had rein- 
forcements arriving: and Buonaparte was now anxious to have 
it believed, that it only depended on him to make separate 
negotiations either with Austria or lUissia. In the mean 
time, under the arrangements commanded by His Britannic 
Majesty, his diplomatic servants had finally concluded the 
subsidiary treaties between Great Britain, Russia, and Prus- 



tS GERMANY ASH FRAN'CE 55 

sia; and thus insured to the alliance a commanding and 
effective force constantly in the field. 

Having now brought down our military details at head- 
quarters to the important epoch of the signature of the 
armistice, I proceed to give a rapid coujj-d/ceil of the opera- 
tions more immediately in the north of Germany. The 
consequences of the battle of Lutzen, as affecting the affairs 
on the Lower Elbe, were very disastrous. General Lyon, 
in his communications, had expressed a confident hope that 
the defensive positions on the line of the river might be 
maintained ; but when Marshal Davoust pressed forward 
with not less than 10,000 men, this expectation was disap- 
pointed. Tettenborn, Domberg, and Czernicheff, all fell back 
on Hamburgh, where they were for some days united. The 
further movement of a French force under Sebastiani, in- 
duced Walmoden to take up a position at Danitz, and to leave 
Hamburgh to its own resources, and the uncertain aid of some 
of the new levies. On the 8th, Davoust, who was in force 
opposite Hamburgh, attacked and carried the island of Wil- 
helmsburg, and threatened HamburgJi itself with an imme- 
diate assault. 

The fate of the city was for a short time suspended by the 
remonstrance and hostile demonstrations of a Danish force 
stationed at Altona, supported by some gun-boats. It was 
not, however, consistent with the policy of the Danish court 
to persist in this spirited resolution : their troops were with- 
drawn on the arrival of a detachment of Swedes, who under- 
took the defence of the place : but the diminution which this 
independent movement would have caused in the Swedish 
forces, made its propriety more than questionable ; and the 
detachment was shortly recalled, having had only one oppor- 
tunity of showing its military qualities, by taking part in the 
defence of the town against an attack made upon it on the 
2'2d. 

On the 30th. General Tettenborn evacuated the city; and 
it was occupied by the French and Danes: the last of whom 
had now formally declared war against the allies, and taken 
part in the hostile operations. General Lyon liad fortunately 
succeeded in withdrawing the stores and treasures intrusted 
to his superintendence, and had retired provisionally to 
Wismar. The importance of the Swedish co-operation, at 
this moment, was too generally acknowledged to leave room 
for any feelincfs but those of regret for the fate of Hamburgh. 

A great military error would have been committed, if the 
rassemhlement at Stralsund and in its neighborhood had been 
interrupted by any efforts to send detachments to the Lower 
Elbe ; and it would moreover have exposed this part of the 



58 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR 

combined operations to certain failure, inasmuch as the 
Crown Prince of Sweden must, by partial actions in detail, 
have been disqualified from pursuing the great objects which 
an undivided force, under the guidance of his military repu- 
tation, might accomplish. 

The same spirit, however, which Jiad displayed itself in 
the offensive operations of the earlier movements, was fully 
maintained now that the war had assumed on our part a 
character almost wholly defensive. It was a system of de- 
fence ever watchful for opportunity ; and though carried on 
in the face of a vigilant and powerful enemy, such opportu- 
nity was not wanting. Reports were made of several bril- 
liant enterprises, which I proceed to notice in the order of 
their occurrence. 

General Czernicheff left the Lower Elbe, and placed his 
corps in cantonments between Magdeburg and the junction 
of the Elbe and Havel. He learnt there that the Westpha- 
lian General Ochs would arrive at Halberstadt with a convoy 
of artillery : he therefore determined to surprise him ; and 
crossing the river, marched with his cavalry thirteen German 
miles. He had with him the hussars of Isum and Riga, with 
several pulks of Cossacks, and two guns. He arrived before 
Halberstadt at five o'clock on the morning of the 30th of 
May, but found the enemy prepared to receive him : 1600 
infantry and eighty gens-d'armes were placed behind am- 
munition-wagons, supported by fourteen pieces of cannon. 
Notwithstanding this disparity of force, the Russians, after a 
desperate resistance, carried the strong position of the en- 
emy: of whom 400 were killed, as many wounded, and 800 
taken prisoners. General Ochs was among the latter; wound- 
ed, but not severely. 

The Cossacks of Czernicheff" on this occasion distinguished 
themselves, by displaying as much steadiness and firmness 
as regular cavalry : an advantage arising from the superior 
manner in which they were led on by that very gallant 
officer. Their loss was considerable : the French fought 
desperately, and would not accept of quarter. All the guns 
were taken ; and the ammunition-wagons of the convoy 
were either blown up during the action, or afterwards de- 
stroyed. 

In respect to General Bulow's affair at I.uckau on the 4th 
inst., it was stated that Marshal Oudinot's corps was equal in 
numbers to the whole of the Prussians, and that only three 
brigades of General Bulow's came into action. The French 
attacked General Bulow, who had posted himself in and 
behind the town ; but they made no impression, and retreated 
at night, setting fire to the suburb wiiich they had occupied 



IN" GERxMANY AND FRA7VCE. 57 

during tlie engagement. Their loss was computed at about 
3000 men ; 500 of whom were prisoners : two guns and one 
howitzer were taken. The enemy retreated towards Tormee- 
walde, and were pursued by the cavalry. 

After the action, General Bulow was joined by Generals 
Borstell, Borgen, and Harpe ; and the armistice alone prevent- 
ed this combined force from making a most powerful diversion 
in the rear of the enemy's army. 

General Czernicheff, who had recrossed the Elbe after the 
affair at Halberstadt, having learnt that General Arrighi was 
at Leipsic with about 5000 men and considerable magazines, 
and that there were also a number of wounded French in 
the town, communicated with General VVoronzoff, who com- 
manded the Russian corps before Magdeburg ; and they 
agreed to make a joint attack on the enemy : they were 
joined by the Prussian partisan-corps of Lutzow. General 
Czernicheff took up a position at Bernburg, and succeeded 
in drawing the attention of the enemy from the real point of 
attack. 

In the mean time, the corps of Woronzofi' and Lutzow 
were directed by rapid marches to the neighborhood of Leip- 
sic : when they had reached Dolitsch, General Czernicheff 
joined them, by a forced march of nine German miles in one 
day. The French had scarcely time to take a position before 
the town at the village of Zaucha: they had some cavalry, 
which opposed but a weak resistance, and were routed in a 
moment ; their infantry then formed, but being attacked by 
the Russian cavalry, and that part of General Woronzoff 's 
infantry which had come up, their columns were broken, and 
they retreated precipitately towards the town. As their 
cavalry was completely beaten and dispirited, there is no 
doubt the issue of the contest would have been as at Lune- 
berg and Halberstadt, one half of the combined troops not 
having been brought into action before their opponents were 
actually discomfited ; but unfortunately, just as they were 
coming up. General Arrighi sent forward two officers with a 
copy of the armistice. General Czernicheff at first refused 
to believe it, and referred them to General Woronzoffj as the 
senior officer; but upon examination of the document, the 
latter being convinced of its authenticity, the victorious troops 
were obliged to abandon their well-earned success. General 
Czernicheff had taken 400 prisoners, and General Woron- 
zoff 150. The loss of the French in killed and wounded was 
considerable. 

Captain Colon, a Prussian partisan, who remained in Saxony 
in rear of the French army when the allies retreated, em- 
ployed himself in annoying the enemy in the remote parts 



58 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

of Saxony towards Franconia. Having heard of the expected 
arrival of a train of fourteen pieces of cannon, six howitzers, 
and a number of ammunition-wagons, which were to advance 
by the road of Hoff, he formed an ambuscade, and attacked 
the convoy. The French, completely surprised, either fled 
or were made prisoners. The artillery was rendered useies.s, 
and the ammunition blown up : the guns were buried in the 
woods by the peasants. Captain Colon was afterwards joined 
by Major Lutzow with 600 cavalry and many volunteers. 
They established themselves in the mountains of the Vogt- 
land ; and their successful enterprises were only arrested by 
the conclusion of the armistice. 

Conformably to the terms of the armistice (lor which see 
Appendix), the line of demarcation was settled as follows : — 
The French line commenced at Travemunde on the Baltic, 
and followed the course of the Trave as far as Lubeck, in- 
cluding a circuit of one German mile round the town, thence 
extended to the frontier of Holstein, and passed by Bergedorf 
and Alten-Gamm to the Elbe. The Russian line commenced 
at Dessau, and was extended by Hollenbach to that river. 
The portion of territory included between these two lines 
was declared to be neutral, and was to remain in its actual 
military position until the termination of the armistice. The 
line of demarcation then followed the course of the Elbe to 
a little above Magdeburg; thence it passed along the frontier 
of Prussia and Saxony to the Oder, the course of which 
river it followed to the confluence of the Katsbach. Here a 
neutral space was again establislied: the French line passing 
by Dittersbach to the Bohemian frontier; our line attaining 
the same point by following the Oder to Althof, and thence 
passing by Land shut and Pfaflendorf 

The actual position of the troops of the grand army on the 
15th was as follows : — The left wing occupied the villages 
on the left bank of the Neisse to the frontiers of Bohemia : 
the Emperor of Russia and the reserves at Peterswalde and 
the neighboring villages : the King of Prussia at Neudorlf, 
and his guards at Groditz, Emsdoff", a.nd tlie adjacent villages: 
General Wittgenstein's corps at Waldenburg : Generals Blu- 
cher, D'Yorck, and Kleist's corps extended from Strehlin to 
Breslau : Generals Lachen and Schaulau at Ohlau : the 
cavalry were on the right bank of the Oder; General Bar-^ 
clay de Tolly and the head-quarters at Reichenbach. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 59 



CHAPTER V. 

Conferences — Ability displayed by the Austrian minister — Effective state 
of tlie Prussian army— Proceeding on the part of the French— Fortress of 
Spandau — Public feeling at Berlin — The landsturm, or local militia — 
Swedish troops— Their general appearance— Head-quarters of the army — 
The Sovereigns— and society at head-quarters — Observations as to the 
Prince Royalof Svv'eden— The Ilanseatic legion— The armistice prolonged 
— The Russian German Legion— their complete state of discipline, &:c. — 
News of the battle of Vittoria— Hanoverian levies— Movements of Swe- 
dish troops— The Prince Royal's arrival at Berlin. 

No sooner had the conditions of the armistice been defini- 
tively adjusted, than the attention of the allied monarchs at 
head-quarters was turned to the negotiations about to be 
entered upon through the mediation of Austria. Of the pre- 
vailing impression of public opinion, some idea will have been 
formed from the sketch in the foregoing- chapter : conjecture 
was still very busy, and had a wide field for action. It was 
known that much discussion was taking place as to the manner 
in M'^hich the conferences should be carried on : Russia and 
Prussia having positively declined to send plenipotentiaries 
to communicate directly vv^ith the French authorities. It was 
at length determined that negotiators should proceed to an 
appointed rendezvous, where, without being invested with 
full powers, they might enter into conferences with Count 
Metternich and the French authorities. The distinction was 
certainly a very nice one ; but all things considered, it had 
its importance. Skilful and adroit as the French Emperor 
had ever shown himself in the arrangement and conduct of 
diplomatic discussion, he was on this occasion met with at 
least equal dexterity. The matter was conducted by the 
Austrian minister with so much address, that while the 
French Emperor was prevented from carrying his points in 
the cabinet, he was equally shut out from all opportunity of 
exercising a favorite political raanceuvre ; namely, that of 
turning his discomfiture in negotiation into a means of making 
an impression on the public mind in France. These were 
the views with which the conferences were about to open : 
the rendezvous was fixed at Gitschin in Bohemia. 

In the mean time, Prince Schwartzenberg's head-quarters 
were fixed at Braudeiss ; and the Austrian force was drawn 
together in cantonments, extending from the line of the Mol- 
dau to the Reisengeberge mountains. My own position, at 
this period, bore no direct relation to the negotiations in pro- 
gress. The treaties of concert and subsidy with Prussia had 
been completed, and signed ; and I was now at liberty to give 



60 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

attention to the other objects of my mission. These were 
such as to render it desirable that 1 should set out, with as 
little delay as possible, for the north of Germany ; and in con- 
sequence I left Reichenbach on the night of the 22d, and 
reached Berlin on the 25th of June. 

I found on my route the best spirit prevailing- in the coun- 
try, and indications in every place that the Prussian army 
was rapidly becoming- more effective. A circumstance had 
happened with respect to one of the free corps which had 
raised the greatest indignation. This corps had been acting 
in the enemy's rear, when, on the news of the armistice, they 
desired to have a free passage from the neighborhood of Hoff 
to the right bank of the Elbe. The French general received 
them, and promised them safe-conduct. He however, in their 
march, fell upon them with superior numbers: two-thirds 
only of the corps effected their escape, and this with great 
difficulty. The excuse pleaded was, that he had received 
instructions to exclude from the benefit of the armistice all 
those who carried on war, like marauders, in the rear of their 
opponents, and to treat the free corps especially with great 
severity. 

This proceeding would have afforded sufficient ground for 
breaking the armistice, if the ruling powers had been so in- 
clined. The people of Leipsic were so exasperated, that 
their town was declared in a state of siege. A burgher 
guard was formed, and placed under the orders of a French 
colonel ; and it was expected they would immediately be 
marched to join the French army : a measure which wore the 
twofold character of punishment for past resistance, and a 
pledge taken to prevent the recurrence of new acts of hos-^ 
tility. This, however, was not deemed sufficient; as the 
Leipsic Gazette of the 24th contained a long article threat- 
ening that all who had been in communication with the al- 
lies, assisted them in any way, or who had spoken ill of the 
French, should be delivered over to a military commission. 

Having been detained at Berlin by an accident, I endea- 
vored to turn the interval to account by making an accurate 
inspection of the fortress of Spandau. It is situated at the 
confluence of the Spree and Havel, two German miles from 
Berlin. The suburbs on the Berlin side can be inundated, so 
as to render the approach impracticable. The country around 
is flat, and cannot be commanded ; nor would it be possible to 
attack the place on both sides simultaneously. The citadel 
is strong, and well placed : it consists of four large bastions 
with short curtains. There are in the different bastions em- 
brasures for forty pieces of cannon. 

When it was taken from the French, the attack was made 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 61 

from the right bank of the Spree, and was directed chiefly 
against the west, or Queen's bastion. This bastion during 
the siege was destroyed by an explosion of the French pow- 
der-magazine : an accident which, it will readily be admitted, 
was very fortunate for the besiegers, whatever the causes 
may have been to which it might be ascribed. I found the 
Prussian commandant, Colonel Blankhaus, a very distinguished 
officer, busily engaged in forwarding the repairs of the for- 
tress. There were, however, only about 600 men within the 
walls, though the garrison ought not to be less than 3000 : 
indeed, the casements in the citadel alone would hold 3000 
men. There were, as I was assured, 2000 pieces of ordnance 
in the place ; and my impressions on the whole were very 
favorable, with reference both to the diligence and skill ex- 
hibited in restoring this important fortress. 

The state of public feeling in Berlin was most satisfactory. 
A strong intrenched camp had been formed at Charlotten- 
burg; and works were thrown up round the town to secure 
it from surprise or military insult. 

I delayed my departure from Berlin until the 3d of July, 
to inspect (as I was told) near 20,000 landsturm, or local mi- 
litia, when these were collected : however, they diminished 
to about 4000 ; among which were two brigades of guns, 
manned and appointed by the citizens of Berlin. These ap- 
peared to be the most efficient part of the military spectacle. 
The men, considering their little practice, worked the guns 
well : the horses belonging to them were remarkably good ; 
and this artillery proved efficient. The landsturm were 
formed into six battalions : the generality of the men were 
fine, but there was a great proportion of boys amongst them. 
About 150 of each battalion were armed with rifles or mus- 
kets, the rest with pikes : they had been sufficiently drilled 
to march tolerably, and they were moved vvithout confusion, 
which was as much as could be expected from them in so 
short a time after their formation. 

General Bulow, who showed me these people, informed m 
they were only a fourth of the force in the neighborhood of 
Berlin, but that it was not convenient to have them assem- 
bled at once. I believe from 20 to 25,000 of these citizens, 
the immediate population of the town, were counted upon 
with certainty to add to the landwehr and other troops that 
were employed in its immediate defence in case of need. 

I proceeded from Berlin, on my way to Stralsund ; and ar- 
rived on the 5th inst. at Greifswald, the head-quarters of the 
Prince Royal of Sweden, and found him on the point of set- 
ting out for Traclienberg, on a rendezvous to meet the allied 
Sovereigns. The following dav, General Adlercreutz was so 

F 



62 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

good as to propose to me to review the Swedish division of 
troops in camp near the town, consisting of 10,000 men. The 
appearance of the troops, collectively, was good ; individu- 
ally, they had not the air, gait, or dress of disciplined soldiers: 
neither the old troops or new levies were steady under arms: 
their clothes were ill made ; and their appearance, after see- 
ing the Russians and Prussians, was not prepossessing. How- 
ever, I must do them the justice to admit, that their perform- 
ance in the field exceeded my anticipations. Their guards 
and artillery were composed of the choice of their men; 
and throughout, the composition of the Swedish soldiery was 
respectable. 

The regiments exercised and moved on the French system 
of tactics : they were generally loose in their formations, and 
had not then acquired that celerity which counterbalances the 
other fault. I saw four brigades of artillery — two were 
mounted, and two were called artillerie assise — carrying the 
cannoniers : this was formerly the practice in the Austrian 
service, but was abolished there, and should be everywhere, 
as it is disadvantageous when guns are to move rapidly on bad 
ground : these were of iron, and seemed to be particularly 
inefficient; the carriages, and every thing relating to equip- 
ment, were very far behind those of the present day, and 
those in other armies. 

I inquired for the artillery received from England ; and was 
much surprised to find that they had parked it in the Isle of 
Rugen, and preferred bringing forward what was evidently 
so much inferior. I saw four regiments of cavalry : two of 
hussars, one of heavy cavalry, and one of chasseurs a cheval. 
The Swedish horse is not a good animal, having a very short 
neck, and an immense thick cart hind-quarter: he may en- 
dure fatigue, but in point of appearance and movement he is 
a sorry exhibition. There were, however, some few tolerable 
foreign horses in their cavalry; but in their exercise they 
were infinitely below par : nor, indeed, is it to be wondered 
at, as I understand few regiments of cavalry in Sweden are 
ever kept together. Proprietors of certain estates were 
obliged to keep a man and horse for the government, equipped 
to serve in the cavalry, and to find them in every thing. ' 
They had little opportunity of exercise, or being assembled ; 
so that this arm, which required the most constant practice 
and vigilant attention to bring it to perfection, was very much 
in arrear in Sweden. 

It was not surprising, therefore, after contemplating Rus- 
sian, Prussian, and English cavalry, that the Swedish regi- 
ments should have appeared to such disadvantage. However, 
I do not mean to assert that they were not fit to take the field ; 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 63 

and if they could have been brought to act in conjunction 
with a better description offeree, they would, I am sure, have 
been efficient. The squadrons were weak, about thirty-two 
file each : the regiments were of five or six squadrons when 
completed. 

I believe the Crown Prince brought with him about 4500 
cavalry, and 27 or 28,000 infantry ; which certainly fulfilled 
this part of his engagements. The infantry were serviceable, 
without being parade troops. The division mancEUvred by 
changing its front to the right, where they supposed an ene- 
my ; formed two lines; sent forward their artillery, supported 
by cavalry and infantry; retired in echequier, second line 
supporting ; charged with their cavalry as a finale ; and, on 
the whole, performed the movements without confusion, al- 
though without precision ; which, considering their little ex- 
perience, is saying much. I doubted whether the generality 
of the regiments were well officered ; but I was not well in- 
formed on this head. It appeared to me, from seeing these 
troops, that they were capable, in good hands, of great im- 
provement ; and a campaign or two with troops more aguerris, 
would bring them to a military state. 

In the repetition of movements, the recapitulation offerees, 
and the ordinary details of a military narrative, much same- 
ness must ensue ; and there will be a great dearth in this 
narrative of the light anecdote and personal exploit which 
interest the unprofessional reader : but it must be considered 
that a British officer, in witnessing the operations of foreign 
armies, cannot possess that intimate knowledge of their in- 
terior, as he would have when acting with the troops of his 
own nation. 

There is always, moreover, a considerable difficulty for a 
stranger in obtaining information of what is going forward on 
an immensely extended line of operation, and on those in- 
teresting incidents which the scene of a great assembled 
army produce. 

A description of the course of life at the grand head-quar 
ters of the army, which I had just left, may not be here en- 
tirely out of place, and serve to vary the monotonous military 
detail. 

The quarters of the ambassadors and foreign general officers 
attached to the Sovereigns were always allotted by the stafl' 
in those towns or villages where the head-quarters were es- 
tablished. Marked attention, as to accommodation and con- 
venience, was always shown to His Britannic Majesty's ser- 
vants : indeed, the general respect and deference with which 
they were treated, strongly indicated how much value was 



64 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

attached to the powerful co-operation of the British govern- 
ment. 

About ten o'clock every morning, the Sovereigns had a 
parade of the guards and troops in the cantonment. On 
these occasions, every effort was made to demonstrate the 
perfect union of the alliance. The Sovereigns wore the uni- 
forms of the regiments they had been appointed to in each 
other's army : they headed those corps, of which they were 
the colonels, in the routine and forms of parade; and the stalls 
of the armies mingled together, as if they belonged to one 
directing head, and had but one impulse. 

After the attendance at parade, a levee was usually held 
for business at the Sovereigns' quarters ; and ministers, am- 
bassadors, and officers, transacted such affairs as they were 
charged with. The dinner-hour was two; and the Sovereigns 
invariably invited one or more of the ambassadors, ministers, 
or military commissioners, to dine with them. Excellent sup- 
plies always existed ; and nothing could be more agreeable 
than these repasts. 

In the head-quarters of the Sovereigns, more especially at 
the period of the armistice, many of the Princes of Germany, 
and their courtiers and nobles of the first distinction belong- 
ing to the different potentates, were assembled ; resorting, as 
they now did, to the seat of deliberation and war, for every 
thing that was valuable or important to them. Many were 
joined by their consorts ; and the beauty and attractions of 
the Princess Pauline of Wirtemburg, Madame D'Alopeeus, 
the Princesses of Courlande, and others, deserve to be elo- 
quently described, and with other anecdotes might prove 
more interesting to many than my military narrative. But 
my duty is not to deviate from, but to adhere to the dry detail 
of the campaign. However, it will be seen from the above, 
that female society of the most perfect description was within 
our reach ; and its allurements and dissipations often divided 
the mind of soldier and politician from their more severe 
duties. 

Exercise after dinner, des courses, or parties of pleasure in 
the neighborhood, and reunions in the evening, filled up the 
period of each day when the army was stationary ; and each 
ambassador or minister, of any calibre, kept his own table, 
and always received a certain number of guests. 

As my immediate avocations divided my attention between 
the grand head-quarters and the Prince Royal of Sweden, I 
shall now revert to his army ; and at a future moment give 
fiirther accounts and anecdotes of the mode of life during the 
interesting period of the years 1813 and 1814. 

I dined on the day of my arrival at Greifswald with the 



IN GERMANY AND FEANCE 65 

Prince Royal of Sweden, and had two long- conferences with 
His Royal Highness. His engaging manners, spirited con- 
versation, facility of expression, and the talent which dis- 
played itself in all that he said, convinced me on my first 
interview that he was no ordinary man. It was, however, 
my duty not to permit myself to be dazzled by his brilliancy, 
but to ascertain if possible, through the glitter that sur- 
rounded him, what were his real views, and how far the 
warmth of his expressions and splendor of his designs would 
be borne out by the reality of his services to the general 
cause. 

The cautious line he had adopted and maintained during 
the last campaign, had been of the most important conse- 
quence to the allies. Nothing had yet occurred in his de- 
meanor which could be made a matter of reproach ; but, it 
must be owned, there was nothing to justify confidence : it 
remained to be discovered whether the future would wear a 
more promising aspect. The unequivocal proof of his sin- 
cerity would have been, to have boldly and unreservedly 
committed his new subjects against his old friends : it was 
not possible to believe him fully in earnest, until we should 
see him fairly in action at the head of his Swedes, with French 
troops for their opponents. 

He was on the eve of setting out to Trachenberg, at the 
moment of my arrival. The time, therefore, was too short to 
allow of systematic discussion ; and our conversations, on 
both sides, assumed a very miscellaneous character. Of these 
conversations, and of all the points embraced in them, my 
position debars me from giving a complete account ; but the 
impression left upon my mind will be conveyed exactly by a 
phrase of which I availed myself when recording what had 
passed — " He clothed himself in a pelisse of war, but his un- 
der garments were made of Swedish objects and peace ;" and 
further to confirm me in my belief that these sentiments were 
not erroneous, a celebrated and distinguished general officer, 
who was at this period one of my colleagues at the Swedish 
head-quarters, emphatically assured me, "The zeal of the 
Prince will always show itself the most when he shall think 
It the least necessary." In the progress, however, of my de- 
tail, I shall bring forward circumstances and facts that will 
enable the impartial reader to form his own judgment. In 
this part of the narrative, it is only necessary to state that 
there was, in truth, no natural link to connect him with the 
allies : policy had brought him forward ; but both policy and 
affection restrained him from committing himself absolutely 
against that nation, the love of which was early ingrafted in 
his breast. I must, however, beg to be understood in any 

F2 



66 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

observations I make, as not having adopted them from any 
official source : they will be confined solely to the sentiments 
I formed myself on the bare military subjects that came for- 
ward, and were then in agitation. My opinions may be in- 
correct; the data for my judgment deficient; the difficulties 
of the Prince Royal's position known better to himself than 
to others ; but such as my sentiments are I give them, with 
honesty, and, I hope, with becoming deference, while writing 
a military narrative. 

It happened very fortunately, that the news of the debates 
on the Swedish treaty in the two houses of parliament, and 
of the very considerable majority in its favor, had preceded 
ray arrival. At Stralsund this had a most satisfactory influ- 
ence; and it was natural to ascribe much of the Prince Roy- 
al's cordiality to this cause. Of the individuals by whom His 
Royal Highness was surrounded, the most prominent was a 
Colonel Camps, his foster-brother, a Frenchman : the Swedish 
generals were undoubtedly honest, upright, and sensible men ; 
but there existed a secret ascendency over some of the staif- 
officers, which it was difficult to develop. I must, however, 
do, thus early, full justice to Baron Wetterstedt, the secretary 
of state, General Adlercreutz (since dead). General Count 
Lowenhehn, and some others : never were more valuable 
officers than these, nor men more devoted to the common 
cause of their country and P^urope. If reports were to be 
credited, at times there was a less direct and less respectable 
means of influence than these in operation. There was cer- 
tainly nothing in the character or habits of some leading 
persons at the Prince's head-quarters, which made it impos- 
sible to believe the reports in circulation. A celebrated 
actress had lately taken her departure from Stralsund, and it 
was said had been conveyed to General Vandamme's outpost 
with an escort. As to the nature and extent of lier commu- 
nications, rumor was not idle. But 1 advert to the fact only, 
for the sake of reminding my reader that the manoeuvres re- 
sorted to by Napoleon were not always of a strictly military 
character. 

For ten days or a fortnight after the Prince Royal's depar- 
ture for Trachenberg, my attention was taken up in arrang- 
ing matters of importance connected with the state of affairs 
at the anticipated renewal of hostilities. General Arentschildt, 
of the Russian German liCgion, had arrived; and with him I 
settled the supply of arms and necessaries for his division. 
Major-general Dornberg had connnunications to make rela- 
tive to the formation and organization of the Hanseatic legion. 
These troops had been newly taken into British pay, and the 



IX GERMANY AND FRANCE. 67 

General had much to accomplish before tliey could be made 
effective. 

On the 15th, intelligence reached us from the Prince Royal 
that the armistice was prolonged to the 10th of August. 
Speculation was busy as to the ulterior movements of the 
Swedish troops, should the suspension of arms be protracted 
until winter. The island of Rugen becoming then insecure 
as a point of retreat, my anxiety was to keep the attention of 
these Swedish officers, who spoke to me on the subject, alivG 
to the real aim of the campaign, that they might give up the 
notion of partial retreat and all separate objects, and look to 
war on a grand scale. The Swedish troops, it was quite cer- 
tain, could winter well in Germany and Colberg ; and other 
points would offer means of re-embarkation, if necessary : but 
to talk of Stralsund and Rugen as places d''armes for retreat, 
was viewing things within narrow limits, and under a false 
light. 

My intention of effecting a tour of military inspection, had 
been postponed in consequence of the Prince Royal's absence ; 
but on the 17th, Major-general Arentschildt, commanding the 
Russian German Legion, having arranged with me to see his 
corps, I had great satisfaction in being able to make a detailed 
report upon it. 

The legion, as far as its numbers went, was not only per- 
fectly fit for service in the field, but it was a matter of con- 
siderable surprise to find that, notwithstanding the short time 
they had been raised, and the very arduous marches they had 
made, they should have arrived at a state of field discipline 
creditable to any description of troops. I could not but attach 
the entire credit of this to the general ofiicer, and the officers 
commanding corps: and the two officers commanding the 
cavalry regiments, Colonel Count Goltz and Major Count 
Dossman, appeared to me to be remarkably intelligent, clever 
officers. 

The commanding officers of the infantry battalions, as well 
as the corps of officers generall)'', were, to all appearance, 
admirably selected, and exactly what might have been de- 
sired. And here I should not omit observing, that so excellent 
an esprit du corjjs reigned amongst them, that one or two 
young officers who had not conducted themselves in a satis- 
factory manner, according to their brother officers' opinions, 
had been forced by them to leave their regiment. My in- 
spection of the Hanoverian levies was yet to be completed ; 
but I had already seen enough to satisfy me that we should 
soon have a considerable and efficient British force in this 
quarter, not less than 20.000 men. In what manner this 
force could be employed, and in what degree it would con- 



68 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

duce prominently to the general issue of the campaigfn, re- 
mained to be decided. My own anticipations as a British 
officer were sanguine. 

Early on the morning of the 16th we were gratified by the 
arrival of a British messenger, bearing the glorious news of 
the battle of Vittoria. The Prince Royal returned the same 
evening from Trachenberg ; and it was easy to perceive that 
Lord Wellington's great achievements had produced as great 
a change in the political atmosphere of Dresden and the 
north, as it could have effected in southern Europe. On the 
Prince Royal's arrival, I had the honor of an interview : he 
declared very frankly his satisfaction at the favorable news, 
and held out brilliant hopes for the future. The maps were 
spread out ; and we had the advantage of hearing much said 
by His Royal Highness that was very eloquent and scien- 
tific on the subject of the great combinations which were to 
be entered upon. Nothing was left to wish for, but that the 
troops should be put in motion; his dislocations being com- 
pleted, and his masses assembled. This desirable event 
seemed likely now to take place. 

On the 20'th the Prince Royal began to put his troops in 
motion ; taking up a line, with the right at the Lake Schwe- 
rin, the left at Demmin and Pau. The Swedish division of 
Lieutenant-general Laendels', under Major-general Tetten- 
born, and a Prussian division of about 5000 men, were the 
forces destined for the corps of observation against the Danes 
and Hamburgh ; to which was to be added the Hanseatic 
Legion, as not being quite in a-fit state to go forward. This 
corps of observation remained in the neighborhood of Wis- 
mar. 

The Prince Royal proceeded himself to Berlin, along the 
line of demarcation, to see the troops; but dispatches from 
General Barclay de Tolly, relative to the assembling of Gene- 
ral Winzingerode's corps and the troops that were to be 
placed under his orders, obliged His Royal Highness to move 
rapidly ; and I had the honor to accompany him, after seeing 
the Hanoverian levies in our way. 



1 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 



CHAPTER VI. 

British force under Major-general Gibbs— Hanoverian levies— Appointment 
of officers— The Prince Royal— Troops under his orders— The Duke of 
Cumberland— Treaties of concert and subsidy with Russia and Prussia 
—General Alexander Hope— Affability of the Prince Royal— His inter- 
view with the Duke of Cumberland— Removal of General Walmoden— 
The late Duke of Mecklenburg Strelitz— Adventures at SlreliTz— Arrival 
of the Prince Royal at Berlin— Reports regarding the enemy— Letter from 
General Tauenstein — Intelligence from "the grand head-quarters — Ar- 
rangements of the Prince Royal — Arrival of the Duke of Vicenza— Dia- 
position of Napoleon's forces— Position of the allied army— 3Ioreau~ 
Austria declares war against France— Spirit of the Austrian troops- 
March of the allies into Bohemia. 

Mr. Thornton now received the details of the British force 
arriving under Major-general Gibbs. Colonel Cooke was or- 
dered by me to afford them every assistance on their lauding, 
and to communicate between them and the Swedish authori- 
ties. 

The most important points at this moment for the delibe- 
ration of the British government were as follow : 

1st. If the armistice should by any unforeseen occurrence 
be prolonged, what in such case was expected of the Prince 
Royal? 

2d. If the Prince Royal should determine on remaining in 
Germany during the winter (to which he did not in any event 
positively object), whether Great Britain would be disposed 
to give an increased subsidy next year 1 This arrangement 
was strongly urged by the Prince Royal. 

3d. In the event of France accepting any basis proposed 
by Austria, and acquiesced in by Russia and Prussia, whether 
it should be positively admitted that the corps of the Russian 
German l^eglon was to be considered as a corps at the dispo- 
sal of Great Britain, and to follow the Swedish army, or such 
orders as it mioht receive from Great Britain? 

In a detail of troops which was sent as Russian troops af- 
forded by the Emperor to the Prince Royal, the Legion was 
included : this gave dissatisfaction to the Crown Prince. 

The Hanoverian levies were also detailed by Russia in this 
paper ; and it was left to His Royal Highness to appoint 
chiefs to these corps. All this was incorrect ; for the whole 
of these troops, paid by Great Britain, should have been con- 
sidered as a British force, furnished solely by the Prince Re- 
gent to Sweden. 

The Prince Royal, to do him justice, was entirely of this 
opinion ; and would neither appoint officers, nor make any 
arrangement not dictated by the British government. It was, 



70 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

however, now of importance that all these points should be 
finally determined. 

With regard to the appointment of officers to the levies, it 
was mainly in the hands of Lieutenant-general Count Wal- 
moden : but some check to the very great patronage this af- 
forded seemed necessary ; and the regency of Hanover, as 
well as the officer superintending the levies (Brigadier-gene- 
ral Lyon), obtained, at my instigation, proper control on this 
head. Baron Bremer, a very intelligent and zealous Hano- 
verian, was directed to reside at the head-quarters of these 
levies, to assist in their arrangements in the field. 

Orders were at this time received for the incorporation of 
the Hanseatic Legion into the Hanoverian levies : the Le- 
gion would not agree to this arrangement; and declared it 
must be preserved, if at all, as a corps subject to be conceded 
to Hamburgh when required. 

The same proceeding occurred with respect to the Dessau 
battalion; and it was only afterwards that propositions and 
treaties were framed, by which their services were defined 
and secured. 

Some abuses prevailed under the management of those 
whom Great Britain so largely and liberally supplied. At 
Stralsund, the English ordnance storekeeper was not only 
paying for store-houses, but actually for the disembarkation 
of every article of arms, whether for the Swedish or other 
services. It seemed so extraordinary, that the Prince Royal 
and the Swedes could not take upon themselves the landing 
of what was for their own use, that I immediately insisted 
on a complete and satisfactory arrangement with the Prince 
Royal on this subject. Other points might be mentioned ; but 
at last every thing was landed free of expense : receipts 
were given for the use of any horses or wagons — whatever 
was for the Swedish army, they were to defray ; and what 
went for the services of the other troops in British pay, the 
two governments were to settle hereafter, as might be agreed 
on. 

Colonel Cooke was placed by my orders in charge of all 
the service and details before mentioned, and always went 
through them with indefatigable assiduity and attention. 
Lieutenant-general Count VValmoden and Brigadier-general 
Lyon communicated with me on every military exigency that 
arose ; and measures were adopted to put the troops in an 
effective state to take the field. Major Macdonald, who 
was placed by Lord Bathurst under General Lyon, was 
stationed at Stralsund to assist Colonel Cooke until further 
orders. 

The Prince Royal showed some uneasiness as to the in- 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 71 

tended regulations of command, on the arrival of Major- 
general Gibbs' corps, in the garrison of Stralsund. His Royal 
Highness was assured by me that General Gibbs would not 
interfere with the command of the place, so long as the Swe- 
dish general, Englebrecken, remained ; and all that must be 
understood was, that General Gibbs was not to be interfered 
with in the command of his own people. The Prince Royal 
added, that Lieutenant-general Laendels would command the 
corps of observation ; and that in the event of his falling back, 
or other accidents, General Gibbs would report to him. To 
this I did not conceive there would be any objection. 

Having completed the inspection of the Hanoverian levies, 
considering the disadvantages under which they had labored 
since their formation, they were in a better state than I had 
expected : but there was still much room for improvement. 
I must not forget to record here the strong interest, zeal and 
ability that were displayed by His Royal Highness the Duke 
of Cumberland, who was residing now at Strelitz, at his 
father-in-law's court, in aid of the military preparations in 
the north : he had been waiting for ray arrival there, in order 
to accompany me both to Stralsund and on my way back to 
the grand head-quarters. I represented to His Royal High- 
ness the uncertainty of the period of my stay at Stralsund : 
the knowledge I entertained of the Prince Royal's immediate 
departure for the interview of Trachenberg ; and, finally, my 
belief that it would occasion him considerable inconvenience 
in travelling with me. He was therefore pleased to forego 
accompanying me to Stralsund, and waited for me at Stre- 
litz, in order to proceed with me back to the grand army ; 
where I shall hereafter have occasion to speak of his Royal 
Highness. 

To return again to the military impressions of the Prince 
Royal. When I repeatedly persevered, previous to his depar- 
ture, in speaking of the troops to be put under his orders, 
including General Winzingerode's corps, His Royal Highness 
seemed rather to think disparagingly of these forces, and 
gave me the idea that he felt events would counteract these 
arrangements. He said, if he had an army of 80,000 men, 
as stated in his letter to the Emperor of Russia, he must be 
independent of the grand army: to advance when he thought 
right ; to retire when it was prudent ; and that he would not 
commit his fate or operations to the direction of other men 
with other objects. In reply, I respectfully advanced that I 
concluded the Emperor and the King of Prussia would enter 
into a complete arrangement, and combine plans of operations 
with him, for which their meeting at Trachenberg had been 
concerted, than which nothing could be more advantageous 



72 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

to the common cause ; and, if I were so fortunate as to see 
him on his return, I trusted to see all such arrangements 
completed to his satisfaction. 

The Prince asked me about our treaties of concert and 
subsidy with Russia and Prussia. I communicated with him 
frankly the substance of them ; and when he asked my opin- 
ion, if the armistice would be prolonged, I said I did not see 
how it could be so under our treaties, without the consent of 
England. He thought as I did on this subject. He denied 
that Sweden had accepted the late mediation of Austria; 
and while he was impressing on my mind the renewal of the 
war with vigor, I plainly perceived that he had no confidence 
in the issue of events proving fortunate for the allied cause ; 
and if I could read into his secret thoughts, there was little 
desire that this should be the case. 

I should not forget to mention, that the news had arrived 
of the division in the House of Commons on the Swedish 
treaty the day I conversed with the Prince Royal, as above 
detailed; and, notwithstanding the warmth with which I 
expressed my feelings, often differing entirely with His Royal 
Highness, he dismissed me at parting, as he received me on 
arriving, with two French embraces. 

I feel a delicacy in adding much more here on the subject 
of the Prince Royal, which I should have done, if there had 
not been present about that period a most able English officer, 
viz. General Alexander Hope, whose mission did much to 
elucidate the British government on the state of affairs in 
this scene of action on v/hich I was momentarily introduced. 
I had several conversations with the Crown Prince on his 
return from Trachenberg; and to judge of his intentions by 
his sentiments, and the manner in which he expressed him- 
self satisfied with all that had passed, they were most favor- 
able. The impression of Lord Wellington's success had been 
etrongand universal; and produced ultimately, in my opinion, 
the recommencement of hostilities. 

His Royal Highness produced as usual his map, and talked 
most eloquently and scientifically of the great combined 
operations we should be engaged in. This was all as it ought 
to be ; but I wanted to see his army in motion ; and in press- 
ing this object, he passed mc by, saying, it would not be 
prudent to collect his masses too early, as the enemy would 
be aware of their points of concentration : but he assured 
me that 10,000 men had marched. 

Whenever the Prince Royal conversed, it was always with 
the greatest affability and cordiality. It is impossible to re- 
sist tiio fascination of his eloquent expressions, or be indif- 
ferent to his insinuating lone and manner ; and when armed, 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 73 

as he always is, with a bottle of Eau-de-Cologne in one hand, 
and a white handkerchief in the other, inundating lavishly 
every thing around him with the perfume. It requires some 
hardihood to be quite collected, and insensible to beautiful 
phraseology, so as to discover the drift or solidity of the 
extraordinary man into whose presence you are at all times 
admitted, and accosted as "Mow aw?"." 

To do his Royal Highness however justice, he was invari- 
ably kind and civil, particularly to me ; and when I mentioned 
the probability of my being at his head-quarters during any 
interesting operations, he assured me I should always be le 
bien-venu ; but at the same time distinctly told me, he never 
would agree in any convention or treaty to have British offi- 
cers, especially general officers, placed near his person. 
Russia and Prussia might do so, but he had a different way 
of thinking on these points ; thus evidently showing that he 
would be extremely jealous of the idea of any counsel or 
control. All this I took in as respectful a manner as possible. 

I now determined to proceed from Strelitz to the imperial 
head-quarters : but before I take leave of affairs here, I shall 
state the cause of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumber- 
land's change of purpose, as to accompanying me thither. 
In the course of conversation with the Prince Royal, I inti- 
mated the Duke's desire to see the active operations that 
might take place ; but that His Royal Highness's high rank 
and his general situation imposed difficulties in the way 
of arrangement. The Prince Royal listened with great inter- 
est to all I advanced ; and then added, that although he should 
be most desirous of forwarding any views agreeable to any 
branch of our royal family, still that the nominations to the 
command of any troops in his army in British pay must 
entirely originate with the British government. 

Owing to this communication, the Duke of Cumberland 
decided on repairing to the grand allied army; but to my 
surprise at Strelitz, after His Royal Highness had had a pri- 
vate audience with the Prince Royal, the former informed 
me that the latter had pressed on him the command of all the 
Hanoverian troops; saying, it was essential that one of the 
family should head them : that this offer opened to him a 
prospect of active employment ; and that he was to meet the 
Prince Royal again at Potsdam on the 10th, when he was to 
hear more in detail what the Prince Royal's views were: 
that at present he had confined his answer to the Prince 
Royal, to an expression of his desire to do whatever was most 
consistent with the good of the common cause, and whatever 
the Prince Regent's government might decide upon. Now 
the conduct of the Prince Royal was certainly disingenuous. 

U 



74 NARRATH'E OF THE WAR 

It arose either from a desire to remove General Walmoden, 
or from a wish to conciliate one of our princes, by an offer 
which the Prince Royal felt himself could not be arranged. 

With regard to his desire of seeing- General Walmoden 
removed, it was evident that he was not pleased with that 
distinguished general officer: however, I was inclined to con- 
sider that this feeling on the part of the Prince Royal was 
just the reason that ought to induce me to wish the General 
to remain in his command ; for I believed him to be an excel- 
lent, vigilant officer, and above all, devoted to the Prince 
Regent and to the British objects. I must remark, that the 
result of what passed between the t^vo Princes was, that the 
Duke of Cumberland decided on remaining at Strelitz. 

A singular and ludicrous anecdote occurred to me at that 
court, which I cannot fjrbear relating, as a testimonial of the 
hospitality and kindness of the late Duke of Mecklenburg 
Strelitz : a prince who v.as beloved and respected not only 
by his subjects, but by all w^ho knew him ; and who marked 
by a particular kindness all English visitors and residents in 
his states. I had ordered myself, on arriving very late at 
night in the town, to be driven to the inn ; but being sound 
asleep in my carriage with my aides-de-camp on entering the 
gates, my chasseurs and orderly from the box showed my 
passports. I was not aware that orders had been sent from 
the palace to the guard-house to send my cortege to the 
reigning Duke's brother's house in the town. 

On alighting, I found myself shown into magnificent apart- 
ments, lighted up, with numerous servants, and with a grand 
convert laid for supper. Congratulating myself with my 
companions on our capital inn. we proceeded to call about us, 
ordered and made free, precisely as if in the first Paris hotel. 
The v.-ines were excellent; more and more were ordered up; 
a provision directed to be laid aride to carry forward on the 
ne.xt day's march: in short, we all v;ent to bed in the sweetest 
delirium. But the consternation that followed the next morn- 
ing was appalling : when av/akening, I Avas informed that 
the Duke's brother was in the anteroom, waiting to know, 
" if his Excellency was satisfied with his reception." The 
ridicule attached to me for this anecdote, did not leave me 
during the few very happy days I spent at the delightful 
palace of the Duke of Mecklenburnr at Strelitz, and in the 
most enchanting society that then embellished it. 

During the stay of the Prince Royal at ^lecklenburg, we 
had no little difficulty as to the etiquette of this small court 
with the two Princes. The Prince Royal, as heir to tho 
throne of Sweden, considered that he should take the pas. 
The Duke of Cumberland most properly and rationally could 



IN GEEMANY AND FRANCE. 75 

not brook his blood should give way at his uncle's court to 
Bernadotte, much less did he incline to cede the fair Princess 
who presided there. The old Duke of Mecklenburg, under 
these circumstances, entreated me to settle upon some plan 
tor them to get from the saloon into the dining-room. After 
some reflection, I proposed that the two ladies of rank present, 
the Princess of Solms and the Landgravine of Darmstadt, 
should go out together, and that the royal Princes should fol- 
low hand in hand. This was adopted after considerable dif- 
ficulty ; but the Duke of Cumberland soon assumed his just 
rights, and took the first place by the Princess : which the 
Prince Royal not only perceived, but certainly resented it, 
by showing extreme ill-humor during the dinner. 

From Strelitz the Prince Royal of Sweden repaired to 
Berlin, where he arrived on the night of the 24th of July, 
and immediately besran to occupy himself with the general 
arrangements of the army placed under his orders. General 
Bulow's head-quarters were at Berlin, and Count Woronzow 
and some of the principal Russian general officers were also 
in that place. A report at this time arrived from the ad- 
vanced-posts on the Elbe, which caused a considerable sensa- 
tion : it stated that the enemy had collected considerable 
masses at Magdeburg and Wittenberg, and strengthened 
their advances on the Elbe ; and on inquiry being made into 
the cause, the French general, Le Marois, commanding at 
Magdeburg, and others," appeared to feign ignorance of the 
armistice being prolonged, and seemed by their demonstra- 
tions as if Buonaparte was preparing to strike some unex- 
pected blow. 

The fact of the enemy's concentration of 60 or 80,000 men 
being reported, orders were issued for General Bulow to as- 
semble the greater part of his troops at Mittenv/alde and 
Belitz to cover Berlin: the Swedish armies were to be fur- 
ther advanced, and the necessary measures taken to prevent 
any breach of treaty, if it should be attempted, on the part of 
the French. 

The numerical forces in the neighborhood consisted of Bu- 
low's corps, said to be about 30,000 men, including land wehr; 
General Count Woronzow's corps, 9400 cavalry and 5000 
infantry; and General Winzingerode with 12,000, chiefly 
infantrv: to these may be added, the corps on the Lower 
Elbe. 

The Prince Royal now received a letter from General 
Tauenstein before Stettin, pressing very strongly for the 
positive orders to assault that place, having no doubt of its 
immediate capture ; observing also on the advantages of liber- 
ating his corps from its blockade. The Prince assured me 



7'6 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

that he should not delay sending" him complete powers to act 
when the moment arrived ; but it did not seem quite so clear 
when, in His Royal Highness's opinion, that would be. The 
accounts from Dresden now mentioned Buonaparte's extreme 
rage at the news from Spain. Every one was afraid to refer 
to the subject with him : at one instant he declared eternal 
war against England, and then more calmly he would revert 
to a pacific arrangement. The advice of his most confidential 
people, it is said, was for peace ; and risings in the interior 
of France urged it. 

The etat-major of the Prince Royal of Sweden^s army 
was at this period arranged ; and it was settled that General 
Baron Adlercreutz should be chief of the staff; Baron Ta- 
verst to be employed for the business of the chanceUerie ; 
and Count Lowenhehn for more active duties with the Prince 
Royal. Officers from the different corps, selected by their 
chiefs, were to assist in the general arrangements under the 
above chiefs. 

On the 27th, intelligence arrived from the grand head- 
quarters at Peterswalde, informing the Prince Royal that 
Austria was much satisfied with the consent given for the 
prolongation of the armistice. It then stated that Napoleon 
desired that the commissioners sent to his head-quarters 
should proceed with the arrangements that had been agreed 
upon ; but Napoleon accompanied this communication, by re- 
quiring that French officers should be sent to the fortresses 
charged to superintend the supplies of provisions, and that a 
return should be furnished for 50,000 men and 6000 horses : 
numbers very considerably superior to the garrisons, and to 
what had hitherto been provided under the stipulations of the 
armistice. 

The Emperor of Russia thought himself peremptorily called 
upon to resist this demand ; and the language held in reply 
by the French was, that Buonaparte would not ratify the pro- 
longation of the armistice, but would recommence hostilities 
immediately, if his demands were rejected. The Duke of 
Vicenza had not proceeded to Prague as was expected ; and 
since Count Narbonne's arrival at that city, up to the 22d, 
not the least step had been taken to enter upon the business 
of the negotiations. It was then calculated, that allowing for 
the time of His Imperial Majesty's answer to reach Dresden, 
and the rejoinder to be received, added to the six days neces- 
sary for the Denunciation of the truce, the 2d of August 
would be the earliest period when hostilities could recom- 
mence. 

Austria was extremely mortified at this new instance of 
unreasonable conduct on the part of France ; and Count Met- 



INT GEEJMANY AND FRANCE. 77 

ternich declared most positively, that any neglect of their 
mediation, or an attempt to infringe what had been agreed 
on, would be followed by an immediate declaration of war on 
their part It was not very probable that Buonaparte would 
prematurely and injudiciously force Austria to decide against 
him ; and indeed it was more likely that the French Ruler was 
merely trying how far he could, by manoeuvres and artful man- 
agement, accomplish his objects. The Emperor of Russia, 
however, remained firm ; and the Prince Royal was pressed 
to forward his arrangements, so that the allies might not be 
taken unprepared. The plan of the campaign had been set- 
tled at the meeting at Trachenberg ; and the Emperor was 
already taking measures for the immediate movement of his 
troops. Meanwhile, Buonaparte proceeded himself to Luc- 
kau, and was there on the 22d, where a very large force had 
been assembled, with tjie view, as was supposed, of striking 
an immediate blow against the Prince Royal ; in which event 
the Emperor of Russia was immediately to move forward. 

The arrangements of the Prince Poyal, made in conse- 
quence of this communication from head-quarters, were to 
assemble General Bulow at Mittenwalde ; the head of Gene- 
ral Winzingerode's corps was to arrive also in the neighbor- 
hood of that place on the 1st of August ; General Woronzow 
was to assemble on the right; and General Czernicheif was 
to move forward tovv-ards Spandau and its vicinity. The 
Swedes were to advance, so that their head-quarters were to 
be established in the centre : the Russians and Prussians 
forming the flanks of this army ; and orders had been sent to 
llie officer commanding at the advanced-posts, to call upon 
the enemy to declare positively in what manner they regard- 
c d the armistice. The second Swedish divisions, from Ros- 
tock and Greifswald, were now marching forward ; but the 
Wismar division had not yet been put in motion. The 
Swedes were wonderfully healthy. In the Rostock division 
of 9400 men, there were only thirty-one sick. The second 
division amounted to about 21,000 men. General Walmo- 
den's corps was also now advancing. It was feared there 
would be difficulties here about provisions ; but this evident- 
ly arose only from want of arrangement. 

Allusions having been made to the plans of campaign and 
arrangements made at Trachenberg between the allied Sove- 
reigns and the Prince Royal of Sweden, the outline of the 
convention signed, as far as I became acquainted with it, will 
be found in the Appendix. 

During the period of the suspension of hostilities, the bel- 
ligerents on both sides occupied themselves in bringing for- 
ward all their resources to re-open the campaign with effect; 

G2 



78 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

but it became generally evident, that Napoleon only consent- 
ed to the prolongation of the armistice with a view of detach- 
ing Austria, by mancBuvres and negotiation, from the com- 
mon cause of Europe. 

The Duke of Vicenza (Caulaincourt) arrived on the 28th 
of July at Prague, but not invested with such full powers as 
could give any hopes of a favorable issue to the affairs pend- 
ing ; and the 10th of August, the day of declaring the armistice 
at an end, now approached, without the parties having ad- 
vanced a step in the principal objects of their negotiations. 

The general apperru of Napoleon's forces and dispositions 
at this crisis was as follows : — The first corps, under General 
Vandamme, was assembling at Dresden from Magdeburg ; 
Marshal Augereau, collected in Saxony ; Marshal Gouvion 
St. Cyr, at Freyberg : all these united composed a force of 
not less than 350,000 men in Silesia and Saxony. Murat ar- 
rived on the 14th of July at Dresden, to take the command 
of the cavalry, in the place of Marshal Bessieres. 

The disposition of the grand allied army may next be 
briefly sketched as follows : — General Blucher commanded in 
chief his army of 70,000 men ; composed of General D' Yorck's 
corps, and two Russian corps under Lieutenant-general 
Count Langeron. General Gniesenau was chief of the staff 
of this army: an officer whose distinguished military reputa- 
tion and high fame in Europe are established on too firm a 
basis to require any eulogy from me. The remainder of 
the grand army was composed of, 1st. the corps of General 
Count Wittgenstein, under whom were Prince Gortchakoff, 
Prince Eugene of Wirtemburg, and Count Pahlen ; 2d. the 
Prussian corps; 3d. the Russian reserves, and the Russian 
and Prussian guards, under tiie Grand-Duke Constantine and 
General IMiloradovitch, then forming 80,000, which now pro- 
ceeded to join the Austrian army in Bohemia : making with 
them a total of about 200,000 men, under the command in 
chief of Prince Schv/artzenberg. General Radezkj'' was 
named chief of the staff to this army: the head-quarters of 
which were now stationed at Prague ; and on the 18th of 
August the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia arrived 
there. 

In addition to the illustrious warriors who graced this vast 
theatre of action, particular mention must be made of the 
celebrated French general, Moreau, who now arrived from 
New- York, and adoj)ted the title of aide-de-camp to the Em- 
peror Alexander, to oppose his former companions in arms, 
under the despot who now ruled them. 

War was declared by Austria aoainst France on the morn- 
ing of the 11th of August, in conformity with the intentions 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 79 

announced in M. de Metternich's dispatch to Count Stadion; 
and the French ministers received their passports, accom- 
panied by a note, in which it was declared that, no answer 
having- been returned to the Emperor's ultimatum, the con- 
gress was at an end ; and that his Imperial Majesty joined 
his forces to those of the allies to extort peace. It appeared 
that the Austrian minister's ultimatum was made known to 
M. de Caulaincourt on the 8th ; and that he was permitted to 
take a copy of it. 

In a long conversation which ensued between them, Gene- 
ral Caulaincourt told M. de Metternich that if he were 
Buonaparte, he would accept, without hesitation, the Austrian 
proposals (the nature of which I need not enter into) ; but 
that he was without full powers, and did not think that they 
would be accepted by the Emperor. A courier was dispatch- 
ed with them to Dresden, the moment when the conference 
ended. Although hostilities were not to commence until six 
days after the 10th, as originally stipulated, nevertheless, 
from the latter period, Austria became a co-bell ig.erent; and 
even if Napoleon had now changed his mind, his propositions 
must have been addressed to the allied powers, the mediation 
being at an end. 

It is difficult to describe the enthusiasm generally created 
by the Austrian declaration of war. The spirit of the army 
also was at the highest pitch. When the three allied Sove- 
reigns met at Prague, it excited a proud sensation in the 
breast of such British subjects as witnessed the event: for 
the persevering and energetic conduct of their own country, 
under the wise administration of the Prince Regent's gov- 
ernment, and, above all, the glorious exploits of British arms 
in Spain, had ultimately, and I may say exclusively, brought 
into action a complete and efficient alliance against the am- 
bition of France, and the tyranny of its chief; affording ra- 
tional hopes of a glorious termination of the contest. The 
recently dubious conduct of Austria having thus terminated, 
she nobly and magnanimously brought to bear her great and 
commanding advantages in point of numerical forces; and 
England, with her wonted generosity, was the first to acknow- 
ledge her sincerity, and restore to her her confidence. 

The allied army now continued its march into Bohemia. 
The treaties of subsidy and concert between England and 
the allies having been signed and settled at Reichenbach, I 
will not further allude to them, nor to any separate or secret 
conventions made between any of the powers : suffice it to 
say, that the alliance was preserved with that solid union, 
good faith, and complete understanding, which promised, and 
finally produced, a successful result. 



80 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 



CHAPTER VII. 

Movements of the enemy— Removal of the allied head-quarters to Prague 
—Count Stadion— Intrepid character of the Emperor Alexander— Dispo- 
sition of Austria— Prince Schwartzenberg— The Breslau central commie- 
sion— Observations on the rupture of negotiations— Reply of Austria- 
Conduct of Caulaincourt— Confidence of Buonaparte— Count Metternich— 
his course of proceedings— Review of the Austrian army— Fine appear- 
ance and discipline of the troops— Retreat of the P'rench— ColJ«^cUon of 
the enemy's forces at Zittau— The French general, Jomenil— Intelligence 
of the defeat of Soult— Ceneral Blucher attacked by Ney and Marmont— 
Count Wittgenstein's corps— Advance of the grand armies towards Dres- 
den—The enemy retires— The allies attack Dresden— they abandon the 
assault— their loss on the occasion— Advantages of the French— Fate of 
Moreau. 

On the 15th of August I proceeded to Landeck, where 
His Prussian Majesty's head-quarters then were, for the rati- 
fication of the treaties before alluded to, when intelligence 
was received that the French had crossed the line of demar- 
cation on the roads to Landshut, Jauer, and Neumarkt. Gene- 
ral Blucher took up a position at Schweidnitz; and General 
Sachen had orders to occupy Breslau. It was stated to have 
been said by the French general, Girard, at Lowenberg, that 
a very large army was to move on Berlin. Davoust was ad- 
vancing with the corps assembled round Magdeburg. The 
troops at Leipsic, Dessau, and throughout Lusatia, were now 
also in motion. 

Private accounts gave the detail of the French army as 
divided into thirteen corps: the 4th, which was in canton- 
ments near Sprottau, marched thence on the 12th of August 
towards Greseberg. It was supposed that this corps would 
pass the Oder, and proceed along the right bank of that river 
towards Kastrin. The corps of Ney, Lauriston, and Bertrand, 
were in the neighborhood of Lignitz, The 5th corps had 
been encamped hitherto near Goldberg, but had marched on 
Lignitz. The 6th corps left Bunzlau on the r2th for the 
same destination. The 11th corps marched on the same day 
from Lowenberg towards Lignitz; which place had been 
strongly fortified. Another corps encamped at Grciffenberg, 
was not yet put in motion. The French park of artillery at 
Bunzlau was sent to Lignitz. Scbastiani had arrived at Hay- 
nau. The 2d corps consisted chiefly of nineteen regiments 
of cavalry, which were however weak, not having more than 
3 or 400 in each regiment. 

It was believed that the French troops assembled upon the 
Katzbach were not intended to act offensively against Silesia, 
but were to enter Bohemia through the Riesen-GebOrge, in 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 81 

concert with another French corps cfarmee^ to penetrate from 
Zittau : thus breaking in on the line of march of the Russians 
and Prussians at Prague, and turning the positions of the 
Austrians on the banks of the Elbe. 

It was intimated that the Emperor of Russia was disposed 
to place the whole of the army of Barclay de Tolly under 
Prince Schwartzenberg; and General Moreau was to be re- 
quested by both Emperors to assist the Austrian field-marshal. 
His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland now arrived 
from Strelitz, having learnt that His Prussian Majesty was 
at Landeck, on his way to Prague, whither His Royal High- 
ness determined to proceed. 

When I found the head-quarters were moving to Prague, 
I immediately applied to Count Stadion for passports for His 
Royal Highness. The Count declined giving passports until 
he had communicated with his Emperor on his arrival at 
Prague, but promised to send his answer to Landeck. The 
King of Prussia left Landeck for Prague on the 16th ; and as 
I received no answer from Count Stadion, I arranged with 
His Royal Highness that he should remain at Landeck, whilst 
I went forward and prepared for his reception at Prague. 

I found, on my arrival there, that no point had been so 
much canvassed as that of the chief command. The Emperor 
Alexander nobly aspired to the title of military captain: his 
personal intrepidity, perseverance, and firmness, entitled him 
to great consideration in this respect ; and my impression is, 
had Austria consented to place the whole of the allied forces 
under his orders, there would have been a unity of design, 
productive of beneficial results. The King of Prussia was 
not disinclined to this opinion. I do not mean to advance that 
the Emperor did not reserve some advice and assistance in 
command, but with General Moreau and the council the chief 
direction might have been well placed in His Imperial 
Majesty's hands : and considering the temper of the Russians, 
if they became dissatisfied, it did not appear the least advi- 
sable arrangement. 

Austria naturally wished, from the prominent part she had 
taken, to be the arbiter of a universal peace, and have the 
glory of her own work ; and she was therefore desirous of 
an Austrian for the military command. A certain degree of 
jealousy of Russia on political points operated against her 
yielding to the Emperor's wishes ; and, above all, the arrival 
of Moreau created discontent amongst the Austrians, and 
was perhaps the principal reason why the command in chief 
was not offered to the Emperor Alexander. At this period, 
Prince Schwartzenberg sent the orders of the day secretly 
to Barclay de Tolly ; but they were promulgated to the Rus- 



82 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

sians as if emanating from their own general. Generals 
Moreau and (afterwards) Jomenil, both at the head-quarters 
of the Emperor Alexander, pressed strongly for His Imperial 
Majesty's assuming the chief command. This was natural ; 
as their own influence would be thereby more conspicuous in 
the eyes of Europe, in conducting the operations with an Em- 
peror of Russia as commander-in-chief than an Austrian 
Prince, whose character was established as an excellent and 
experienced officer. 

Next to the command in chief there was renewed con- 
tention regarding the Breslau central commission, and the 
occupation of the territories wrested from the enemy. This 
last point had become (owing perhaps to Baron Stein's pres- 
ence and want of employment) a topic of much deliberation. 
Austria did not like to agree to such an arrangement as was 
formed at Breslau : it remained then to be seen w-hether a 
new one might not be concocted more agreeable to all parties. 

There was incessant debate relative to the immediate of- 
fensive or defensive operations, among the great military 
chiefs in the respective armies. x\ustria thinking her troops 
young, preferred waiting Buonaparte's attacks; but Russia 
and Prussia overruled this caution ; and the campaign was 
pressed on the general plan, as laid down at Trachenberg : 
a reference to which, with what I have described, will con- 
vey, I trust, a general idea of the operations. 

It may not be wholly uninteresting to revert here to the 
general observations made at Prague upon the rupture of 
recent neo'otiations. Count Narbonne left Prague on the 
14th; Caulaincourt remained till the 16th, and instead of 
answering direct the Austrian ultimatum, made some new 
propositions. It was however intimated to Caulaincourt that 
he could not with propriety remain in Prague, where the 
Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia were hourly expected ; 
consequently he withdrew to a country-house in the neigh- 
borhood, where he stayed until his overtures were rejected. 
He w^as very urgent to obtain an audience of the Emperor of 
Russia ; but that was positively interdicted. The purport of 
those propositions was rumored to be; 1st. Napoleon was 
willing to cede the duchy of Warsaw, provided the King of 
Saxony received elsewhere an indemnification of 500,000 
souls for this cession ; 2d. Prussia receiving Poland, was 
thereout to provide for that indemnification. Buonaparte also 
agreed to yield Dantzic and its territory, after a certain 
period, with the express condition that the works were to be 
completely destroyed. He consented, likewise, to restore the 
Illyrian provinces, with the exception of Istria ; and some 



m GERiMAPfY AND FRANCE. 83 

added Fiume and Trieste. These were the outlines of the 
last offer. 

Austria was reported to reply, in answer, that her powers 
had ceased as a mediator ; but she consented to submit the 
proposals to the allies, by whom they were formally rejected, 
as wholly inadmissible. Caulaincourt then departed, but his 
conduct was very moderate ; and if it had depended on him, 
the terms of Austria would probably have been accepted. 
Narbonne, in all his communications to his Emperor, before 
Caulaincourt's arrival, expressed his firm conviction that 
Austria would never act hostilely, but only threatened to ac- 
complish her own objects. Caulaincourt suddenly arrived at 
Prague, and positively ascertained Count Metternich's deter- 
mination to declare war after the 10th, and saw that Nar- 
bonne had been deceived. His consternation was then great; 
and courier upon courier was dispatched to Buonaparte. 

Buonaparte was much urged by the Empress and Senate 
at Mayence to make peace on any terms. His answer is 
reported to have been, " All or nothing :" meaning to preserve 
all his conquests, or try the chance of war. His language 
always indicated confidence in his own genius and physical 
strength. He had, according to the most accurate accounts, 
above 300,000 men on the right bank of the Rhine. The 
Austrian force was now computed at 160,000 men in Bohe- 
mia, 30,000 in the valley of the Danube, and 50,000 on the 
banks of the Saave. 

The command v/as at length confided to Prince Schwartz- 
enberg. The two Emperors were to remain at or near the 
head-quarters of their respective armies, and the King of 
Prussia with those of the Emperor Alexander. Little was 
hitherto positively known of Buonaparte's intentions. He 
went from Dresden to Bautzen, and thence proceeded towards 
Gorlitz, Many augured that he would commence his opera- 
tions against the Prince Royal of Sweden ; whilst others said 
such a measure would be too hazardous, and conjectured that 
he would retire behind the Elbe, and enter Bohemia by the 
roads of Peterswalde and Sebastiansberg. 

Prince Paul Esterhazy was now named by the Austrian 
government for the embassy to England ; and intelligence 
arrived from home that the Earl of Aberdeen was appointed 
His Britannic Majesty's ambassador to the Emperor of Aus- 
tria, and was on his way to the head-quarters of .the army. 

Previous to noticing the arrival of a British ambassador, I 
cannot help doing justice to the noble sentiments which were 
unofficially expressed to me by Count Metternich, at an in- 
terview I had with him at Prague, at this interesting epoch. 
He began by detailing the course he had pursued since he 



84 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR 

had taken the reins of government. He found the finances 
of the Austrian monarchy in a state of insolvency, and the 
despondency of its subjects at the lovi^est ebb. He arranged 
the marriage of the Archduchess, to give his country the first 
ascending step from the abyss of misfortune into which it had 
fallen ; never intending, when existence and power were again 
secured, that the marriage should direct or influence the 
politics of the cabinet of Vienna. He persevered in his 
course, he added ; and deaf to the opinions and entreaties of 
all, he would not stir, notwithstanding the most urgent so- 
licitations. When the Russians were on the Memel, he told 
them to come to the Oder and to the Elbe ; and when Aus- 
tria was ready, she should act. He was universally suspected ; 
but he had only a single object in view — to raise his country, 
and through her reascendency give peace to the world. He 
said he knew that the British cabinet had always doubted 
him : he did not wonder at it ; but that he hoped he should 
at length stand justified in their opinion, and that of posterity. 
He wished for nothing so much as to establish the most cor- 
dial relations between the two courts, which he hoped would 
be effected without delay. And here I am bound to add, that 
from this period to the death of that statesman who then pre- 
sided over our foreign affairs, there never was any serious 
divergence of sentiment on any great European question. 
The last letter from Bassano to Metternich was received pre- 
vious to the above conversation. This dispatch began and 
ended in an offensive tone, stating that Austria avoit prostitue 
the character of a mediator, for that to Bassano's knowledge 
she had been long united with the allies. Nevertheless, the 
extreme and urgent desire of the Emperor for peace, prompt- 
ed him to make another offer; that some neutral point should 
be fixed for negotiators to assemble even during the progress 
of hostilities. The deliberate answer returned by Metternich 
was, that the allies would never refuse to listen to negotiations 
for peace, provided England and Sweden consented, and as- 
sisted at the negotiations, of which the propositions of the 
16th of May were to form the basis. 

The Austrian army was reviewed by the three Sovereigns 
near Schlan, six miles from Prague, on the 19th of August. 
It was a most sublime military spectacle ; ninety-one battal- 
ions of infantry and fifty squadrons of cavalry defiled before 
their Majesties. The battalions were about 800 strong ; and 
the infantry amounted to something more than 70,000 men. 
The cavalry present did not exceed 7000 : the remainder of 
it and light troops formed the advanced-guard, consisting of 
three divisions, about 30,000 men; these were in advance,, 
and not inspected. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 85 

The composition of this army was magnificent, although I 
perceived a great many recruits : still the system that reigned 
throughout, and the military air that marked the soldier, es- 
pecially the Hungarian, must ever fix it in my recollection 
as the finest army of the continent. The Russians may pos- 
sess a more powerful soldiery, of greater physical strength 
and hardihood, but they cannot equal the Austrians in disci- 
pline or military malntien. The general officers of the latter 
are of a superior class; and the army has a fine ton in all its 
departments. To see one Austrian and one Hungarian regi- 
ment, is to see the army : for a complete equality and uni- 
formity reign throughout ; and they have no constant changes 
of uniform and equipment : their movement was beautifully 
correct, and the troops seemed formed in the most perfect 
order. Twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers and sixteen of 
hussars deserved to be particularly noticed. Among the for- 
mer were the cuirassiers of the Emperor, who were presented 
with new standards ; and the three Sovereigns nailed in uni- 
son their standards to the pole in front of the army, as a token 
of their firm alliance. This was a most exhilarating moment. 
The hussars are peculiar to this army in their style and ap- 
pearance : in vain do others imitate them ; and it is but strict 
justice to admit, that they are incomparable, I may say match- 
less. 

The artillery seemed less well appointed ; and the ammu- 
nition-wagons and horses for their guns and train were of an 
inferior description to those of the Russians (whose artillery 
horses are perfect) ; but the officers and men are scientific 
and expert, and the artillery is not to be judged of by its ap- 
pearance. 

From the military reports now current, it appeared that the 
grand allied and French armies were making two conver- 
sions, as it were — the allied armies wheeling from Bohemia 
into Saxon]?', by the passes of Peterswalde and Komotau ; and 
the French forces withdrawing from Silesia were turning to- 
wards Bohemia, and collecting on the right bank of the Elbe. 
These demonstrations denoted the approach of a serious con- 
flict; and it v/as argued that if it should occur, the allies 
would probably engage with their front towards the Elbe ; 
and the enemy having it in their rear, would offer a tremen- 
dous resistance ; and that if Napoleon acted upon military 
principles, he would retire to the left bank of the Elbe, and 
rather give battle on that side. 

The French forces having commenced their retreat on the 
15th from Grimberg and Freystadt in Silesia, abandoning the 
line of demarcation, the allies immediately moved forwards. 
General Blucher's corps, as has been before observed, from 

H 



86 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

its position at Schweidnitz, occupied successively the points 
evacuated by the enemy. General Sacken's corps entered 
Breslau ; and on the 18th the greater part of Silesia, and par- 
ticularly the towns of Parchwitz, Lignitz, and Goldberg, were 
abandoned. General Blucher had his advanced-posts at Low- 
enberg. 

From these movements, it was expected that the interest- 
ing intelligence would soon arrive of the French having 
wholly retired into Saxony ; but while the retreat v/as con- 
tinued here, an effort was preparing in another quarter. By 
the reports up to the 17th from Berlin, all seemed quiet in 
that direction, the Prince Royal having his head-quarters at 
Potsdam : thus it was apparent that the grand armies, on the 
frontiers of Bohemia and Saxony, would first come in con- 
tact. 

The enemy's great assemblage of troops was at Zittau, 
Grossenhayn, and Chemnitz. From the former place they 
moved a corps on the 17th against the Austrian General, Neu- 
perg, who was at Friedland with about 25,000 men. General 
Regnier and Poniatowski's corps made this movement. The 
Austrian General, as the enemy's approach was sudden and 
unexpected, retired. The great operations of the allied ar- 
mies were now in activity on the principal roads to Leipsic, 
by the passes of Peterswalde and Komotau. The Russian 
and Prussian armies were proceeding by the former, namely, 
the corps under Count Wittgenstein and General Milorado- 
vitch, with the reserve of the guards and cavalry ; General 
Kleist being on the right, and the Austrian army occupying 
the left. The advances approached near St. Sebastiansberg 
and Lobositz, thus pressing on the enemy's flank; and as he 
had delayed his retreat so long, according to all reasonable 
calculation he must have severely suffered from it. 

Buonaparte reviewed his guards at Leipsic on the 10th 
(called 30,000 men) ; and his having withdrawn them from 
Dresden, indicated that he meditated his great concentration 
near the former place. The Emperor of Russia moved his 
head-quarters on the 21st to Walditz ; the Emperor of Aus- 
tria to Lahn ; and the King of Prussia followed on the 22d. 

Mention has been made of the French general, Jomenil : 
he had come over from the enemy, and was an officer cele- 
brated for his military writings. He was appointed (I believe) 
a Lieutenant-general in His Imperial Majesty's service; and 
his experience and knowledge were no doubt of the highest 
importance in the approaching crisis. In a conversation I 
had with this officer, he stated Napoleon's force to be very 
strong; and, above all, that the exertions he made in France 
to re-equip and re-organize a great mass of artOlery were 



liV GERMANY AND FRANCE. 87 

quite astonishing. He added, that his contemptuous conduct 
had deprived him of every sincere friend he ever had ; and 
that he lived in tlie army only from the fear entertained of 
him, and the ability he possessed, which his most inveterate 
enemy was compelled to admit. This opinion of his talents, 
from such a source, was at any rate interesting. 

It was no ordinary satisfaction, at this juncture, that intel- 
ligence reached the allied army from Paris, dated the 12th, 
stating that Lord Wellington had completely defeated Soult, 
near Roncesvalles, on the 28th of July. The French General 
had retired first on St. Jean de Luz, and afterwards to St. 
Jean Pied de Port, near Bayonne ; and Lord Wellington was 
following him, up to the 31st, when the accounts came away. 
All Soult's baggage, artillery, and 15,000 prisoners, were 
Kaid to be takenT St. Sebastian's, and it was believed also Pam- 
peluna, had both fallen. On the Mediterranean side, Suchet 
was retiring from Barcelona towards Perpignan ; and was so 
annoyed by the British fleet, added to his general position, 
that the greatest appreliensions were entertained at Paris for 
the safety of his army. It was added, from the best authority, 
tliat Soult had written, that unless Buonaparte could send 
him 50,000 fresh troops that had never been in Spain, it 
would be quite impossible to maintain any footing in the 
Peninsula. Intelligence arrived also from Toulon and other 
quarters of French disasters; and the greatest panic pre- 
vailed in the south of France, and families were flying in 
all directions. Such were the gratifying details circulated 
through the allied army; and the glory of the above achieve- 
ments could be equalled only by their opportune occurrence. 

To return to the military operations before us. While 
the main Russian army under General Barclay de Tolly, in- 
cluding the corps of Wittgenstein and JVIiloradovitch, and the 
Prussian corps of General Kleist, together with the whole of 
the Austrian army, were to act offensively from Bohemia, un- 
der the chief command of Prince Schwartzenberg, — General 
Bluclier's corps d\irmee, composed of a division of Prussians 
under B'Yorck, Generals Sachen's and Langeron's Russian 
divisions were to move from Silesia on Lusatia, and threaten 
the enemy in front. General Blucher was directed to avoid 
any general action, especially against superior numbers. 

In conformity with those instructions, General Blucher ad- 
vanced, on the 20th, in three columns, from Lignitz, Goldberg, 
and Jauer, on Bunzlau and Lowenberg; General Sachen's 
corps moved to tlie riglit on Bunzlau; D'Yorck's in the centre, 
and Langeron's on tlie left. The enem}'^ abandoned Bunzlau, 
destroying tlieir works and magazines. General Blucher's 
force advanced to the Bober, where they were attacked, on 



gg NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

the 21st, by the enemy under Marshal Ney, and by the 6th 
corps under Marmont. These moved in great force on Bunz- 
lau, Lovvenberg, and Lahn; and a very serious affair took 
place. It was reported that Buonaparte also was in person in 
the field, and that he opposed 100,000 men to the force of 
Blucher. 

The allied troops contested the g'round with great bravery; 
but as General Blucher had received orders to avoid a general 
engagement, he withdrew in the bent order to Haynau, 
Siegendort, Horschberg, and behind the Katzbach. The Iobs 
of General Blucher in this affair was reported to be 3000 men : 
he took, however, several prisoners. The enemy suffered 
considerably; but General Blucher deemed it expedient to 
fall back with his army on Jauer. 

Having now detailed the first movements of the army of 
Silesia, I return to the grand armies on the side of Bohemia, 
which, on the 20th and 21st, commenced passing the fron- 
tiers. Count Wittgenstein's and General Kleist's columns 
proceeded by the pass of Peters walde, and the Austrians by 
Komotau. On the 22d, Count Wittgenstein's corps fell in 
with the enemy, and had a very serious affair with them near 
Timscht. 

The enemy encountered the allies on the frontiers ; but, 
although they endeavored to defend every inch of ground, 
they were beaten back from all their positions towards Dres- 
den. The different columns of the allied armies debouched 
from the mountains, and passed at such concerted points as 
would probably have operated fatally on the enemy, if the 
arrangements, as planned, had been completely carried into 
effect? But the eagerness of the troops to push on and en- 
gage, brought, on the morning of the 22d, the right corps into 
action before the other columns were up. 

The French were commanded by Gouvion St. Cyr, and 
their force consisted of upwards of 15,000 men : they were 
supported by their troops from Koningstein, and by the camp 
of Ijllienstein, which amounted to at least 6000 men, under 
General Bonnet. After a very sharp action, Count Wittgen- 
stein drove the enemy before liim, and took 3 or 400 prison- 
ers. The French had also a vast number killed and wounded: 
the loss of the allies was not severe. 

After this action, the enemy retired into Koningstein and 
his intrenched camp, and also into tJie various works he had 
thrown up round Dresden. The allies pressed forwards on 
every side; and the grand army now manccuvred to encircle 
Dresden. 

On the 20th, the hussar regiment of Grodno, belonging to 
Wittgenstein's corps, had a very brisk engagement close to 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. S9 

Dresden, in which they took four guns and 6onie howitzers. 
The advanced-guards of the Russians, Prussians, and Austri- 
ans, encamped that night on the heights above Dresden. 

On the morning of! the 26th, the French abandoned the 
ground which they had occupied, in advance of Dresden, 
called the Grossen-Garten, and withdrew into the suburbs 
and their difl'erent redoubts. As no official reports were made 
out, every hour being fraught with events, details may in 
many points be imperfect; but certainly the history of war 
nowhere offers any period like the one before us, in which 
two such immense armies stood committed to such bold opera- 
tions. If Buonaparte maintained his positions in advance, 
it was evidently with an intention of forcing a passage into 
Bohemia, and adopting that plan of campaign against the al- 
lies which they so successfully foiled and imitated. The pos- 
session of Koningstein afforded him a facility of passing the 
Elbe at that place, moving into the mountains of Bohemia, 
and acting against the pivot of the force with which he was 
contending : on the other hand, such an attempt was sure to 
be hazardous, and if it failed destructive. 

Napoleon felt at this period the absolute necessity of his 
presence on the Elbe, in front of the grand army. He arrived, 
therefore, on the 23d, with Marshal Ney, leaving Marshal 
Macdonald in command of the army opposed to Blucher in 
Silesia, consisting of the 3d, 5th, and 11th corps; and on the 
24th, Marmont's corps, the 6th, and General Latour Mau- 
bourg's cavalry, also received orders to return to Dresden. 

Tvv^o Westphalian regiments of hussars, commanded by 
Colonel Hammerstein, now came over from the enem}'-, and 
were eager to be incorporated with the allies, and take their 
revenge for the misery the French had inflicted upon their 
country. 

The enemy having on the morning of the 27th abandoned 
the ground surrounding Dresden, called the Grossen-Garten, 
and having withdrawn into their works and into the suburbs 
of the town, it was deemed expedient, as its possession had 
become of considerable importance, to make an attack with 
a large force upon the place. During the morning of the 
26th, in the attack of the gardens. Count Wittgenstein's and 
General Kleist's light corps, on the right of the town, expe- 
rienced some loss; and indeed the enemy had so much im- 
proved by art the defences around it, that the capture by 
assault was evidently an enterprise of considerable difficulty. 
The most important of the fortifications of the city, were 
three strong redoubts on the left bank of the Elbe ; one before 
the Freyberg, and the others before the Plauen and Dippol- 
diswald gates. The troops moved to the attack at three 

H2 



1 



90 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

o'clock in the afternoon : Count Wittgenstein's corps, in three 
columns, on the right of the Grossen-Garten ; while General 
Kleist's moved one column through these gardens, and two 
on the left. The left column was headed by Prince Augustus 
of Prussia. 

Three divisions of Austrians, at the same time, on the left 
of the town, under the immediate direction of Count Coloredo 
and Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, joined the Prussians ; 
these formed the centre attack, the Russians being on their 
left. A tremendous cannonade commenced this grand opera- 
tion : the batteries being planted in a circular form round the 
town. The effect was magnificent. The fine buildings of 
Dresden were soon enveloped in smoke and flame ; and the 
troops moved forward in the most perfect order to the assault. 
They approached on all sides close to the town ; and the 
Austrians took an advanced redoubt, with eight guns, in the 
most undaunted and gallant style. The work was of the 
strongest description, situated about sixty yards from the main 
wall ; and nothing could surpass the gallantry with which it 
was stormed. 

The enemy fled from it only to shelter themselves behind 
new defences, manning the thick walls of the town, in which 
it was impossible, without a long and continued fire of heavy 
artillerj'', to make a breach. The French, v;ith the aid of the 
means of resistance which a strong tovv^n afibrds, now held in 
check the troops which had so gallantly carried and entered 
the outworks. The night was fast approaching ; and the 
enemy now attempted to make a sortie with all his guards, 
amounting at least to 30,000 men, in order to separate the 
allied troops, and take each wing in flank and rear. This 
was immediately perceived ; and as it appeared evident that 
it was not practicable to carry the place that night, orders 
were sent to draw off the troops, which returned to their 
several encampments. Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein adopt- 
ed an admirable disposition on the side where the enemy 
made their sortie, and by which all disorder v;as avoided. 
This enterprise, in proportion to its importance, was one of 
great difticulty. 

No troops could have signalized themselves more than 
those of the allies engaged in this day's combat; and if it had 
been physically possible to have carried the place under the 
circumstances, they would have accomplished it. Unfortu- 
nately, there were no breaches practicable for the troops to 
enter; and the artillery, although brought up at the close of 
the evening to within one hundred paces of the wall, was 
unable to batter it, or make any material impression. From 
the best calculation, the loss of the allies was under 5000 



IN' GERM AN^l'" ANI) FRANCE. 91 

men ; and m this attack the Austrians chiefly suffered. The 
sortie of the enemy was a prelude to a more genera] engage- 
ment, which took place the following morning, on the 27th. 
Buonaparte having a strong force in Dresden, at least 130,000 
men, determined on attacking the allies, who occupied a very 
extended position on the surrounding heights. The enemy 
had great advantages in their disposition for attack. Dresden, 
bristled with guns, was in their rear ; while their communi- 
cations were not intersected. If they made an impression, 
they could follow it up; and in case of failure, could with- 
draw in security. The allied troops, if victorious, could not 
pursue under the guns of the fortress. One of the worst days 
ever seen added materially to the embarrassment of the allies, 
who had arrived at their positions by rapid marches, through 
bad roads and defiles; and their supplies of every kind it was 
difficult, if not impossible, to bring up. 

Availing himself of the advantages above stated, Napoleon 
displayed an immense number of field-pieces on* the morning 
of the 27th ; and heavy cannonading on both sides formed 
the chief feature of the battle. Charges in various parts 
were made, as well with Russian and Prussian, as Austrian 
cavalry, and they distinguished themselves highly; but the 
main bodies of the infantry in both armies did not come into 
contact. The weather was hazy ; the rain incessant. The 
action was sustained at all points under tlie heaviest disad- 
vantages ; and towards the middle of the day a catastrophe 
occurred, which awakened more than ordinary sensibility and 
regret throughout the allied army. 

General Moreau, while in earnest conversation with the 
Emperor of Russia on the progress of operations, had both 
his legs carried otf by a cannon-shot (the ball piercing the 
body of his horse). Thus the good cause and the profession 
of arms sustained a heavy loss. It was impossible not deeply 
to lament the hard fate of an amiable man and gallant sol- 
dier, whose talents, patriotism, and courage were doubted and 
decried, and his life cut short by his own countrymen. The 
enemy continued his efforts on the position of the allies till 
the evening, when finding he could make no impression, the 
action ceased. 

The battle cost the allies 6 or 7000 men : the enemy must 
have suffered more. In one charge of Russian cavalry against 
infantry and a battery, a great number of prisoners were 
taken, though the guns were not brought off. 



92 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Difficulties of the allies after their retreat from Dresden — Advantages of 
Napoleon — Causes of the late failure — Prince Schwartzenberg — Buona- 
parte's fortresses on the Elbe — Complexion of affairs — Operations of Gen- 
eral Blucher — Brilliant affair of General Sachen's corps — The Silesian 
army pursue the enemy — Successes of Blucher — Action near Toplitz — 
Bravery of the Russian guards — The Duke of Cumberland— Defeat of 
Vandamme at Kulm — The grand army encamps near Toplitz — Events 
in the north under the Prince Royal of Sweden — Repulse of General Ber- 
trand — Victory obtained by the Crown Prince — Napoleon attacks the 
army of Silesia — Various military operations — Interests of the different 
powers. 

The general difficulties which the ailied army had to en- 
counter, owing to their failure on Dresden (by no means 
anticipated), now became apparent ; not only from the large 
force opposed to them, but from tlie opinion that Napoleon 
would pass a considerable body of troops across the Elbe at 
Koningstein and Pirna, to possess himself of the passes iu 
the rear of the Abur : these and other considerations operated 
in forming the resolution to withdraw the allied armies behind 
the Eger. Orders for this purpose were issued on the evening 
of the 28th ; and the army commenced its retrograde move- 
ment in different columns. The enemy did not follow vigor- 
ously ; but the roads through the passes were extremely 
bad, and the difficulty of getting the artillery and baggage 
through them was extreme. 

It was impossible not to regret that so fine and numerous 
an army, perfectly entire in all its parts, should have been 
reduced to the necessity of making any retreat ; as miscal- 
culations might be made on the event, and the enemy might 
suppose he had gained essential advantage. But it was cer- 
tain the allied army was as eager as ever to meet the enemy ; 
the same determined spirit existed : though a partial change, 
of operations might be deemed necessary, the general result 
of the campaign was in no degree doubted. The enemy's 
force was not diminished on the side of Lusatia, from his 
efforts on the Elbe up to the 23d, as he again attacked Gene- 
ral Blucher on that day in great force, who retired upon 
Jauer ; of which I shall speak elsewhere. During these 
events, the Austrian corps of General Neuberg had also 
advanced in the direction of Zittau for some days past. 

In the bold game both armies were now playing, Buonaparte 
had this great advantage — there was one mind directing one 
force ; whereas the allies, with national jealousies ever aris- 
ing, had to encounter great impediments. In these first 
operations, Wittgenstein was much censured tor having 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 93 

engaged his columns too soon, and advanced too rapidly, be- 
fore the other corps deboucheing from the mountains had got 
more into the rear of the enemy, advancing on the frontiers. 
The attack on the town of Dresden was boldly attenipted : 
yet I could not but feel surprised that the Austrians, so well 
versed in war, should have moved their columns of attack 
up to the glacis of a town in which no breach had been 
previously made, and without scaling-ladders, or means of 
accomplishing any lodgment when the troops should ai'rive 
at the fosse. 

The bravery of the troops was unquestionable : but the 
previous plan was ill-digested ; and the necessary prepara- 
tions for insuring success were, I conclude, confided to some 
unskilful subordinates. The assault was certainly commenced 
at too late an hour in the evening, as it became twilight the 
moment the troops arrived at the ramparts ; whilst the enemy 
had perfect light to observe the directions in which the dif- 
ferent columns approached. Now the desideratum in similar 
attacks is to arrive concealed at the points where the troops 
are to mount, and to wait for light to begin the work. When 
the Austrians carried the advanced works, they were tediously 
exposed to a galling fire from the enemy, owing to the want 
of their pioneers to destroy the palisades, through which they 
could not penetrate. However, nothing ever surpassed their 
gallantry. When the sortie was made as it was growing 
dark, there was some disorder ; and I was fortunate enough, 
with Prince John of Lichtenstein and my aide-de-camp, to gal- 
lop through a French column ; and we were in rear of their 
batteries before we were aware of our danger. In this ex- 
tremity, our only chance was to dash through, trusting to our 
being undiscovered in the vieUe, which, in the obscurity of 
the evening, occurred. The brunt of this attack chiefly fell 
upon the Austrian army. The most that can be said of this 
battle is, that the raiu was intense and the mist general ; the 
positions were remote, and the intervals between the corps 
of the army so extensive, that at one position little or nothir,^ 
could be distinguished of what was going on at another. 
Buonaparte, on its immediate flank, below the extensive 
heights that surrounded Dresden, with his army collected, 
moved it with facility, and preserved it compact. His cavalry, 
under INIurat and Latour Maubourg, was always available, and 
of the highest service. The allies, extended, and occupying 
the larger circle, distant from their supplies, having bad roads 
in their rear, and sadly oppressed by the weather, labored 
under every disadvantage. 

The failure of the attack on the city was the first misfor- 
tune. Why it was not bombarded by all the mortars in the 



94 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

army, and why such insufficient measures were taken to as- 
certain the real state and improved strength of it before any 
attempt was made, remains for others to explain. If one 
asked the reason why Dresden was attacked under such cir- 
cumstances, the answer received was, that being before the 
town, it was necessary to do something. Much of the great 
evil resulted from the difficult and perplexing state in which 
the command still seemed to lay. Schwartzenberg nominally 
issued orders, and v;as undoubtedly chief; but the Emperor, 
all along eager for the glory of generalship, acted as a man 
who still aimed at and desired to obtain his favorite object. 
His own partisans and officers depreciated Schwartzenberg's 
military abilities. The latter was called upon for explana- 
tions of all orders he gave, when he should have been think- 
ing of future directions. Possibly only half his own plans, 
with half those of the Emperor's, who was aided by Moreau 
until his wound disabled him, were adopted ; while Jomenil, 
who was also in council, filled up the measure of embarrass- 
ments. 

No one would own the project that had just failed ; and 
each diverted the storm of blame from himself. The error 
was in grasping at the object too precipitately, and passing 
the defiles before means were collected to insure the subsist- 
ence of the army ; and before it was perfectly determined 
what the army was to accomplish when it came before Dres- 
den, already intrenched and made a respectable fortress. 
Buonaparte could never have annoyed our movements, by 
acting on our riglit flank, if we had not been too far and too 
heedlessly committed. The strong fortress of Theresienstadt, 
the works on the frontiers, and the Austrian corps of General 
Neuberg, who had been left to guard the defiles, gave ample 
security for the riglit ; and the most feasible movement, as I 
conceive, was for all the corps deboucheing from the left to 
have made a detour, so as to have appeared before Dresden 
previous to our right flank having forced the enemy from his 
forward positions near the passes. By thus proceeding, our 
right would have been always secure and respected ; our 
pivot, as it were, unmolested ; and the force that arrived be- 
fore Dresden would have compassed all v.e had in view, until 
we could see further into the intentions of the enemy. 

The allies should never have lost sight of the five very 
strong and important fortresses (no doubt fully supplied witli 
every article of war) which Buonaparte liad on the Elbe- 
Hamburgh, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden — 
which gave him the facility of being a chcval on that river 
in every point. Like a snake, he could twist and turn him- 
self, making front every way ; having his fortresses, his de- 



liV GERMANY AND FRANCE. 95 

pots, and his means at his back. The nunabers he possessed 
enabled him to meet the allies in any quarter ; and, above 
all, he had advantages that existed in the unity of action of 
his sing-le word and undivided command. 

Both the movements beyond the passes and the attack on 
Dresden were undertaken against the advice of General Mo- 
reau. His conduct and demeanor, since his arrival at the 
army, had been generally spoken of in the highest terras ; 
and he was the greatest loss the army could then have sus- 
tained. His heroism was truly great: after the fatal shot, he 
spoke to the Emperor with the most perfect self-possession, 
never uttered a groan, and smoked a cigar the moment after 
the shot had struck him. 

Prince Schwartzenberg, with whom I had much conversa- 
tion after the retreat, mentioned that Barclay de Tolly, to 
whom he sent orders on the day of the general action to ad- 
vance and attack, declared that it was impossible, as the 
enemy were too superior. It was undeniable that the retreat 
was attended with some disaster and confusion: the corps 
were mixed, retiring through the different defiles; ammunition, 
stores, and supplies, were everywhere deficient, A great 
quantity of baggage was taken : the stragglers and wounded 
were left behind ; and we lost at least 2000 men, up to the 
28th, by the retreat. But Schwartzenberg excused himself 
by the observation, that there was no commanding with Em- 
perors and Kings on the spot ; and he certainly had a difficult 
card to play. 

From the general complexion of affairs, it appeared that if 
Buonaparte persevered in making propositions, there was 
great probability they would be listened to. The conferences, 
political as well as military, became frequent. The Emperor 
of Russia, from the disappointment of not having the com- 
mand, was less eager to share in the contest; and Prince 
Schwartzenberg informed me, he deemed it judicious, at that 
moment, to avoid general actions, unless he were forced into 
them, and to act wholly on the defensive. 

I must now revert to General Blucher's army of Silesia, 
in position on the 24th at Jauer, and to that part of the French 
army wliich was before him upon the Katzbach. On the 25th, 
Marshal Blucher advanced, and took up the position of Hen- 
nersdorf; and on the 26th he made a general attack on the 
enemy. His three corps, of Sachen, D'Yorck, and Langeron, 
were to pass the Katzbach, between Goldberg and Lignitz. 
The enemy deployed between the villages of Weinberg and 
Eichholz. After an obstinate combat. General Sachen's corps 
took possession of Eichholz, which turned the enemy's po- 
sition ; and among the Russians, the Generals WassiltsLhakofF, 



96 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Navorossky, and Lieven, greatly distinguished themselves. 
The rain fell in torrents during the action, which was both 
bloody and decisive ; and the French were in full retreat, 
when a reserve arrived from Lignitz, with sixteen pieces of 
artillery, and attacked the right flank of Blucher's army, in 
the hope of saving Lauriston's corps from entire annihilation. 
Generals Lieven and Navorossky, however, again repulsed 
the enemy, and took the train of artillery ; maintaining their 
success until night closed on this brilliant action. 

On tlie 28th, the Silesian army, passing the Katzbach, con- 
tinued its pursuit of the enemy, who was forced to retire by 
the only passage overr the Bober at Bunzlau. The division of 
the French General, Pacthod, which had been detached to- 
wards Jauer to operate on Blucher's rear, was now cut off; and 
a corps under Prince ScherbatofF, and cavalry under General 
Korff, forced the surrender of his division, after a gallant re- 
sistance. This division consisted of ma.ny officers, 400 men, 
and two standards. 

On the 1st of September, Blucher's head-quarters were es- 
tablished at Lowenberg ; and he announced to his army that 
since the 26th he had taken 100 pieces of cannon, 250 tum- 
brils, three generals, many colonels, and near 20,000 prison- 
ers. We must now return to Bohemia. Napoleon, greatly 
elated by the retreat of the allies, considered them as sub- 
stantially broken, and took immediate measures for a vigor- 
ous pursuit of their different columns. The cavalry, with 
the 1st corps under General Yandamme, and the 6th and 14th, 
were immediately put in motion. Murat and Victor advanced 
to Freyberg ; Marmont to Dippoldiswald ; St, Cyr and Van- 
damme towards Nollendorff. Mortier took post at Pirna with 
part of the guards. On the 29th, Murat was at Leuchten- 
berg with the 2d corps ; the 6th at Falkenhein ; and the 14th 
at Reinhartsgrimma. 

General Vandamme followed the corps of the Russian Gene- 
ral, Osterman-Tolstoy, from Nollendorff towards Toplitz : the 
latter disputed every inch of ground with the enemy. A very 
hrilliant action now tool? place on the road from Toplitz to- 
wards Peterswalde, about two German miles from the former 
place. The Russian column under Count Osterman, retiring 
by the pass of Peterswalde, found the enemy, who had eventu- 
ally crossed the Elbe at Pirna and Koningstein, in possession 
of the pass in the mountains ; and Osterman's corps were to 
force their way through with the bayonet. They there re- 
mained in action with the enemy till late in the evening ; and 
having been reinforced by the reserve of the Russian guards, 
cavalry, and infantry, the former under the orders of the 
Grand-Duke Constantine, who were sent rapidly to their sup- 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 97 

port, this body of troops, consisting of about 8000, held in 
check during the day two corps and one division of the 
French army, under Generals Vandamme and Bertrand, 
amounting to at least 30,000 men. As to the dauntless con- 
duct of His Imperial Majesty's guards, were I to describe 
here the admiration I felt at witnessing their reckless bravery, 
I should fail for language to express it. 

Tlie light cavalry of the guards, consisting of the Polonese 
and dragoon regiments, charged columns of infantry, regard- 
less of every disadvantage or rule of modern warfare. Gene- 
ral Diebitsch, an officer of great merit, and now commander- 
in-chief of the Russian army in the East, particularly distin- 
guished himself: Prince Demeter Gallitzin in like manner, 
and he was wounded in the attack. Count Osterman, towards 
the close of the day, had his arm carried off by a cannon-shot. 
The General commanding the cuirassiers of St. George was 
also wounded. 

The importance of the firmness and audacity displayed by 
these troops is highly augmented, when it is considered that 
had they not held their ground, the columns of the army and 
the artillery retiring by Altenburg, which were delayed by 
the bad roads, would have been aux abols. 

His Prussian Majesty was in Toplitz when the enemy push- 
ed on by Peterswalde ; and he made the most able disposi- 
tions to reinforce Count Osterman. By his coolness and per- 
sonal exertions, he preserved order and regularity ; which 
even the momentary idea of the enemy aux reins is apt to 
destroy. The admirable conduct of this Sovereign, on every 
occasion, was the theme of invariable praise in the armies. 
The corps of Count Osterman lost 3200 men in this day's 
action, hors de combat. The French loss may be averaged at 
double. General Vandamme's corps suffered very severely. 
The cavalry of the Russian guard took two standards, and 3 
or 400 prisoners. The enemy followed the rear-guard during 
the day, on the Dippoldiswald road ; and they met with con- 
siderable check from the rear-guard, commanded by the Aus- 
trian general. Count Hardegg. 

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland arrived at 
Toplitz on the 28th, at the moment the enemy were making 
their impression in that quarter. His Royal Highness ran 
considerable risk of being taken ; but repaired immediately 
to the field of battle, and assisted in the operations through 
this and the following days, with all that ardor, true personal 
courage, and ability, that are proverbially the attributes of 
the royal family of England. 

The brilliant action of the 29th, in which the Russian 
guards covered themselves with glory, was followed up by a 

I 



98 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

very general and decisive victory over that part of the 
enemy's force which had advanced from Koningstein and 
Pirna, on the great chaussee leading from Peterswalde to 
Toplitz. It became of the utmost importance to make this 
attack ; not only to give time for those columns of the army 
to fall back, which were still retiring upon the Altenburg and 
Dippoldiswald roads, but at the same time to extricate the 
corps of General Kleist, which had not disengaged itself from 
the mountains. The enemy had the advantage, in pushing 
rapidly forward upon our right flank, of a good line of road ; 
whereas the columns of the allied army, although retiring by 
shorter lines, were impeded as well by the unfavorable state 
of the weather as by almost impassable roads. A great pro- 
portion of the artillery-train and baggage of the allied army had 
not got clear of the mountains, when the enemy had arrived 
at NollendorfT and Kulm, about three German miles distant 
from Toplitz, the scene where the action took place. 

The attack being determined upon, the following arrange- 
ment of the troops destined for that purpose was immediately 
made. Prince Schwartzenberg charged General Barclay de 
Tolly with the chief direction of the attack, and placed the 
divisions of Colored©, Bianchi, and Philippe de Hesse Hom- 
burg, with the Russian corps, at his disposition. 

Six thousand of the grenadiers of the latter, 2000 infantry 
and 4000 cavalry, imder the immediate orders of General 
Miloradovitch, together with 12,000 of the Austrians under 
Count Coloredo and General Bianchi, commenced the attack, 
the remainder of the troops collected far this enterprise being 
formed in columns of reserve upon the adjacent plain. The 
village of Kulm is situated at the bottom of a range of moun- 
tains, which forms an almost impregnable barrier between 
Saxony and Bohemia : from this point branch off two distinct 
ranges, east and west, between which the ground is generally 
flat, affording however, in some places, good defensible posi- 
tions. Upon this ground, immediately fronting the village of 
Kulm, the enemy collected a strong force of infantry, with a 
considerable train of artillery. A galling fire was maintained 
incessantly from this point upon the Russians, under General 
Miloradovitch. 

Such was the strength of the adjacent heights of Kulm, 
and so ably had the enemy disposed of their force for their 
defence, that it was judged more expedient to make the prin- 
cipal attack by the right : in consequence of which, the Aus- 
trian infantry were directed to move along the high ground 
upon the right, while the Russian guards and infantry were 
to commence their attack upon tlie left, as soon as the Aus- 
trians were sufficiently advanced. While these movements 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 99 

were executing, the corps of General Kleist, which had not 
been disengaged from the mountains, appeared in the enemy's 
rear, descending the road by which the latter expected to re- 
tire in case of need. 

On all sides the attack was commenced in the most vigor- 
ous and decisive manner. The enemy's left was turned by 
the skill and bravery of the Austrians, under Count Coloredo ; 
the cavalry charging repeatedly : while upon the other flank, 
General Miloradovitch, with the hussar imperial guards and 
grenadiers, forced every position, which the enemy in vain 
attempted to defend. Upon this point, above forty pieces of 
artillery and sixty tumbrils, much baggage, and the whole 
equipage of General Vandamme, fell into the hands of the 
Russians. Completely beaten in front at all points, and in- 
tercepted in their rear by General Kleist, nothing was left 
for the enemy, but a desperate and precipitate dispersion. 
Five hundred French horse immediately dashed through the 
Prussian landwehr, and actually took possession, for a few 
minutes, of the whole of General Kleist's artillery : it was, 
however, immediately recovered, by the rapid advance of the 
Russian and Austrian cavalry. 

The rout now became general ; the enemy throwing down 
their arms in every direction, and ceasing all resistance, 
abandoned their guns and standards to seek for shelter in the 
forests. The fruits of this victory were considerable: no 
less than the general commanding, Vandamme, six other 
general officers, among whom were Generals Giott, Hein- 
berg, and Prince Reass, sixty pieces of artillery, and about 
6000 prisoners, with six standards. The whole of General 
Vandamme's staff, and many officers of rank, were also num- 
bered among the prisoners. The enemy continued their re- 
treat, closely pursued by the Cossacks and allied cavalry. 

Having received a severe wound in the thigh, by the ex- 
plosion of a shell, shortly after the commencement of the ac- 
tion, I was under the necessity of quitting the field of battle 
late in the evening ; and my details must necessarily be more 
imperfect. It may be fairly stated, however, that the ene- 
my's force in this battle was annihilated, except a small body 
of cavalry that escaped under General Dumonceau, with 
other officers. This signal action amply compensated for the 
failure before Dresden; and with Blucher's brilliant victory 
of the Katzbach, renewed all the former enthusiastic hopes 
of the allied armies. After the battle, the grand army en- 
camped in the neighborhood of Toplitz, where the head-quar- 
ters of the three Sovereigns were established. 

The Prince Regent of England now sent the Order of the 
Garter to the Emperor of Russia, as a mark of his high es- 



100 NAR&ATIVE OF THE WAR 

teem and personal consideration. It was conveyed to His 
Imperial Majesty by Sir T. Tyrwhitt, who suffered not a 
little difficulty and embarrassment in his heavy equipages, 
traversing the bad roads, and mixing in the columns of march 
in the mountains ; and at this time the Emperor of Austria 
also conferred the Order of Maria Theresa on the Emperor 
of Russia and the King of Prussia. 

Leaving their Imperial Majesties in the delightful environs 
and luxurious residence of this far-famed and delicious wa- 
tering-place, where there is a magnificent palace of the Aus- 
trian prince, Clari, we must turn our eyes for a short time to 
the events in the north, under the Prince Royal of Sweden. 
Here, however, I can give only a cursory detail, as the care 
of my wound at Toplitz, with other circumstances, deprived 
me of that information, which otherwise I was likely to have 
obtained. 

The Prmce Royal, on the 17th of August, assembled his 
army between Berlin and Spandau, with his head-quarters at 
Charlottenburg. Marshal Oudinot now received orders to 
attack him with the 4th, 7th, and 12th corps, and a mass of 
cavalry, under the Duke of Padua. On the 21st, the Prince 
Royal moved his head-quarters to Potsdam. On the same 
day, the French attacked the line destined to cover Berlin ; 
and on the 22d, the Crown Prince took up the following po- 
sitions : — 

The Swedish army was stationed at Potsdam ; the Rus- 
sians were at Juterbock; the Prussian corps at Wittstock ; 
and General Winzingerode and his Cossacks at Belitz. On 
the 23d, General Bertrand attacked the Prussians, under Bu- 
low, Borstell, and Tauenstein, at Gross-beeven ; but was re- 
pulsed, with the loss of twenty-six guns, sixty tumbrils, and 
2000 prisoners. Partial actions continued to take place in 
this quarter during many of the following days; and the 
Prince Royal transferred his head-quarters to Saarmund, and 
then to Buchholz, on the 30tli. On the 4th of September he 
was at Rabenstein, where His Royal Highness projected 
passing the Elbe at Rosslau to move on Leipsic. 

In the mean time. Napoleon was unwilling to abandon his 
enterprise of taking Berlin ; he reinforced his troops in this 
quarter, and on tiie 4th intrusted to Marshal Ney the chief 
command. That general moved on the 6tli on Neundorff, 
Juterbock, and Roterbeck. General Bulow met the advancing 
columns with the brigades of Borstell, Thiimen, Kraft, and 
Hesse Homburg, and the corps of General Tauenstein. 
These, for some time, arrested the whole of Ney's force, 
amounting to 80,000 men, till the Prince Royal, with seventy 
battalions of Russians and Swedes, 10,000 cavalry, and 150 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 101 

pieces of cannon, advanced, and obtained a complete and 
signal victory. 

After the battle of Roterbeck and Juterbock, the enemy 
retired : tlieir loss amounted to 14 or 15,000 men, eighty 
pieces of cannon, and 10,000 prisoners. The Russians, on 
the part of the allies, suffered most, having 8000 men killed 
and wounded. In the mean time, General Blucher, with the 
Silesian army, passed the Neisse; and was following up hia 
victory, when Napoleon, now liberated by the retreat of the 
grand army through Bohemia, turned all his remaining force 
from Dresden against Blucher, who took up a position behind 
the Lobauer-Wasser. 

Napoleon attacked the army of Silesia on the 5th before 
Reichenbach, and obliged Blucher to retire across the Neisse 
and the Q,ueis ; but he was unable to follow the Prussians, 
as the victory of Kulm, and the advantages gained by the 
grand army, made him aware they would soon resume the 
offensive : he returned, therefore, to Dresden on the 6th. 
The delay that now occurred in the operations afforded the 
main army some repose, and placed them in a more efficient 
state : supplies of all kinds, particularly shoes, arrived. Count 
Wittgenstein proceeded to Peterswalde ; and Prince Eugene 
of Wirtemburg's division advanced to Dippoldiswald. The 
enemy took up strong positions in rear of the above places 
on the different roads. General Gouvion St. Cyr commanded 
their advance ; and the ground on the Peterswalde side was 
formidable, in case it were to be attacked. 

The intelligence from Dresden, that Napoleon had gone 
v/ith all his guards towards Bautzen with a view of acting 
on Blucher, hastened the movement of a large corps on Zit- 
tau to gain communication with the Silesian army. It had 
boen finally determined that 50,000 Austrians should make 
this movement; Prince Schwartzenberg taking the command 
of them ; and they were to arrive at Zittau on the 13th. The 
divisions of Meerveldt, and all the reserve under the Prince 
of Hesse Homburg, composed this force. 

Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein's light division proceeded, 
in the direction of Altenburg, to observe Freyberg ; and 
General Kleinau's division marched upon Chemnitz, to sup- 
port the light corps of General Thielman : which last was to 
continue its demonstrations towards Leipsic. The movement 
to the right bank of the Elbe with so large a support to 
General Bluciier, both from the intelligence received and the 
general complexion of affairs, was certainly the most prudent 
and judicious operation. 

By advices received, General Bennigsen's army of reserve 
had its advance already at Lignitz, where that general him- 

12 



102 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

self now was in person r it was stated at 80,000 men. The 
losses since the opening of the campaign to the grand army 
were not less than 35,000 men. The attempt to pass the 
range of mountains in front of the grand army having al- 
ready been attended with so little solid advantage, it was not 
likely to be again restored to ; nor indeed would it have been 
wise or judicious, when we consider that the season of the 
year was too far advanced to reckon with certainty upon 
favorable weather. 

The late success against Vandamme appeared to insure 
some offensive operations, which otherwise would have been 
avoided ; although no positive decision was yet arrived at as 
to what these offensive operations should be. I am apt to be- 
lieve it was the intention immediately to reinforce the Aus- 
trian general, Neuberg's, corps, which hitherto consisted only 
of 6 or 8000 men ; this had been stationed between the main 
army and that in Silesia and Lusatia. The allies seemed dis- 
posed, while they acted offensively, to do it at the least pos- 
sible hazard : they reinforced their troops upon the right bank 
of the Elbe, while they made demonstrations of meditating 
another formidable movement against Dresden and Leipsic. 
With this object, a corps had already been detached of 4000 
horse on the Chemnitz road to Leipsic ; and it was to be fol- 
lowed by a larger flying corps, as soon as the troops had taken 
a few days' repose. The French troops in Lusatia had been 
filing towards the Elbe, appearing to retire to the left bank 
of that river; but hitherto their intentions were by no means 
known. 

However great and formidable the alliance against France 
now appeared — however cordial and zealous were the allied 
powers for the common cause, still it was impossible the 
great leaders of the different armies should not have their 
military opinions in some degree governed by the immediate 
interests of the powers they represented. It was Russia's 
interest to act in Saxony, inasmuch as she might be looking 
to that feeble duchy as a future prize. It was Austria's to 
rouse the Tyrolese, to recover their own freedom and Italy. 
The movements chalked out for Bavaria upon the Danube 
were more congenial to her objects, and made her feel more 
secure. It was the interest of Prussia to remove the war 
from Silesia, and regain her strong-liolds. All these objects 
would be accomplished by the overthrow of the enemy : but 
it always has been, and will continue to be, the essential de- 
fect of great coalitions, both military and, I believe, political, 
that the several powers concerned will not divest themselves 
of the bias of their own immediate interests, or consent to 
forego the chances of attaining and securing their own objects 
during the progress of the operations they carry forward. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 103 



CHAPTER IX. 

Attack on the allies at Dohna — Severe contest — Count Wittgenstein retires 
— The Duke of Cumberland assists in the action — Buonaparte arrives in 
force from Dresden — Preparations for a general engagement — The French 
retire — Advance of the allies — Brilliant coup de main — Manoeuvres of Na- 
poleon—Continues his retreat — Partial action — Losses of Marshal Ney — 
Demonstrations before Kuhn — Attack on the allied position — Repulse of 
the enemy — Napoleon's horse shot under him — He retires towards Dresiien 
— Distress of the French army — Positions of the allies— Successes of 
Generals PlatofF and Thielman — Alfair near Altenburg — Movements of 
the allied army — Reports of Napoleon at Leipsic — Position of the Rus- 
sian and Prussian armies — System of Prince Sclnvartzenberg — Tidings 
of Lord Wellington's victories in Spain — Napoleon's letters to the Em- 
peror of Austria — Exalted position of England — Policy of Prince Met- 
ternich — The Emperor Alexander's letter to Sir C. Stewart — Progress of 
the Silesian army — Plans of the Prince Royal of Sweden— Napoleon'* 
manoeuvres on the Elster — Bold project and decided movements of the 
allies — Concentration of the enemj' towards Leipsic. 

On the 8th of Aug-ust, the corps of Count Wittgenstein, 
and part of General Kleist's, under the orders of General 
Zeithen, which had advanced throug-h the mountains beyond 
Peterswalde and on the road towards Dresden, were attacked 
by a very superior force of the enemy, and a sharp afiair took 
place. Count Wittgenstein had his head-quarters at Pirna 
when the enemy began their advance. The chief contest 
during the day was for the village of Dohna, which was de- 
fended with much steadiness and bravery by the allies ; but 
the enemy bringing up increasing numbers towards the even- 
ing, Count Wittgenstein determined to fall back, and evacu- 
ate Dohna. General Zeithen's c^jrps, therefore, was ordered 
to occupy Pirna in the evening, and Count Wittgenstein's 
corps fell back towards Peterswalde. The loss of the allies 
in this day's action may be estimated at about 1000 killed 
and wounded : that of the enemy was much more consider- 
able. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland was in 
the field, and assisted throughout tlie engagement. General 
Kleinau, with a corps, had been detached towards Frcyberg 
and Chemnitz, on the left ; while the Austrians had moved 
to Aussig and Leutmeritz, on the Elbe. On the 9th the enemy 
continued their advance ; and the allies retired, fighting every 
inch of ground in the mountains. Buonaparte arrived from 
Dresden; and a very large force was advancing, either with 
a determination to make a general attack, or for tlie purpose 
of a great demonstration to cover a retrograde movement, 
and the removal of a large magazine of powder from Kon- 
ingstein to Dresden. 

On the advance of the enemy, orders were immediately 
sent for the Austrians to countermarch ; and the allies imme- 



104. NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

diately began to collect all their forces in the now victorioua 
fields of Kulm and Toplitz. On the 10th, the enemy pressed, 
apparently with greater force, from the mountains, on Kulm 
and towards Toplitz. They had advanced not only with the 
columns that followed Count Wittgenstein's rear, but also 
with another very considerable corps by Kraupen. At this 
time the Austrian columns had not come into close commu- 
nication from Aussig and Leutmeritz ; and it was known the 
Russian and Prussian force in front of Toplitz was greatly 
outnumbered by the en-emy. It was however determined to 
give him battle in the event of his advancing, and the dispo- 
sition was accordingly made. The enemy continued, upon 
the 11th, to make such demonstrations as indicated a general 
attack; and on the 12th they advanced, and took possession 
of the village of Nollendorff, approaching close to Kulm. 
Above half the Austrian corps had now rejoined the army, 
and come into position : they had been marching in very bad 
weather and worse roads, without intermi.-sion, from the 10th 
instant; but arrived in excellent order. Buonaparte could at 
length perceive the allied army of upwards of 1G0,(100 men 
in position, with SOU pieces of cannon, ready to give him 
battle. It seems, however, that he began his retreat about 
mid-day from Nollendorff: the allies began immediately to 
clear their front, and to send out strong reconnoitring parties; 
and General Kleinau's corps was again detached to the left, 
and reinforced by two divisions under Prince Lichtenstein. 
Up to mid-day on the 13th the enemy still continued his re- 
treat, breaking up and destroying the roads in every direction 
towards Dresden. This rather delayed the pursuit of the 
allies, and made even any lateral movement more difficult. 
Accounts were now received of General Blucher's having 
entered Bautzen on the 10th ; and on the 0th, the Russian 
colonel. Prince Modatoff, of the Alexandroski guards, had exe- 
cuted a brillant coup de main between Bautzen and Dresden. 
He blew up 200 ammunition-wagons, took a part of tlie ba.g- 
gage of Napoleon, and made 1200 prisoners. On the 13th, 
General Count Bubna, who now commanded the Austrian 
corps, lately under General Neuberg, which had been much 
reinforced, entered Neustadt and Neukirchen ; and came into 
close communication with General Bluclier, who had his head- 
quarters at Hermshutt, with his advanced-posts beyond Baut- 
zen : the enemy having retired to BischofFswerde. On the 
14th, in the morning, the advanced-posts of the grand army 
advanced again to the frontiers by the Peterswaldc road. 
The rear-guard of the enemy, consisting of two battalions of 
infantry and a regiment of cavalry, and some guns, were 
forced from Nollendorff by Count Pahlen, commanding Count 



m 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 105 

Wittgenstein's advance : the artillery of the allies, and more 
force, was in readiness to follow, as soon as the roads could 
be made practicable. The Prussians, under General Kleist 
and Prince Augustus, moved to Ettersdorf. 

Buonaparte assisted personally at the grand reconnoissance 
made on the 10th. He had his head-quarters at Liebstadt 
on the 11th; and moved forward on the left of the allies to 
Barenstein, near Altenburg, on the 12th. The plan of the 
enemy appeared to have been to attack the allies, if he could 
do so with an evident advantage ; if not, to impede their ad- 
vance, and by menaces gain time, either to extricate himself 
from the dangerous predicament in which he stood, or to 
mancEuvre the allies out of their position. On the 15th, in 
the morning, the enemy continued to retire ; and Prince 
Schwartzenberg ordered a general reconnoissance to be made 
on all sides. Count Wittgenstein and Count Pahlen's corps 
fell in with the enemy near Peterswalde. Four squadrons 
of Russian cavalry very gallantly charged a French column, 
and cut down several hundred men. To give some idea of 
these attacks, from a French return which was found of the 
loss of the 7th regiment of infantry, when the Russian 
cavalry in Count Osterman's action charged, they had 825 
wounded, and 730 killed : the residue of fugitives remaining 
were 600. The enemy's corps in advance, opposed to Count 
Pahlen, consisted of 12,000 men, under General Bonnet, 
They made a good stand near Gotleibe: six Russian light 
guns did great execution, and forced this column to Jeave 
their ground. The main position of the enemy was not at- 
tacked. An Austrian corps of 17,000 men, under Count 
Coloredo, equally reconnoitred the enemy on the side of 
Berenstein and Breitenau. 

The head-quarters of the enemy were now moved to Dip- 
poldiswald. General Thielman's partisan-corps met with 
considerable success. He took possession of the town of 
Weissenfels, which was occupied by infantry and artillery; and 
made a general, forty officers, and near 1300 men prisoners ; 
these partisans were very useful. The Austrian Colonel, 
Mensdorff, took a French courier between Leipsic and Dres- 
den, charged with dispatclies and letters from the French 
army for Paris, at least 5000 in number: these letters gave 
the most doleful details of the French army, and of their 
defeats. Of the whole corps engaged under Marshal Ney, 
only 16,000 men had escaped : 10,000 had arrived at Dresden 
under Marshal Oudinot; the rest, according to these let- 
ters, were left at Wittenberg and Torgau. Reinforcements, 
amounting to 15,000 men, had reached Erfurth; but they 
were troops of an inferior description. It was also stated in 



106 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

these letters, that the new guards, and particularly the artil- 
lery, suffered dreadfully in the battle near Dresden : Generals 
Vachot and Leibu were killed, and Generals Dentail, Zios, 
Boisildieu, Maison, Ween, and Aubert, severely wounded. On 
the 15th, in the evening, the enemy brought up more troops 
against Count Pahlen : and as it was not the intention of the 
allies to engage in a general affair in the mountains and 
defiles of Saxony, the advanced-corps moved back to NoUen- 
dorff. The French had two corps (Carmee supporting their 
advanced-corps of 12,000 men. General Blucher's last ac- 
counts were from Bautzen, with his advanced-posts within a 
German mile of Dresden; and he was, at this period, in 
communication with the Prince Royal's army. 

Active preparations were made at the allied head-quarters 
for movements in advance by our left. General Kleinau's 
corps was at Marienburg. A considerable body of the enemy 
were at Freyberg, and a corps of their cavalry between that 
and Rossen. It was reported, on the 16th, that Buonaparte 
had retreated back to Dresden, clearing it of all non-combat- 
ants, and that he was concentrating to cover the recent 
movements, to which the late successes of the allies had re- 
duced him. Accounts from Klagenfurt, dated the 6th, stated 
that the Viceroy of Italy had been engaged on the Drave, in 
a general battle with General Hiller, near Rossuk, and had 
forced him from his position : later accounts, however, brought 
the satisfactory intelligence, that the latter had gained ad- 
vantages over the Viceroy. 

The enemy, on the 16th, still occupied the mountains and 
heights in front of Nollendorff in considerable force : they 
made in the evening* an attempt to turn the right of the 
allied position before Kulm, while they also assailed the cen- 
tre and left. Buonaparte appears to have assisted in person 
at this affair : 15,000 men were detached to turn the right ; 
8000 advanced in front and on the left : about 30,000 infantry 
and 8000 cavalry in reserve formed the attack on the part of 
the enemy. 

On the 17th, the corps moving on our right being conceal- 
ed by an intense fog, and advancing through dense woods, 
had succeeded in gaining our flank before its movement was 
perceived ; while the enemy, in very superior force, drove 
the Russians and Prussians from tlie village of Nollendorff; 
but they were kept in check on the left. General Colloredo 
now, with a corps of Austrians, fell on the enemy's advanced 
column, which had gained our right; and with an intrepidity, 
steadiness, and order, that gained universal admiration, com- 
pletely defeated his flank, took between 2 and 3000 prisoners, 
among whom were the general of division, Kreitzer, and 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 107 

many officers, with ten guns. Our loss was about 1000 killed 
and wounded. At the time the enemy made their attack on 
the centre, the Prussians were about to be relieved by the 
Russians, which occasioned some momentary disorder. A 
very fine young man, a son of General Blucher, who was 
distinguishing himself very gallantly in re-establishing order, 
was killed. The enemy, repulsed at all points, retired at 
night into their former position on the mountains, occupying, 
however, NollendorfF. The allies took up their old ground, 
extending across the plain in a semicircular position. It 
was determined, from these frequent demonstrations and 
partial attacks of the enemy, and from the numbers he had 
assembled, that any movements on the left by the allies, as 
before resolved upon, should be deferred ; it not being prudent 
to detach largely while the enemy was collected in force. 
The continued affairs and skirmishes during the last fortnight 
cost many men on both sides ; but there was no doubt of the 
enemy having suffered in at least a double proportion. It was 
stated that Buonaparte had his horse shot under him, while 
reconnoitring on the hill on that day. The Austrian troops 
that formed the advance of General Kleinau's corps, under 
the immediate command of General Scheiither, had entered 
Freyberg, where they surprised and made prisoners 400 of 
the enemy, with their general. It was a singular and pleas- 
ing circumstance, that two of the remaining squadrons of the 
Westphalian hussars, which did not come over from the 
enemy with their two regiments (being on detachment), form- 
ed a part of the prisoners taken. An Austrian corps also 
advanced towards Chemnitz. 

On the 19th, the enemy remained in position at Peters- 
walde. Buonaparte slept at Pirna. On the 20th, they retired 
still further towards Dresden, and withdrew also from Nollen 
dorff The Prussian corps under General Zeithen immediately 
followed them. An order was intercepted from Marshal 
Berthier to General Lobau, commanding the advanced troop.s 
of the enemy, directing him to make all his dispositions for 
retreat on Dresden. All accounts agreed in stating the 
extreme distress of the French army in the mountains ; they 
were losing numbers of their horses daily, and their troops 
were in the greatest want of provisions. It seemed probable 
that Buonaparte would remain a cheval on the Elbe as long 
as possible. 

General Bennigsen's army was expected to arrive in five 
or six days by the pass of Zittau, when more extended move- 
ments were contemplated. According to the general report 
and information, Buonaparte arrived at Bischoffswerde on the 



108 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

23d, and he meditated some attempt on General Blucher; 
but finding that officer not only prepared for him, but actually 
making preparations to act ofiensively, Buonaparte retired 
again on Dresden. The old guards were still stationed there 
with various depots of regiments. The enemy were working 
at the place. The redoubts at Pirna gate were demolished ; 
but new ones were erected at those of Falken, Freyberg, 
and some others. Provisions were very scarce in the city ; 
one loaf was divided amongst eight men. To add to these 
distresses, two magazines were burnt down, containing hay 
and oats ; one to the value of 30,000, and the other 40,000 
rix-dollars. It was believed the enemy was retiring grad- 
ually to the left bank of the river : 4000 men and sixteen 
guns had lately returned from Bischoffswerde to the heights 
of Potshafel. Marshal Lefebvre, according to the French 
account, had 30,000 men at Leipsic. In Magdeburg there 
were 9000 men, and the artillery was very complete. Mar- 
shal Augereau set out for Branberg on the 23d, 11,500 
strong. 

Great exertions were now making in the dillerent fortresses 
on the Rhine. Ehrenbreitstein was to be repaired, and ren- 
dered as strong as possible. All the troops that had measured 
back their steps across the Elbe were in a miserable condi- 
tion. Count Bubna attacked the enemy's troops near Hol- 
pen : the Austrians suffered some loss. The enemy's move- 
ments, on the whole, seemed very wavering ; and it was 
difRcult, with certainty, to determine their immediate inten- 
tion, though of their ultimate attempt to retreat no doubt was 
entertained. 

The whole of General Bennigsen's corps was not expected 
in their positions until the 3d or 4th of October; but the fol- 
lowing movements were determined on. Prince Maurice 
of Lichtenstein was to march with 5000 Austrians to Gera, 
to donner la 7nain to all the partisans, Platoff, Thielraan, 
&c. who communicated quite round the enemy's positions with 
the Prince Royal's light corps from the army of the north. 
General Kleinau's corps, upwards of 25,000, were to move to 
Chemnitz ; General Count Wittgenstein's and Kleist's corps, 
above 30,000, to Marienburg; the Austrian corps of Giulay 
to Zwickau ; the 1st and 2d corps of the Austrian army to 
Komotau ; and General Barclay de Tolly, with the Russian 
head-quarters, to Briix. General Bennigsen was to have his 
head-quarters at Toplitz. This flank movement was to be 
prolonged in the direction of Erfurth ; and an attempt was 
to be made to destroy the enemy's corps and magazines, &:c. 
in that place. 

In the mean time, it was presumed thQ,t the favorable ap- 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 109 

pearances from the side of Bavaria, would shortly put in mo- 
tion a combined force, in the direction of Wurtzburg, which 
would complete the enemy's embarrassments in every quar- 
ter of Germany. A report was received on the 30th, that a 
joint attack was made by Platoff and Thielman on the enemy 
at Altenburg-, near Leipsic, in which 2000 prisoners were 
made. One regiment of hussars escaped, but it was supposed 
it would still be taken. 

The affair near Altenburg proved of more importance than 
was at first supposed ; and the Hettman, Platoff, with his 
usual ability and gallantry, performed a brilliant exploit 
against a considerable corps of the enemy's cavalry. This 
corps was under the orders of General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, 
and consisted of the French light cavalry, the Polish uhlans 
of the guard, and a brigade of light dragoons under the or- 
ders of General Pivot. The force consisted of 8000 cavalry 
and 700 infantry, one squadron of Mamelukes, and a small 
party of Tartars of the guard, under a Colonel Mucol. The 
whole were attacked by PlatofiJ and completely put to the 
rout. A general was reported by the prisoners to have been 
killed : 1500 prisoners, five guns, and forty officers, including 
three officers of the staff, were the fruits of this enterprise. 

The army broke up fi*om Toplitz on the 1st of October, 
and was in movement to the left. On the 30th of September, 
the corps of General CounJ; Wittgenstein was at Komotau, 
and that of General Kleist near Briix. The Austrians marched 
upon Chemnitz. A report from the enemy stated that Napo- 
leon, attended by the King of Saxony and family, had de- 
parted upon the 28th instant for Leipsic, whither his head- 
quarters were about to be removed ; and a French corps, 
under Marshal Augereau, had marched upon Coburg. The 
Russian and Prussian army now exceeded 80,000 men ; and 
it was to assemble on the Chemnitz and Frej'berg line. To 
this may be added the corps of Kleinau of 10,000 men, to- 
gether with all the Austrians, General Bennigsen's corps 
was reviewed this day, and was found in a very efficient 
state ; and a reinforcement of 7000 men for the Prussian corps 
of General Kleist was upon the road from Prague. 

Afler the late actions, Prince Schwartzenberg, with the 
grand army, confined his offensive system to constant skir- 
mishing of light troops and affairs of out-posts, under General 
Thielman, Colonel Mensdorff, and others. The various suc- 
cesses, however, of the General-in-chief in the main opera- 
tions, afforded to the armies of Silesia and the north the ad- 
vantage of coming into close communication. 

Being anxious now to carry into execution the measures 
K 



110 NARTIATIVE OF THE WAR 

with which I was charged, I set out again for the head-quar- 
ters of the Prince Royal of Sweden. Previous, however, to 
my leaving the grand army, I ought to record that owing to 
their late splendid successes, and also to the victories of Lord 
Wellington in Spain, astute means of opening negotiations, 
in the specious form of a general congress, had been adopted 
by Napoleon. This was done by letters addressed from him- 
self through the Duke of Bassano on that subject direct to 
the Emperor of Austria. 

It was a glorious and exalting era for Great Britain ; at 
the present moment she saw herself rewarded for her unex- 
ampled perseverance and generosity, by the whole continent 
of Europe relying upon the wisdom of her councils and the 
exploits of her arms, which were about to decide the desti- 
nies of Europe. Nobly were her labors repaid ; gloriously 
were her efforts crowned, by the bright and cheering pros- 
pect that now beamed upon the civilized v^'orld. It is in vain, 
however, to conceal that, owing to a concurrence of circurh- 
stances, the great powers of the continent appeared to think, 
if they could obtain a peace upon fair terms, it would be pre- 
ferable to protracting the present sanguinary contest. The 
length of its duration, the little jealousies of individual com- 
manders in the allied armies, the peculiar objects of each 
power (demonstrated in various quarters), with the considera- 
tion of the family alliance between the Emperor of Austria 
and Buonaparte, which certainly influenced in some small 
degree the Austrian minister, au fond the commander-in- 
chief, as well as the prime minister. All conspired to ac- 
complish a peace by the shortest and safest way possible, 
rather than to continue the struggle. It was difficult to point 
out how the congress proposed was to proceed, if assented to 
by all parties; but Count Metternich always had his eyes 
open, and saw at once the cessions Buonaparte might make, 
and how the general interests of Europe might be poised: he 
was not so young in politics as, in contemplating a particular 
measure, not to divine the result. 

The world will not, I trust, accuse me of vanity, but give 
me credit for an honest pride, if, before I take leave of the 
very interesting details of the battles of Dresden and Kulm, 
I venture to annex an indulgent, though unmerited autograph 
letter I received from that brave and virtuous monarch, the 
Emperor of Russia, at that period. 

" Toplitz, September 27, 1813. 
" General Stewart, 
"1 have witnessed, as well as the whole army, the inde- 
fatigable zeal which you have exhibited during this campaign, 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. Ill 

where, always present on the field of honor, in the most ex- 
posed situations, you have been remarkable for your self-pos- 
session as well as for your bravery. 

"It is my duty to do honor to such brilliant qualities, and 
1 believe I give a proof of the justice which I render theni 
in sending you the insignia of the order of St. George of the 
fourth class. 

" These you know are granted alone to military virtue. 
They will recall to your mind the memorable day of Kulm, 
where your blood flowed ; and all the heroes who fought there 
will, with pleasure, see you bear a decoration which attests 
that you have partaken of their glory and of their dangers. 

" Receive, with these particular marks of my esteem, the 
assurance of my sentiments. 

(Signed) "Alexander." 

I received at the same time a letter from the Prussian 
Chancellor of State, conferring on me, by the King's com- 
mand, all the Prussian orders, including the very highest, 
that of the Black Eagle.* All these testimonies of the feel^ 
ings of the allied courts towards the British nation in my 
person, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent was gracious- 
ly pleased to permit me to accept and wear. 

The army of Silesia now moved forward from the Pleisse 
along its whole line, to circumscribe the enemy in their posi- 
tion round Dresden ; while the army of the Prince Royal, 
profiting by their late victory, crossed the Elbe, the French 
corps opposed to them retired towards Torgau. I joined the 
head-quarters of the Crown Prince of Sweden at Zorbig on 
the 9th. After the brilliant passage of the Elbe by General 
Blucher at Elster, in whicli both decision and judgment were 
pre-eminently displayed, and the consequent crossing of the 
same river by the Prince Royal's army at the points of Ross- 
lau and x\cken, His Royal Highness conceived that a move- 
ment of the whole allied force to the left bank of the Saale 
would either force the enemy to a general battle, or effectu- 
ally embarrass and impede his retreat, if he should determine 
upon a measure which the combined movements of the armies 
of Bohemia, Silesia, and the north of Germany, on his flanks 
and on his communications, seemed to render so indispensa- 
bly necessary. 

Buonaparte, it seems, had, according to reports, manoeuvred 
from Dresden with a large corps of cavalry on the right, and 
all his infantry on the lefl bank of the Elbe, as far down as 
Strehlau. A strong demonstration, from 25 to 30,000 men, 

* This letter will be found in the Appemlix, No. V. 



112 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

was made from Torgau towards the point of the Elster on the 
8th, where General Blucher passed, probably with a design 
of menacing him, and forcing him to repass the river. The 
bold determination of the allies was not, however, to be ar- 
rested ; and the whole army of General Blucher being now 
in close communication with that of the Prince Royal, the 
former marched from Duben on Jasnitz on the 9th, and passed 
the Mulda, while the Prince Royal concentrated his forces 
near Zorbig. The enemy, according to accounts, appeared to 
be collected about Eulenburg and Oschatz, between the Mulda 
and the Elbe. On the 10th, General Blucher moved from 
Jasnitz to Zorbig ; and the armies of Silesia and the north of 
Germany were here assembled. 

The determination being taken to pass the Saale, orders 
were issued in the night ; and General Blucher moved with 
the Silesian army : bridges being constructed for that pur- 
pose. General Bulow, with his corps (Varmee, was in like 
manner to pass at Wettin ; General Winzingerode, with the 
Russians, at Rothenberg; and the Prince Royal, with the 
Swedes, at Alsleben and Bernburg. The v\'hole allied force 
was then to place itself in order of battle on the left of the 
Saale, waiting the further development of the enemy's move- 
ments. General Woronzoff, who formed General Winzinge- 
rode's advanced-guard at Halle, was to refuse battle, and fall 
back on the forces passing at Wettin, if he should be attack- 
ed by superior numbers ; but otherwise, to retain Halle as 
long as possible. By these decided movements, the points of 
passage on the Elbe, by which the armies had passed, were 
to be abandoned, and destroyed, if necessary ; while other 
bridges were prepared below Magdeburg, in case of need. 

The corps of observation, under General Thtimen, before 
Wittenberg, of about 6000 men, in the event of the enemy 
forcing a passage there, (for the purpose of alloirgetng the 
right bank of the Elbe, and returning by Magdeburg, in the 
extremity in which he was placed, or in another improbable, 
but possible event of his pushing with all his forces to Berlin,) 
had orders to retire on General Tauenstein, who with 10,000 
men was to remain at Dessau ; and, according to circum- 
stances, either to manoeuvre on the right bank against any 
possible effort of the enemy's, or by forced marches strengthen, 
if necessary, the armies assembled on the Saale. General 
Tauenstein was to be assisted by all the landsturm, and some 
smaller detached corps were also to join him. 

Information now arrived that General PlatofF, with his 
Cossacks, was at Pegau ; Generals Kleist and Wittgenstein, 
with the advance of the grand army of Bohemia, were ap- 
proaching Altenburg; and communications seemed to be es- 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 113 

tablished in tlie rear of the French army by our light troops. 
Information of the movements of the enemy were vague ; 
but accounts were brought in, on the evenings of the 11th 
and r2Lh, that he was moving troops from the diiferent points 
of Lutzen and Wurzen towards Leipsic ; and it was added, 
that Buonaparte was expected to arrive there. His force be- 
tween Dresden and Leipsic, exclusive of garrisons, was es- 
timated, at the highest calculation, at 180,000 men ; that of 
the Silesian army at 65,000 ; that of the Prince Royal at 
60,000 men, with 100 pieces of artillery ; and it was impos- 
sible to see finer troops, or more fully equipped in all essentials. 
General Platoff^ with his Cossacks, had arrived at Lutzen, 
having taken some hundreds of prisoners at Weissenfels ; 
and he' was in complete communication with the advance of 
General Woronzoft''s Cossacks from Halle. Platoif reported 
the assembling of the enemy round Leipsic. The army of 
Bohemia was between Altenburg and Chemnitz ; and Gene- 
ral Bennigsen, with the Austrian division of Coloredo which 
had been joined to him, was meditating a demonstration to- 
wards Dresden. Such were, at this period, the general out- 
lines of the positions of the respective forces; and it was im- 
possible, on looking at the map, not to be sanguine as to the 
result. Buonaparte seemed to have the advantage of con- 
centration : that he might carry his whole force against the 
grand army, or the Prusso-Swedish army, was evident; but 
in either case the arm}', unattacked, was close in his rear. 
The Cossacks and light troops were hovering on all his com- 
munications; they even passed through his army in different 
directions, and his position seemed similar to that in which 
he was placed on the Beresina. 



CHAPTER X. 

Prosecution of offensive operations — Movements of the Silesian army — of 
the grand army — Loss of commnnications across the Elbe — Treaty with 
Bavaria — Intercepted dispatclies— The enemy's demonstrations on the 
Mulda — Concentration near Leipsic — Movements of the Prince Royal of 
Sweden — Advance of the \\holc allied army — Victory of Radcfeld and 
Lindenthal — Brilliant attacks of Rluchor — Napoleon arrives in tiie fiold — 
attacks the whole line of the allies — forces part of their position by a 
coup de main — unable to profit by it — The grand arn)y resumes its posi- 
tion — Conversations with thi' Prince Royal— strictures on his movements 
— Letters to that Prince, and communications with General Blncher. 

The bold and offensive system now so gallantly commenced 
by General Bluchcr, gave a new tone to tlie operations of the 
allies. The glorious career of the Silesian army, daily engaged 

K2 



114 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

in action Bince the opening of the campaign, and hourly cov- 
ering itself with laurels, merits the historian's loftiest eulogy: 
it stood pre-eminent in the advance next the foe, with its 
venerable and gallant leader eagerly availing himself of 
every opportunity to augment his heroic reputation, rescue 
his country, and avenge her sufferings. General Blucher 
was not enabled — the bridge being incomplete — to traverse 
the Saale at Wettin ; but proceeded to Halle, where he 
passed. General Bulow had not got over on the 11th of 
October; but the rest of the allied army crossed to the left 
bank of the Saale on that day. On the 12th, the Prince 
Royal's head-quarters were at Seyda, General Winzinge- 
rode's cavalry occupied Dessau and Kothen. 

On the 14th, the Prince Royal moved to Coswick ; on the 
15th, to Zerbst. Various affairs of advanced -posts now took 
place : the details of which, however deserving of praise, 
would hardly fall within the extent and object of the present 
narrative. The army of Silesia and that of the Prince Royal 
continued a cheval on the Saale, up to the 11th instant. On 
the 12th, it appeared that the enemy had collected consider- 
ably on the right bank of the Mulda, between Duben and 
Eulenburg; while at the same time, it was believed, he 
remained in force against the grand army. But his chief 
strength seemed concentrated between the Mulda, Leipsic, 
and Torgau. 

The grand army, on the 12th, was posted as follows: — the 
main body was at Altenburg; General Wittgenstein's corps 
at Borne, where it appears he had a successful affair with the 
enemy ; General Kleinau at Freyberg ; Generals Giulay and 
Thielman at Zeitz ; Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein at Pe- 
gau ; General Bennigsen had advanced from Peterswalde 
and Dohna to Waldheim ; and General Bubna had a very 
brilliant affair before Dresden on the 10th; he also succeeded 
in carrying the lete da ponl at Pirna, destroyed the boats, 
and took some cannon and prisoners. The enemy had left 
about 12,000 men in garrison at Dresden. To this general 
information was added, that of the enemy having debouched 
from Wittenberg on the right bank of the Elbe, and suc- 
ceeded in forcing the corps of General Thiimen to retire on 
the 11th. 

It became now of the greatest importance to ascertain the 
amount of the enemy's force passing at Wittenberg. That 
Buonaparte should adopt the measure of crossing with his 
army at Wittenberg and Torgau, by which he abandoned all 
his communications, and allow the whole allied armies to bn 
united and placed between him and France, seemed so des- 
perate, and so little in accordance with military calculation, 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 115 

that until the existence of the step was beyond a doubt, it 
was impossible to act upon its adoption. The Crown Prince, 
in the present state of affairs, recrossed the Saale on the 13th, 
and marched to Kothen, where he took up a position ; being- 
thus within march of General Blucher at Halle. Each army 
would reciprocally support the other, and combine their move- 
ments, while the grand army was expected every hour at 
Leipsic. Six divisions of the enemy, with the guards, had 
passed at Wittenberg, and were directing their march on 
Berlin. Our communications across the Elbe at Rosslau and 
Acken were attacked ; and the former were given up by 
General Tauenstein, who had passed at Wittenberg, joined 
General Thiimen, and then fallen back on Zerbst, and towards 
Potsdam. 

The momentary loss of the communications across the Elbe, 
except below Magdeburg, was a temporary inconvenience ; 
but the annihilation, if possible, of the French army being 
the grand object, the Crown Prince resolved to march to 
Halle, and join the corps of General Blucher and the grand 
army. When the allied forces should thus be united, the 
fate of Napoleon might be decided. The intelligence of the 
treaty being signed between the allies and Bavaria arrived 
on the 15th ; and at this period also news was received that 
the King of Wirtemburg had joined the common cause, and 
that his forces, which were assembling under the orders of 
General Baron Wrede, would immediately join the grand 
array. General Walmoden's corps in the north, and the other 
forces, were to act according to circumstances. 

The accounts received of the six divisions of the jeune 
garde of the enemy having debouched from Wittenberg, as 
also troops from Torgau on the right bank of the Elbe, like- 
wise of his having taken possession of Dessau, caused a mo- 
mentary anxiety ; but later intelligence stated that he was 
recalling his forces from the direction of Wittenberg to the 
Lower Mulda, and seemed to be assembling them in the neigh- 
borhood of Leipsic, Tamhu, and Eulenburg. This report was 
in part derived from a lieutenant-colonel of the French etat 
major, who had been taken prisoner ; on whom was found a 
letter addressed to Marshal Marmont, enjoining him to put 
himself in march for Leipsic, and place himself under the 
orders of Murat. 

The enemy's force employed in manoeuvring on the right 
bank of the Mulda, and which had crossed the Elbe, was 
commanded by Marshals Ney and Marmont ; and they had 
so studiously concealed their movements by marches and 
counter-marches, and the countrv was so inclosed and diffi- 



116 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

cult near the conflux of those rivers, that the information was 
not precise. 

The enemy's assemblage in the neighborhood of Leipsic 
was now positive. On the 14th he retired from Zerbst, and 
withdrew from Acken, where he had shown himself. Having 
destroyed our tete dii pont at Rosslau, he abandoned it; and 
the Cossacks of General Winzingerode's corps of the Prince 
Royal's army drove him from Dessau, which was reoccupied. 
These different events confirmed the other intelligence ; and 
appearances denoted the movement from Wittenberg to have 
been undertaken with a view of alluring the northern army 
to repass the Elbe. Upon general and military principles, 
for the allies to have crossed that river without possessing 
the appui of Wittenberg, might be considered by many a 
doubtful, if not an injurious, undertaking ; but on the other 
hand must be balanced the advantages derived from tbc union 
of above 300,000 men surrounding the enemy on all points, 
the state of demoralization in his army, their distress for pro- 
visions, which, hemmed in as they were, necessarily increased 
daily; and, lastly, the advantage of being able to undertake 
vigorous and offensive operations in all quarters. 

The Prince Royal of Sweden detached on the 14th a di- 
vision of his army, under the orders of the Prince of Hesse 
Ilomburg, to re-establish his communications at Acken, and 
to insure the passage of the river and #"the town, which is 
strong, by fortifying it still further, if possible. The garrison 
of Magdeburg made attempts upon the post of Bernburg on 
the Saale — a point of infinite importance for the passage of 
that river, in case of necessity. They were here, however, 
again checked by a detachment of Cossacks of General Win- 
zingerode's corps ; and two battalions and some guns were 
placed to reinforce the garrison. The Prince Royal's army, 
on this day, extended its rig'lit in the direction of the moun- 
tain called !St. Peterberg — a point which forms a principal 
feature in this country, from its abrupt rise; its left towards 
Kothen and Elsdorf ; while his advanced-guard was pushed 
into the villages on the left bank of the Mulda. 

The Silesian army was in position near Halle, with its 
advanced-guards at Merseburg and Skenditz. 

By dispatches from the grand army, Count Wittgenstein 
made a general reconnoissance on the 13th, and marching to 
his left, occupied Pegau with tlie greatest part of his corps. 
On the 14th, establishing iiis communication on the left with 
the Austrian corps of Count Giulay and Prince Maurice of 
Ijic!)tenstoin posted at Weissenfels and Naumburg, he joined 
with Tliielman and Platoll' towards Lutzen ; and on the right 
with the corps of Count Kleinau, who marched to Borne, and 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 117 

was to detach to Grimma and Colditz. The Russian grena- 
diers and cuirassiers were at Altenburg. The main body of 
the grand army, namely, the corps of Meerveldt, the Aus- 
trian army of reserve, the Russian and Prussian guards, took 
post at Zeitz ; the corps of Coloredo at Chemnitz and Penig, 
and detached towards Rochlitz. General Bennigsen had or- 
ders to make himself master of the roads leading on Nossen 
and Meissen, and to push on with all possible expedition. In 
this general position, the armies were to press on, closing in 
the enemy till they were enabled to make simultaneous at- 
tacks. 

Under these circumstances, if the enemy forced his passage 
against any one of the corps, the others united would be able 
to fall on the point attacked. This operation became the 
more easy, in proportion as the communications between the 
different armies became established ; and the circle which 
the allied troops occupied round the enemy narrowed. In the 
event of a retreat, the left bank of the Saale afforded a very 
strong line on the one side, and the position of Lutzen, Weis- 
senfels, and Altenburg, on tlie other. The Bavarian corps of 
Count Wrede, and the Austrian corps of Prince Reuss, were 
ordered to advance, by forced marches ; and every effort was 
made to take possession of Wurtzburg, and to fortify the line 
of the Maine, All the corps of the grand army had moved 
forward on the 15th ; General Blucher to Gross-Kiigel and 
Skenditz, with his advance pushed towards Leipsic ; while 
the Prince Royal had his right in front of the St. Peterberg, 
the left at Zorbig, with the Swedes near Wettin. 

The glorious army of Silesia now added another victory to 
its list ; and the brow of its valiant leader was again deco- 
rated with a fresh laurel. Forty pieces of cannon, 12,000 
killed, wounded, and prisoners, one eagle, and many caissons, 
were the fruits of the victory of Radefeld and Lindenthal. 
To give the clearest idea in my power of this battle, I must 
revert to the positions of the armies of Silesia and the north 
of Germany, on the 14th instant, when certain intelligence 
was received that the enemy was withdrawing from the right 
bank of the Elbe to collect on Leipsic. 

At this time the Prince Royal was at Kothen, and General 
Blucher at Halle: the former in possession, with his advanced- 
guards, of the left bank of the Mulda; and the latter, of 
Merseburg and Skenditz. General Blucher moved his head- 
quarters on the 10th to Gross-Kiigel, pushing his advance on 
the great road to Leipsic, and occupying the villages on each 
side of it. The enemy were in force in his front ; still hold- 
ing Debitz and Radefeld with some troops along the Mulda. 
The Crown Prince of Sweden issued orders to march to 



118 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Halle on the night of the 14th ; but when his troops were en 
route, he took up his head-quarters at Sylbitz, and placed the 
Swedish army with its right at Wettin, and the left near to 
St. Peterberg. General Bulow occupied the centre of his 
line, between Peterberg and Oppin ; and the corps of Win- 
zingerode was on the left at Zorbig. His Royal Highness 
seemed to have apprehended, either that the enemy were not 
clear of the Elbe, or that we might be attacked from the 
Mulda: the bridges, however, had been broken. His ad- 
vanced-guard was on it : and a direct march on Zorbig, and 
towards Debitz and Radefeld, would, without question, have 
brought the army of the north into action on the 16th, which 
would have rendered the victory much more decisive. 

General Blucher found the enemy's forces, consisting of 
the 4th, 6th, and 7th corps of the French army, and great part 
of the guard under Marshals Ney and Marmont and General 
Bertrand, occupying a line with their right at Freyroda, and 
their left at Lindenthal. The country around these villages 
is open, and very favorable for cavalr}^; but the enemy was 
strongly posted in front of a wood of some extent near Rade- 
feld, and behind it the ground is more intersected : generally 
speaking, however, it is adapted to all arms. The disposi- 
tion of attack of the Silesian army was as follows: — the 
corps of General Count Langeron was to attack and carry 
Freyroda, and then F^adefeld, having the corps of General 
Sachen in reserve: the corps iVa-nnee of General D'Yorck 
was directed to move on the great chaussce leading to Leip- 
sic, until it reached the village of Lutschen, when turning 
to its left it was to force the enemy at Lindenthal : the Rus- 
sian guards and the advanced-guard were to press on the 
main road to Leipsic : the corps of Genervil St. Priest, arriving 
from Merseburg, was to follow the corps of Count Lange- 
ron : the cavalry and the dift'erent reserves were formed in 
the open ground between the villages. 

It was nearly mid-day before the troops were at tlieir sta- 
tions ; and hopes were entertained, which proved fallacious, 
that the cavalry and flying artillery of the Prince Royal's 
army would be in line. The enemy soon afler the first onset 
gave up the advanced villages, and retired some distance ; 
but tenaciously held the woody ground on their right, and 
the villages of Gross and IClein, Wetteritz, as also the vil- 
lages of Mockau and Mockern, on their left. At Mockern a 
most bloody contest ensued ; it was taken and retaken by the 
corps of D'Yorck five times: the musketry fire was most gall- 
ing ; and this was the hottest part of the field. Many of the 
superior officers were cither killed or woundetL At length 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 119 

the victorious Silesians carried all before them, and drove the 
enemy beyond the Partha. 

In the plain there were several brilliant charges of cav- 
alry. The Brandenburg regiment of hussars distinguished 
itself in a particular manner, and, supported by infantry, 
charged and carried a battery of eight pieces. The enemy 
made an obstinate resistance also on his right, in the villages 
of Great and Little Wetteritz, and in the surrounding wood ; 
and when he perceived we had forced his left, he brought an 
additional number of troops on Count Langeron, who was 
chiefly engaged with Marshal Ney's corps, from the neigh- 
borhood of Duben. The Russians, however, equally with 
their brave allies in arms, made the most gallant efforts, and 
they were fully successful ; night only putting an end to the 
action. 

The Russian cavalry acted in a very conspicuous manner. 
General Korff 's cavalry took a battery of thirteen guns ; and 
the Cossacks of General Emanuel, five. The enemy now 
drew off towards Siegeritz and Pfosen, and passed the river 
Partha, retreating from all points. General Sachen's corps, 
which supported General Langeron, very much distinguished 
itself in the presence of Napoleon, who, it seems, according 
to the information of the prisoners), arrived from the other 
wing of his army at five o'clock in the evening. The corps 
of D'Yorck, which displayed the utmost coolness and courage, 
had many of its most gallant leaders killed or wounded. 
Among the latter were, Colonels Heinmetz, Kubzler, Bouch, 
Hiller, Lowenthal, Laurentz, and Majors Schon and Bismark. 
The momentary loss of these officers was seriously felt, as 
they- nearly all commanded brigades from the reduced list of 
general officers in the Prussian army : and we had to lament 
that His Serene Highness the Prince of Mecklenburg Strelitz, 
who was distinguishing himself in a particular manner, hav- 
ing had two horses shot under him, and whose gallant corps 
took 500 prisoners and an eagle, received a severe, though 
happily not mortal, wound. Among the Russians, General 
Chinchin and several officers of distinction were killed or 
wounded ; and I average General Blucher's total loss at near 
6 or 7000 men, hois de combat. 

Let me here own my anxiety to perpetuate the renown so 
deservedly acquired by this brave army, in endeavoring 
feebly, but I declare faithfully, to detail its proceedings. 
Liberated Europe will, I am confident, justly appreciate the 
enthusiasm and lieroism with which its operations were con- 
ceived and effected. It had measured its strength in twenty- 
one combats, several times with the best troops of France, 
including the guards. I attached that excellent and able 



120 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

officer, Colonel, afterwards Brigadier-general, Hudson Lowe, 
to General Blucher in the field the early part of the day, be- 
ing myself with the Prince Royal ; and it is due to the talent 
and zeal of that officer to record, that I derived great assist- 
ance from the activity evinced in all his reports. 

To turn to the operations of the grand army up to the 16th, 
and the disposition for the attack to be made on the 17th. The 
corps of Generals Guilay, Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, 
Thielman, and Platoff, were collected in the neighborhood of 
Mark Ranstedt, and were to move forward on Leipsic, keep- 
ing up the communication with General Blucher's army and 
the other corps to their right. General Nostitz's cavalry 
were to form also on their right; and in case of retreat, these 
corps were to retire towards Zeitz. The reserves of Russian 
and Prussian guards were to move on Rotha, where they 
were to pass the Pleisse, and form in columns on its right 
bank. The reserves of the Prince of Hesse Homhurg, Gene- 
rals Meerveldt and Wittgenstein, were also to take post at 
this station. General Barclay de Tolly commanded all the 
columns on the right bank of the Pleisse. Generals Wittgen- 
stein, Kleist, and Kleinau, advanced from their respective 
positions on Leipsic: the Russian guard formed their reserve; 
and General Coloredo moved from Borne as reserve to Gene- 
ral Kleinau. The retreat of these corps was to be on Chem- 
nitz. Generals Wittgenstein's, Kleist's, and Kleinau's, on 
Altenburg and Penig. The army of General Bennigsen was 
to push on from Colditz towards Grimma and Weingen. The 
corps of Count Bubna had been relieved before Leipsic by 
General Tolstoy's. A very heavy firing continued all the day 
of the 16th from the grand army. Late at night, a report 
reached General Blucher, that Buonaparte had attacked in 
person the whole line of the allies, and, forming his cavalry 
in the centre, succeeded in making an opening in the com- 
bined army before all its cavalry could come up. He was, 
however, not able to profit by this grand coup de main : he 
retired in the evening, and the allies occupied their position 
as before. 

On the 17th, the combined corps were ready to renew the 
attack. The Prince Royal, who had his head-quarters at 
Landsberg and his army behind it, marched at two o'clock in 
the morning, and arrived at Radefeld towards mid-day. Gene- 
rals Winzingerode's and Bulow's corps had moved forward 
in the night near the heights of Taucha, No cannonade being 
heard on the side of the grand army (though General Blu- 
cher's corps was under arms), and as it was also understood 
that General Bennigsen would not arrive until this day at 
Griraraa, and part of the Prince Royal's army being still in 



IN GERMANY AND PRANCE. 121 

the rear, it was deemed expedient to wait till the following 
day to renew the general attack. The enemy showed himself 
in great force in a good position on the left of the Partha, on 
a ridge of some extent parallel to the river. There was some 
cannonading in the morning: the enemy made demonstra- 
tions ; and the hussars charged on advanced parties into the 
suburbs of Leipsic, and took some cannon and prisoners. 

The state of affairs was now so changed, that the most 
sangume expectations were justly entertained that the glo- 
rious cause in which Europe was engaged would immediately 
triumph. 

I shall now offer some personal observations relating to the 
Prince Royal's position at Kothen on the 14th, when Gene- 
ral Blucher was at Halle. No sooner was information re- 
ceived, and ascertained to be correct, that the enemy's corps 
beyond the Elbe w^ere returning towards Leipsic, than I con- 
ceived that a forced march of the army of the north to con- 
centrate at Zorbig (having its advance towards Dolitsch 
and Duben) was indispensably necessary, in support of the 
plan of taking a forward position. I expressed this opinion to 
the Prince Royal of Sweden ; and stated, that according to 
the reports of the dispositions of the allies from the grand 
army, and of General Blucher's operations, if his Royal 
Highness did not cover that general's left, it seemed to me 
he might be deprived of his share in the anticipated struggle. 
The Prince Royal replied, that I was urging him to make a 
march with his flank to the enemy as at the battle of Eylau, 
which could not fail of being disastrous. I answered His 
Royal Highness, that as all the bridges on the Mulda were 
destroyed, and as its passage was so difficult, that His Royal 
Highness had told me he could not pass it to attack : the 
enemy, I was certain, if they were present in force, could 
not attempt its passage to attack him, especially with General 
Blucher before them, and the grand army so close. Besides, 
I told him, he had 60,000 men, with a river to protect his flank 
during his march, on which he might, if necessary, throw an 
additional corps to his advanced-guard during this movement: 
and, above all, as we knew the enemy was filing towards 
Leipsic, there could be no possible risk. After more conver- 
sation, in which I blended the respect I had for his military 
renown with an honest disclosure of my sentiments, I ex- 
pressed my gratitude for his condescension in listening to me, 
where he had an undoubted right to consider himself as best 
qualified to judge. His Royal Highness at length determined 
to march to Halle : I urged, with deferential earnestness, that 
Halle was in rear of General Blucher, and if the General 
should engage, His Royal Highness would never be able to 

L 



122 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

support him during the conflict His Royal Highness answer- 
ed, he would be in the second line, and able to support if 
necessary : and in his orders on the following' day, he directed 
his army to prepare to follow the enemy if they were beaten, 
and to do them all possible mischief in their retreat, evidently 
showing he did not intend to assist in the action. I left the 
Prince Royal, however, in the evening, with a promise, on his 
part, that he would change the direction of the march from 
Halle to the left on Zorbig, when the troops should be in 
route in the morning. Here, I must observe, my urgent propo- 
sition was to reach Zorbig on the i4th, which could easily 
have been achieved, as we remained two da)^s at Kothen; 
still it was something to approximate the army towards the 
former place. On the 14th, I left Kothen, and rode with the 
Prince on the morning of the 15th ; but my surprise and 
chagrin were equal when, instead of directing his troops to 
the left on Zorbig, as he had promised, or even to Halle, he 
marched the Swedes by Gropzig, in the rear of the Peter- 
berg, towards Wettin ; the Prussians to the Peterberg and 
Oppin ; while the Russian corps had their left at Zorbig. 

The army collected at Kothen on the 14th : their obvious 
march, to support General Blucher and to meet the enemy, 
was to the left and forward ; but His Royal Highness direct- 
ed them to the right, in rear of General Blucher, and back- 
ward, making at the same time an angle to the rear, which 
nearly doubled their distance. At Sylbitz, where the Prince 
Royal stopped to issue orders to the troops, I respectfully but 
urgently requested it might be weighed whether the other 
armies would not complain of this movement, especially Gen- 
eral Blucher, when it was intimated that any one who recom- 
mended a march to the left of Zorbig was un sot : after some 
time, however, I had the satisfaction of finding the Russian 
corps ordered to Zorbig. Baron Witterstedt, still minister 
of Sweden, and General Adlercreutz, also, were present, but 
took no part in this discussion. 

I must here observe, that the orders intentionally (for they 
could not be ignorantly) issued on this day by the Prince 
Royal were for the different corps to have brigades formed 
towards the Elbe, evidently to give the impression that the 
enemy were to be looked for in that quarter. On the 16th, 
in the morning, being personally much chagrined at the 
Prince Royal's resolutions, I repaired to General Blucher. 
All I had been able to accomplish by dint of persuasion, was 
to get the Russians to Zorbig; and General Blucher fairly 
and naturally sympathized with my painful sensations on this 
result. 

The Prince Roval however assured me, that in case Gen- 



IN GERx'klANY AND FRANCE. 1 23 

eral Blucher should make an attack the following- day, I might 
give the General his word that he would be on the ground in 
the direction of Dolitsch and Eulenburg, with 8 or 10,000 
cavalry and light artillery to support him, even if his infantry 
could not arrive. This pledge I stated totidem verbis to 
General Blucher when I joined him. I there wrote and dis- 
patched by my own aide-de-camp from the ground, while the 
dispositions for General Blucher's attack were making, the 
following' letter to His Royal Highness : — 

" October 16th, i past 9, A. M 
" My Lord, 
" After the report of General Blucher, the enemy quitted 
Dolitsch. It is of the greatest importance, according to his 
ideas, that the army of your Royal Highness should march to 
the left, behind Dolitsch: the marshes and defiles will place 
it entirely without risk ; and your Royal Highness will be in 
a state to take part in the combat, which will be more deci- 
sive with your army and your military talents. As the whole 
force of the enemy is in the environs of Leipsic, permit me 
to say to you that the moments are precious. The English 
nation has its eyes upon you : it is my duty to speak to you 
with frankness. England will never believe that you are in- 
different, provided the enemy are beaten, whether you there 
take part or not. I must entreat your Royal Highness, if 
you remain in the second line, to send Captain Bogue with 
his brigade of Rocket-men to act with General Blucher's 
cavalry. 

" I have the honor to be, &c. &c. 
(Signed) " Charles Stewart, 

" Lieut. General." 

General Blucher now urged me strongly to hasten to the 
Prince Royal in person, that the object of this letter might 
be insured. I proceeded immediately, and met an aide-de- 
camp of the Crown Prince's on the road, bearing a letter 
from General x'Vdlercreutz, acquainting me that, in conse- 
quence of my pressing solicitations, His Royal Highness had 
consented to move with his advance (tlie Russians) to the 
left of Landsberg on that day. Tlie Prussians were a march 
behind the Russians, and the Swedes one more behind the 
Prussians. 

In vain I sought the Prince Royal ; and despairing of an 
interview, I stated to General Adlercreutz, at Landsberg, how 
imperiously necessary it was lor the Russian cavalry and 
light artillery to advance immediately in the direction of 
Taucha ; and that the Prince's word had been pledged to it. 



1 24 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

The General replied, if I could arrange that step with Gen- 
eral Winzingerode, he would answer for the concurrence of 
the Prince. I hurried to this General, who stated that his 
orders were positive from the Emperor of Russia not to act 
but by the express commands of the Crown Prince ; that he 
dared not move in person, but he would send 3000 horse forth- 
with, and 8000 on the following morning, if I could procure 
such order. I returned to General Blucher greatly disap- 
pointed; but was happy to learn, in the sequel, that 3000 
horse were actually pushed forward that evening, on General 
Adlercreutz seeing the Prince, and they appeared on Gen- 
eral Blucher's left in the morning. After seeing General 
Blucher's action, and being uncertain where to find the Prince 
Royal, I rode late at night to Halle, where I found Baron 
Witterstedt; I prevailed upon him to send an express to His 
Royal Highness with the following letter: 

" Halle, October 16th, 9 o'clock, P. M. 
" My Lord, 
" I come from the field of battle, from General Blucher. 
I have the honor to send you the details of this affair. 

"I entreat your Royal Highness to set out the moment you 
receive this letter, and to march upon Taucha. 

" There is not a moment to be lost. Your Royal Highness 
has promised me to do so. This is to speak to you as a friend. 
I speak now as a soldier ; and if you do not commence your 
march, you will for ever repent of it. 

" I have the lienor, &c. 
(Signed) " Charles Stewart." 

The answer from Baron Witterstedt afforded me the satis- 
faction of knowing, that by repeated and strenuous efforts, 
the head of the northern army would have been in their 
place at twelve on the 17th, if an attack had been made. 

I think I have said enough to show that, if the Prince had 
exerted all ]iis faculties, and the mental and phvsical energy 
he possessed, the corps of Marmont, Ney, and Bertrand, 
would have been more completely overthrown, and the serious 
losses of D'Yorck's corps of Prussians spared, by the timely 
arrival of the Prince Royal's army. A moment's reference 
to the detail of the positions, will convince the world of this 
fact. If the northern army had marched to Zorbig on the 
14th, or even on the 15th, with its advance towards Dolitsch, 
evacuated by the enemy on that day, the Prince Royal would 
have been enabled to have acted upon Ney's force, wliich, on 
General Langeron's attack, filed from the neigborhood of 
Duben and Dolitsch, and protected Marmont's right ; and if 



IN GERMANY ATVD FRANCE. 125 

an impression had been made and followed up to the Partha, 
simultaneously with General Blucher's attacks, the whole 
force of the enemy must have been destroyed. 

Bold as these remarks are, I have no solid motive for dis- 
guising them : as a soldier devoted to his country and his 
profession, fearing neither the frowns nor courting the favors 
of any man, I publish my own observations and sentiments 
as they arose in my mind out of the circumstances which 
passed within my own knowledge. Of these facts others 
may judge ; and form their own, and perhaps different con- 
clusions, influenced as they may be by conflicting accounts, 
or the knowledge of latent motives, operating upon the chief 
actor in these very interesting proceedings. I have at least 
one consolation, that if these details give dissatisfaction in 
any quarter, the King and country I served were, at all events, 
satisfied with my humble exertions ; which will best be seen 
from the letter addressed to me by my own government, 
which will be found in the Appendix. 

I have merely to mention, before closing the present chap- 
ter, that in the battle of the 16th, a most brilliant charge was 
made by the Adjutant-general Orloff with the Cossacks of 
the guard, directed in person by the Emperor Alexander, 
when they took twenty-four pieces of cannon. There were 
also various exploits in every part of these bloody fields to 
which I much lament my pen is unable to do justice; for 
such was the hurry and confusion of the moment, and the 
rapidity with which event followed event, and victory battle, 
that it was totally impossible to collect all details. 



CHAPTER XL 

Successes of the Crown Prince of Sweden— of General Walraoden — Con- 
centration of the enemy round Leipsic — Remarks on this movement- 
Proclamation to the allied army — Preparations for a general engagement 
— Description of the battle of Leipsic — its glorious results — The enemy 
routed at all points— Capture of Leipsic — pursuit and dispersion of the 
French armj- — Movements of the allied forces towards the Rhine — Puli- 
lic rejoicings— Tidings of the victory in England— Propositions of peace 
from Napoleon — Singular interview with tlie Prince Royal — Presented by 
His Royal Highness with the Swedish military Order of the sword. 

Before describing the great operations connected with the 
battle of Leipsic, by which the fate of Napoleon, in my opin- 
ion, was entirely and irrevocably decided, I wish to direct the 
reader's attention to the corps in the north. Tlic Prince 
Royal left General Walmoden with iiis corps, and those of 

L2 



1 26 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

General Tettenbom, Dornberg, &c. to keep Marshal Davoust 
in check ; and on the 18th of August, in a well-contested ac- 
tion at Vella, 2000 cavalry under Walmoden held in check 
15,000 French, commanded by Davoust. That general, in 
consequence of the successes of the Prince Royal, evacuated 
Schvverin, where he had his head-quarters; the Danes, how- 
ever, now separated themselves from the French, and took 
post behind the Stecknitz river. 

A very brilliant action took place on the 15th near Domitz. 
General Walmoden left General Vegesack to observe Da- 
voust, and marched to join General Tetterborn, who found 
the enemy placed between the villages of Ollendorf and 
Euchdorf with 10,000 men and eight pieces of artillery. The 
disposition being made. General Walmoden succeeded on 
every side, destroyed the entire division of Pecheux, and 
took thirty officers and 1500 men. After the action, Walmo- 
den placed his head-quarters at Dennewitz, and Davoust re- 
treated behind the Stecknitz. Many brilliant skirmishes were 
reported in that direction ; amongst which a Prussian colonel, 
Marwitz, greatly distinguished himself 

The great crisis now approached, by Napoleon concentra- 
ting all his force in the environs of Leipsic. Why he decided 
upon this measure, and did not rather determine on taking his 
iirst position behind the Saale, or carrying his army in the 
direction of Magdeburg, was a point often and much debated 
on. 

The allied army being at length assembled, the Field-mar- 
shal Prince Schwartzenberg issued the following order : — 

" Brave Warriors ! The most important period of the holy 
struggle is arrived ; the decisive hour is about to strike ; pre- 
pare for combat. The band which unites the most powerful 
nations for one and the same end, will be riveted on the field 
of battle : Russians, Prussians, Austrians, you will fight for 
the same cause, for the liberty of Europe, for independence, 
for immortality. All for one, one for all, let this be your 
watch-word in this holy combat ; be faithful to it at the deci- 
sive moment, and the victory is yours. 

" Charles P. Schwartzenberg." 

Such was the order issued to the grand army by its com- 
mander. 

Europe now approached her deliverance ; and England 
might fairly and triumphantly look forward to reap that har- 
vest of glory her steady and unexampled efforts in the com- 
mon cause so justly entitled her to receive. I can only re- 
gret the absence of an abler pen in the individual commis- 
sioned to make known to the British government the events 



IN GERMAXT AXt) FEANXE. 127 

of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of October, but such was the task 
imposed on the writer of this narrative ; and in endeavoring 
rapidly to describe the prominent features of these memora- 
ble days, pregnant with the fate of so many millions, with 
any thing like military connexion and precision, he conceived 
he best fulfilled his duty as a soldier. 

The battle of General Blucher on the 16th was followed 
by a complete and signal victory on the 18th, by the com- 
bined forces, over Buonaparte, at the head of his army, in 
the neighborhood of Leipsic, The collective loss of above 
100 pieces of cannon, 60,000 men, an immense number of 
prisoners — the desertion of the Saxon army, and also of the Ba- 
varian and Wirtemburg troops still remaining in the French 
ranks, consisting in all of artillery, cavalry, and infantry— many 
generals killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, among whom 
were Regnier, Valberg, Brune, Bertrand, and Lauriston, 
were some of the first-fruits of the glorious day of the 18th of 
October. These were followed by the capture by assault of the 
town of Leipsic ; the magazines, the artillery, stores of the place, 
with the King of Saxony, all his court, the garrison, and the 
rear-guard of the French army ; the whole of the enemy's 
wounded, the number of whom exceeded 30,000, with the 
complete deroute of the French army, it being entirely sur- 
rounded, and endeavoring to escape in all directions: such 
were the prominent subjects of exultation. Buonaparte was 
fortunate enough to escape by rapid flight two hours before 
the entry into Leipsic of all the allied forces. The further re- 
sults may be obtained from a statement of the day's military 
manoeuvres and positions, which it will here be my endeavor 
to give as succinctly as possible : firstly, of the general and 
combined operations determined upon by the imperial and 
royal generals; and secondly, a description of what immedi- 
ately came under my own observation, namely, the move- 
ments of General Blucher and the Prince Royal. 

The positions of the allied armies, up to the 16th, have 
been already detailed. It being announced by Prince Schwart- 
zenberg that it was the intention of their majesties, the allied 
Sovereigns, to renew the attack upon the enemy on the 18th, 
and the order above detailed for the army having been issued, 
the armies of the north and Silesia were directed to co-ope- 
rate. Napoleon's army was situated on the 18th nearly as 
follows : — the Sth, 2d, and 5th corps, under Murat, at Can- 
newitz ; the right was commanded by Prince Poniatowski ; 
Victor formed the centre at Probstheide ; the lefi:, under Lau- 
riston, occupied Homburg; the guards occupied Thornberg, 
where Buonaparte was in person ; Ney was uith Napoleon ; 
Oudinot supported Poniatowski with the jeune garden and 



128 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Mortier was charged with the defence of Leipsic. The dis- 
positions and orders of the grand army were as follows : — the 
1st column, under Barclay de Tolly, composed of Wittgen- 
stein's corps and the Russian and Prussian guards, were to 
advance to the heights of Wachan ; the 2d column, under the 
Hereditary Prince of Hesse Homburg, a most gallant and 
skilful officer (since married to our English Princess Eliza- 
beth, but unfortunately now no more), composed of the 
divisions of Bianchi, Maurice, Lichtenstein, and Weissen- 
wolf, with the reserve, marched on Dolitsch, with Coloredo's 
corps as a further reserve ; the 3d column, under Bennigsen, 
with the corps of Kleinau and Guthin, marched on Holzhau- 
sen. 

Whilst the grand a.rmy was to commence the attack from 
the different points of assembly, on the principal villages sit- 
uated upon the great roads leading to Leipsic, the armies of 
the north and Silesia were jointly to attack the line of the 
Saale, and the enemy's position along the Partha river. Gene- 
ral Blucher intrusted to the Prince Royal of Sweden 30,000 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery; and with this formidable 
reinforcement, the northern army was to attack from the 
heights of Taucha ; while General Blucher was to retain his 
position before Leipsic, and use his utmost efforts to gain pos- 
session of the place. In the event of the whole of the ene- 
my's forces being carried against either of the armies, they 
were reciprocally to support each other, and concert further 
movements. 

That part of the enemy's force which for some time had 
been opposed to the Prince Royal of Sweden and General 
Blucher, had taken up a very good position upon the left bank 
of the Partha, having its right at the strong point of Taucha, 
and its left towards Leipsic. To force the enemy's right, and 
obtain possession of the heights of Taucha, was the first opera- 
tion of the Prince Royal's army. 'I'he corps of Russians 
under General Winzingerode, and the Prussians under Gene- 
ral Bulow, were destined for this purpose ; and the Swedisli 
army was directed to force the passage of the river near 
Plosen and Mockau. The passage was effected without much 
opposition : General Winzingerode took about 3000 prisoners 
at Taucha, and some guns; and General Blucher put his army 
in motion, as soon as he found the grand army engaged very 
liotly in the neighborhood of the villages of Stetteritz and 
Probstheide. The infantry of the Prince Royal's army had 
not sufficient time to make their flank movement before tiie 
enemy's infantry had abandoned tiie line of the river, and 
retired over tiie plain, in line and column, towards Leipsic, 
occupying Pounsdorf, and Schonefel hi strength, so as to pro- 



IN GER.MANY AND FRANCE. 129 

tect their retreat. A very heavy cannonading, and eorae 
brilliant performances of General Winzingerode's cavalry, 
marked cliiefly the events of the early part of the day; to- 
wards the close, when General Count Langeron had cross- 
ed the river and attacked the village of Schonefel, he met 
a determined resistance, and at first was unable to force 
liis way : he however possessed himself of the villages, but 
was driven back ; when the most positive orders were sent 
liini by General Blucher to reoccupy it at the point of th 
bayonet, which he accomplished before sunset. 

Some Prussian battalions of General Bulow^s corps were 
warmly engaged also at Pounsdorf, and the enemy were re- 
tiring from it, when the Prince Royal directed the rocket 
brigade, under Captain Bogue, to form on the left of a Rus- 
sian battery, and open upon the retiring columns. Congreve's 
formidable weapon had scarcely accomplished the object of 
paralyzing a solid square of infantry, which, after our fire, 
delivered themselves up, as if panic-struck, when that esti- 
mable man and gallant officer, Captain Bogue, of the British 
royal artillery, received a mortal wound in the head, which 
at once deprived society of a noble character, and this country 
of his valuable services. Lieutenant Strangeways, who suc- 
ceeded in the command of the brigade, received the Prince 
Royal's thanks, conveyed through me, for the important 
assistance they had rendered. I felt great satisfaction at 
witnessing, during this day, a species of improved warfare, 
the effects of which were truly astonishing; and produced 
an impression upon the enemy of something supernatural. 
During the action, twenty-two guns of Saxon artillery, with 
two Westphalian regiments of hussars, and two battalions 
of Saxons, joined us from the enemy ; the former were in- 
stantly led again into the field, our artillery and ammunition 
not being all brought forward. The close communication 
was fully established between the grand army and those 
of Blucher and the north. The Grand-duke Constantine, 
Generals Platoff, Miloradovitch, and other ofiicers of distinc- 
tion, joined the Prince Royal, to communicate the events 
carrying on in the several quarters of this great field of 
battle. 

The most desperate resistance was made by the enemy at 
Probstheide, Stetteritz, and Cannewitz. But the different 
columns bearing on those points, as above detailed, carried 
every thing before them ; General Bennigsen taking the vil- 
lages on the right bank, and General Giulay manteuvring 
25,000 Austrians on the left bank of the Elster. General 
Thielman's and Prince Maurice Lichtenstein's corps moved 
upon the same river ; and the grand result of the day was, 



130 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

that the enemy lost above 40,000 men in killed and wounded, 
sixty-five pieces of artillery, and seventeen battalions of 
German infantry, with all their staff and generals, who came 
over in a mass during the action. The armies remained, du- 
ring- the night, upon the ground which they had so bravely 
conquered. The Prince Royal had his bivouac at Pounsdorf ; 
General Blucher remained at Wellens; and the Emperors 
and Kmg at R-oda. 

About the close of the day, it being reported that the enemy 
were retiring by Weissenfels and Naumberg, General Blu- 
cher received an order from the King of Prussia to detach 
in that direction. The movement of the Prince Royal's army 
completely precluded the retreat on Wittenberg ; that upon 
Erfurth had long since been lost to them, and the line of the 
Saale appeared alone to remain. As both the flanks and rear 
would be operated upon during their march, it was difficult 
to say with w^hat portion of his army the enemy could get to 
the Rhine. 

On the 19th the town of Leipsic was attacked, and carried, 
alter a short resistance, by the armies of Blucher, the Prince 
Royal, Bennigsen, and the grand army. Marmont and Mac- 
donald commanded in the town : these, with Augereau and 
Victor, narrowly escaped Vvith a small escort. Their majes- 
ties, the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, and the 
Crown Prince of Sweden, each heading their respective 
troops, entered the town at different points, and met in the 
great square. The acclamations and rejoicings of the people 
are not to be described : handkerchiefs waving from the win- 
dows, hands clamorous in applause, and lastly, but most 
eloquently, tears rolling from the eyes, announced the de- 
lightful era of the liberation of the world from the tyranny 
of the despot to be at hand. The moment was too enthu- 
siastically felt to be described in adequate terms, and I confess 
myself unequal to it. The multiplicity of brilliant achieve- 
ments, the impossibility of doing full justice to the talent and 
prowess shown in the series of enterprises arising from the 
boldness of conception in our commander, Prince Field- 
marshal Schwartzenbcrg, and the other intrepid and ex- 
perienced captains, will be admitted by every one, and plead 
an excuse for a sketch which scarcely merits the name of a 
description. 

I sent the account of this battle to England by my aide-de- 
camp and cousin, Mr. James, who most gallantly was every- 
where in the hottest of the action, and had been distinguished 
for his ardor in the service since he had been witli this army. 
In order also to take every measure to accomplish the ti*ans- 
mission home of this vitally important intelligence as speedily 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 131 

as possible, I was induced to avail myself of the services 
of Mr. Solly, a Prussian gentleman, largely connected in 
England ; who with indefatigable zeal, and at great personal 
risk and inconvenience, undertook to carry a copy of my 
communication direct to the English government through the 
midst of the French armies. He embarked in an open boat, 
and arrived in London with this glorious intelligence in an 
incredibly short space of time. One palliating circumstance 
connected with my imperfect detail of this combat is, that I 
wrote it nearly as I have given it above on a stone in^ the 
field of battle, when the fire had ceased, without correction 
or amendment. I ought here to record the gallantry displayed, 
and the efficient assistance I received from my aides-de-camp, 
Captain Charles, now Major, Wood, and Lieutenant-colonel 
Noel Harris ; the latter brave officer lost his arm, in the fol- 
lowing year, at Waterloo. 

An officer arrived on the 19th from General Tettenborn, 
bringing the intelligence of the surrender of Bremen to the 
corps under his orders ; and the keys of that town were pre- 
sented by the Prince Royal to the Emperor of Russia in the 
square of Leipsic. 

The losses sustained in the last four days' combats could 
not with precision be stated ; but they were averaged, on the 
part of the enemy, at 15,000 prisoners, without reckoning 
23,000 sick and wounded found in the hospitals at Leipsic, 
250 pieces of cannon, and 900 tumbrils. Prince Poniatowski, 
Generals Vial, Rochambeau, Dumoutier, Campans, and La- 
tour Maubourg, were killed; and Ne}^, Marmont, and Souham, 
wounded. Fifteen generals were made prisoners. The loss 
of the allies was equally serious. The Prussian corps of 
D'Yorck lost 5000 men : the Austrians enumerated no less 
than sixty officers of distinction killed in this sanguinary 
contest. 

I have now to record an ingenious device of the enemy to 
excite delay and discussion amongst tlie allies. Genera] 
Meerveldt, who had been taken on the 16th, was liberated on 
his parole by Buonaparte, charged with propositions of peace 
to the Emperor of Russia. Buonaparte saw General Meer- 
veldt in the village of Lutschen : he spoke very earnestly on 
the subject of a general pacification ; but first declared that 
he had 200,000 men in line, and a much more considerable 
cavalry than the allies had expected. He offered, on condi- 
tion of an armistice during the negotiation, to evacuate Dant- 
zic, Modelin, Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Dresden, Torgau, and 
even, in case of necessity, Wittenberg. He promised to re- 
tire behind the Saale; and he said, as to terms of peace, that 
England could receive Hanover; the neutrality of the flag 



132 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

of Hamburgh and Lubeck might be insured, as well as the 
independence of Holland ; and Italy be united with an inde- 
pendent monarchy. He hesitated as to the restitution of 
Mantua to Austria ; and repeated, that Italy should be kept 
entire. Meerveldt observed, that tlie allies might object to 
Murat as the sovereign of Naples. The answer was, that it 
was not necessary to anticipate that arrangement ; and Na- 
poleon again and again declared he did not believe England 
would make peace ; and never without a condition to which 
he could never submit, viz. limitation of the number of French 
ships of war. 

General Meerveldt then inquired, whether he would resign 
Erfurth, as well as the other fortresses'] Napoleon hesitated : 
the General then said, the resignation of the protectorship of 
the Rhine was necessary. Buonaparte replied, it w^as impos- 
sible; but on being told that Bavaria had withdrawn from his 
protection, the courier from Munich having been taken, and 
that other treaties were negotiating, he exclaimed. Then the 
protectorship of the confederation ceases of itself. As to 
Spain, it was a question of dynasty, ^e n'y suis plus — there- 
fore, that question is decided. These were the principal topics 
of conversation, as given by General Meerveldt. His impres- 
sion also was, from Napoleon's manner and all he said, that 
he would fall back upon the Rhine : he looked jaded and ill 
at this period, and was very much depressed. 

This interview, it must be understood, took place before 
the last battles ; and there was certainly amongst the allies 
a disposition to accept of Buonaparte's terms, and open a 
negotiation. 

In further reference to my correspondence with the Prince 
Royal of Sweden, already detailed, it is right for me to state, 
that returning to the head-quarters of His Royal Highness 
on the morning of the 18th from General Blucher at Breiten- 
feld, when dispositions were making for the attack, the gene- 
ral officers being present, the aide-de-camp in waiting desired 
me to walk in. 

On entering, I was no less surprised than hurt, when the 
Prince approached with a look bordering upon suppressed 
anger, and withdrawing towards the window, he addressed 
me nearly as follows, but in a purposely low tone, that others 
might not overhear: — "How is this! General Stewart? what 
right have you to write to me I Do you not recollect that I 
am the Prince of Sweden, one of the greatest generals of the 
agel and if you were in my place, what would you think if 
some one should write to you as you have written to me 1 
You have no authority here ; it is through my friendship that 
you are here ; and you have caused me much pain." I an- 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 133 

swered in the most respectful tone: — It was possible my zeal 
had carried me too far ; but, according to my own conception 
of my duty, I could not repent one step I had taken. I had 
urged the march to Zorbig: His Royal Highness had reluc- 
tantly, and in part only, consented to that measure. I had 
entreated the movement forward to Landsberg ; and His Royal 
Highness had adopted that idea. After General Blucher's 
victory, my letter and entreaty induced His Royal Highness 
to break up at two o'clock in the morning from Landsberg, 
and bring the head of his columns at that critical moment into 
position. His Royal Highness could then see whether I had 
mistaken the views of the enemy. The whole circumstances 
were known to his staff, his ministers, and the principal 
officers of his army. I desired to be judged by Baron Wet- 
terstedt and General Adlercreutz whether the result had not 
been attained by my individual, but humble, importunity and 
exertions. I had never been intentionally deficient in respect 
to His Royal Highness's exalted position ; but it was a little 
hard, instead of receiving thanks for my services, to be visit- 
ed with displeasure : it is true, I was not formally accredited 
as British minister to the court of Sweden, but I was charged 
generally with the military interest of Great Britain in the 
north of Europe. England paid the Swedish army ; and my 
reports whether that army did what I considered its duty 
to the common cause, actively or passively, must operate 
seriously upon the alliance. I was incapable of the vanity 
of placing the value of my military opinions on a par with 
those of so great a general ; but it required very little 
discrimination to perceive that His Royal Highness had 
been literally pressed into the recent transactions — that his 
original orders wore evidently a departure from the system 
of combination, and foreign to the dispositions of the grand 
armies. But independently of these demonstrations of isolated 
objects, certain expressions of his own were most explicit, 
and this was not a moment for diplomatic concealment. I 
spoke my opinion openly and firmly, but respectfully. I 
never should shrink from my duty in the most painful situ- 
ation ; which, I fairly confessed, after listening to His Royal 
Highness, the one I was then placed in appeared to me 
to be. 

The expression of his countenance during my discourse 
varied considerably, and at length had become calm ; and he 
replied with bon-hommie : " Very well ! do you wish that we 
should be friends'! You know, my friend, the friendship I 
bear you; why not speak together of military dispositions ? 
Tell me your opinions ; but do not write any more, I beg of 
you." I assured His Royal Highness I felt honored by his 

M 



134 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

friendship, when I considered he was acting as became the 
Crown Prince of Sweden : that if he was displeased with my 
correspondence, I should write in future to General Adler- 
creutz ; although his own invitation, on my first arrival, had 
led me rather to address my letters to the Generalissimo in 
person. My anxious efforts were to assist the Swedish nation ; 
but I could never see their chief depart from what I knew 
were the true interests of his situation, without remonstrating- 
boldly. The Prince upon this took my hand, assuring me of 
his friendship. We discussed the principal features of what 
had passed, and I felt myself restored to favor ; so much so, 
that he invited me. at dinner to meet the Emperor and King, 
I being the only minister present. 

However distressing this scene was to my feelings, I relate 
it to show the difficulties of the duties imposed upon me ; 
and I experience a sensible pleasure in stating, that those 
able, experienced, and highly-talented general officers, who 
were placed by the allied powers near the person of His 
Royal Highness, amongst whom General Pozzo di Borgo 
stood pre-eminently conspicuous for his high abilities and 
acute discernment, aided me in my most difficult task. If the 
time should ever arrive to allow of the correspondence of 
those general officers. Generals Baron Vincent, Krusemark, 
and Pozzo di Borgo, with their courts (much of which I have 
in my possession), to be made public, I shall have no hesita- 
tion in giving them to history, as more than corroborative of 
my candid statements. Posterity will then do justice to the 
extreme difficulties we had to surmount in the execution of 
our duties. General Pozzo di Borgo had made himself very 
unpalatable to the Prince Royal, through his ardent zeal for 
the common cause, heightened by his personal knowledge of 
the dangerous character of Buonaparte; and every effort was 
made at Leipsic by his Royal Highness, to remove him from 
the head-quarters of the Swedish army. I was the fortunate 
medium, however, of arresting that measure ; and the Em- 
peror of Russia ordered no change to take place ; and by 
making my own government privy to General Pozzo di Bor- 
go's able reports, I confirmed the confidence the English gov- 
ernment had in his capacity. After the battles above detailed, 
His Royal Highness presented me with the Swedish military 
Order of the Sword, which the Prince Regent graciously 
permitted me to accept. 



IN GEEMANY AND FRANCE. 135 



CHAPTER XII. 

Continued pursuit of the enemy — Line of march of the allies towards the 
Rhine— Unhappy fate of Prince Poniatowski— Attack of the retreating 
corps on Count Tolstoy— Extensive captures— Movements of Marshal 
Blucher and of the Prince Royal— Dresden evacuated by Gouvion St. Cyr 
— Motions of General Bennigsen — Collecting of the enemy near Erfurth 
— Progress and positions of the allied armies — Arrival of General Wrede 
— Active measures — The Silesian army overtakes and routs the enemy — 
Large capture of prisoners — Brilliant successes of Marshal Blucher — Dis- 
patches from Sir Hudson Lovv'e- Hot pursuit and narrow escape of Napo- 
leon—Disasters and sufferings of the enemy — Napoleon retreats on Frank- 
fort—Reports of General Wrede— of engagements at Hanau— Further 
progress of the Silesian army — Rapid marches, and heroic actions of the 
allies. 

The pursuit of the enemy continued along- the whole line ; 
and prisoners, baggage, and all the attirail of a flying army 
were hourly sent in by the Cossacks and light troops. I felt 
most anxious about the fate of Buonaparte, conceiving that 
his ultimate destiny could not be doubtful or remote. He 
reached Lutzen on the 19th ; and I concluded he would either 
direct his march across the Saale, and make for Nordhausen 
and the Hartz, in order to place himself behind the Weser, 
calling Marshal Davoust's army from the north to his aid, or 
attempt to move on the chaussee towards Erfurth, after pass- 
ing the Saale at Weissenfels. It was almost impossible he 
should escape, except with the wreck of an army ; but it was 
easy to imagine that the remnant of his masses, directed on 
one line, might force their way through smaller corps. 

The following disposition of the allied armies was now 
concerted, with immediate preparations to carry it into effect. 
The grand army of Bohemia marched on the enemy's right 
in the direction of Frankfort on the Maine; taking the route 
of Pegau, Zeitz, and Eisenberg. The army of General Ben- 
nigsen, united to that of the army of the north, and under 
the orders of the Crown Prince, followed the enemy's centre 
in the direction of Lutzen and Naumburg. The triumphan 
army of Silesia, when near Leipsic, diverged still further to 
the right, and was to cotoyer the enemy's left by Merseburg ; 
and its cannon was soon heard reverberating in that direction. 
If the enemy passed the Saale at Weissenfels, the army of 
the Prince Royal was to move on Freyberg. The Saxon 
troops were joined to the Swedish army ; but 2000 Baden 
troops were considered prisoners of war. The captures con- 
tinued to be still greater than those hitherto detailed ; fifty 
more pieces of cannon were discovered, besides those buried 
by the enemy. Prince Poniatowski, who received two wounds 
in attempting to pass the Elster, urged by what the French 



136 NABRATIVE OF THE WAR 

call un beau desespoir, was drowned in that river ; decked, 
it was said, with brilliants, and too heavily charged with coin 
for a retreat a la nage. 

Several battalions of Poles joined the allied army. The 
Emperor's head-quarters moved on the 31st towards Eisen- 
berg. The Prince Royal preferred a change in his line of 
march, and moved to Merseburg the same day. His Prussian 
Majesty nominated General Blucher to the rank of Field- 
marshal, as a fit recompense for his pre-eminent services ; and 
their Majesties, the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor of 
Austria, conferred on Prince Schwartzenberg the First Class 
of their respective military Orders of St. George and Maria 
Theresa, and the King of Prussia that of the Black Eagle. 

By intelligence received from Count Tolstoy's corps, which 
was left to watch the force under General Gouvion St. Cyr, 
in garrison at Dresden, the enemy, findmg the grand army 
had moved away, commenced an offensive operation on Count 
Tolstoy, which they followed up with some success, as he was 
much outnumbered. He lost 4 or 5000 men ; but took up a 
defensive position at Peters walde. 

The allied armies continued tlieir pursuit of the enemy; 
and no day passed, since the memorable battle of Leipsic, 
without cannon, prisoners, baggage, and carriages of all sorts, 
falling into their Imnds. Marshal Blucher's pursuit was the 
closest, from the position which he occupied on the 19th, 
as he followed the enemy on the Lutzen road. Marshal 
Blucher thus formed the centre army, the Prince Royal the 
right, and the grand army the left of the allied forces. 

I am unable, from my own personal observation, to afford 
the details of the advantages obtained at this epoch in pur- 
suit by the armies of Silesia, Bohemia, and the north ; and 
to recapitulate the information obtained from different sources 
would require volumes. The Crown Prince put his army 
in march on the 20th, and had liis head-quarters at Merse- 
burg on the 22d ; at Querfurt on the 23d ; and at Artern on 
the 24th. 

By advices received, General Gouvion St. Cyr, after his 
action with General Tolstoy, evacuated Dresden, taking with 
him the garrison, and directed himself on Torgau and Wit- 
tenberg. It was computed that he could collect between 
30 and 40,000 men : which force, it was presumed, would 
march upon Magdeburg, and probably attempt to form a junc- 
tion with Marshal Davoust's corps. As this army's move- 
ment might occasion a momentary alarm. General Bennigsen, 
with a corps of 10,000 men, exclusive of cavalry, was di- 
rected to put himself in march immediately; and he was 
ordered to assume the command of all the allied corps on 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 137 

the Elbe, under Generals Tolstoy, Tauenstein, &c., amount- 
ing to between 60 and 70,000 men. This army was first to 
find out General Gouvion St. Cyr, wherever he might be, 
and fall upon him en masse. They were then to undertake 
the sieges of Torgau and Wittenberg, should they still hold 
out. 

Lieutenant-general Count Walmoden's movements were 
to be guided by those of Marshal Davoust, and in combination 
with those of General Bennigsen. The other two divisions 
of General Bennigsen's army were added to the Russians 
under General Winzingerode. The Saxon troops were de- 
tached to join General Count Tolstoy. 

According to further advices, the enemy were collecting 
about Erfurth on the 27th of October. The following was 
nearly the position of the different armies : — the grand army 
was at Weimar ; Marshal Blucher at, or about, Eisenach ; 
General Langeron at Wisbach ; General D'Yorck at Som- 
merda; General Bulow atColleda; the Crown Prince at Ar- 
tern ; and General Winzingerode at Kindelbriick. By the 
above arrangement, if the enemy stood his ground, the wings 
could all fall back upon the grand army, and inflict the coup 
de grace upon that hydra of demoralization and destruction 
still lingering in Germany. Some thousand French, sur- 
rounded and succorless, now laid down their arms near 
Weissenfels. 

The enemy's columns continued their retreat with so much 
rapidity, that however difficult to keep Vepee aux reins, yet 
increased harasses and further discomfiture daily ensued. 
General Count Wrede had arrived with his army of 58,000 
Bavarians and Austrians. On the 24th, he was to surround 
Wurtzburg, to summon the fortress, and bombard both that 
and the city in case of refusal to surrender. General Wrede 
next proposed to place himself a cheval on the Maine, and to 
occupy and break up the roads to Mayence, in order to im- 
pede the enemy's retreat, and attempt to take possession of 
the tete du pont of Cassel. 

The grand army moved on by its left, in two columns, from 
Weimar towards Erfurth. The first column, composed of the 
1st, 2d, and 3d Austrian divisions, and the advanced-guard, 
pressed forward on Erfurth and Gotha : Generals Wittgen- 
stein's and Kleist's corps observed Erfurth ; and in the event 
of the enemy having left only a small garrison, they were to 
blockade the place with a corps, and move on in pursuit. The 
second column, composed wholly of Russian and Prussian 
guards and reserves, marched from Weimar by Berka and 
Kranichfeld, where the head-quarters were to be established 
on the 28th. The enemy evacuated Erfurth, leaving a gar- 

M2 



138 NAURATTVE OF THE \VAR 

rison in it. In the centre, the army of Silesia never allowed 
itself a moment's repose, or ceased from those extraordinary 
efforts by which its whole progress had been characterized. 
The Russian advanced-guard, under General Wassilchikoff, 
made 2000 prisoners near Lutzen : after which, General 
D'Yorck came up on the 22d, reached the enemy near Frey- 
berg, took 1500 more prisoners, liberated 4000 Russians and 
Austrians, captured eighteen pieces of cannon, and compelled 
the enemy to destroy 500 ammunition-wagons. 

Marshal Blucher's march, through defiles and bad roads, 
was most difficult and appalling : added to which, the soldiers 
had to contend at this unfavorable season with almost total 
destitution of necessaries ; but he proceeded through Weiss- 
ensee and Langencalza, always on the enemy's flank, who 
kept the great chaussee to Erfurth and Gotha, 

On the 26th, the Field-marshal again came up with the 
enemy near Eisenach ; they appeared in a column of about 
20,000 men, in tolerable order : the ground was unfavorable 
for the Marshal's cavalry, being between the Thuringian 
mountains and the Hortelberg and Kahlenberg ; and as the 
greater part of his infantry had been directed on Gross-Leip- 
nitz, more on the enemy's flank, it was late before the strug- 
gle commenced. General D'Yorck's corps, however, when 
it arrived from Gross-Leipnitz, attacked the enemy entering 
the town of Eisenach, and he was thrown into complete dis- 
order. General Langeron coming up made 2000 prisoners ; 
and the enemy abandoned here, as elsewhere, a whole train 
of caissons, most of which were blown up. Night closed 
this brilliant and decisive affair. On the 27th, the enemy 
retired from Eisenach, pursued by Marshal Blucher. It was 
believed General Bertrand's division was completely sepa- 
rated, and cut off from the grand route of Frankfort, and 
forced to take the mountain roads in the direction of Schwein- 
furth; General D'Yorck was sent after this corps. Buona- 
naparte left Eisenach at five o'clock on the morning of this 
action. Marshal Blucher moved on the high road to Frank- 
fi)rt; and it was conjectured that this would be Buonaparte's 
great line of retreat. 

Marshal Blucher's successes since the battles of Leipsic 
might be fairly averaged at 6000 prisoners, 4000 Russiana 
liberated, forty ])ieces of cannon, and 100 caissons taken, ex- 
clusive of those blown up. Of the corps of Marmont, which 
was composed of the best French troops, only 3000 now re- 
mained : in short, the disasters of the enemy were hourly, and 
of every description. 

Colonel Hudson Lowe being at this period attached by me 
to Marshal Bluclier, I can confide in the authenticity of the 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE 139 

information which I give, as received from that able and in- 
telligent officer. Marshal Blucher's army, since leaving 
Leipsic on the 27th of October, had outmarched the grand 
army even in its own line of march, and now formed in the 
van. The Colonel conceived that the 26th might have been 
a most fatal day for Buonaparte, had the Silesian army put 
itself in movement at an earlier hour, or had there been offi- 
cers of greater activity and combination at the head of the 
Russian cavalry. A prompt march upon Eisenach, which lies 
in the very centre of defiles, would have rendered all further 
retreat on that line impassable. 

It would have cost some lives, however : and tlia infantry 
had already snfiered so much, and were so exceedingly harass- 
ed, that it would have been unreasonable to expect much 
more could have been done by then). The extraordinary effort 
must have been made by the cavalry, with such artillery and 
infantry as could follow. 

Notwithstanding, sufficient was done, as it was, to establish 
a fair claim to public approbation. Even Napoleon, who by 
the rapidity of his march had placed himself at a very secure 
distance from the grand army, must not have been a little 
surprised and alarmed at finding his Silesian opponents close 
upon his flanks, and arriving at Eisenach at almost the same 
moment as himself The Colonel continues to write as 
follows: — 

" I had mentioned to General Gniesenau what you desired 
me to say. He is of opinion, as every other person must be, 
that the Prince Royal could not do less* than he has done to 
meet the extraordinary services you have rendered to the 
cause and to him. 

"General Gniesenau has had the cross of a commander of 
Maria Theresa conferred on him. I wish sincerely that our 
country had some method also of distinguishing the services 
of officers known to it, who deserve so well for their exer- 
tions in the public cause. There is nothing which appears to 
afford Marshal Blucher so much gratification, as the idea that 
liis name and exploits will be well considered in England : 
any testimony of approbation, either from the Sovereign or 
the country, would, I am sure, delight him. 

" I hope, sir, you will do me the justice to believe that 1 
am incapable of abusing your indulgence, so far as even to 
express a desire of remaining with General Blucher's army, 
whilst there are duties of a more indispensable nature for nic 
to perform in any other quarter. If there can be any situa- 
tion more enviable than another, it is that of being attached 

* This alludns to the Prince Royal of Sweden havinji conferred the Swedish 
militajy Order of the Sword on General Sir Charles Stewart. 



140 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR 

to such an army ; and the longer I remain with it, the more 
agreeable I feel I should find it: but the business I have in 
the other quarter I know must be terminated, and I shall be 
therefore ready prepared at your first call to proceed, and 
join you wherever you appoint me to receive your further 
directions. Perhaps one of the columns may come to a halt 
in two, three, or four days, v/hich may appear to you the 
most suitable time. 

"The interest of the present moment is so very great, 
Napoleon so near, and the Bavarian array marching across 
his supposed line of retreat, that not manydays can elapse 
before some crisis ensues. However, I beg to say I am en- 
tirely at your orders for an immediate move, wherever you 
judge my services most necessary. In the mean time, whether 
it may be my good fortune to be attached to JMarshal Blucher 
on any future occasion or not, I shall always feel a most lively 
sense of the high favor you have conferred on me, by placing 
me near him at the present important crisis, 

"I must now inform you, that General Blucher, at the sug- 
gestion of the king of Prussia, detached General D'Yorck's 
corps, and a body of cavalry under General Wassilchikoff, to 
harass the enemy in his retreat. General Wassilchikoff came 
up with the enemy near Lutzen, and made near 2000 prison- 
ers. General D'Yorck, who moved with his infantry by a 
wider route, did not con:ie up with the enemy till the 22d, 
near Freyberg, w^here he attacked a column that had marched 
by that road, took eighteen pieces of cannon, 1500 prisoners, 
liberated nearly 4000 i^ustrians and Russians, whom the 
enemy was conducting as prisoners into France, and com- 
pelled hira to burn upwards of 400 ammunition-wagons.'" 

Before daylight on the morning of the 27th October, the 
enemy had quitted the town of Eisenach, which was imme- 
diately after entered by Marshal Blucher's army ; an advanc- 
ed corps of which had Ijcon sent directjy in pursuit, and came 
up with the rear of tlie enemy at the entrance of the defiles 
in the mountains, within about a German mile from the town. 
The blowing up of the several ammunition-wagons, the de- 
struction or abandonment of baggage, and tlje capture of 
several stragglers, was the immediate consequence; but the 
enemy had penetrated fir into the defiles, wliere the ground 
was not favorable for the advance of tlie cavalry ; and it was 
only by following his march for the three subsequent days, 
that the precipitancy and disasters of his flight became ob- 
vious. 

For an extent of nearly fifly English miles, from Eisenach 
to Fulda, carcasses of dead and dying horses, without num- 
ber, dead bodies of men, who had been either killed or per- 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 141 

iohed through hunger, sickness, or fatigue, lying on the roads 
or in the ditches ; parties of prisoners and stragglers, brought 
in by the Cossacks ; blown up or destroyed ammunition and 
baggage- wagons,- in such numbers as absolutely to obstruct 
the road, sufficiently attested the sufferings of the enemy ; 
whilst pillaged and burning towns and villages marked at 
the same time the ferocity with which he had conducted him- 
self 

The number of dead bodies on the road had been consider- 
ably augmented, from a resolution that had been taken to 
carry off all the sick and wounded; not resulting surely from 
any principle of humanity, but probably as matter of boast, 
in the relations that might be given to the world of the event, 
as several of these men were found abandoned on the road 
in the last gasp of hunger and disease : the dead and the 
dying were frequently mixed together, lying in groups of six 
or eight, by half-extinguished fires on the road-side. Several 
of these men must have been compelled to move on foot, as 
their bodies were found on the road with the sticks with which 
they had endeavored to support their march lying by their 
sides. The dead might have been counted by hundreds ; and 
in the space from Eisenach to Fulda could certainly not have 
amounted to much less than a thousand. 

The enemy continued to be closely pursued during the 
three days' march from Eisenach to Vach Hiinefeld and Fuldai 
and frequently cannonading ensued at the head of the ad- 
vanced-guard ; but the nature of the country not permitting 
the cavalry to act, the enemy escaped with only such losses 
as have been enumerated. 

On arriving at Fulda, it was ascertained that Buonaparte 
had fled in the direction of Frankfort ; but a subsequent re- 
lation assured us that General Count Wrede had taken Hanau, 
with his Bavarian troops, by assault, on the 28th : Napoleon 
would be therefore compelled to turn towards Coblentz, and 
Marshal Blucher had made his dispositions for following him 
in that direction. General Count St. Priest, of General Baron 
Sachen's division, had in the mean time entered Cassel. 
General Baron Sachen, who had not found it necessary to 
pursue him in that direction, halted this day at Lantubach ; 
General Count Langeron at Luder, and General D'Yorck at 
Neuchoff The whole were to move forward on the Lalm. 

It had been the original intention of Field-marshal Blucher 
to keep the high road to Frankfort, on which he was already 
the foremost in advance; but the columns of the grand 
combined army following close on the same route, the solicita- 
tions of the Prince Marshal commanding it, who represented 
the difficulties of subsistence, and the advance of General 



142 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Wrede on Hanau, induced him to turn off to the right, so as 
effectually to provide against the enemy's effecting his retreat 
by the way of Coblentz. 

The first day's march was to Ulrickstein, an old town with 
a castle, on the highest pinnacle of the Vorelberg mountains. 
The roads to it were full of every obstacle that hills, woods, 
ravines, morasses, and roads that had never been destined for 
wheel conveyances, could present ; and were, in fact, such as, 
according to any usual military calculation, would have been 
considered as impracticable for the movements of a large 
army : infantry, cavalry, artillery, and baggage, every thing, 
however, were pushed over them. The Russian twelve- 
pounders frequently stuck in the road ; but where six horses 
were not sufficient, twelve were tackled; and finally, every 
thing was made to yield to the perseverance and determined 
resolution which had distinguished all the operations of this 
army. 

The troops after their long march were cantoned in several 
of the small mountain villages ; and corps of 3000 men were 
allotted to some, whose usual population would not amount 
to as many hundreds. The inhabitants supplied their wants 
with cheerfulness in every thing : the soldiers were delight- 
ed ; and they had equal reason to be satisfied with each other. 
The soldiers from Caucasus and the Volga, forgot all the fa- 
tigues of their long marches in the hospitable reception the 
peasants had afforded them. 

On arriving at Ulrickstein, accounts were received by Field- 
marshal Blucher that General Wrede had fallen in with the 
enemy, during their retreat on the 29th, and taken 4000 pris- 
oners, many of them of the guards. On the 30th, he was 
himself attacked by Napoleon, but enabled to keep his posi- 
tion. On the 31st, another affair was reported to have taken 
place ; the result not known. At or near Gelnhausen, Gene- 
ral Platoff also fell in with the enemy ; and, as reported to 
the Field-marshal, had taken 30C0 prisoners. Tlie Field- 
marshal marched this day to Giessen. 

It was here reported that Napoleon was still in Frankfort, 
and had concentred his army between and round Hanau, 
Frankfort, and the Rhine ; that General Wrede, who had 
possessed himself of both Hanau and Frankfort, found it ne- 
cessary to dra.w in his force to resist the attacks of Napoleon, 
who, after his first affairs, returned from the Frankfort road to 
attack the General ; and that he was now in position about 
these towns, both of which he occupied. There were further 
reports of another battle, in which General Wrede had been 
successful ; but no accounts to be relied on had been received. 

General Blucher did not commence his march until afler 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 143 

the assault of Leipsic. After six days' rapid marches, by 
cross-roads, through Freyberg, Colleda, Weissensee, and 
Langencalza, in a thick clayey country, where preceding rains 
had rendered the defiles almost impracticable, whilst the ene- 
my, followed by the grand combined army, was moving his 
columns along the great chaussee that leads from Leipsic to 
Erfurth and Gotha, General, now Field-marshal, Blucher 
found himself on the enemy's flank, in his line of retreat from 
Gotha to Eisenach. He appeared to be in a strong column 
of from 15 to 20,000 men, the main body marching in tolera- 
bly good order ; but a considerable number of stragglers, many 
without arms, on their flanks and in the rear. 

The Field-marshal made the following dispositions: the 
whole army had marched on that morning, the 26th of Octo- 
ber, from Langencalza. He ordered the corps of General 
Count Langeron to move on Frederichsworth, and that of 
Generals D'Yorck and Sachen on Gross- Leipnitz, to recon- 
noitre the heiglits and villages on their front, and to attack 
where circumstances admitted. The chaussee on which the 
enemy was proceeding runs in a valley ; bounded on one side 
by the great chain of the Thuringian mountains, and on the 
other by a range of minor heights, called the Hurthberg, 
Horselberg, and Kalilenberg. The river Horsel runs closely 
parallel to the chaussee : the ground was not, in consequence, 
favorable for the operation of cavalry, or for bringing artillery 
speedily up to the attack ; and the enemy had occupied all 
the ravines and lower eminences bordering on the road with 
his tirailleurs. The main body of the Field-marshal's infan- 
try had been directed upon Gross-Leipnitz, considerably in 
advance towards Eisenach. 

It was not, therefore, until late in the evening that the at- 
tack commenced. General D'Yorck's corps advanced from 
Gross-Leipnitz, and threw itself upon the enemy as he was 
entering the town of Eisenach. A heavy cannonading and 
musketry ensued on both sides: the enemy was thrown into 
confusion ; and General Count Langeron, who had pushed on 
at the same time with his corps in the rear, and gained the 
great chaussee, made 2000 prisoners, and compelled the ene- 
my to blow up several of his powder-wagons. General 
D'Yorck suffered a loss of nearly 300 killed and wounded : 
the enemy must have suffered in a greater proportion ; and in 
regard to prisoners, his entire loss was not ascertained, as 
several stragglers were every moment hurrying in. 

On the 27th of October the enemy quitted Eisenach, pur- 
sued by the Field-marshal's advanced-guard. It was ascertain- 
ed that General Bertrand's division of the French army had 
taken the direction of Schweinfurth. General D'Yorck had 



1 



144 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

received orders to march across that line. General Baron 
Sachen's corps was to move towards Cassel. 

Field-marshal Blucher, accompanied by the chief of his 
staff, General Gniesenau, followed him with the corps of Gen- 
eral Count Langeron on the high road to Frankfort, which 
the Marshal conjectured would be his line of retreat. Thus 
was the army of Silesia, after taking the most circuitous 
marches, again the first in its pursuit and attack of the ene- 
my. The number of prisoners taken by it, since the retreat 
from Leipsic, cannot be estimated at a less number than 6000 
men ; whilst nearly 4000 had been gained for the cause, viz. 
the liberation of the prisoners that had been taken by the 
enemy. 

Information was now received that Lieutenant-general 
Count Wrede, at the head of an army of 58,000 Austrians 
and Bavarians, had advanced as far as Wurtzburg, and was 
pursuing his march on Frankfort, so that sanguine hopes were 
entertained of his arriving there before the enemy could 
reach that point. On the 20th the Prince Royal moved his 
army to Sondershausen, and on the 28th to Mulhausen ; having 
his advance, under Lieutenant-general Woronzofl^ on the 
great roads leading towards Cassel, to which point His Royal 
Highness's immediate attention now seemed directed. 

Lieutenant-general Czernichefl^ who joined General Win- 
zingerode's command, with his usual activity, was alive in all 
directions in the enemy's rear and on its flanks; and he never 
gave them breathing time. He had a brilliant affair at En- 
terode, near Eisenach ; attacking with 200 horse the division 
of Fournier, 800 strong : he made 200 prisoners, and killed 
many more. The general then resolved to march on Fulda, 
to head the enemy's columns in that direction. 

Buonaparte generally remained with his rear-guard, which 
was composed of his guards. Marshal Kellerman, it was 
believed, had not more than 4 or 5000 men at Frankfort. 
General Czernicheflf' marched without guns for greater ra- 
pidity, and generally advanced eight or ten German miles a 
day. General Tauenstein reported all quiet in the quarter 
of Wittenberg, and the right bank of the Elbe ; and it was 
now said that General Gouvion St. Cyr was directing him- 
self on Chemnitz. General Bennigsen's corps continued its 
march by Leipsic. The ci-devant King of Westphalia had 
fled from Cassel, forcing the inhabitants to buy all the valua- 
bles he had and could not carry off with him : he decamped 
with a good booty. 

While successes crowned the efforts of the allies on all 
sides, the firm and cheerful behavior of the troops, amidst all 
their fatigues and deprivations, was remarkable : yet it be 



IN GERMANY AND FKAIVCE. 145 

came necessary before long to give the armies repose, in 
order to recruit their ranks, to re-equip the soldiers, and 
carefully to superintend the hospitals. Numbers of men 
had been left behind, worn down by suffering and exertions 
almost superhuman. But while this measure appeared so 
necessary, it was stUl a secondary consideration with the allied 
Sovereigns, so long as the enemy remained on the right bank 
of the Rhine. 

A successful coup de main by a partisan. Colonel Chra- 
powitski, who entered Gotha on the 22d, took the French 
minister. Baron St. Aignau, seventy-three officers, 900 men, 
prisoners, and blew up fifty ammunition-wagons, terminated 
this campaign. Many interesting letters were intercepted 
by the capture of the above-named diplomate, who was 
now about to play a prominent part on this great scene of 
action. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

Movements of the French army — Bold and masterly conduct of General 
Wrede — Amount of Napoleon's force — Skilful retreat of his commanders 
— Taking of Hanau — Head-quarters of Napoleon at Frankfort — Contin- 
ued retreat — Position of Marshal Davoust with the Danes — March of the 
army of the north towards Hanover — New plans of the Prince of Swe- 
den — Brilliant conduct of the partisan-corps— Marshal Blucher's pursuit 
of the enemy — Occupation of Bremen — Entrance of the allies into Hano- 
ver — Plans of the Prince Royal — The Duke of Cumberland — Dissatisfac- 
tion of General Walmoden — Conversations with the Prince Royal of 
Sweden — Causes of misunderstanding among the allies — Public declara- 
tion — Proposals to Napoleon — Movements of the allied armies — Capitula- 
tion treated of with Davoust by the Prince Royal — Capitulation of 
Dresden — not sanctioned at head-quarters — Interview with Prince Har- 
den berg— Alliance between Great Britain and Prussia— Grounds of union 
between the great powers. 

To return to the movements of the grand army : on the 
23d of October, Napoleon seemed to be concentrating and 
reorganizing his army at Erfurth. On the 25th, the two 
Emperors, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwartzenberg, 
established their head-quarters at Weimar ; while the Sile- 
sian army, anticipating the probability of a future combat at 
Erfurth, proceeded to Langencalza ; a movement which, 
threatening Napoleon's rear, compelled him to abandon his 
position at Erfurth. Marshal Blucher then marched on Eise- 
nach, as has been already recorded. The enemy continued 
their rapid retreat by Fulda and Frankfort, harassed by 
the cavalry and Cossacks, under Platoff, Sloweiski, and 
Czernicheff. 

In the mean time, General Wrede, with the Bavarian 

N 



146 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

army, made rapid marches towards Mayence, in the hope of 
arriving at Frankfort before them, and of cutting- off the 
major part of the • etreating army. The grand allied army 
marched in two columns: one by Fulda, and the other by 
Aschaffenburg, on Frankfort. The Silesian army continued 
its route by Wetzlar. The Prince Royal of Sweden, up to 
this period, moved in the direction of Cassel : but changes 
took place here, which shall be presently detailed. General 
Count Wrede, with the Bavarian army, having very gallantly 
assaulted three different times the strong capital of Wurtz- 
burg, ultimately succeeded in forcmg its capitulation on the 
26th of October, and pressed on his march as has been before 
mentioned. On the 27th he arrived at Aschaffenburg, and on 
the 28th entered Hanau. The Bavarian General now learn- 
ed that the main French army was before him : he was 
obliged, therefore, to evacuate the place until all his troops 
came up ; and he took up a position in the rear of it, and on 
the following days had various skirmishes with the enemy. 
At length he collected about 36,000 men ; and taking a posi- 
tion with his right to Reineck, and his left to Gelnhausen, 
he determined to attack the enemy, however superior in 
numbers. 

Napoleon, however, had upwards of 60,000 men and 120 
pieces of cannon, and only wanted to disengage the line of 
march for his retreat. His generals, Nansouty, Sebastiani, 
and Davoust, ably and skilfully fulfilled the orders that were 
given ; and a great portion of the French army filed off during 
the night towards Frankfort. But on the following day, 
General Wrede made a most gallant and desperate attack on 
Hanau, which he took by assault, receiving a severe wound 
in the action, while leading on his troops with dauntless 
intrepidity. 

Napoleon, meantime, continued his march by Stockstadt, 
on the right of the great road near Hanau, leaving Marshal 
Mortier, with a rear-guard of 14,000 men, to cover his retreat. 

On the 31st, the light cavalry of the French passed the 
Maine, and entered Frankfort ; and at twelve on that day, 
Napoleon established his head-quarters there. The result of 
the battle of Hanau was stated to be 1.5,000 killed and wound- 
ed, 10,000 prisoners, and nine generals. 

On the 1st of November, Napoleon continued his retreat 
from all points. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, and 
the King of Prussia, accompanied by Prince Schwartzenberg, 
Generals Barclay de Tolly and Wittgenstein, surrounded also 
by their other generals and suite, made their magnificent and 
solemn entry into Frankfort on the 4th ; and the main French 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 147 

army was now effectually driven from the right bank of the 
Rhine. 

I now return to the Prince Royal's army. The intended 
movement of the main body of the army of the north on 
Cassel was arrested ; and the Prince Royal was induced to 
direct his operations towards Hanover and the north, for the 
following- substantial reasons : — Marshal Davoust was still iij 
position on the right bank of the Elbe, and seemed very un- 
willing to separate from the Danes, so long as he could main- 
tain his positions. The corps of Lieutenant-general Count 
Walmoden was not of sufficient force to act offensively, with- 
out considerable aid. The extermination of the enemy in 
the north of Germany ; the possession of Bremen ; the mouths 
of the Weser and the Elbe; the speedy reduction of Ham- 
burgh ; the advantage of opening an immediate communica- 
tion with England during the winter ; the liberation of His 
Majesty's electoral dominions, and the organization of its civil 
and military power ; the facility that would be afforded to 
the future operations of the northern army, either in Holland 
or on the Rhine, when their rear should be entirely secure; 
and, lastly, the hope of cutting off Marshal Davoust com- 
pletely from Holland, were the united considerations which 
determined His Royal Highness to alter his proposed move- 
ment. 

The army of the north was consequently put in march, 
towards the end of October, for Bremen and Hanover ; from 
whence it was to be directed against the remaining forces 
of the enemy in the north of Germany. The Prince Royal 
transferred his head-quarters from Mulhausen to Dinglestadt 
on the 29th ; on the 30th to Heligenstadt, and on the 1st of 
November to Gottingen. 

The advanced-guard of Woronzoff, and the Russians under 
General Winzingerode, entered Cassel on the 30th. The 
Swedes and Prussians were in the neighborhood of Heligen- 
stadt on that day, when His Royal Highness determined on 
a change in his line of movements. Reports received from 
General Czernicheff, dated from Newens, on the 27th, de- 
tailed, that having joined General Sloweiski with another 
partisan-corps of the grand arm}'', he proceeded to Fulda, 
which town he occupied, making 500 prisoners ; he then 
destroyed the enemy's magazines, and proceeded to break 
down llie bridges, and render the roads as impracticable. as 
possible, having contrived to post himself between the ene- 
my's main body and their advance. The manner in which 
General Czernicheff harassed them was not to be described. 
While in his position at Fulda, he perceived the advance of 
their collected force, consisting of some squadrons of gen- 



148 NA^lRATIVE OF THE WAR 

darmes, moving towards the town : he immediately advanced 
with his Cossacks, charged, and overthrew them, and then 
returned to follow the advanced-guard on the great road 
towards Frankfort, carrying destruction before him, and de- 
priving the enemy of all their means before their arrival. 

General Czernicheff, moreover, stated, that Buonaparte 
went from Eisenach to Vach ; and that he had the intention 
of going to the Weser, but the march of the Prince Royal 
and Marshal Blucher prevented him, and he supposed his line 
would be Frankfort. He added, his army was reduced to 
60,000 strong, armed and collected ; many of the enemy, 
however, were retiring in different directions, even without 
arms : the retreat forcibly resembled that from Russia. All 
accounts agreed that the greatest consternation reigned in 
France, and that interior discontent was very generally mani- 
festing itself 

From the intrepid and dexterous exploits of the partisans, 
we now turn, with equal cause for exultation, to the move- 
ments of the armies. Marshal Blucher, with the Silesian 
army, reported from Philipstadt and Hunefeldt, on the 29th, 
that such was the disorder of the enemy's flight, he could not 
for a moment desist from the pursuit, however harassed his 
troops might be : His Excellency was daily making prison- 
ers. General Bennigsen reached Halle on the 29th. It seemed 
that the corps of General Gouvion St. Cyr, originally stated 
to have left Dresden for Torgau or Wittenberg, and latterly 
supposed to be moving to Chemnitz, had, nevertheless, re- 
mained at Dresden. A part of General Regnier's corps, 
probably separated from the French army by the operations 
of the allies and the battle of Leipsic, had been mistaken for 
that of General Gouvion St. Cyr. Tliis corps was now en- 
camped near Torgau, on the right bank of the Elbe ; and 
General Bennigsen was moving towards the Elbe, to act with 
all the different corps under his orders there in the most vig- 
orous manner. 

There was now a report of a corps of the enemy, about 
12,000 men, under General Mollitor, moving from Holland ; 
but it had not advanced further than Bonstanger. General 
Cara St. Cyr reoccupied the town of Bremen with a part of 
his force, after General Tettenborn had evacuated it; it was, 
however, soon again free. The movements of the Prince 
Royal's columns in march were as follow : — the Russians pro- 
cieeded from Cassel by Padcrborn to Bremen and Oldenburg; 
the Prussians, under General Bulow, to Minden ; and the 
Swedes, to Hanover. 

On the 28th of November, I witnessed, with inexpressible 
pleasure, the entrance of the allied troops into the Electoral 



IN GERMANY AND FHANCE. 149 

dominions. Tlie enthusiastic loyalty and unbounded joy of 
the people are not to be described ; and although ten years had 
elapsed since that country had been governed by its legiti- 
mate sovereign, it was obvious that he still reigned in their 
hearts with the same deep-rooted affection. The reception 
of the Prince Royal must have been highly gratifying. The 
tew English present were greeted with joyous acclamations. 

It is a remarkable and pleasing anecdote, that during the 
existence of the new regime, and the studied obliteration of 
every memorial of the ancient dynasty, the bust of our re- 
vered Monarch, which I believe was a present of Her Ma- 
jesty's to the professors and students, retained its place in 
the university : no sacrilegious hand had ever presumed to 
remove it. 

Active measures were taken, under the authority of the 
regency, for the re-establishment of all the civil authorities; 
and His Royal Highness the Prince of Sweden, with the ut- 
most attention and care in providing for his troops by requi- 
sitions, made arrangements for payment ; and in every thing 
considered the country and its inhabitants the most favored 
soil. 

So soon as His Royal Highness the Prince of Sweden 
changed his plan of operations^ on the 30th, His Royal High- 
ness the Buke of Cumberland joined the corps of Lieuten- 
ant-general Walmoden ; but tlie Crown Prince expressed 
fears that if the Duke of Cumberland entered Hanover un- 
der existing circumstances, embarrassment would arise. 

General Walmoden now became discontented with his 
situation and position. This was the more to be lamented, 
considering the extraordinary favor that had been shown him 
by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. The frequent 
representations he made to tlio Prince Royal of his critical 
and forlorn predicament, operated as an argument, which His 
Royal Highness did not fail to make use of, to lead his forces 
to that quarter, where the Prince Royafs inclinations had 
been so long leaning. As it appeared now of the greatest 
importance to open the communication, without loss of time, 
from the Weser with fleligoland, in order that packets might 
go from thence with our communications, I addressed a letter 
to the Governor of Heligoland by a confidential person for 
this object. 

On the 4th of November, the Prince Royal, in a confer- 
ence, was pleased to communicate to me that he had dis- 
patched the Count Lovvcnheilnj, one of the officers of his staff, 
to His Imperial Majesty, to propose the following disposition 
for consideration : — That the grand army of Bohemia should 
place its left on the Maine, stretching with its right to the 

N2 



150 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

conflux of the Sieg with the Rhine : the army of Silesia, or 
the army of the centre, to have the appui of its left on the 
right bank of the Sieg, and to post its right towards Dussel- 
dorf : the army of the Prince Royal, after disposing of the 
enemy's forces in the north, was to undertake the siege of 
Wesel, directing itself from thence upon Holland ; of which 
country His Royal Highness proposed to undertake the libe- 
ration : the armies in the several positions on the right bank 
of the Rhine were, in the first instance, to reorganize them- 
selves as far as possible ; the recruiting of them was to be 
carried to the highest possible pitch ; and, at the earliest mo- 
ment, operations were to commence on the left bank of that 
river: the troops employed in the blockades of the different 
fortresses on the Elbe were, as soon as possible, to undertake 
the sieges of them, as well as of those on the Oder. 

The Crown Prince expected that Torgau and Stettin would 
fall in the course of fifteen days : these appeared the general 
outlines of His Royal Highness's ideas ; which I deem inter- 
esting, in a military point of view, to record. No official ac- 
count was yet promulgated, from whence a judgment could 
be formed of the manner in which Buonaparte, with the rem- 
nant of his army, had extricated himself after the sangui- 
nary and hard-fought actions with General Wrede, who mer- 
ited, unquestionably, the highest encomiums. The force of 
Buonaparte, as he retired on the great line of his communi- 
cations, was probably augmented by troops at Erfurth, and 
other places on its march. In his battles with General Wrede, 
he brought forward 60 or 70,000 men : a force much beyond 
what we estimated him to possess after his various losses. It 
was quite clear, however, he did not think himself secure 
with this number, as, during the last battle, he appeared to 
seek his safety with an e&cort of 10,000 cavalry; which 
General CzernichefT very gallantly attacked, and roughly 
handled. 

Marshal Blncher's army being directed out of tlie great 
line of road on Frankfort, on which they were following the 
enemy, were marched, as I liave before stated, on Wetzlar 
and Coblentz. I certainly considered, when General Wrede 
occupied Hanau and Frankfort, that Buonaparte would march 
on Coblentz; but it was to be regretted that our numerous 
cavalry ever lost sight of the enemy, so as to have made the 
question of his march for a moment doubtful. By Marshal 
Blucher being turned into another direction, it appeared that 
no part of the grand army did or could arrive in time to take 
part in the actions with General Wrede, which was much to 
be lamented, as the final escape of Buonaparte, and his pas- 
sage of the Rhine, became the object of much discussion; 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 151 

and I am corry I have it not in my power to afford ample and 
complete information on so interesting- a matter. 

The Prussians, mider Bulow, were now at Minden ; and 
General Winzingerode was to arrive in a day or two at Bre- 
men : the Swedes were marching- towards Harburg ; the 
corps of General Bennigsen descended the Elbe, and arrived 
at Lutzen. This General, with Count Walmoden, had orders 
to operate on the right bank, against Marshal Davoust's posi- 
tion on the Stecknitz. 

The Prince Royal's plan at this moment seemed to be, to 
proceed to Strasburg- with part of his army, in order to be 
ready to co-operate in the attacks upon Marshal Davoust ; as 
also to possess himself of Hamburgh, and, if possible, secure 
an appui on the Elbe, before he pushed forward with the 
whole of his forces into Stralsund. Generals Winzingerode 
and Bulow, however, were not to be delayed in commencing 
their marches. General Bennigsen brought ample force with 
him; while General Bulow recruited his army, in His Prus- 
sian Majesty's ancient states, to the number it amounted to 
before the opening of the campaign. The generous and libe- 
ral aid of the Prince Regent, in arms and clothing, was of in- 
valuable importance to these brave Prussians at this moment: 
they were the means of re-equipping and arming the corps 
cVarmee forthwith, nearly on their original establishment. It 
must be as gratifying to the English nation as creditable to 
its government, to see how opportunely their aid was forth- 
coming. The gratitude of Marshal Blucher and General Bu- 
low, as expressed to me, was most satisfactory to the country 
I served. 

On the return of Count Lowenheilm from the imperial 
head-quarters with the plan from the Prince Royal of Sweden 
(the outline of which I have before stated), he brought a 
counter-project, or rather a plan of operations, which it seems 
had been there decided upon. The Prince Royal, on its re- 
ceipt, expressed himself much hurt at being so little con- 
sidered : he said that it was by his plan at Trachenberg the 
allies had obtained so much success — that lie was not in a 
position to be directed by any one — that if the plan fixed was 
that of the Emperor of Russia, or of any military man of great 
character, he would, bad as he thought it, be disposed to ac- 
quiesce ; but that he knew it was either the offspring of the 
ideas of those Faircuis, alluding, I apprehend, to the Russian 
etat major, who had yet to be as much instructed in war as 
he was; or else a plan which Austria was anxious to grasp 
at to cover her hereditary states in Italy, to liberate that 
country, and to forward her own objects rather than the com- 
mon cause, or it would not have been adopted. 



152 NARRATIVE OF THE \\^AR 

His Royal Highness . then called my attention to the situa" 
tion in which he stood; the Swedes looked up to him for 
something. Of all the powers, he was the only individual 
who had not recovered some valuable possession : his rear 
must be made secure, and Hamburgh occupied. He further 
told me his determination was taken to write observations on 
the Emperor's plan, detailing fully his opinions ; it appeared 
to the Prince, that the projectors at the grand head-quarters 
had founded their present reasoning and project pretty much 
on the general ideas the Prince had laid down at Trachen- 
berg, without ever adverting, as His Royal Highness observ- 
ed, to the wide change and difference that existed as to the 
relative situation of our general political affairs and the ar- 
mies. To expose this difference-— to elucidate his own ideas — 
to make himself heard, if not heeded, the Prince determined 
to draw up a military paper of observations. 

In discussing these important subjects, I could not refrain 
from admitting, that in my opinion there was much weight 
in many of the opinions of His Royal Highness ; but I put it 
to His Royal Highness fairly, to consider whether a plan even 
with some objections, acted on in perfect concert, was not 
better than for each army to pursue its own objects without 
a perfect understanding. The Prince, in reply, assured me, 
that after he had made his representations to the Emperor, 
afler he had done himself justice, and after he had felt him- 
self somewhat more secured as to Davoust's operations, and 
the line the Danes would adopt, he would, however unfavor- 
ably he thought of the plan, do his utmost to act his part, and 
carry it into effect; that he was anxious, however, during the 
interval of concentration, to go in person to Minden and Bre- 
men, and from thence to Stralsund, with his Swedes, in addi- 
tion to General Woropzoff already there, and General Wal- 
moden on the right bank of tJie Elbe; that he hoped this 
movement would bring something to a conclusion with Da- 
voust. If, however, matters were protracted, lie could at all 
events make new dispositions. 

His Royal Highness expressed himself much discontented 
at the idea of ordering his Swedes to be so much divided, and 
complained generally of the little consideration shown him in 
this instance. He appeared to entertain great horror at the 
idea of the Cossacks entering France ; he was more than 
ever anxious to rouse that nation, which he loved, against 
their ruler, whom he abhorred: he wrote a proclamation, 
perfect in most respects, except where he dwelt on himself 
and his own exploits. 

However eager I was, when a military plan of operations 
had come from the head source, to support it, without any 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 153 

reference whatever to my own ideas, still the Prince, in two 
or three conversations, seemed so fixed in the line he had 
adopted, and reiterated his reasons so strongly, that I per- 
ceived I could do no good by contending with him; and under 
all the bearings of the circumstances, I thought it prudent to 
desist until further advices should arrive from the grand head- 
quarters. 

I must here remark, that the Prince was very anxious for 
a public declaration, by way of appeal to France, of the terms 
on which we would make peace : much of his reasoning and 
argument was formed on the injury we should do to the com- 
mon cause, if such a proceeding did not take place. His 
Royal Highness, it seemed, had not been informed, until I 
now made it known to him, that M. de St. Aignan had been 
charged by Prince Metternich with communications to Napo- 
leon ; of the purport of which, more hereafter. 

When the Prince Royal became acquainted with this fact, 
he appeared delighted, but he thought the diplomatic mode 
not sufficiently public ; and, indeed, if it were an object to 
urge the Prince Royal, in his military capacity, to do what 
the allies required, it was surely impolitic to put him so little 
ail fait, in the first instance, upon so important a demarche : 
he had a right to expect his due share in these discussions. 
Finding himself thus excluded, he argued he was no longer 
considered ; and his feelings operated accordingly. In propor- 
tion as the difficulty of managing the Prince Royal increased, 
the disposition to attempt so delicate a task diminished, his 
aid having become less essential. 

The army of the north continued its march on Munster 
and Bremen ; and that part of it under the immediate orders 
of the Prince Royal of Sweden moved on Harburg, for the 
purpose of a combined movement with the forces on the right 
bank of the Elbe, directed against Marshal Davoust. The 
army did not make these movements with rapidity, as the 
troops needed re-equipment in the principal towns through 
which they passed ; and as measures for the recruiting and 
re-establishing the proper authorities in the different districts 
required time during the progress of the march. 

The Prince Royal of Sweden moved on the 16th to Min- 
den and Bremen, to inspect and give the necessary orders in 
those towns. His head-quarters were to move to Celle ; from 
thence he proceeded to Luneberg and Harburg. His Royal 
Highness joined his head-quarters again before they passed 
Luneberg ; and he adopted the necessary measures to render 
himself master of the Lower Elbe. Durmg this interval, 
His Royal Highness's operations towards the Rhine and Hol- 
land were not to be neglected. A report arrived that Marshal 



154 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Davoust had broken up from Ratzeburg and his positions on 
the Stecknitz, and retired ; but it was as yet uncertain whether 
he meant to throw himself into Hamburg-h, or to withdraw 
into Holstein and the fortresses of Lubeck and Rendsburg- : 
the latter was most probable, especially from his seizure of 
the bank of Hamburgh, and sending it to Altona. There 
were so many accounts of the misunderstandings between 
the French and the Danes, and this last subject of the bank 
had so much added to the dissatisfaction, that some favorable 
issue was anticipated. 

It appeared that Buonaparte was himself at Mentz. This 
seemed a central point, from which he could transport him- 
self to the point most threatened. By a report from Lieuten- 
ant-general VVoronzoff, at Luneberg, dated the 14th instant, 
at night, his advanced parties sent intelligence that Marsha] 
Davoust had arrived with from 9 to 12,000 men at Harburg, 
and it was thought with a view of directing his march on 
Bremen. This intelligence seemed too good to be true : in 
such an event. Marshal Davoust was infallibly lost, as our 
army would surround his force on all sides ; and Lieutenant- 
general Walmoden's corps, disposable, would follow him 
across the Elbe, and march on his rear. This report was 
possibly circulated to cover his real movement into Hamburgh, 
or the fortresses in Holstein. 

A report was now received at the head-quarters of the army 
of the north, that a capitulation was demanded and acceded 
to by General Thielman before Dresden ; by which the gar- 
rison was to return into France, and be exchanged, man for 
man. This was ratified by the Commander-in-chief 

Notwithstanding the formal protest I made to His Royal 
Highness the Crown Prince of Sv.-eden against the impolicy 
and dishonor of entering into capitulation with Marshal Da- 
voust, by which he should be permitted to return to France 
with his force ; and notwithstanding His Royal Highness as- 
sured me that if I entertained such serious objections to it, 
he would not attempt such a measure, the moment after my 
departure from Hanover to return to Frankfort, as I was in- 
formed by both Generals Vincent and Krusemark, instruc- 
tions were sent to Lieutenant-general Count Walmoden to 
do his utmost to bring about a capitulation by Marshal Da- 
voust of the nature alluded to. Having received the Prince 
Royal's assurance to the contrary only the preceding evening, 
I was surprised by this intelligence; and as His Royal High- 
ness had left Hanover for Bremen, I had no alternative but 
to write to him the annexed letter, containing my sentiments 
on the subject. 



IN GERMANY AND FKANCE. 165 

"Hanover, 16th November, 1813. 
" My Lord, 

"Permit me to address you two lines, on the eve of my 
departure ; the subject is in my opinion of the greatest im- 
portance ; and I believe that your Royal Highness, with your 
usual kindness, will permit me to express the sentiments of 
Great Britain on a military subject, in which she ought to 
take the greatest interest. In all probability Denmark will 
be with us, and Marshal Davoust lost ; if he should return 
to France by any capitulation, I foresee a spot of the blackest 
kind on the military glory of the army of the north. This 
would be to carry the corps of Davoust to a fatal spot where 
it would be lost, and then to put it in array against the allies. 
My Prince, you have overwhelmed me with kindnesses; be 
persuaded, it is to your glory and to your personal interests 
that I address myself I will answer for the opinion of my 
country. It is with great pain that I hear, after the manner 
of your Royal Highness to me last evening, that General 
Walmoden has received new orders to this effect. 

" I beg you to pardon me, my Lord, if I go too far. I only 
do my duty in reiterating the opinions of my government, 
and hereafter I leave every thing with confidence to your 
wise and worthy decision. 

" I have the honor to be, of your Royal Highness, the most 
devoted of servants, 

(Signed) " Charles Stewart, 

" Lieut. General." 

I was fortified in my view of this act, by the intelligence 
that a capitulation of a similar kind at Dresden had not been 
ratified at the imperial head-quarters. In consequence of a 
communication I received while at Gottingen, the then head- 
quarters of the Crown Prince of Sweden, from His Majesty's 
ambassador at the court of Russia (Earl Cathcart), leaving 
me at liberty to open myself to the Prussian government on 
the subject of the important diplomatic instructions alluded 
to as being enforced just before the battle of Leipsic, I lost 
no time in proceeding to Frankfort. 

On my arrival, I had frequent discussions with His Excel- 
lency Prince Hardenberg respecting my object; and had 
great satisfaction in finding him enter entirely into the views 
of His Majesty's government. He repeatedly assured me, 
that he was convinced the policy of Prussia was to cultivate 
the strictest union with Great Britain, and fully sensible both 
of the wisdom and justice of the proposals I was charged to 
make ; being entirely of opinion that the instructions for- 
warded to me were preferable to any alterations that were 



156 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

projected by the ministers of either of the imperial powers, 
I felt it a duty I owed to this government and myself to state 
to my court the determination of His Prussian Majesty. 
Union between the great powers was to be collected by in- 
ference and a sense of necessity, rather than to be found em- 
bodied in any ostensible and defined treaties : there were no 
grounds for departing from the great measure of consolidating 
the union of the allies by one general and complete under- 
standing. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

Opening of the war across the Rhine— Measures adopted by Napoleon- 
Plan of the new campaign— criticised by the Prince of Sweden— Proposed 
movements of the allied army— Force in Germany— Motions of the Prince 
Royal— Discussion of negotiations— Alliance between the powers— Mag- 
nitude of the allied armies— Occupation of Holland— Embarkation of 
English forces— Successes of General Bulow— Concentration of the allied 
armies— Re-establishment of the Orange dynasty — Capture of the Ger- 
man fortresses— Surrender of Stettin, Doriiherg, and Zutphen— The grand 
army under Prince Schwartzenberg — Marshal Bellegarde— Overtures to 
Napoleon — Proposed basis of peace — Position of Great Britain— English 
officers— Sir R. Wilson— Lord Buvghersh— Active nieasurf^s of the allies — 
General Blucher— Fall of Dantzic— Army of the Crown Prince — Success 
of the Danes— Report of the alfair — Views of the Prince of Sweden — Af- 
fairs in Holland — on the Upper Rhine— Arrival of the Duke of Cambridge 
— his public entry into Hanover — Rejoicings on that occasion. 

Napoleon, when forced across tlie Rhine, was obliged to 
employ the greater part of his disposable force in the garri- 
sons upon that river, the Moselle, and the Mouse. At the 
close of 1813 he returned to Paris, and ordered the levy of 
120,000 men of the conscription of 1814: by a senntus-con- 
sultum it was also decreed, that 160,000 men of the con- 
scription of 1815 were to be called out; and by a further 
decree, he directed the assembling of 300,000 conscripts from 
the arrears of the years 1811 to 1814. These preparations 
produced the conviction that a long^er delay on the part of the 
allied Sovereigns in following up their advantages, could only 
be prejudicial to their ultimate object, — that of conquering 
France. 

Besides the above efforts on the part of Napoleon, he or- 
dered 30,000 citizens of Paris to form a national guard for its 
internal protection. These stupendous exertions induced the 
allied Sovereigns to issue a declaration of their principles, 
and the grounds on which they continued hostilities, dated 
the 1st of December, from Frankfort. This manifesto is 
annexed to the Appendix, No. VI. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 157 

The allies equally resorted to gig-antic efforts. A new 
confederation of the Rhenish states was formed, divided into 
eight principal corps d'armee; and the additional force which 
Germany was to bring into the field amounted on paper, ac- 
cording to the arrangements, to 280,000 men. Certain plans 
were concerted for the arrangement of the forces of the Ger- 
man states belonging to the Rhenish league ; and a financial 
system was also adopted, not necessary to detail. 

The general idea of reopening the campaign, which had 
been in some manner laid down by the supreme powers at the 
grand head-quarters, was, as usual, criticised by the Prince 
Royal of Sweden ; and he made representations thereon to 
the allied Sovereigns, 

On my arrival at Frankfort, no definitive resolution ap- 
peared to have been taken ; and although the array was in 
march, much change was contemplated before the plan de- 
veloped itself A deviation of no trifling nature already 
occurred ; it was said that the grand army, instead of going 
into Switzerland and Italy, which was at first proposed, would 
pass the Rhine near Basle and Huningen, and march direct 
on Befort, occupying the country in its neighborhood. 

At the same time a strong corps was to traverse Switzer- 
land, and to come into communication by Milan with Marshal 
Bellegarde's army, advancing from Vicenza; and when the 
Italian army should be more closely united with that acting 
from the Rhine, the operations could be combined, and they 
could mutually support each other. On the other hand, the 
proposed plans for Marshal Blucher seemed to be, that he 
should remain in the centre of the very extended line, oppo- 
site the fortresses, thirteen in number, which present them- 
selves when we pass the Rhine at Mayence. This was con- 
fiding to the army of Silesia to play the same game that they 
had hitherto pursued — that of retiring, if the enemy advanced 
upon them, while they could pass the Rhine and make demon- 
strations, should the enemy move all his force against the 
grand army. 

The army of the north was to have orders to enter Hol- 
land, as already projected, and pursue its operations indepen- 
dently. The same system appeared in this outline as in the 
plan hitherto acted upon. Switzerland was to become another 
Bohemia; Blucher acting in the centre, and the Prince Royal 
in the north. The difference in the execution, however, was 
the immense extent to be acted upon, and, to preserve the 
road of communication between the armies, the occupation of 
Switzerland seemed essential. It presented an appui for the 
flank, in undertaking any operation ; and it was argued, that 
by possessing the line of the Danube, behind the grand army, 

O 



158 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

great resources in Bavaria, and the means for supplying am- 
munition, would be secured. 

These were the prevailing motives that determined the 
great feature of future operations ; and it was now promul- 
gated, that the head of the grand allied army was to arrive 
at Friburg about the 25th instant. About the 5th of Decem- 
ber, it was supposed a corps might arrive at Befort; but, in 
the mean time, no order for movement of the head-quarters 
was positively given ; and discussions still prevailed. I ought 
here to record, for the honor of his country, the eminent ser- 
vices rendered in the grand allied elat major, and in all their 
councils and grand military combinations, by that highly- 
gifted Prussian officer. General Knese. He was constantly 
attached to the King's person throughout the war ; but his 
genius, commanding talents, and experience, made him the 
most prominent adviser in every arrangement, and his ardor 
and skill in execution contributed towards every good result. 
I never can forget his personal kindness to me ; and this 
eulogy is a very inefficient mark of the respect and affection 
to which his virtues entitle him, and which I sincerely feel 
towards him. 

The Prussian general Gniesenau, always remarkable for 
his activity, was much chagrined at the existing delays. 
Measures being still protracted from day to day, he framed 
and submitted to the Emperor a new plan, materially varying 
from the outline detailed ; but his views appeared too vast, 
considering the then state of the allied forces. Amongst 
other points, he proposed to carry Marshal Blucher's army 
forward into Holland, instead of that of the Prince Ro)*al. 

No great progress was made in the organization of the 
German forces, while the allied army remained on the Rhine. 
The different interests, the various authorities, the confusion 
incident to new measures, and the means necessary, pre- 
cluded the carrying into effect the intended arrangements : 
still the collecting, consolidating, and arming the German 
states was of so much importance, that it became an object 
to make such a disposition of the great armies, as would not 
impede the formation of those which would be so powerful 
as auxiliaries. This was another disadvantage of the delays 
that occurred in determining the line of operation. R was 
now given out that Marshal Bellegarde's arrival at Frankfort 
was anxiously waited for, in order to consult his opinions, and 
combine the movements of tiie army of Raly with that of the 
Rhine. 

On this ground, fresh delay was excused. With respect 
to the army of the north of Germany, they came to the reso- 
lution at the grand head-quarters, that in the event of con 



IX GER3IANY AND FRANCE. 159 

tinued operations against the Danes being necessary, and of 
the Prince Royal still manifesting a disposition to engage in 
this warfare in preference to that of Holland, they would 
leave under orders of that Prince 50,000 men, includino- his 
Swedes, and consider him as quite independent of the com- 
bined operations in France ; and place in the hands of an- 
other general the army destined to enter Holland. 

It was however to be presumed from the accounts received, 
that the Prince Royal intended to direct his own march from 
Bremen to Holland, his Prussian corps having already entered 
it at various points ; and General Baron Adlercreutz was to 
have the direction of the forces against the Danes. The 
affair of the capitulation of Dresden created great discussion, 
and awakened lively interest. Had the capitulation been 
ratified, Napoleon would have received 1700 officers, an im- 
portant acquisition, in addition to the whole of Gouvion St. 
Cyr's garrison, as a nucleus to the new armies he was organ- 
izing. It was formally annulled ; and General St. Cyr was 
offered permission to return and resume the command, which 
he refused. 

I am about to touch upon a subject which I find myself 
precluded by my diplomatic position from so discussing in all 
its bearings, as under other circumstances I should most 
anxiously have desired; I mean that celebrated interview 
which the Austrian minister had with M. de St. Aignan at 
Frankfort. It took place in the presence of a British ambas- 
sador; and ended in a sort of minute of conference, produc- 
tive of negotiations and correspondence, which became the 
cause of much complication and misunderstanding in the 
councils of the allies at this juncture. The archives of our 
Foreign Office contain, for the information of future states- 
men, the course pursued by the diplomatic servants of the 
different governments at this interesting crisis. I shall only 
state that, having had the misfortune to differ from my col- 
leagues in the principal features of that negotiation, I had 
the satisfaction, nevertheless, of receiving the approbation o* 
His Majesty's government for the whole of my conduct and 
proceedings. 

The alliance between tlie powers was placed on so clear a 
basis, that no proceeding should have been taken but in com- 
plete concert; and it never should have been imagined that 
when the allied armies were victorious on the Rhine, the 
Prince Regent's government should depart from those great 
principles of negotiation which were proclaimed when they 
were on the Oder, with the armies of France still unbroken 
before them. 

The points in negotiation, from which it was known the 



160 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

British government would under no circumstances relax, were 
Spain, Portugal, Sicily, and the fulfilment of the existing 
engagements with Sweden. With regard to maritime rights, 
it was a question in which the mediation of any ally with 
Great Britain could not be accepted ; and it was still less a 
question which Great Britain would ever discuss at a general 
congress. 

How far these great points were compromised, or attempt- 
ed to be compromised, perhaps undesignedly, in M. de St. 
Aignan's most extraordinary negotiation, time and future his- 
torians will develop. It was well understood, however, that 
Great Britain deprecated the assembling of a congress until 
a basis should be positively agreed to : and this basis, as re- 
garded England, was distinctly established by diplomatic 
notes, in date of the 16th of May, as well as by subsequent 
instructions to her diplomatic servants. 

At the moment the communications for peace were opened 
with Buonaparte through M. de St. iVignan at Frankfort, it 
may be well to remark, that the allied forces, if vigorous and 
proper measures were adopted, would arrive at an army of 
the following magnitude, arrayed for the cause of Europe, 
and able to bid defiance to all the efforts that could be made 
against it : 

German army .... 291,120 
Russian ditto, by treaty . 150,000 
Austrian ditto, by ditto . 150,000 
Prussian ditto, by ditto . 150,000 
Swedish ditto, by ditto . 30,000 

Total 771,120 

besides what it was conjectured would be obtained from Hol- 
land, and from the armies of the Duke of Wellington ; and 
Holland now began to show a determined spirit to liberate 
herself from French dominion. 

A revolutionary spirit broke out at Amsterdam on the 15th 
of November, which was quickly communicated to the far 
greater part of North Holland, and followed by the termina- 
tion of the French power in that country. 

I received immediate intelligence from the Earl of Clan- 
carty, appointed His Britannic JMnjesty's ambassador to the 
provincial government of the Prince of Orano-e at the Hague, 
that a deputation was sent to His Serene Highness tlie Prince 
of Orange to invite liini to his sovereignty, and to solicit 
arms and succors from the British government. The depu- 
ties arrived in London on Sunday the 21st of November ; and 
having communicated with His Majesty's ministers, imme- 
diate orders were given for the dispatch of 25,000 stand of 



IN GEKMATnY and FllANCE. 161 

arms, which had been previously embarked, in anticipation 
of this movement. A body of troops, composed of every de- 
scription of force, to the amount of between 5 or 6000 men, 
were ordered for embarkation, under the command of Lieu- 
tenant-general Sir Thomas Graham. A deputation also ar- 
rived from the Hague at the grand head-quarters: in conse- 
quence of which, his Majesty the King of Prussia immedi- 
ately dispatched the young Prince Frederick of Orange to 
the corps of General Bulovv, in order that one of the Orange 
family might be present at the re-establishment of their dy- 
nasty. 

The fortress of Stettin surrendered on the 5th of Decem- 
ber to the troops of His Prussian Majesty. The garrison 
became prisoners of war, and were to be conducted to the 
Prussian territories on the right bank of the Vistula: Za- 
mose, also, was taken by capitulation ; and it was confidently 
e.xpected that Dantzic would immediately fall. 
^ General Bulow's successes in Holland were next an- 
nounced ; he had carried Dorsberg and Zutphen on the Issel 
by assault; both of these places were fortified, but had been 
stripped of their artillery, although they had strong garrisons. 
The enemy had inundated Deventer, and it presented more 
difficulty. Arnheim was carried in a very gallant manner. 
The utmost exertions were making to pursue the great ad- 
vantages so gloriously opening in Holland. The allies hav- 
ing lost the opportunity of following up tlie enemy in the 
moment of panic, after concentrating at Frankfort, extended 
their flanks, and were disposed at length to operate simulta- 
neously on the sides of Switzerland and Holland ; while 
Marshal Blucher passed the Rhine near Mayence, and by 
drawing the attention of the enemy, to afford the armies on 
the flanks more liberty to act. 

The army in Holland was to push to Utrecht, Rotterdam, 
and the Hague. Prince Schwartzenberg, with the grand 
army of nearly 180,000 men, was to pass the Rhine near 
Basle and Brisach, and assemble in the neighborhood of Be- 
fort and Besancon : detaching a strong corps through central 
Switzerland, by Neufchatel, to Geneva. The three places 
of Huningen, Befort, and Besancon, would, it was thought, 
not require a greater force to observe them than Mayence. 
The main army was to endeavor to penetrate towards Lyons 
and Dijon, to cut ofl^ the enemy's communication with Italy ; 
General Kleinau to march to reinforce the army of Italy, 
which was to be augmented to 100,000 men ; and Marshal 
Bellegarde, who had now arrived at Frankfort, was to pro- 
ceed to take the command of the whole. With respect to 
Switzerland, although deputies had arrived to concert and 

02 



162 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

proclaim its neutrality, and to arrange a route into Franco 
without infringing' its territory ; and although there was a 
doubt on the part of the Emperor of Russia as to the precise 
mode to be pursued, still it was evidently too important a 
military feature, both for the safety of Germany and Italy, 
not to secure it against any attempt from France. Every 
forbearance was to be shown to this small, but highly respect- 
able republic, while the body of the main army was to cross 
the Rhine at Basle. 

On the 9th of December, I was privately informed that an 
answer had been received from the Duke of Vicenza (Caul- 
aincourt), in consequence of the overtures through M. de St. 
Aignan, by which France accepted the basis of negotiation 
proposed ; and in order to explain the whole course of this 
proceeding, that ingenious and dexterous, as well as profound 
diplomatist, General Pozzo di Borgo, was sent as a check 
against any English accounts, or as a joint expounder of cir- 
cumstances, from the allied ministers at Frankfort to the 
cabinet of St. James's. 

As I found, by dispatches from the Earl of Clancart}^ that 
he was extremely desirous of every information from the 
grand head-quarters to regulate matters at the Hague, I de- 
termined to send off immediately my secretary of legation, 
Mr. Jackson, with full details to his lordship, in order to put 
him completely in possession of the carte du 'pays. This sub- 
sequently procured for me the double advantage of having aJl 
my proceedings on M. de St. Aignan's mission thoroughly 
explained to my government : for Lord Clancarty, acting in 
that spirit of confidence and friendship which uniformly char- 
acterized his relations with me, when he found General Pozzo 
di Borgo waiting for a passage from the Hague to England, 
charged with a special mission, ordered Mr. Jackson to be 
Hccommodated on board the same packet. 

In remarking on the state in which political afRiirs tlien 
stood, I could not but feel that the Prince Regent's ministers, 
WMth all their caution and all the detailed instructions they 
had sent, were placed, by an unfortunate train of circum- 
stances, in a most embarrassing predicament. They were 
obliged, by the invitation now transmitted to them, either to 
send a plenipotentiary to open a negotiation prcU/ninaire 
with a French authority (and in conjunction with the other 
three powers) on an undetined basis, — their resolutions hav- 
ing been previously clearly promulgated ; or by declining 
such an insidious proposition, to incur the imputation of 
resisting a measure seemingly tending to a general pacifica- 
tion. 

No negotiator could be sent from England w-ithout buoying 



IN GERMANY AST) FRAXCE 103 

up that nation with the prospect of immediate peace. And 
was England, in her present commanding- attitude, to lend 
herself to a premature communication for a congress, if she 
did not discover a sincere intention on the part of France, 
evinced by decisive acts, or by declarations of such restricted 
views, as might tend to a probably favorable issue to the 
negotiation '! Would it not be more fatal to enter into discus- 
sions, and encourage hopes of peace, if all were to end as at 
Prague, than to adhere to that wise policy which had marked 
the proceedings of the Prince Regent's ministers in all their 
previous measures ] There was no temptation, in my humble 
opinion, and under all the suspicious circumstances by which 
this affair was accompanied, to send a plenipotentiary at a 
moment when we stood in such a proud position : on one side 
planting our standards in France ; upholding the nations of 
the continent on the other : almost unanimous in our parlia- 
ment: and one voice and one impulse directing the sound 
part of the British empire. 

I should before have stated, that the military councils and 
the political proceedings which passed at Frankfort were 
largely and fully detailed to the British government, by the 
appointment of more English officers to the different corps 
of the allied armies. In addition to Sir Robert Wilson, who 
had been from the campaign of Moscow acting with the 
Pvussian, and subsequently with the Austrian, armies in the 
tiekl, which gave him great insight into all that was planned, 
rejected or adopted by the allied Sovereigns, Lord Burghersh 
also arrived, accredited to the Austrian army as military 
commissioner; and was immediately placed near Prince 
Schwartzenberg's person. The high favor he soon obtained 
amongst the Austrians, the friendship of their commander, 
with his own tilents and energy, soon placed him in a posi- 
tion to render solid services to his government and the common 
cause. In short, so ample was the information from the central 
theatre of war, that, acting upon that discretionary power with 
which I was intrusted, I returned to the army of the north 
of German)^ 

The outline of the plans for actively commencing the cam- 
paign remained generally fixed, as I have before pointed out. 
The grand army, passing the Rhine at Basle and Huningen, 
was to respect, as far as possible, the neutrality of Switzer- 
land. General Blucher, with his Silesian army, was to cross 
the river at Mayence and Manheim, and push forward in like 
manner into France, with all the forces on his right ; while 
the Prince Royal was engaged on the side of Holland. 

Dantzic fell on the Stli of December, by capitulation, to 
the Duke of Wirtemhnrg; but as it was a similar arrange- 



164 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

ment to that at Dresden, it was not ratified by the Emperor, 
and Dantzic was taken possession of by the allies upon their 
own terms. 

During my absence from the head-quarters of the Crown 
Prince of Sweden, various affairs and skirmishes between the 
forces in that quarter took place, but none of very material 
moment. The Prince Royal and General Walmoden hemmed 
in Marshal Davoust in Hamburgh. Colonel Cooke, who was 
stationed there, gave me regular and able reports of all that 
occurred. I am bound, as a candid writer, to afford some 
account of those troops, in which the British government 
felt a peculiar interest. I subjoin the Colonel's report of the 
14th of December from Eidestadt, near Kiel; although it does 
not give a flattering prospect of the new levies, judging 
from their first efforts. 

" There has been a very serious affair in this neighborhood 
with a part of Walmoden's corps, under the immediate com- 
mand of General Arenscheldt, and the Danish troops, under 
the direction of the French General, L'Allemande. It was 
known that the Danish division, consisting of good men, in- 
tended marching upon Rendsburg; although they were aware 
that part of Count Walmoden's army was at hand to oppose 
them. The Prince Royal directed General Walmoden to 
meet them ; adding, that General Vegesack's corps should be 
at hand to support him. 

" In consequence of this order, the Russian German Legion, 
the Dessau battalion, Lauenbourg, and Brigade Halkett, 
marched with the greater portion of the cavalry. In the 
neighborhood of Kleswick the two armies came in contact. 
The Danes immediately withdrew into position, and were 
followed and attacked by the allied troops. No sooner, how- 
ever, were the allies brought under fire, than they were 
broken, in spite of an inclosed country, stone walls, haystacks, 
peasants' houses, and steep banks: some Danish cavalry, wl)o, 
it is true, fought most nobl}", got among them, and continued 
the pursuit: two British guns were taken. 

"At this time General Lyon, from whom I have this ac- 
count, not having readied this place from head-quarters until 
the ensuing day, received an order to advance with his di- 
vision to support the troops engaged. The narrow road by 
which he advanced impeded his progress; and the broken 
troops of all descriptions pressing upon his front, almost pre- 
cluded the possibility of the best disposed troops getting 
forward. 

" Meantime the Danish dragoons were employing them- 
selves in routing the remains of the infantry named to you, 
without receiving any check. The conduct of the allied 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 165 

troops was far from creditable. At length the corps of Gene- 
ral Lyon disengaged itself, and remained firm, drove back 
the cavalry, and covered the retreating troops. Disposition 
was immediately made for covering the bridge of Ulneiah : 
fortunately, the Danes, content with the advantages they 
had gained, moved away upon their right, and gained Rends- 
burg. 

" I have avoided entering into any minute detail of the 
outline of this operation, or giving my opinion upon it; but 
you will not fail to observe two very strong features — bad 
information of the enemy's strength, and an army not well 
disciplined. 

"The enemy had possession of Schested before we knew it: 
some cavalry and light troops were sent against the place. 
The officer commanding requested succor: soon after, he 
reported the retreat of the Danes ; but upon the approach of 
the battalion sent to his support, the whole Danish army 
turned about, and drove them into the river directly in their 
rear upon a single bridge. Dornberg was at Eckersdorff; too 
distant to be of use in case of a battle. 

"We knew the enemy were at Kiel, and marching on 
Eendsburg. That fact established, what more simple than to 
collect the army between Schested and the Wittensee in po- 
sition 1 By this means Rendsburg was always covered, our 
original object completed, and the Danish army must have 
capitulated. 

"It is believed, however, that the plan of advance and at- 
tack was the Prince Royal's ; and although Walmoden did 
in some particulars object to the distribution, he was directed 
to adhere to the original order. Vegesack's division was in 
the rear at NordorfF. Had the enemy forced the bridge of 
Kluvesik, none of the troops engaged would even have got 
away. The enemy carried away about 400 prisoners and two 
British guns. General Lyon attributed the whole of the mis- 
conduct in the affair to some of the raw inexperienced levies. 
The Dessau battalion had only forty men leff., although few 
were killed ; the Russian German Legion appear to have 
acted ill ; and Colonel Halkett's report, in an official form, is 
of such a nature, as to attach a distinct cliarge of cowardice. 
Officers are what the levies stand in great need of, and a 
regular system of discij)line, without which they will again 
be subject to a recurrence of a similar nature. 

" It appears now there is some negotiation going on. The 
Prince of Hesse sent a flag of truce to Walmoden, express- 
ing surprise that operations in the field should still exist, when 
it was known that peace had been signed at Copenhagen. To 
this communication no reply was made by the Prince Royal. 



166 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

His Royal higlmess is at Kiel ; and has issued an order for 
all leading men of property to attend him there, in order to 
assist in the formation of a government for Holstein. His 
interest appears to lead him in every point of view^ to render 
this country the scene of his operations: he will linger here; 
and although no operation be effected, he w^ill feed his Sviredes 
on the country and the villages by requisition," 

It was impossible, from this and various other similar re- 
ports, to blind myself as to the real motives influencing the 
restless spirit of the Crown Prince : all his movements were 
directed towards securing his own particular objects. The 
whole of his proceedings relative to a protectorship for the 
Hanse Towns, followed up by an attempt for the immediate 
annexation of Holstein to the crown of Sweden, denoted a 
conduct which required close observation. The system to be 
adopted by me towards the Prince Royal became a subject of 
very serious and anxious consideration. 

By some communications which arrived from the Prince of 
Orange, it appeared that the Prince Royal was now persuad- 
ing the Prussians so to reinforce General Bulow, that there 
might be no necessity for Russians or Swedes in Holland ; 
and as the command in the Prince of Orange's hands was a 
point now working to the exclusion of the Prince Royal, 
a desire was expressed by Russia that he should remain in 
Holstein. 

Difficulties arose about the chief command in the Low 
Countries. Captain Perponcher arrived from the Hague to 
procure for the military questions in that quarter a proper 
discussion and arrang-ement — the plans of campaign on the 
Upper Rhine ; the employment of Marshal Blucher in that 
direction, which engrossed the other force that might have 
been disposable for Holland ; and, lastly, the necessity and 
importance of keeping the alliance together on its first prin- 
ciples, were all points that were canvassed and debated : fcv 
my own part, it was my intention to urge the Prince Royal 
in the strongest manner to advance into Holland, and commit 
himself honestly in the great contest with France. 

I left Frankfort on the 14th of December, and arrived at 
Hanover on the 17th, on my way to the Prince Royal. I un- 
derstood at Hanover that His Royal Highness the Duke of 
Cambridge was immediately expected. I met the secretary 
of legation of Count Bombelles on the road, who put me in 
possession of the late events in Holstein, and in some degree 
acquainted me with v.'hat had occurred at Copenhagen. He 
also stated, that an armistice was on the point of being con- 
cluded between the Prince Royal of Sweden and the Prince 
of Hesse on the part of the Danes. Being certaui from these 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 167 

accounts that no further military operations would immediate- 
ly occur in the Prince Royal's army, and being- equally per- 
suaded that he would wait in Holstein at least for the return 
of M. de Bombelles' secretary, and advices from the imperial 
head-quarters, I considered that I could not more usefully 
employ my time than, in the interval of the reorganization of 
the electoral dominions, awaiting the Duke of Cambridge's 
arrival at Hanover; and by a personal communication with 
His Royal Highness and Count Munster, deliver up, in the 
most satisfactory manner in my power, all those concerns 
relative to Hanover with which I had hitherto been charged. 
His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge made his public 
entry into Hanover on the 20th of December, 1813. It was 
my good fortune to have witnessed, of late, many happy 
events ; but the scene of the 20th pre-eminently surpassed 
them all, in the touching and affecting demonstrations of joy 
exhibited by all classes at the return of this beloved descend- 
ant of their ancient race of sovereigns — a language that 
spoke from the heart, and which my pen cannot adequately 
convey : a loyalty and devotion displayed, which would have 
done lionor to Britons, and which British dominion, so nearly 
resembling patriarchal sway, so universally inspires. In the 
necessary absence of military ceremony, from the Electoral 
troops being in the field, the citizens formed themselves into 
bands to honor the entrance of His Royal Highness into their 
capital : their wives and daughters, dressed in white, strewed 
his path with flowers ; and the voices of their innocent chil- 
dren, tutored to chant in one peal our national hymn, gave 
the whole of this spectacle a character as peculiar as it was 
interesting and affecting. Illuminations and other demonstra- 
tions of joy at night closed this first day of relief from anxiety 
and alarm, the harbinger of the subsequent prosperity and 
ha'jpiness of the Hanoverians under their natural protectors. 



I (58 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 



CHAPTER XV. 

The war in the north— Position of Marshal Davoust — defeated by General 
Wahnoden — Progress and state of the campaign — Motives and objects of 
the Prince Royal— The Duke of Cambridge at Hanover— The Duke of 
Brunswick — Communication from the King of Prussia to the Crown Prince 
—Sir C. Stewart proceeds from Hanover to Holstein— Armistice with the 
Danes— Letters from the King of Denmark and Prince Royal of Sweden — 
Observations on the Prince Royal— Gallantry of the Prussians— Capture 
of Bois le Due — Denmark joins the common cause — Articles of peace — 
Operations of the grand army— Passage of the Rhine — Surrender of Dantzic 
— Positions of the allies— Buonaparte at Metz— Progress of the allies 
— The enemy at Chalons — Power of Russia — Reflections — Success of 
Marshal Blucher— Relative positions of the armies — The Emperor of Rus- 
sia enters Vesoul — Capture of Nancy — Surrender of fortresses on the 
Rhine — Marcli towards the capital. 

I SHALL now shortly advert to the state of affairs in the 
north, and to the position of Marshal Davoust. He remained 
stationary in his intrenchments upon the Stecknitz ; where 
he was assailed repeatedly by Generals Walmoden, Tetten- 
born, Vegesack, and Dornberg, in several affairs between the 
6th and 12th of October. On the 13th a corps of this army, 
under General Tettenborn, attacked Bremen ; which was 
taken, as well as Nienburg, after a short resistance. This 
last success reduced Marshal Davoust to his communications 
with Denmark alone. On the 18th, Davoust made a general 
reconnaissance ; attacked, but was defeated at all points. An 
expose of the general state of affairs at this period, and the 
opinions of that high-spirited and intelligent officer, General 
Walmoden, may be seen by a reference to the Appendix, No. 
VII. The glorious successes of the allies now insured the 
reconquest of Holland ; and, in justice to an able and gallant 
officer, I have added in the Appendix to this narrative a letter 
from General Gniesenau to myself, in which his talents and 
genius prompted him to suggest an expedient by which the 
invasion could be effected. (See Appendix, No. VIII.) 

The whole of the military operations in Holstein appeared 
to me of an unpleasant character ; and confidence in the 
Prince Royal's adherence was hourly diminishing. It seemed 
to me inauspicious, that he should now continue with all his 
force on the right bank of the Elbe, leaving Marshal Davoust 
by Harburg, an open road into Holland, Witliout imputing 
any bad intention, still, after the desire shown to let Marshal 
Davoust return to France, if he should have escaped into 
Holland and created confusion, although he might ultimately 
have been destroyed, I should not have acquitted the Prince 
Royal, now that a Swedish division was marching on Schles- 
wig and Gluckstadt for the immediate security of Drontheim. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 169 

The Prince Royal was most anxious to retain the whole of 
Holstein and the fortresses. His Royal Highness demanded 
that the Polish troops (cavalry), serving with the Danes, 
should be given up to him as prisoners of war. This would 
have been treachery as regarded the Danes, and should never 
have been required. 

I had now very satisfactory communications with His Royal 
Highness the Duke of Cambridge and Count Munster, on their 
arrival at Hanover : they notified to me, that 15,000 men was 
the contingent which Hanover and Brunswick would furnish 
to the common cause. 

I had much communication at this period with His Serene 
Highness the Duke of Brunswick, who arrived at Hanover. 
His mind was very unsettled : he expressed a wish to serve, 
yet declared he would serve neither under Walmoden nor 
the Prince of Sweden : he was likewise very uneasy about 
the arrangements for Brunswick. I endeavored to convince 
His Serene Highness how much it was his interest to sub- 
scribe completely to the Prince Regent's decision in all these 
points; to communicate with the government here as to his 
quota, the means of arming it, the assistance to be derived 
from Great Britain, and his own personal situation as to the 
command of his own contingent, under such a leader as the 
Prince Regent might select: and His Serene Highness ap- 
peared at length satisfied with the line of conduct I urged 
him to pursue. 

Since my departure from Frankfort the king of Prussia 
had written to the Crown Prince to say, that the corps of 
Putlitz and Marwitz (landwehr) were placed under his or- 
ders ; and that His Majesty hoped he would have arranged 
with the Danes, and defeated Davoust ; and that he would 
hasten to gather laurels in the Netherlands, as it was of the 
utmost importance not only to secure what was already gain- 
ed in Holland, but also to push the advantages obtained 
there. His Majesty proposed that General Borstell should 
join General Bulow, and be replaced by part of General Win- 
zingerode's corps ; and that the Saxon corps, and the remain- 
der of that of Winzingerode, should be ordered to advance 
to the Meuse, and support the left wing of General Bulow 
on his advance. 

From Hanover I proceeded to Kiel, in Holstein, and ar- 
rived there on the 29th of December. On my arrival I found, 
to my great regret, that a prolongation of the armistice with 
the Danes, to the 6th of January, had been concluded between 
the Prince Royal and the plenipotentiary sent from Copen- 
hagen. It was useless to complain, the thing was irretrieva- 
ble ; but from all the oteervations I could make, and the 

P 



170 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

conversation I heard, it was evident Denmark was anxious 
to gain time by the prolongation of the armistice. The letters 
in the Appendix, (Nos. IX. X. XL) from the King of Den- 
mark and Prince Royal of Sweden, will show the main 
grounds upon which the negotiation was accomplished, which 
gained Denmark to the cause of the alliance. 

With regard to the military points, when I conversed with 
the Prince Royal on the absolute expediency of making every 
eifort immediately for Holland, I found him so determined on 
taking no further steps whatever until the expiration of the 
armistice on the 6th, that it was a vain attempt to use per- 
suasion ; indeed, he sealed my lips by an entreaty to that 
effect. I think it right to mention another circumstance, on 
which His Royal Highness and I had some discussion, and 
which occurred to me as very singular. The Prince Royal 
ordered from Stralsund a number of French officers of all 
ranks, to the amount of 150 prisoners of war, to be marched 
back to France on their parole. I met them on their march 
through Hanover. General Borstell very properly wrote, 
that he could not permit them to pass by Wesel without the 
most positive orders. I inquired from the Prince an explana- 
tion of this circumstance, and suggested the serious mis- 
chief such a number of officers returning would create. His 
Royal Highness said, where he sent back a thousand officers, 
he gained a million of friends; that he had a right to do 
as he pleased with his own prisoners of war ; and that he 
had settled this on an agreement with the Emperor Alexan- 
der: which last declaration, of course, silenced any further 
remonstrance. 

After the 6th, when the armistice with the Danes expired, 
a momentary return to hostilities occurred ; but Rendsburg 
and Schleswig being taken by the Swedes and Woronzoff's 
corps, peace was concluded on the 15th at Kiel, on the follow- 
ing basis: — 

1st. Denmark joined the common cause, declared war 
against France, and furnished a corps of troops to the army 
of the north. 

2d. Denmark yielded Norway to Sweden. 

3d. Sweden yielded to Denmark Swedish Pomerania and 
the Isle of Rugen. 

4th. The troops were to evacuate Holstein, except those 
who formed the blockade of Hamburgh ; in which fortress 
Marshal Davoust's corps still remain. 

The siege of this place was now confided to General Ben- 
nigsen ; and the Prince Royal intimated his intention of 
passing the Rhine, and engaging in the hostile operations 



4 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 171 

in France. How far any subsequent service, however, was 
derived from these expressed intentions, will be seen in the 
sequel. 

To return to the Upper Rhine, and the operations of the 
grand army. 

The neutrality of Switzerland having been respected in 
consequence of different negotiations, and its future integrity 
secured at a general peace by the sovereigns of the alliance, 
Prince Schwartz«nberg moved his head-quarters on the 20th 
December to Lorrach ; and on that day, his army commenced 
crossing the Rhine in different columns at Basle, Lauffenberg, 
and Shaffhausen. 

It may be interesting to point out what was expected by the 
sovereigns of the alliance from Switzerland, and to give a 
sketch of its strength and situation. 

The military force of this independent state might be raised 
to 25 or 30,000 men : the militia were immediately to be 
established to guard the towns on the frontier: the town of 
Biel made an offer to form two companies of guides who 
knew all the avenues and mountains of the Swiss confines. 

Arberg is one of the most advantageous points in the cen- 
tre of the line of defence of Switzerland. Nature itself has 
formed it a fortress against France ; for the Aar surrounds 
it, and is only accessible by a bridge. It stands upon a hill 
of considerable magnitude, without being commanded by a 
higher point, as is the case with all the positions behind 
the Aar. By this circumstance the transports of cattle from 
the upper land of Bern could always be secured and facil- 
itated. 

Biel is an open place, surrounded by mountains ; but the 
lake of Biel is connected with that of Neufchatel, by which 
the transport by water is managed, and the town may be 
protected against a coup de main by light troops stationed in 
the passes of Biel : but Arberg remains the most advantageous 
point as a basis for a line of operation : this line forms an 
angle which extends itself from Arberg on both sides to the 
extreme fortified points of Switzerland, Geneva and Basil, 
and forms with her mountains and defiles, which are easily 
secured and defended, the surest basis, for all the operations 
against France. 

The establishment of troops to be raised was to protect this 
line ; and should Switzerland not join the offensive operations 
of the allies, this position protected her basis, her provisions, 
her transports, and her hospitals. At the frontier of Bran- 
truth, on the French boundary, the following inscription had 
been placed : " Malheur a celui qui franchira cette limite d 
main armee.^^ Threats and sentences of this tenor were 



172 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

generally the arms of all French generals on the frontier, 
which intimidate none but the timid of the country. This 
war of words was made use of in lieu of real forces, of which 
they now stood greatly in need. All the reports agreed that 
Buonaparte assembled his chief force round Paris : the means 
to form this force were of the most oppressive kind : the 
gendarmerie were to deliver up the greatest part of their 
horses, as the cavalry was not yet mounted. Napoleon, how- 
ever, by this measure, got no more than 4,600 horses fit for 
service. These horses belonged to the gendarmes them- 
selves, and this corps thereby was unable to perform its 
services; and the desertion in the army, that is, of the sol- 
diers who returned to their homes, was so considerable, that 
the 10th regiment of line, which arrived from Lyons, con- 
sisted of but 500 men; and of a battalion of the national 
guards, which was to be expected in Eefort, only the com- 
mander with 113 men arrived. Nobody belonging to the 
conscription ordered now appeared at his regiment: no taxes 
were raised ; and the emptiness of the coffers may be con- 
ceived by the forced loan of 120 millions from the merchants; 
and the weakness of the regiments, by the defence of the 
towns being intrusted to citizens, as belonging to the national 
guard. Whether the proprietor of a house would see it 
burnt down with the same indifference as the soldier, vvho 
had no property in it, remained to be seen. The poverty of 
the military chest in every state and canton was so great, that 
the officers in all the districts of the frontiers were reduced 
to half-pay. The struggle in France was now calculated to 
bring all classes of society, whatsoever were their opinions, 
to moderate principles. The present municipality of Besan- 
9on, Befort, and Bourg-en-Brisse, was composed of married 
priests, who planted the tree of liberty in those places : but 
this tree, which twenty years ago had no roots, frightened 
now even the adherents of Buonaparte ; and the adherents 
of the red cap and of the imperial crown formed everywhere 
two parties, who endeavored to aggrandize themselves by 
every means. TJiis difference of opinion arrested all mea- 
sures and things, in a country where formerly reigned only 
one will, which formed every thing according to its fancy. 

Many passages over the Upper Rhine, in Swit/.erland, were 
practicable, and might be undertaken wherever it was thought 
proper; and from this side of France, (except a small part 
of Franchc-Comte, of Lothringen, and particularly Colmar,) 
the greatest part of the inhabitants being supported by a 
foreign power, it was supposed would show themselves ac- 
tive for the good cause. 

The town of Basle lies without the line of defence of 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 173 

Switzerland, which line begins at the mountain chain which 
rises behind Liechstall. The fortress of Huninguen is ex- 
tremely strong, and seemed capable of resisting any attack. 
The fortifications of Geneva could also be increased ; and an- 
other strong point on the declivity of the Jura, near the passes 
of Biel, perhaps Biel itself, would tend to make the line of 
Switzerland secure against France, and all transports to the 
allied army could with safety be forwarded through this 
country. 

Yverdun is the next strongest position in Switzerland 
There are three great lines leading to it; viz. Yverdun, Mou- 
don, and Lausanne. These lines of march may bring corps 
stationed there by one march to the frontiers of Switzerland 
to any threatened point. The right wing of this position is 
covered by the lake of Neuburg; the left by a morass, which 
is only dry in the hottest summer season ; and the front by 
the Orbe river, over which there are three wooden bridges 
constructed, that can be removed in a few hours. 

Next to the general defences of Switzerland, the state of 
a Swiss soldier may be worthy of remark: he receives every 
day fifteen kreutzers, one pound and a half of bread, and half 
a pound of meat. The proprietor of the house where he is 
billeted is obliged to fiirnish him with salt, vegetables, wood, 
and candles, which are paid for by the cantons, and cost a 
considerable sum, owing to the dearness of articles, especially 
in the small cantons. Of the troops themselves I must speak 
Avith approbation : they may be ranged in loyalty to the cause 
they fight in, and in appearance, with the best troops of Eu- 
rope ; and their chasseurs are very pre-eminent in enduring 
Hardships, and as excellent marksmen. 

The above detail may afford a general notion of the state 
of Switzerland at this crisis. The object of the allies was 
CO place the country in a situation to refuse nothing, and to 
aid in every respect the common cause ; and every step they 
could oblige or urge Switzerland to take against France, 
placed her more in this situation. 

To return to what relates to Marshal Blucher's passage of 
the Rhine, it will be as memorable in military annals for its 
rapidity and decision, as his passage of the Elbe ; and I re- 
gretted that absence in Holstein prevented my being a per- 
sonal witness of a military event remarkable for its brilliant 
execution. 

The Marshal passed with his army at three points : Lieu- 
tenant-general Count St. Priest, of Count Langeron's corps 
(Varmce, crossed opposite Coblentz on the nights of the 1st 
and 2d instant : he occupied that town, took seven pieces of 
cannon, and made 500 prisoners. Generals Count Langeron 

r 2 



174 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

and D'Yorck passed at Kaab, where Marshal Blucher as- 
sisted in person, without much resistance on the part of the 
enemy. On the 3d instant, Count Langeron attacked and 
forced Bingen, which is considered very strong in point of 
situation ; and was defended by a general of brigade, with 
cannon and infantry. Count Langeron made some prisoners, 
and his loss was trifling. He had already his advanced-posts 
established as far as the Salzback, opposite Ingelheim. 

Marshal Blucher advanced, notwithstanding every difficulty 
of roads and season, to Kreugreach ; and General D'Yorck's 
advanced-posts were directed upon the Lauter. General 
Baron Sachen's corps forced the enemy's intrenchments near 
Manheim, after passing the Rhine, and was directed on AU- 
zey. The King of Prussia was present at Manheim at the 
passage of the Rhine, and inspired all around him, as hereto- 
fore, with admiration of those military attributes that are so 
conspicuously his own. 

Dantzic surrendered on the 2d of January : the first-capitu- 
lation was not ratified, hat the garrison finally surrendered 
prisoners of war. It would be tedious to give a detail of 
those marches and combinations which brought the allied 
armies again into motion in the beginning of 1814 : I shall 
confine myself, therefore, to the actual position of the com- 
bined forces early in the month of January, adding such ob- 
servations as occur on the recommencement of active hostili- 
ties. 

The head-quarters of Prince Schwartzenberg remained at 
Lorrach on the 20th of December. Count Bubna had moved 
to Dole. The other Austrian corps between Dole and Mont- 
belliard, in the valley of the Dauve. Detachments occupied 
Vesoul, Espinal, &c. ; in the former place 200 prisoners were 
taken. Parties were also in possession of the valley of Mar- 
tigny, the Semplon, and St. Bernard. The first division of 
the Austrian army moved on Aney ; the second was at Mont- 
arlot, near Besancon ; the third at Villersexelle ; the division 
Greenfeld at Mollars; the division Bianchi at Befort; two 
divisions of Austrian grenadiers, and two of cuirassiers were 
in march for Besancon ; the fourth division was at St. Amber ; 
the fifth, composed of the Bavarians, formed the blockade of 
Huningen and Breisach, and extended to Schletstadt. Count 
Wittgenstein was before Kehl, and occupied also Fort Louis, , 
pushing his parties, very fir advanced on the other side of 
the Rhine, in the direction of Nancy. 

The Russian grenadiers were in march to relieve Bianchi's 
division in the blockade of Befort, in order that the latter 
niight then be enabled to move forward. The Russian and 
Prussian guards and reserves were still at Altkirk and Lor- 



IK GERMANY AND FRA^XE. 175 

rach, but were forthwith to marcli forward. Tlie main body 
of the Cossacks, under their daring- Hetman, Platoff, had ad- 
vanced, on the 7t'n of January, as far as Corrimont, Vesoul, 
and Langres ; and they might already be said to be threaten- 
ing Napoleon's " good city of Paris." The enemy, under 
Marshal Marraont, had already been overtaken by Marshal 
Blucher. This French force was estimated at between 16 
and 17,000 men : it occupied Kaiserslautern, which is the 
Hollendorff pass, as it were, of the country. The environs 
are so intricate and mountainous, that every step Marmont 
took, posted as the Silesian army would soon be, rendered his 
situation precarious. General D'Yorck and General Sachen 
were on the 5th of January between Frankenstein and Neu- 
stadt ; and General St. Priest at Coblentz, 

From the advanced position of General D'Yorck on Mar- 
shal Marmont's flank, and the march of the corps moving up 
in all directions, we flattered ourselves that if he delayed 
much longer at Kaiserslautern, Marshal Blucher would be 
able to force him to an action. The auspicious aspect of af- 
fairs that every day brightened to the view of the allies, the 
marcli of events as rapid as they were glorious, the success 
tliat seemed to attend upon the most trifling movement, mili- 
tary or political, produced a strong sentiment of religious 
gratitude in the public mind. The progress of the campaign 
jiitherto seemed to promise even more brilliant consequences 
tlian its projectors could have anticipated. 

Buonaparte for some time collected at Metz : for, by the 
march of General Bulow towards Holland, he possibly thought 
the allies were carrying' their forces in that direction ; and 
s'vit his guards, by rapid conveyances, towards Breda, about 
the 18th instant. However, when Prince Schwartzenberg 
crossed the Upper Rhine, on the 20th, the enemy's troops 
were as rapidly countermarched, being thrown into uncer- 
tainty as to the plans of the combined armies. Buonaparte 
seemed to have separated the remnant of his force, and they 
were dispersed in corps : there was no mass collected any- 
where, and it must have been a large one indeed which 
could arrest in any manner the formidable legions of the 
conquerors. 

The importance of the possession of Huninguen, on the 
Upper Rhine, to Prince Schwartzenberg, was considerable ; 
but it did not seem that it could be easily taken. The cap- 
ture of Befort was also of great moment ; for, from such a 
base, the grand army might march immediately on Paris with 
perfect security against any possible contingency. The con- 
verging march of the different colunms all bearing to the 
central point, so that on an emergency a large force might be 



176 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

collected, without unnecessarily risking any separate corps, 
with vigilant communications, and a due regard always to the 
main points of appui, formed the system on which the inva- 
sion of France was conducted : and if this principle had not 
been unfortunately departed from, many of the failures and 
disasters which intervened would never have occurred. After 
the battle of Leipsic, it was noway chimerical to predict that 
Europe approached her deliverance ; and I now waited with 
the calmness of perfect confidence for the arrival of that 
happy moment, for my country and the whole civilized world, 
when it would fall to my lot to announce to the British gov- 
ernment that the individual whose elevation had caused no 
many calamities had ceased to reign. 

I think I may without presumption or indibcretion attempt 
here a very general view of the important negotiations on the 
tapis. The questions were of so extensive a nature, the ar- 
guments to be adduced so various, and, above all, the inform- 
ation I individually possessed so limited, that I look with 
some apprehension to the task of introducing into my narra- 
tive even such prominent diplomatic features as may be essen- 
tial to the better understanding of the military combinations: 
still, where a point is to be gained, and a mass is to be 
digested, little hints may serve to throw some light u])on the 
subject. Supposing, in the first place, it was expedient to 
enter into negotiations with Buonaparte, on the basis pro- 
posed by the allies through M. de St. Aignau, which M. de 
Caulaincourt's arrival at the advanced-posts, and the last 
communications, brought to a decision in the affirmative, the 
following were some of the leading points to consider. 

That Prince Metternich wished to accomplish a pe;»ce 
could not be doubted, and that the arrangements for Germany 
were to be made as he planned, was pretty evident: that he 
had also his own game nearer at heart than any other was 
not surprising; but it was not to be permitted that, in order 
to play this as he fancied, the other powers of Europe were 
to be confined in their natural views and objects, Avhich the 
downfall of Napoleon and increased successes might in some 
degree alter. When Buonaparte subdued Austria, did he not 
dictate peace? did he not insist on heavy pecuniary contribu- 
tions to indemnify the people of France? At Tilsit, did he 
not, in like manner, drain Prussia of her last kreutzer to sup- 
])ort his army, and alleviate tlie burdens of the French nation ? 
Would not a just principle of retaliation direct, that if the 
allies now made peace with France, and confined her to lier 
ancient limits, the amount of past robberies should be re- 
funded ] And yet, when we had the game in our own hands, 
we appeared, by a secret and extraordinary mission at Frank- 



IN GERMANY AND TRANCE- 177 

fort, ^iid a demi-official declaration, referring to propositions 
which the world were unacquainted with, and which tjeemed 
now to be as binding in the minds of some as the best authen- 
ticated state document, to have lost the commanding position 
in which we stood. 

It was argued that the propositions sent in embraced the 
twofold objects of accomplishing a general peace, and a more 
humbled state of the political and military government of 
France. How much more humble she would have been at 
this period, and how much less enibarrasshig our predica- 
ment, had those propositions not been made, can be best ap- 
preciated by remarking the effects produced by M. de St. 
Aignau's mission, with all the explanations and defences and 
shifts which followed it. If we negotiated now, it was deter- 
mined, first, to make a peace with Buonaparte himself, in 
preference to holding out and attempting to obtain the legiti- 
mate government for France by his downfall. Secondly, we 
were content with obtaining the basis proposed, in the most 
extended sense and latitude, attached to it. Thirdly, this 
peace, such as we dictated, signed at Basle, seemed to be con- 
sidered by some more advisable, than, by undertaking a march 
to the capital of France incur the hazard of another revolu- 
tion, which might bring all the horrors of the former to be 
acted over again. 

It really seemed impossible, but yet it was given out, that 
the great powers coincided in this general idea ; and I must 
suppose, if so, that it arose from a difference of opinion amongst 
them as to what, if Buonaparte were set aside, would be the 
best and wisest government for France. Austria might pre- 
fer the King of Rome under a regency ; which the spirit of 
her present minister, in a great degree, could direct or con- 
trol: England, the Bourbons: the Emperor of Russia, possi- 
bly, as was said, his friend Bernadotte. In short, there seemed 
a dread of anarchy in France; and a disunion in the coalition, 
if a bold choice were made, which might produce a more 
convulsed state of Europe than that existing before the reign 
of Buonaparte. 

If Napoleon were forced from the throne of France, it was 
to be considered whether the sentiments of the allies could 
be brought to the same decision on the great question of a 
successor. Should this be the case, a totally difierent line 
might be taken from what was then under contemplation. 
This view I founded on the certainty that the re-establish- 
ment of the Bourbons would be more acceptable to England 
than any other arrangement. If, however, as some main- 
tained, England wished to see France reduced to as humble 
a position as possible, it might be policy to keep Buonaparte 



178 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

on his throne, with his wings clipped to the utmost, in prefer- 
ence to restoring the hereditary princes, who might again 
resume a sway similar to the times of Louis XIV., and become 
formidable alike to England and to the continent. 

The difficulty of negotiation at this crisis appeared in fix- 
ing upon the fundamental principles to be adopted and the 
points to be obtained ; and it seemed indispensable that the 
government of England should send their minister of foreign 
affairs to the then theatre of action, as no one could ax;t with 
the same advantages. There were other considerations of a 
minor nature — which, however, were not to be overlooked — 
such as the trifling jealousies among powers and personages 
that might arise ; and which made me firmly of opinion, that 
the British cabinet could delegate this duty to none but the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He could see, in the progress 
of discussion, to what points it was possible that the political 
machine could be wound up : an object, under the then 
predicament of the allies, that seemed to be the genera) 
wish; although some had neither the boldness nor the will to 
avow it. 

Having taken a hasty view of the probable train of negotia- 
tion, founded on the principle of treating with Buonaparte 
under the projected basis, before I proceed to enter at large 
into what the allies would have to contend for, or rather dic- 
tate, as their decision, I shall just advert to what might, in 
my judgment, have been the best policy, in case of deciding 
to await the expression of public feeling in France, in order 
to secure the overthrow of the existing dynasty, and the re- 
establishment of the Bourbons. Every delay in negotiation 
with Caulaincourt, in such case, should have been made. It 
might fairly have been stated that, so long as the King of 
Spain and the Pope were in captivity, the allies would not 
send their propositions : meanwhile, the armies might have 
continued their march ; and six weeks, or two months, might 
have given rise to a general impulse throughout the nation 
expressive of their wish, without positively departing from 
the first proposals. 

It was thus to be considered whether a plan of procrastina- 
tion, under existing circumstances, might not make events 
lean to the great object of a lasting peace for the world, even 
more rapidly than they were actually advancing. Great 
Britain's decision expressed, might change Austria, and per- 
suade Russia and Prussia. But the policy of these courts, I 
must say, was so anxiously, so impatiently bent upon insuring 
the blessings of peace, so long withlield from them, that tliey 
thought and dreamed of notliing else. Austria desired it on 
even reasonable terms with France ; and the Emperor wished 



IN GER3IANY AND FRANCE. 179 

it, for the sake of a daughter he very much loved. Russia 
so eagerly longed for it, that no man but the Emperor, v^^ho 
stood alone as a sheet-anchor of perseverance and devotion 
to the common cause, could have kept his generals, officers, 
and troops, so long tranquil. Prussia sought for it after her 
sufferings, and the King after his misfortunes, public and pri- 
vate, in preference to any war that would insure her aggran- 
dizement. The amiable domestic habits of that monarch led 
him rather to seek a mournful consolation, near the tomb of 
his departed queen, in Charlottenburg. In justice, however, 
to his revered, lamented, and incomparable minister, the 
Chancellor Hardenberg, I must declare that his firmness and 
conviction of the policy of a vigorous prosecution of the con- 
test, greatly tended to press forward the power of Prussia. 

Still the wish nearest the hearts of all became every day 
more and more evident ; there was a general cry for no delay 
in its accomplishment. The project of continuing the war 
for the Bourbons was liable, in case of a reverse, to cause dis- 
union among the powers, if they were not agreed in the prin- 
ciple of proceeding ; and it was argued, at this period, that a 
march to Paris, in order that the Emperors might enter at the 
head of their guards to sign the same peace w^ith Buonaparte 
as they could conclude at Basle, would be mere vain-glory and 
parade ; and a movement on Paris should only be undertaken 
for a specific and agreed object — the re-establishment of the 
Bourbons. No lasting peace with France could be made, in 
my mind, so long as Buonaparte was at the head of the gov- 
ernment. 

In the north of Germany still greater difficulties than those 
already described arose. Prussia had not only a right, after 
her treaties, to be placed in the state in which she was in 
1805, but, independently of this, all the powers were of opin- 
ion that Prussia should be placed on such a respectable footing 
as, combined with Austria, to oppose a barrier to Russia on 
one side, and to France on the other. Austria, it was said, 
desired this : they would assign to Prussia ten millions of 
souls ; the latter had at that time not more than between four 
and a half and five millions. If they were to restore to Prussia 
all she had lost in Poland, it would give her two millions and 
a half of what was required ; but Russia was only willing to 
give that part which joins Russia with Silesia, and wanted to 
carry her own frontier to the Vistula: hence arose to Prussia 
a deficit of two millions and a half 

The question of Poland likewise came under discussion ; 
but as it is of immense importance, and cannot be treated 
at length, I shall not touch on it: I shall equally avoid allud- 
ing here more at large to the state of Switzerland, Russia 



180 NARRATIVE 01' THE WAR 

desired to draw a line, from Johansberg by the Pilicia to the 
corner of Silesia ; and she would not consent to give up this 
plan for any consideration. Prussia might be permitted to 
possess, as she desired. Saxony ; and there seemed no objec- 
tion, except as to a part which the Emperor of Russia wished 
to reserve for the Duke of Weimar. By this plan Prussia 
would acquire one million and a half of subjects. After this 
there would be wanting an indemnity for Hildesheim. There 
belonged to Prussia all her Westphalian provinces, Anspach, 
Bayreuth, and Neufchatel ; yet, if she repossessed all these, 
she would not obtain near the extent of possession she had 
just pretentions to claim. If Prussia obtained Saxony, 
Anspach and Bayreuth would not be too far separated, and 
she might be glad to recover them ; but, even in this case, 
more indemnity must be found for Bavaria. Prussia, however, 
was not desirous of having these detached possessions, pro- 
vided she could be remunerated in a collected body; but the 
difficulty to find this was the evil. 

Nothing appeared to be more impolitic than the designs 
imputed now to Austria, of requiring, in case of a general 
arrangement, the possession of certain districts she formerly 
held in the Brisgau, on the confines of France. This policy 
was viewed as an attempt to remove a controlling power 
over the states which separate Austria from France ; such as 
Bavaria, Wirtemburg, and Baden, and to secure them in her 
interests. It was argued that the result would be totally ad- 
verse to the designs of Austria ; for the control would not be 
effectual for the purpose of influence and power over those 
states, and it would breed in them perpetual jealousy, and 
lead them to consider the power of France as necessary to 
balance any design which might be conceived against them 
by Austria, and to dispose them to alliances with the former 
power. This policy was placing within the reach of France 
possessions which would give a pretence, in any war with 
Austria, for France passing the Rhine into Germany. She 
would have always a distinction in her favor that she was not 
going to attack the German league, but Austria only; and if 
France quarrelled with Austria onl}^ exclusive of Germany, 
she v/ould have a right to use this argument. But if we con- 
sider another course, and suppose Austria, from a principle of 
confidence in the German powers, to give up the idea of con- 
trol, and to act upon principles of sincere confidence, Austria 
could never be attacked but by the desertion of the three in- 
intermediate powers named from the cause of Germany and 
their own. It is against every principle of calculation that 
Baden, Wirtemburg and Bavaria would ever sufler a French 
army to pass the PJiine> except from jealousy of Austria; 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 181 

and so long as they are really united with her, they will form 
to her an impregnable barrier. Jealousy and suspicion of 
Austrian designs and pretensions can alone divide or unite 
them against her. 

The divisions amongst the members of the German body 
have been the sources of all the wars which have desolated 
Germany. It should be the great object of Austria, therefore, 
to keep them united, which could alone be accomplished by 
renouncing all old claims of every kind, and making herself 
the protector of Germany, by resolving never to take an in- 
terested part in the quarrels in which Germany might en- 
gage, even if Austria, in consequence of her powerful inter- 
ference and victories, had fair and just claims of aggrandize- 
ment. She would by this means secure herself against France, 
and be enabled to have her resources concentrated, in case of 
need, against Russia; whom, on every account, in looking over 
the vale of years, Austria has most to dread. 

Nothing can be more disadvantageous to a nation than to 
have paltry distant posts and interests, which invite the at- 
tack of enemies, and prevent the whole of a nation's resources 
from being applied to the point of real danger. 

If France and Russia showed themselves really friendly to 
the designs of Austria, now promulgated, in her desire to re- 
establish herself in the Brisgau, no clearer proof could be 
assigned that they were anxious for the downfall of that 
power. 

Another question of some moment that agitated the great 
negotiation for a general arrangement of Europe, was the 
fate of Saxony. So long as this power remained independent 
in the rear of Prussia, the latter could not become a sufficient 
barrier to the north against Russian invasion : and if once 
the Prussian armies should be defeated on the Oder, and 
Saxony awed into neutrality or confederacy with Russia, 
Berlin and Pomerania would immediately fall. But should 
Prussia be put in possession of Saxony, were she beat upon 
her first line of the Oder, she could form again with renewed 
force and strength on the Elbe, and be enabled to collect all 
her resources, and those of her allies, before Russia could 
master her fortresses, which would not be the case if Russia, 
by the means of the treachery or imbecility of Saxony, were 
to lay hold on the Elbe, 

It was upon this reasoning that, mixed up as I was with 
other political projectors, I formed under existing circum- 
stances, a strong opinion that the possession of Saxony by 
Prussia, at a general settlement of its affairs, was essential 
to the preservation of Europe, and that means ought to have 
been found to have induced the king of Saxony to resign liis 

a 



182 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

dominions with a view to some such arrangement, even if he 
had done nothing to invalidate or forfeit his titles to them, 
and if they had not been at this time under French occupa- 
tion. Add to this argument that Prussia ought not to have 
been looked to as a barrier against Russia, or to be prepared to 
place herself, conjointly with Austria, in that position, unless 
means were supplied to Prussia by the powers of Europe for 
playing that game with security and with effect. 

Prussia, from her contiguity with Russia, and her com- 
parative weakness, was at this period lending herself to the 
views of that colossal empire. The great personal friendship 
that existed between the monarchs aided this course of ac- 
tion ; and Prussia acted in a degree of subordination to a 
bolder policy : she was forced to consider the mere view of 
her own safety. If she detached herself, unprepared, and 
without arrangements, from Russia, to place herself as the 
advanced-guard of Europe against her, what had she not to 
expect from Russian resentment 7 The first favorable moment 
would be seized by that aggressive colossus, when Europe 
might be distracted and Saxony tangible for Russian purposes, 
and Prussia might then be sacrificed, Europe having denied 
her those resources which were necessary for the part she 
ought and was destined to play in maintaining the balance 
of Europe. I therefore consider, on every principle of sound 
policy, Prussia ought neither to have been expected to en- 
gage in forming a barrier against Russia, nor should Europe 
allow her to attempt it, unless she should be supplied with 
adequate means, which she could never have without the ac- 
cession of Saxony. 

As the peace that the allied powers might make with 
France, at the present moment, was of more importance than 
any negotiations that had ever yet been entered upon, so it was 
necessary to consider how its stability could best be secured, 
as well as for diplomatic theorists to give their opinions on all 
parts of the arrangements, and on all the contingencies, sacri- 
fices, or aggrandizements that might occur. Consequently 
the grand head-quarters became a constant scene of political 
disquisition. The idea of forming minor states on the frontiers 
of the French empire, which could oppose such a resistance 
to the encroachments of France as would afibrd time for the 
more powerful nations in the rear to get their forces into the 
field and their preparations in forwardness, was a point which 
next required to be maturel)^ considered. 

The basis, perhaps, of a lasting and efficient peace de- 
pended, first, on gaining sufficient territory from France for 
the formation of states on the frontier ; and, secondly, on 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 183 

Strengthening and consolidating, as much as possible, the 
powers in the rear interested in supporting them. 

Here it was certain that Austria and Prussia were the 
principal powers alluded to : to augment their forces, and to 
form intermediate powers between them and France, were 
the main objects. Every plan had to depend and be modified 
on the extent of those conquests which France might be 
willing to restore on a peace. To consider the terms upon 
which the allies ought to insist with the greatest firmness : — 
it was evident that if Alsace were not wrested from the 
enemy, all the fortresses on the Rhine, as low down as Lan- 
dau, should be destroyed : Strasburg might become, as here- 
tofore, a free city ; and then the ancient frontier of France, 
from Landau to Dunkirk, would be the most perfect military 
line. It was to be considered whether, in uniting territories 
under the pretence of a sufficient barrier for Holland, we did 
not leave to France a greater population and extent than 
under her kings: we might give her the frontier of the 
Rhine from Basle to Landau, and then take what we might 
consider an adequate security for Holland, or for the power 
that would be placed between France and the Rhine. 

Supposing it would not be possible to bring France to con- 
sent to the surrender of the four departments, La Lys, Jemappe, 
L'Escaut, and La Dyle, it might then be proposed to leave 
in her possession Avignon and the maritime Alps, or some 
other indemnity in lieu of two of those departments : at all 
events, the departments of L'Escaut and La Dyle ought to 
be surrendered ; and with thesfr we secured the important 
points of Antwerp, Namur, Luxemburg, and Mentz. Of 
Antwerp there could be no question ; of the other three places 
stated, there should have been none. Namur was essential 
for the command of the Mouse, Luxemburg for the Moselle, 
and Mentz for the Rhine. 1 believe Namur was of as much 
importance as either of them. 

The next best military line to draw w^ould have been from 
Namur to Dinant; from thence along the Som me towards 
Aslon ; and from thence to the Rhine : thus including Trevis, 
which might be fortified and made a very strong place. 

If any of these frontiers were obtained, especially the two 
former, a very considerable territory would be gained on the 
left bank of the Rhine, and the military barrier of Holland 
secured. If Prussia had a possession in this quarter, it should 
be a large one ; at least containing three or four millions of 
inhabitants, in which she could hold an army of 100,000 men. 
If Prussia were brought thus close to France and Austria, 
by the annexation of the Brisgau, which many believed she 
would always cling to, and part of Alsace, also close to the 



184 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Rhine, it remained to be considered whether this might not 
be the most secure plan for the tranquillity of Germany. 

An idea prevailed, that a temptation might be held out to 
Hanover to change the electorate for territories of nearly 
double the population, between the Rliine and the Mouse, 
connecting the possessions of the Prince Regent more with 
Holland, and thus making Hanover and Holland the outposts, 
while Prussia would receive the Hanoverian provinces. This 
notion, however, I always thought impracticable ; but it was 
stated, that instead of a population of 800,000 souls, which 
Hanover then had, she would be offered one of two millions, 
and a much more valuable position. 

It is not necessary to enter into all the details and calcu- 
lations of extent, position, and population, that were' now 
going on ; but the outlines I have stated will satisfy my read- 
ers that every possible plan was now under discussion, for 
peace, and the future settlement of Europe. With regard to 
the south, there were as many projects and speculations ; but 
it would be superfluous to detail them. - 

The columns of the allied armies C(mtinued their advance 
on all sides towards the capital of France. The head-quarters 
of Marshal Prince Schwartzenberg were, on the 12th instant, 
at Vesoul. At Langres, on the advance of General Giulay's 
corps, the inhabitants fired on the troops ; but this was the 
only instance where the allies had not been universally well 
received. 

Prince Schwartzenberg's head-quarters were to be at 
Langres on the 15th or 16th. General Bubna's corps had a 
new direction given it, from Dole towards Lyons, and it was 
on its march. General Bianchi operated against Befort ; and 
there was a report that it had surrendered. Besan<;on was 
invested by the corps of Prince Lichtenstein. The Bavarians, 
under General Wrede, had a very serious affair v.-ith the 
enemy, commanded by Marshal Victor, near St. Drey. In 
the commencement of the action the former were repulsed, 
and the French cavalry, commanded by General Mulhaud, 
had some success ; but on the arrival of General De Roy's 
Bavarian brigade, the enemy were in their turn completely 
repulsed, and retired towards Luneville, with the loss of 
several officers and some hundred prisoners. The Cossacks 
continued very far in advance. We anxiously expected in- 
telligence of important events from Marshal Bluclier: it 
seemed, however, that Marshal Marmont retired with precipi- 
tation from Kaiserslautern, and passed the Saar. Marshal 
Blucher had his head-quarters on the 10th at Kessel ; and it 
was said he had proceeded as far as Saarbruch, and that he 
would be at Mentz on the 15th or 16tli. 



IN' GEraiATCY AXt) TRANCE. 195 

By accounts from Pans, the enemy were collectmg some 
force near Chalons: if so, they probably meant to retire on it 
from Nancy; for by the approach of the allied armies on all 
sides, any force that delayed falling- back would have been 
surrounded. 

The Russian and Prussian guards and reserves, to the 
amount of 30,000, crossed the Rhine at Basle on the 14th, 
and defiled before the allied sovereigns. It is impossible by 
any description to give an exaggerated idea of the perfect 
state of these troops ; their appearance and equipment were 
admirable ; and when one considered what they had endured, 
and contemplated the Russians, some of whom had emerged 
from the steppes of Tartary bordering the Chinese empire, 
traversed their own regions, and marched, in a few short 
months, from Moscow across the Rhine, one was lost in won- 
der, and inspired with a political awe of that colossal power. 
The condition in which the Russian cavalry appeared, re- 
flected the highest reputation on this branch of their service ; 
and their artillery was admirable. I could not help, on seeing 
these Russian guards on that day, recurring to serious im- 
pressions with regard to this overgrown empire ; and I much 
apprehend the present tidings from the east of Europe bear 
out my predictions in 1814, when the Russians were passing 
the Rhine. 

If we consider the power of Russia, unassailable as she is, 
in flank or rear, hovering over Europe with an immense 
front, mistress of the Caspian, the Euxine, and the Baltic, 
with forty millions of hardy, docile, brave, enthusiastic, and 
submissive inhabitants, with immense armies, highly disci- 
plined, excellently appointed ; her innumerable hordes of 
desolating cavalry; her adoption of the French maxims in 
war, of raakino- the countries where her armies march, or 
are cantoned, feed and maintain them, what may we not fear 
from her? When we furtlier consider this power flushed with 
success, and disposed to consider treaties and engagements 
with her as waste paper, if they stood in the way of any 
project of aggrandizement; and if we further contemplate 
her determined will to surmount every barrier which engage- 
ments have interposed, in order to advance herself into the 
heart of Germany, to supplant on one side the ancient do- 
minion of Prussia; on the other, to turn the northern flank 
of Austria on the Vistula, as she has turned the southern on 
the Danube ; and demanding, as it Vv-ere, by the fortresses of 
Thorn and Cracow, the keys of Berlin and Vienna; — when 
we further reflect on the natural march of empires from north 
to south, from the regions of frost, and snow, and famine, to 
the climates of warmth, verdure, and fertility, and recollect 

Q2 



186 NAF.EA'irvE or the war 

the revolutions which have taken place in Europe, Asia, and 
Africa, from the desolating invasions of the northern hordes, 
what may we not fear and expect ? 

When, in addition to these circumstances, we further re- 
flect upon the successive aggrandizements and incorporations 
Russia has made within the last one hundred and fifty years ; 
the numerous Tartar tribes she has embraced within her 
military system ; the provinces she has successively added 
to her empire from Persia, the Porte, Sweden, and Poland ; 
that her whole system of government is a military despotism, 
and nothing known in it or regarded but military subjection 
on the one hand, and military property, military rank, and 
military honors, on the other, what may not be the results ? 
If we consider all these circumstances in all their bearings 
and dependencies, is there a serious and reasonable man in 
Europe that must not admit that the whole system of Euro- 
pean politics ought, as ite leading principle and feature, to 
maintain, as an axiom, the necessity of setting bounds to this 
formidable and encroaching power? Weighed against this 
superior and imperative duty, — a duty urged by all the mo- 
tives of self-preservation, every minor and secondary consid- 
eration, resulting whether from ancient rights or claims, from 
family feelings and alliances, from views of future political 
combination and power, ought to be postponed and disregard- 
ed. There was no better physical or moral safCiTuard against 
the stupendous greatness with vv^hich the continent might, 
ere long, be menaced and overwhelmed by Russia, than in 
the personal character of the reigning Emperor Alexander ; 
a mixture of benevolence and rectitude, a high sense of re- 
ligion, and a generous view on all subjects. These afforded, 
in my mind, the only and best guarantee against the far too 
formidable legions that v/ere then defiling over the Rhine ; 
and that guarantee we have, alas I lost. 

The details from the advanced corps continued to be of the 
most encouraging description. Marshal Blucher had taken 
near 3000 prisoners, and twenty-five pieces of cannon, since 
his passage of the Rhine. By his last reports from St. Arol, 
of the 8th instant, detachments of his troops were occupying 
Treves; and in a few days Luxemburg was to be invested. 
Marffhal Marmont had been under the necessity of making 
the most rapid forced marches, to prevent the Silesian army 
from getting in his rear by the Yosges mountains. In his 
retreat he broke down all the bridges over the Saare ; but 
Marshal Bluchor pursued him closely. Reports of the con- 
fusion and disorder thronghout France were prewilent: the 
assembling of the conscripts was very slow; those that were 
brought together wanted arms and all kind of equipment. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 187 

There seemed nothing now more certain than that the allied 
armies could effect a march to Paris whenever they thought 
proper. Two-thirds of the French old soldiers that had re- 
crossed the Rhine were either dead or gone into the hospitals ; 
and all the general officers and men of experience declared 
tliat no effectual resistance could be made. 

Prince Schwartzenberg however was still at Vesoul on the 
15th. The enemy were collecting at Langres, and the Prmce 
Marshal was preparing to attack them, if they should remain 
there : he had made his dispositions for this purpose, and his 
forces amounted to about 165,000 men. The line he occu- 
pied was, nevertheless, a very extended one, if the enemy 
had force to take advantage of it with collected means in any 
one point. The main Russian army, under General Barclay 
de Tolly, was to be ready to support Prince Schwartzenberg's 
offensive movement. General Wittgenstein's corps occupied 
the country between General Barclay de Tolly and Marshal 
Blucher ; and the Russian and Prussian reserves, accompa- 
nied by the Emperors of Russia and Austria, left Basle to 
march on Vesoul. The French garrison that had retired into 
Besancon amounted to 8000 men. Befort v/as still bombarded, 
and General Schoffer commanded the forces engaged there. 
General Bubna was at Bourg-en-Bresse, having left detach- 
ments at Geneva and Fort I'Ecluse, which had been taken, 
as well as the fortress of Stettin. The Semplon and St. Ber- 
nard were occupied : the Prince of Wirtemburg advanced 
from Epinal ; the enemy retiring, after their defeat by Gene- 
ral de Roy, towards Charmes, and the Prince of Hesse Hora- 
burg from Dole. General Scheuther surrounded the fort of 
Solins ; while General Platoff's Cossacks were heard of in 
every quarter. 

The entry of the Emperor of Russia into Vesoul, with the 
Russian and Prussian reserves; the abandonment of Langres, 
and the position around it, by the enemy; the advance of the 
Prince Royal of Wirtemburg in the direction of Chaumont; 
all carried Lhe grand army nearer the final accomplishment 
of its glorious labors. The movement of so powerful a force 
as the allies now possessed, in all directions, upon any central 
point, rendered the best position the enemy could take up 
wholly precarious. In my opinion they could not have effectu- 
ally covered their capital by any disposition whatever, the 
allies being determined to enter it: — and at length that tri- 
umphant moment was at hand. 

Marshal Blucher's reports of the 17th instant, from Nancy, 
were, that he had sent the keys of that town to the grand 
head-quarters. The Emperor of Russia met the officer bear- 
ing them as he was on his march to Vesoul : he immediately 



188 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

sent two of the keys to the King of Prussia, with an appro- 
priate message, reserving tv/o for himself. This showed the 
mutual deference and consideration that existed between the 
allied sovereigns on every occasion. Marshal Blucher was 
in communication with General Wrede's corps, and thus with 
the grand army. The former energetic veteran wrote that 
he was determined to plant his banners on Napoleon's throne ; 
and he gave a life and vigor to all proceedings, that afforded 
an invaluable example to every professional man. Another 
brilliant achievement of the Prussian arms now occurred : 
the king became again master of Wittenberg, and by no 
other means but the desperate valor of his brave soldiers. 

The siege was begun on the 28th of December, and the 
place was in his possession on the 12th of January. No im- 
pediment of the season had arrested the spirited exertions of 
the besiegers. 

The enemy made a respectable resistance : a breach was 
effected on the 11th, and it was practicable on the 12th, when 
a proposal to surrender was made and refused. At midnight, 
the assault was determined on in four columns. The gallant 
Prussians overcame every obstacle, and in less than half an 
hour they were masters of the place. All the garrison that 
did not lay down their arms were put to the sword. The 
governor had intrenched the castle and the hotel de ville : the 
latter was carried by the troops ; and the governor, who v/as 
in it, surrendered at discretion, with the rest of the garrison. 

This capture alone would establish the fame of that distin- 
guished officer General Tauenstein ; but his former exploits 
in this war were too brilliant ever to be obliterated from the 
records of his country. The siege cost about 800 men, and 
the assault alone, about 107 officers in killed and wounded. 
The Prussians found ninety-six pieces of artillery here, and 
made 2000 prisoners. 

In Torgau they had already obtained possession of 31(> 
pieces. In these fortresses the Prussians also found considera- 
ble magazines of corn and powder. 

General Tauenstein was now to proceed to Magdeburg ; 
and it is not to be overlooked here, that every fortress which 
now fell by tlie admirable dispositions that had been made, 
augmented very materially the force advancing against the 
enemy : we had thus reinforcements, and three lines of re- 
serve as it were on the Oder, the Elbe, and the Rhine, from 
which we constantly derived aid. 

The head-quarters of the Emperors of Austria, Russia, and 
the King of Prussia, were on the 23d of January at Vesoul. 
In continuing my account of the various operations and n^jve- 
ments of the different armies, divisions, and corps, I ought to 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 189 

State generally, that in proportion as the large masses of 
troops approached to one point, viz. the capital of the French 
empire, the respective corps necessarily passed and repassed 
each other in the same direction, but on a more confined 
theatre of war. On this account, to trace the exact progress 
of all lines of march, and keep each clear and distinct, would 
require much greater information than I had the means of 
obtaining, and occupy also much more time_ and space than it 
is the object of the present circumscribed narrative to afford. 
All I mean to attempt is limited to a general and connected 
view of the most important movements and actions, and I 
leave to more experienced and able writers of each nation 
the task "of a more complete and detailed history; ■ ' 

General Bubna still continued his march, possessing him- 
self of the whole of the. department of the Jura. ' .Having re- 
paired the fortifications of Geneva, he next took Dole, and , 
made himself master of the bridge over the Doubs.- General 
Zeuchmeister with his division occupied Aix and Chamberry 
on the 2d instant, without opposition. Had- General Bubna 
at this period been reinforced, he might in conjunction with 
Zeuchmeister have moved rapidly forward on Lyons; but the 
opportunity was lost, and Marshal Augereau no\y received 
orders to repair thither, and, if possible, organize a large force. 
General Bubna in consequence took up a position' behind the 
Arve, and ultimately fixed his head-quarters at- Geheya. v. ; 

With respect to the leading operations on, the l-Tth, Mdrr 
shal Mortier, who was immediately opposed .tb the main. ad-' 
vance from Vesoul on Langres and Chaumpnt, finding it ap- 
parent that his left flank might be turned by the Austrian 
General Giulay's division, abandoned his position at Langres, 
retiring on Chaumont, and the grand head-quarters were now 
taken up hi the former city. General Wrede's corps having 
left a division to blockade Huninguen, now advanced in the 
rear, keeping up communication with the troops that block- 
aded the fortresses of Befort and other places. 

General Count Frimont's corps marched on from Colmar t 
Rixheim : General Count Wittgenstein's division had follow- 
ed Marshal Victor's corps from the side of Strasburg, and had 
now also united in the main line of operations, while General 
Wrede had orders to advance still further from the Meurthe 
river towards the Meuse. By tliis junction,, and bringing up 
General Wrede's division between the grand army and the 
army of Silesia, the forces of the allies became united in one 
formidable line of attack. 

Prince Schwartzenbcrg now determined to carry his army 
immr-liately forward from the line of Chaumont to Chalons- 
sur-Marne, where it was reported that Buonaparte had assem- 
bled all his forces with a view of giving battle. 



190 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 



CHAPTER XVI. 

British officers of distinction— their services in the common, cause— Grand 
head-quarters— Spirited conduct of the Prince of Wirtemiburg — The ene- 
my retires on Chatillon — Junction of the allied forces — Toul carried by 
assault — Napoleon concentrates his forces — Relative positions of the ar- 
mies — Napoleon repairs to Chalons — his plan of the campaign — Move- 
ments of 3Iarshal Blucher — Attacked by Napoleon — Severe action— Dis- 
positions of Prince Schwartzenberg— Movements of the enemy— Inter- 
. cepted letter — Napoleon's views — The partisan corps — Estinjate of the 
forces — Inetfectualefforts of Napoleon— his fearless exposure in battle — 

. Rptreat of the enemy — Intended march on the capital — Disposition of the 
French nation — Want of combination among the allies— Army of the 
Prince Royal of Sweden — Operations in Belgium — ^The English a'ftd Prus- 
sians, attack Marshal Macdonald — are compelled to retire — Bergeh-op- 
Zoom invested by the English— Advance and successes of General Win- 
zingerode^-Assembly of plenipotentiaries at Chatillon — Presence of the 
allied sovereigns — influence the diplomatic body — Interview's and conver- 
sations witli the Emperor Alexander — Policy of Russia — ^Prosecution of 
hostilities — Dissolution of the congress of Chatillon — Character of Caul- 
aincourt, Due de Vicenza— Amicable disposition of the congress. 

I HAVE already adverted to the number of Britisli officers 
employed with the different corps of the allied armies ; from 
all of whom mmute accounts were given, at this period, of 
the dispositions, movements, and operations of the respective 
corps d^armee. But I must particularly refer my readers, in 
order thoroughly to understand every part of the great mili- 
tary manoeuvres now pending, to the able reports of Sir 
Robert Wilson, Colonel Lord Burghersh, (who has written 
an able and excellent memoir of this campaign,) Colonel (now 
Brigadier-general) Sir Hudson Lowe, Colonels Cooke, and 
others. These will fully and clearly exemplify the minutest 
military operations : my province is an attempt to exhibit to 
my readers a more general view of the great drama, of which 
France was now become the theatre. 

The grand head-quarters were established on tlie 29th at 
Chaumont, after a brilliant action of the Prince Royal of 
Wirtemburg, who drove Mortier from his position, and fol- 
lowed him on the route to Troyes and Joinville; ' while 
Giulay's corps, at the same period, repulsed the enemy 
from Bar-sur-Aube, and followed up his rear closely towards 
Chatillon. 

On the 16tli and 18th the army of Silesia had accomplished 
its junction with the grand army, between the Moselle and 
the Marne ; the enemy retiring behind the latter river. He 
still, however, occupied Toul, which Marshal Blucher ordered 
the corps of Sacken to carry by assault. This was gallantly 
performed by General Count Lieven. General D'Yorck's 
cor2)s d'armee, in the mean time, had proceeded from Metz to 



I 



IN GERMANY AND FR.INCE. 191 

the Meiise, leaving corps to blockade Sarre-louis, Thionville, 
and Luxemburg-. 

The two grand armies of the allies being now in line on 
the Meuse, Napoleon had concentrated in their immediate 
front the corps of Mortier, Victor, and Marmont. He had 
been hiniself constantly at Paris since the passage of the 
Rhine by the allies, making efforts to rally the first ban, or 
third of the French population, and to collect reinforcements 
of all kinds for his armies ; and he now issued orders that 
every inch of ground was to be in future disputed by his 
generals in command. He himself repaired to the army 
at Chalons-sur-Marne, where he arrived on the 26th of 
January. 

Marshal Ney also had now joined Napoleon ; and several 
fresh bodies of troops and conscripts had come forward from 
Paris. His cavalry likewise was reinforced by part of the 
imperial guard ; and Generals Lefebvre-Desnouettes, Milhard, 
and Grouchy, were assembled at Chalons with a force of near 
100,000 men. Napoleon's first plan was stated to be, to march 
to Nancy, and operate on the rear of the allies ; but finding 
the grand army superior to the force he had collected, and to 
what he had expected, he determined to fall on Marshal 
Blucher, and annihilate him, if possible, before he could be 
supported by Prince Schwartzenberg. 

On the 28th Napoleon marched his army on Vassy; and 
proceeded, by the way of Montierender and Somevoire, in 
two columns, to attack Marshal Blucher's corps, now posted 
in and about Brienne. Marshal Blucher had only the corps 
of Sacken and part of that of Langeron with him. General 
D' Yorck was still at Ligny, and the Prince Royal of Wirtem- 
burg's corps (which was the nearest in support of the Marshal) 
between Bienville and Trannes. The action was reported 
to have been very bloody, but entirely in favor of the allies. 
The town of Brienne, for some time, was in possession of the 
enemy ; but they were ultimately driven from it with great 
slaughter, and lost some guns. The Marshal resumed his 
position ; and it was most animating to see a very inferior 
force resist at one point the enemy who had collected in such 
strength before him. 

Marshal Blucher had moved from Joinville to Brienne, 
placing himself rather in advance : this had probably tempted 
Napoleon to engage ; but from what occurred, and the man- 
ner of the attack, it was doubtful if Buonaparte's plan were 
to bring on a general action in the country about Chalons : 
it rather appeared that he would not risk so desperate a 
game. 

Field-marshal Prince Schwartzenberg now made his dispo- 



192 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

sitions, and collected all his troops, in case the enemy should 
still hold his ground. The Prince Royal of Wirtemburg was 
ordered up to the support of Marshal Blucher. The divisions 
of Giulay and Coloredo arrived at Bar-sur-Aube. General 
Wittgenstein's corps in Joinville was ordered to Vassy ; as 
also General Kleist, not far in his rear. General Winzmge- 
rode, from the northern army, was likewise in march to join 
the grand army : General D'Yorck moved on the 30th to St 
Dizier : General Wrede, with the Bavarians, to St. Urbain, 
ready to support the movements of General Wittgenstein : 
the Austrian grenadiers and reserves to Colombey : the Rus- 
sian and Prussian guards and cavalry were at and near Chau- 
mont. 

If the enemy should threaten any one corps before the allies 
had all their force brought up, that corps was to retire ; but as 
in two days all the corps were to be united, and ready to act, 
there could hardly be a doubt of another day such as Leipsic, 
if Buonaparte ventured to afford the opportunity. On my 
visiting Marshal Blucher on the 31st, at Trannes, I found him 
occupying a very advantageous position ; his left resting on 
that village and the Aube river, and his right at Maison, 
which was occupied by the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg. 
The enemy showed themselves with then* right at Dienville, 
their centre above Lacoutiere, and then* left extending tovv^ards 
Loulaine. In the middle of the day they appeared to be col- 
lecting on their centre ; and their first movements indicated 
an attempt on Trannes and Marshal Blucher's position. After- 
wards, however, it became evident, by an advance of a con- 
siderable body of cavalry and the filing of troops to their right, 
that they had another object, and that the demonstration made 
was to cover it. 

The country being unfavorable for ascertaining with preci- 
sion the enemy's movements, and the reports of the patrols 
and light corps not having come in, it was difficult to pro- 
nounce as to Napoleon's intentions. By an intercepted letter 
from Berthier, sent in by General ScherbatoflT, it became still 
more evident that it had been Buonaparte's first plan to fall 
upon the right or rear of the allies, and to get round the flank, 
and act upon our communications. Another useftil lesson, 
however, received by Buonaparte at Brienne, when the second 
determination was taken, added possibly to the report of Gene- 
ral D'Yorck's corps at St. Dizier, and General Wittgenstein's 
moving from Joinville, induced him entirely to abandon his 
project. He certainly would have found himself between 
three corps; and the whole allied armj'^ would have been 
united, ready to fall upon him. 

The road from Brienne towards Troyea was now broken up, 



IN GERMANY AND FUANCE. 193 

and tlie bridge at Lesmont destroyed by General Scherbatoff's 
partisan corps. Count Pahlen with all his cavalry made a 
movement from Marshal Blucher's position on the 31st to the 
right, to join Count Witt^enstem. This probably operated to 
accelerate the enemy's withdrawing- from the left. The corps 
of the allied army on the 31st, at night, were posted as fol- 
lows : — General Sacken's, and a division of Count Langeron's 
under Generals Lauskoi, Otterfief, and ScherbatofF, with the 
Prince Royal of Wirtemburg, were in position near Trannes 
and Maison. 

The Marshal's force might now be averaged at above 35,000 
men. General Wrede with the Bavarians, amounting to 
28,000, arrived at Doulevant; General Giulay, with about 
18,000, at Bar-sur-Aube. General Coloredo with 21,000 
marched on the gi'eat road from thence towards Troyes. 
Count Wittgenstein's, at or near Vassy, was stated at 15,000. 
General D'Yorck at St. Dizier had 20,000 men. The re- 
serves of the Russian and Prussian grenadiers and guards con- 
sisted of about a5,000. Thus from 160 to 170,000 men might 
have been concentrated against the enemy, on the morning of 
the 1st of February. General Kleist's corps then arriving at 
St. Michael, and General Winzingerode's following it, were 
not included. The whole of the enemy's force engaged 
against Marshal Blucher on the 29th, belonged to the guard. 
The marshal averaged his loss at not more than 7 or 800 men. 
The enemy's was very heavy ; his immense superiority in 
numbers showed the powerful resistance he had met with. 

Buonaparte v/as seen to encourage his troops and expose 
his person fearlessly during the combat ; and Marshal Blucher's 
movement of his cavalry, which he led on himself, was spoken 
of in the highest terms. Napoleon, who, at this period, 
scarcely acted, in any instance, on common military calcula- 
tion, drew up his army on the 1st of February in two lines, 
on the great plain before La Rothiere, occupying the villages, 
and neglecting much stronger ground in his rear about Bri- 
enne, evidently showing that he meant to play a desperate 
jxame. He led on la jeune garde in person against Marshal 
Blucher's army, to wrest the village of La Rothiere from the 
pallant corps of Sacken ; but three repeated efforts were in- 
effectual. All agreed that the enemy fought with great in- 
trepidity. Buonaparte seemed to have set his political exist- 
ence on a die, as he exposed himself everywhere : his horse 
was shot under him, and he had the mortification of witness- 
ing the capture of a battery of guns in charge of la jeune 
garde. 

Had Marshal Blucher not previously immortalized himself, 
this day would have crowned him in the annals of Fame ; for 

R 



194 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

whatever were the well-grounded apprehensions entertained 
by many for the result of the Prince of Wirtemburg's attack 
on the right, the Marshal dauntlessly eifected those combina- 
tions upon which the result of the day depended. 

The Russian artillery were spoken of in the highest terms : 
the ground was covered with snow, and so deep, that they 
were obliged to leave one-half of their guns in the rear. Yet 
by harnessing double teams to the other half, they contrived 
to bring those forward and get a sufficient number into action. 

The allies brought about 70 or 80,000 men into this bat- 
tle ; the other corps of the army were not yet in line : the 
enemy were supposed to have had about the same strength. 
The enemy's last attack on the village of La Rothiere was at 
two o'clock on the morning of the 2d, immediately after 
which they commenced their retreat. Passing the Aube 
river, they took up a very strong rear-guard position in the 
neighborhood of Lesmont. 

Dispositions were made to attack this position with the 
corps of the Prince Royal of Wu'temburg, Generals Wrede 
and Giulay ; and there was a sliarp fire on this spot. But the 
day was unfavorable, and the fall of snow so excessive, that 
the troops could make no progress. 

In tlie mean time the Field-marshal Prince Schwartzen- 
berg made his arrangements for the pursuit of the enemy, 
who had retired on Vitry, Troyes and Arcis. The two former 
places were supposed to have garrisons and cannon, and Vitry 
v/as walled and protected by a ditch of some extent. It was 
now resolved that the grand army should march by Troyes on 
Paris, and the army of Silesia by Lesmont upon Vitry, form- 
ing their junction with the corps of General Wittgenstein 
coming from Vassy, and the corps of D' Yorck from St. Dizier, 
which last place was taken by General D' Yorck, with some 
loss on the part of the enemy. 

This great combined force was thus to proceed on the 
shortest route to the capital ; and Marshal Blucher sweeping 
round by the right, and forming a jimction with the corps 
above stated, was to overpower every obstacle. It was calcu- 
lated he probably would come in contact witli the corps of 
Marshal Macdonald, which it was reported was marching to 
unite near Vitry. Prince Schwartzenberg's head-quarters 
were on the 3d of February at VendoBuvrep, and Marshal 
Blucher's at Breaux-le-Comte. 

In the battle of La Rothiere eighty pieces of cannon and 
4000 prisoners were taken by the allies ; the latter of whom 
lost 6000 in killed and wounded. The Emperor of Russia 
and King of Prussia were present, and by their heroic con- 
duct infused life and vigor into all the operations. After this 



IN GLRMANY AI\D TRANCE. 195 

battle Napoleon, on the 4th of February, retreated upon 
Troyes, where he established his head-quarters. 

With regard to the fortresses which were left to be block- 
aded by forces in their rear, while the allies made their rapid 
and glorious advance on the capital of France, it may be suf- 
ficient here to state a fact applicable to them all ; namely, 
that the different corps left before them were so nearly 
amounting in force to the garrisons of the places, that the 
latter conhned themselves to insignificant sorties, while the 
former were only desirous of keeping the fortresses invested 
In the march of the army forward, the French nation ap- 
peared to me generally to favor the allies; they seemed 
wearied with the wars they were engaged in, and still more 
weary of their military ruler. The peasantry, however, 
were not allowed by the existing authorities to be passive ; 
and finding measures had been taken to arm them, Prince 
tSchwartzenberg was induced to issue a general order to treat 
all the natives as enemies who were found with arms in their 
possession. 

Napoleon took great care, after the defeats at Brienne and 
La Rothiere, to publish his own accounts in Paris, with that 
dexterity for which he was so conspicuous ; and thus, by his 
own bulletins at this period, as well as during the whole of 
the succeeding battles, the citizens of Paris were kept in 
profound ignorance of the real state of events. There is no 
doubt that the military science and manoeuvres displayed 
between the months of January and March, 1814, are the 
most interesting and important that distinguish this or any 
otiier war. Napoleon, although defeated again and again, 
seemed to rise superior to his difficulties; and after the 
battle of Brienne he displayed more strikingly all those 
resources and talents against his adversaries for which he 
has generally been so conspicuous; while great and grievous 
faults were, subsequently to the above battle, committed by 
the allies. 

A too confident sentiment now prevailed ; and because 
Napoleon had been defeated in an open battle, it was supposed 
lie could no longer maintain an effective resistance; little 
calculation was placed on the considerable reinforcements 
that the French empire continued to pour forth on all sides, 
and each of the allied armies thought itself capable of meet- 
ing the enemy unaided by the other; whereas nothing but 
their union, and a joint operation of t:ie w^hole collected 
force, would ever have insured success. Both the grand 
army and the army of Silesia were eager to have the eclat 
of first entering Paris. To this absurd desire many of the 
misfortunes and losses of Marshal Blucher in his march for- 



196 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

ward were to be attributed : it led bitn to advance far too 
rashly, and separate himself too widely fron) the support of 
Prince Schwartzenberc^ ; and when he experienced a check, 
it became more fatal, from the Silesian army having; no suc- 
cors. Prince Schwartzenberg's marches were more mea- 
sured ; but there was a want of concert, which nothing- but 
beintr over-sanguine as to the ultimate results could account 
for. 

With regard to the Prince Royal and his army of the 
north, he took no part in the grand manoeuvres towards 
Paris. The greatest part of Holland was, during the month 
of January, delivered and restored to her rightful sovereign, 
with the exception of some of the strong places. The rem- 
nant of the French force collected at Antwerp, and retired 
into Belgium, of which Generals Bulow and Winzingerode 
endeavored to make themselves masters. In order to effect 
this object, General Bulow took up a position near Utrecht, 
where he had his head-quarters; and early in the year lie 
addressed a proclamation to the Belgians, in wliich he de- 
clared that he was arriving amongst them to deliver them 
from the odious tyranny under which they had so long 
groaned. 

General Bulow next advanced and passed the Waal, driving 
back the French corps on Antwerp. They still occupied 
however Bergen-op-Zoom, with 4000 men, while Marshal 
Macdonald had his corps assembled between the Meuse and 
the Lower Rhine, and he threw garrisons and provisions intx) 
the different fortresses on the Wesel. Napoleon was known 
to take the deepest interest in the operations carrying on in 
this quarter; and when he heard that the fortress of Breda 
had been taken by the Russians of General Bulow's corps 
e/'orme>, ho sent directions to the French general commanding 
at Antwerp to hazard every thing in retaking it. The French 
general Roguet, in compliance with this order, attacked the 
garrison of the fortress, commanded by General Beakendorff, 
with 10,000 men. 

General Bulow and Sir T. Graham learning this event, 
immediately sent reinforcements ; but the gallant conduct 
of General Beakendorff had forced the French general to 
retire into Antwerp before the succors had arrived. Great 
])raise was due to General Beakendorff for his conduct in this 
gallant defence of Breda. A second attempt was in like 
manner made, and proved equally abortive ; a column of Eng- 
lish troops having meanwhile arrived in the neighborhood, as 
well as General Bulow's reinforcements 

The troops of the expedition from England, under Sir T. 
Graham, now united with Bulow's corps, and Bcakendorff's 



IK GERMAXi' AND FRANCE. 197 

cavalry, forming a division of at least 20,000 men, in the 
neighborhoood of Breda, t^ufEciently strong to compel the 
French troops to enter an intrenched camp between West 
Wesel and Antwerp, with a view to cover the latter place. 
Napoleon, aware of the discomfiture of his forces in Belgium, 
determined now to send General Maison with all the forcea 
he could spare to Lisle, in order to provision and prepare fur- 
ther defences in that city, and in the fortresses. The French 
troops still occupied the country between the Waal and the 
Me use. 

General Bulow, in pursuance of his instructions to make 
himself master of Belgium, attacked Marshal Macdonald in 
the middle of January, in his intrenched camp near Ant- 
werp. The attack was formed in three columns, commanded 
by Generals Borstell, Thiimen, and Oppen : the two former 
succeeded, but the latter failed in his attack; and notwith- 
Htanding this offensive operation was well supported in the 
following days by renewed efforts, aided by the English corps, 
Bulow was under the necessity, at the end of the month of 
January, of resuming his former positions near Breda ; and 
Sir Thomas Graham's English division returned to Bergen- 
op-Zoom, which place they invested. 

In the mean time the corps of General Winzingerode, 
which had been joined by all Czernicheff's cavalry, passed 
the Rhine at Dusseldorff, and in the middle of January 
occupied Aix-la-Chapelle and liege. In the latter place 
C'zernicheff had a brilliant cavalry affair, in which he was 
completely victorious. Marshal Macdonald moved his head- 
quarters, on Winzingerode's passing the Rhine, to Namur, 
and from thence he fell back to Mezieres, and ultimately to 
Dinant and Givet, followed by Czernicheff's cavalry. Win- 
zingerode's head-quarters were established in the end of 
January at Namur. Although the rapid march of Winzin- 
gerode's corps, aided by General Bulow's operations, was not 
attended with the full success that had been expected, yet 
the fall of Bois le Due by assault, and the capture of Brussels 
at the end of January, gave a complete triumph to military 
events in this quarter. 

I shall now briefly recall the reader to that part of my 
narrative which touched incidentally upon the great diplo- 
matic transactions in progress at this period, and those nego- 
tions which led to the conferences of Chatillon, The prin- 
cipal secretary of state for foreign affairs having received his 
Majesty's command to repair to the head-quarters of the al- 
lied sovereigns, arrived in the month of January, and imme- 
diately entered into the strictest communication with the 
state-ministers of the allied powers. And here I cannot, in 

R2 



198 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

natural feeling, refrain from inserting a paragraph of Lord 
Burghersh's Memoirs, which states as follows : — " The de- 
cision now taken in England, v/as to depute one of the cabinet 
ministers to represent Great Britain in the congress, which 
appeared now likely to be held for the final arrangement of 
a secure and lasting peace. Lord Harrowby is un.'lerstofid 
to have been first thought of for this mission : Lord (Jastlc- 
reagh, however, undertook the charge, and in the beginning 
of January joined the head-quarters of the sovereigns. No 
measure was ever wiser, or productive of greater benefits. 
Lord Castlereagh, by the manliness of his conduct, by the 
talent which he displayed under the most difficult circum- 
stances, secured more solid advantages, not only to England, 
but to Europe, than perhaps will ever be generally known or 
acknowledged. In the various changes of fortune which at- 
tended the operations of the campaign of 1814, the steady 
course with which he pursued the general objects of the al- 
liance, being never led aside from them either by reverses or 
success, placed him in triumphant contrast with others, vvjio, 
elated or depressed by the events of each succeeding period, 
would have ruined their cause, as much by overstrained pre- 
tensions in one alternative, as by a conduct totally the reverae 
in the other. Lord Castlereagh is understood to have lef^ 
England with instructions to negotiate for peace upon con- 
ditions honorable to France, but differing from those proposed 
at Frankfort, which the change of circumstances had rendered 
totally inapplicable." The consequence resulting from M. 
de St. Aignan's early mission from Frankfort wa.s the aj>- 
pointment of the Due de Viccnza, Caulaincourt, as French 
plenipotentiary to treat for a general peace with the allied 
])lenipotentiaries assembled at Chatillon for this great objec(. 

The ministers met in the middle of February; I^ord Ab»T- 
deen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart having been 
named plenipotentiaries on the part of Great Britain ; Count 
Razunioffski on the part of Russia ; Count Stad ion for Aus- 
tria ; and Baron Von Humboldt for Prussia. These j)lenipo- 
tentiaries continued to assemble and hold repeated conftr- 
eni^es until the middle of March; and during the whole of 
this period the military operations were carried on. T was 
prevented by my diplomatic duties from witnessing, and con- 
sequently detailing any personal observations on the military 
movements during the same interval ; but the British gov- 
ernment were accurately informed of the course of the ope- 
rations by Colonel J^owe's and Lord Burghersh's very able 
communications. 

The time may possibly arrive when I shall think myself 
justified in giving the history of the diplomatic transactions 



liV GERMANY AND FRANXL. 199 

of this little congresH at this period. 1 retain my own ininutea 
of every minister's remarks on all the subjects of discnssion, 
from which a summary might be drawn up not uninterestin."- 
to posterity. It may not here, however, be irrelevant to re^ 
mark, that it was easy to perceive from the tirst discussions 
as to the terms of peace for Europe, that the most serious 
difficulties presented themselves; and while the statesman- 
like views of the ministers were influenced by the peculiar 
feelings of their sovereigns on the spot, it was hardly possible 
to predict how any ultimate good could be accomplished. 

To prove more strongly the truth of what I have asserted, 
I shall now relate an unofficial conversation I had about this 
period with the Emperor Alexander. His Imperial Majesty's 
known condescension of character, and the marked kindness 
and good-nature he invariably showed me, penetrated me 
with sincere attachment and devotion to his person, and on 
various occasions he honored me by communicating his ob- 
servations and sentiments. At this period, one of the most 
difficult and interesting points for adjustment at a general 
peace, was the fate of the Polish nation, and this peace now 
began confidently to be looked for. In one of my interviews 
with the Emperor, His Imperial Majesty dwelt at great 
length on the immense sacrifices of Russia, and putting these 
foremost in the statement, he declared how doubly necessary 
it became him, on the eve of a settlement of Europe, to look 
to the permanent interests of his own empire. His Imperial 
Majesty stated, that his moral feelings, however, and every 
principle of justice and right, called upon him to use all iiis 
power to restore such a constitution to Poland as would se- 
cure the happiness of so fine and so great a people. The 
abandonment of seven millions of his subjects, were he to 
relinquisli his Polish provinces in any general arrangement, 
without a sufficient guarantee to his country for the great 
utility and advantage of the measure, would be more thon 
his imperial crown was worth. But the consolidating these 
provinces with the Duchy of Warsaw, under such a king, 
and such a constitutional administration as Russia would 
name, would be productive of the happiest efl^ects. His Im- 
perial Majesty continued to observe that his character was 
well known, and ought to give full confidence to Europe. I 
r»-'marked in reply, that Europe could not insure herself at 
all times an Alexander on the throne. To which His Im- 
perial Majesty rejoined, that the Grand-Duke Constantino 
partook entirely of his own sentiments, as well as his two 
brothers. He was happy also to believe that the proposition 
lie had started, and the mode in which he viewed it, were 
seen by Austria in the same light. That he had had a very 



200 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

long conversation with Prince Metternich a day or two since, 
in which the whole of His Majesty's plan had been opened, 
and that the prince n'avoit rien contre, or words to this 
purpose. 

I was considerably struck at the time with so extraordinary 
a declaration from His Majesty ; and I ventured not only to 
express my sur|^rise, but to assure His Majesty that Prince 
Metternich had held a very different language to me, and 
that I never could suppose he would leave to England the task 
of being the only power which would oppose itself to His 
Imperial Majesty's views in case they should not meet witii 
general concurrence, when they were of so much more vital 
interest to Austria and Prussia. 

His Imperial Majesty next alluded, rather in a menacing 
manner, to his power of taking military occupation of Poland, 
and seemed to be certain of the facility with which he could 
obtain his end ; and I doubted much, from the firm and pos- 
itive manner in which he expressed himself, whether he 
would ever be diverted from the purpose he now declared. 
This expose of a great monarch's mind was deeply interest- 
ing at the moment it was communicated ; and later events 
showed, (notwithstanding the complex character of this 
question,) how sedulously the Emperor of Russia's eflbrts 
were thus early directed towards it. 

But confining myself at present to my military narrative, 
I shall only now insert in the Appendix the declaration of the 
allied plenipotentiaries, which after much fruitless delay and 
manceuvring on the part of the French plenipotentiary to 
gain time, ended by dissolving the congress, and by the return 
of the ministers to their respective head-quarters. Averse 
as I had ever been to the whole arrangements and negotia- 
tions with M. de St. Aignan, followed up as they were by 
tlie conferences at Chatillon, I sincerely rejoiced at their ter- 
mination ; and it was soon indeed perceptible that the Due de 
Vicenza neither talked the language, nor was kept an courant 
of the projects of Napoleon ; and that the only desire the lat- 
ter had was to protract an idle negotiation to cover his own 
deeper designs and objects. The allies were too long trifled 
with; and to have permitted it to be spun out longer would 
have been unpardonable. I must do Caulainconrt the justice 
to record, that if it had depended upon him, he was sincerely 
desirous of obtaining a peace for his emperor, whose predica- 
ment he evidently saw became daily more perilous. 

To the memory of these interesting days I must add, that 
the conviviality and harmony that reigned between the min- 
isters made the society and intercourse at Chatillon most 
agreeable. The diplomatists dined alternately with each 



IN GEHMANY AND FRANCE. 201 

other; M. de Cuulaincourt liberally passing for all the minis- 
ters, through tlie French advanced posts, convoys of all good 
cheer, in epicurean wines, &c, that Paris could afford ; nor 
was female society wanting to complete the charm, and banish 
ennui from the Chatillon congress, which I am sure will be 
long recollected with sensations of pleasure by all the pleni- 
potentiaries there engaged. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

Resources and genius displayed by Napoleon— Magnanimity under adverse 
circumstances — his position at Troyes, Lesmonl, Bar-sur-Aube— Prince 
Schvvartzeiiberg determines to attacit— Preparations of the allies— Op?3ra- 
tions of Marshal Blucher— Napoleon takes advantage of his imprudent ad- 
vance-falls upon the corps of Sacken and D'Yorck— gains a decided victory 
over them— Engajienient with Marshal Blucher— Sanguinary coutv-st— The 
Prussians out-manceuvred and surrounded — retreat with considerable 
loss— Rapid movements and manceuvres of Napoleon— Prepares to attack 
Prince Schwartzenberg— The allies collect their forces— Blucher attacked 
with loss at Mery— Grand head-quarters— t?uccessful attack by Prince 
Schwartzeuberg— Loss of the Prussians— liattle at Laon— Retreat of the 
eneniv — Positions of Napoleon— General engagement and defeat of the 
French— Etforts of Napoleon— Masked niovemetils and successes of the al- 
lies— Combined advance— Losses of the French— Barbarities of the Cos- 
sacks — Singular incident, and unhappy catastrophe. 

Napoleon, after the battles of Brienne and La Rothiere, 
displayed, by his masterly movements with an inferior against 
two superior armies, and by braving his accumidated difficul- 
ties, that undoubted science in war which his bitterest ene- 
mies must accord to his genius. In proportion as his embar- 
rassments increased, he seemed to rise superior o.s an individ- 
ual. During his adverse fortune on the Elbe he appeared 
fluctuating and irresolute ; and his lengthened stay in unten- 
able and disadvantageous positions was the cause of his fatal 
overthrow at Leipsic, and of subsequent misfortunes. But 
now lie appeared once more to have burst forth with all his 
talent, and all his energies and mental resources. 

During the early days of February, Napoleon's army was 
in position at Troyes, occupying the main routes of Lesmont, 
Bar-sur-Aube, and Bar-sur-Seine. Prince Schwartzcnberg 
determined to attack Troyes, by turning it by the side of Bar- 
sur-Seine. The divisions of Bianchi and Lichtenstein were 
directed on this object, while Wittgenstein's corps moved on 
Vassy and Montmirail. After some hard fighting at Troyes, 
and on Napoleon's perceiving that the army of Silesia was 
advancing to the Marne, and might take him in rear, he re- 



202 I'^ARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

tired from Troyes on the 8th of February to Nogciit, on the 
left bank of the Seine. The Prince Royal of Wirtemburg-'s 
corps now advanced and occupied Troyes; the whole of 
the grand army followed, and on the 9th had its advance 
at St. Libaud. Marshal Blucher next pressed forward be- 
tween the Seine and Marne ; and it was perceived that Na- 
poleon from Nogent was transporting a part of his army in 
the direction which indicated another determined attack on 
Blucher, with the hope of crushing him before he could be 
followed by the grand army, which the difficulties of passing 
the rivers rapidly made a hazardous undertaking. Blucher 
had his head-quarters at Vertus on the 8th, and D'Yorck was 
at Chateau-Thierry. General Kleisfs corps was in the rear, 
and not able to form in position so soon as was required for 
the formidable attack Napoleon meditated: orders were there- 
fore sent by the Marshal for Kleist and Sacken to retire on 
Montmirail. 

At this period it was generally lamented that the Silesian 
army had too much dispersed its corps; and probably to this 
cause Napoleon's latter success over them was to be attribu- 
ted. On the 18th Napoleon, leaving Oudinot and Victor op- 
posite the grand army on the Seine, marched with Marmont, 
Ney, Mortier, Groucliy, and all his cavalry, from Sezanne 
and Champaubert; leaving then a division before Blucher, he 
moved rapidly after Sacken and D'Yorck, and falling upon 
them with superior forces, Napoleon gained a partial but de- 
cided victory at Marchais, and the slaughter was immense. 
Marshal Blucher, not aware of the defeat of his and other corps, 
marched forward to attack Marmont at Champaubert; but 
Napoleon now arriving from Montmirail, a most bloody contest 
ensued; when towards the close of the day of the 14th Blucher 
saw his army entirely surrounded between Champaubert and 
Etoges: he nevertheless determined de se /aire jour, and 
made good his retreat upon the latter place, not without the 
loss, however, of above 8000 men, and ten or twelve piecf s 
of cannon. 

These defeats of the Silesian army operated as a temporary 
check to the advance of the allies at this moment, and tended 
to make them prolong and encourage the conferences at Cha- 
tillon. Prince Schwartzenberg was not well informed of 
Napoleon's movements, and did not believe that he was march- 
ing all his forces against Blucher. This may account for his 
inactivity during this interval ; but the too great dispersion 
of the Silesian army and Napoleon's masterly and rapid 
manoeuvring were the true causes of the success of the ene- 
my. He accomplished a march of thirty leagues in the space 
of seven days, between the 9th and 16th of February, fought 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 203 

three battles, returned into position on the Seine, and re- 
joined Victor and Oudinot. 

On the 16th Napoleon had his head-quarters at Guignes; 
and having beaten Blucher separately, having reunited his 
divisions, and received the reinforcements from Maine, which 
had arrived by forced marches from Paris, he resolved to fall 
upon Prince SchM^artzenberg, and strike another and he hoped 
decisive blow against him. Wittgenstein's corps, however, 
on Napoleon's advance, had retired ; and Napoleon pursued 
him to Nanges. General Victor's corps moved to Montereau, 
and the head-quarters of the sovereigns fell back to Trainel. 
Prince Schwartzenberg then determined, the 19th of Feb- 
ruary, to collect his whole army at Troyes, and Blucher was 
ordered to concentrate at Mery and Epernay. On the 20th 
Napoleon moved his head-quarters to Nogent. 

It may be necessary to record here, that when both 
Schwartzenberg's and Blucher's armies were thus collected, 
the latter proposed to pass the Seine and give Napoleon bat- 
tle. But the Austrian field-marshal did not think the environs 
of Troyes favorable ; he moved therefore to Colomiers, still 
having his army collected. Blucher was attacked at Mery 
on the 22d, and fell back with some loss. On the 26th the 
allied sovereigns again, took up their head-quarters at Chau- 
rnont, and Prince Schwartzenberg determined to attack the 
enemy in his position of Bar-sur-Aube, with the corps of 
Wrede, Prince Royal of Wirtemburg, and Wittgenstein, 
which happily was attended with complete success ; so that 
on the 2d of March the grand head-quarters were transferred 
to Bar-sur-Aube. The Austrian field-marshal next deter- 
mined on attacking the enemy at Troyes with four corps of 
his army ; but Marshal Oudinot refused battle, and retired on 
Provins behind the Seine. The armies remained then sta- 
tionary for some days in cantonments ; and some overtures 
for an armistice being made, it was supposed they would be 
attended with success. 

On the 9th of March Blucher concentrated his army about 
Laon, and was again attacked by Napoleon ; but Blucher re- 
pulsed him vigorously, and General St. Priest's corps much 
distinguished itself The enemy under Marmont, however, 
entered Rheims, and took 2000 prisoners. Marshal Blucher, 
after this action, sustained his army on the Aisne ; and Kleist, 
Bulow, and Sacken were assembled at Soissons ready to 
march forwards, elated as they were by their success at the 
battle of Laon. That was indeed a critical moment. If a 
victory had not been won, Blucher would have been forced 
to retire on the Low Countries, and all our plans might have 
been rendered abortive. But this brilliant and memorable 



204 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

battle encouraged Prince Schvvartzenberg to resume the of- 
fensive ; he instantly determined on attacking Oudinot and 
Victor, who had retired to Provins. The head-quarters of 
the monarchs were again transferred to Troyes on the 15th 
of March, and immediate dispositions were made for the at- 
tack. 

Napoleon had his forces collected also at Chateau-Thierry, 
Fere Champenoise and Arcis ; and on the 20th he moved in 
great force to the latter place. A general battle now com- 
menced : it was warmest at a village called Torcy ; and the 
result of this day's combat was that Napoleon maintained 
himself in his positions near Arcis and Torcy. The following 
morning Prince Schwartzenberg gave orders for a still more 
concentrated and general attack, which was performed at all 
points with the most triumphant success ; and the enemy suf- 
fered a complete and signal defeat. 

Napoleon now found that he could no longer maintain his 
positions, having failed in his attempt to debouch from Plan- 
cis and Arcis across the Aube : having, moreover, abandoned 
his idea of attacking Prince Schwartzenberg in his position 
at Mesnil la Comptesse (taken up after the battle of the 21st), 
he seems to have been guided in his next operations by the 
desire of preventing the union of the armies of Prince 
Schwartzenberg and Marshal Blucher. Should he not suc- 
ceed to the utmost in this object, it was evidently his best 
policy to force their communication as far to the rear, and to 
make it as circuitous, as possible. It was further manifest, 
also, by intercepted letters, that Buonaparte was of opinion 
that the movement he contemplated, on the right of Prince 
Schwartzenberg, (no other than the extraordinary project of 
passing by Vitry and St. Dizier, and marching upon Nancy 
on the rear, and on the communications of the allies,) might 
induce Schwartzenberg to fall back towards the Rhine, for 
fear of losing the base of his operations; and that then Na- 
poleon would be able to relieve his places, and be in a better 
situation to cover Paris. 

It generally occurs that manoeuvres are made with the ad- 
vance on the head of the opposing army ; but Buonaparte, un- 
der his present project, seems to have forced measures so far, 
by the passage of the Aube with all his troops near Vitry, as 
to have left himself completely open to that bold and masterly 
decision which was immediately adopted. 'Buonaparte put 
his corps in motion on the evening of the 21st for Vitry; and 
that night he remained at Sommosuis. On the following day 
the advanced corps arrived at Vitry, and summoned the place. 
It had been placed by the Russian commandant in a very 
tolerable state of defence, and had a garrison of between 3 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 205 

and 4000 Prussians. Marshal Ney endeavored, by every 
menace, to obtain a surrender; but the brave commandant 
resolutely refused, and held the town, which reduced the 
French commander to the necessity of crossing- the Marne 
river by bridges constructed near Frigincour. Napoleon 
crossed here also with his whole army on the 23d and 24th, 
and was immediately ascertained to have taken the direction 
of St. Dizier. 

Three objects might now be in his view by this movement 
round the right flank of the allies ; namely, to force them 
back; and if this failed, either to operate upon their commu- 
nications, and proceed to form a junction with Marshal Au- 
gereau ; or finally, by moving to his fortresses of Metz, &.c. 
prolong the war by resisting on a new line, while he placed 
the allies in the centre of France, having taken the best pre- 
cautions in his power for the defence of his capital. 

On the 22d, the allies having crossed to the right of the 
Aube, lost no time in forming a junction of the two armies to 
the westward, placing themselves thus between the French 
army and Paris, and proceeding with a united force of at least 
200,000 men towards the capital of the French empire. 

In order the better to mask this movement, the march of 
the allied army was made from Pougy, Lesmont, and Arcis, 
on Vitry, and the Emperor of Russia, by two extraordinary 
marches of eighteen and twelve leagues, established his head- 
quarters with those of the Austrian field-marshal at Vitry on 
the 24th instant. A very brilliant capture of several pieces 
of cannon, 1500 prisoners, and a large number of caissons, 
was made on the 23d instant by General AugerofFski, of the 
cavalry of the Russian guard ; and on that day, and the pre- 
ceding, several advanced-guard affairs took place between 
General Wrede's corps, the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg's 
and the enemy. At the passage of the Aube by the enemy, 
owing as it was said to the late arrival of orders. General 
Wrede with the Bavarians missed an opportunity of attacking 
Marshal Ney with advantage as he defiled under the heights 
where the General was in position, the French army having 
at tlie same moment the Prince Royal of- Wirtemburg's corps 
close on their rear. 

When the Prince Marshal had decided on the advance to 
Paris, he made his dispositions accordingly, by forming a 
corps on the Bar-sur-Aube line, which he committed to the 
care of General Ducca, to protect the head-quarters of the 
Emperor of Austria ; and as it was replete with circumstances 
of delicacy at this moment, for the father of the Empress to 
be with the advance as the allies approached Paris, his Impe- 
rial Majesty, Prince Metternich. and the first ministers of all 

S 



206 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

the allied courts, remained in the rear under the arrangement 
above alluded to, constant communication being kept up with 
them ; while they held themselves prepared to move forward 
as soon as the Emperor of Russia took possession of the French 
capital. General Ducca received orders to attend to the 
numerous convoys, supplies, &.c. and carry them if necessary 
towards the army of the south, and also to secure his rear, 
while he pursued the objects confided to his directions. 

The combined army marched in three columns to La Fere 
Champenoise on the 25th : all the cavalry of the army formed 
the advance, and were to push forward to Sezanne ; the sixth 
and fourth corps formed the advance of the centre column ; 
the fifth was on the right ; and the three corps and the re- 
serves, with the guards, on the left. Marshal Blucher was 
reported to have arrived with a great part of his army at 
Chalons. General Winzingerode and General Czernicheff, 
with all their cavalry, entered Vitry on the 23d, and were 
immediately detached to follow up Buonaparte's march on 
St. Dizier, and to threaten his rear. General Winzingerode's 
infantry had remained at Chalons with Marshal Blucher, 
together with General Woronzoff's and General Sacken's 
corps. General Bulow had marched to attack Soissons; and 
Generals D'Yorck and Kleist had moved in the line of Mont- 
mirail. 

By these simultaneous movements, had Buonaparte even 
not crossed the Aube, and passed between the two allied ar- 
mies, he probably would have found himself in a similar posi- 
tion to that at Leipsic, and the result to him would have been, 
I have no doubt, of the same disastrous nature. 

The army bivouacked on the 25th at La Fere Champenoise. 
It appeared now that the corps of Marshals Marmont and 
Mortier, who had been retiring before Marshal Blucher, were 
moving down towards Vitry to connect themselves with 
Buonaparte's operations; ignorant perhaps of his strateg-ic 
intentions, which may not have been fully formed until Na- 
poleon found himself too far committed to retract with suc- 
cess. The above corps of his army were much perplexed on 
finding themselves close to Prince Schwartzenberg when 
they expected to reinforce their own army. 

It is a singular, but an undoubted fact, that Marshal Mar- 
mont's advance was within a very short distance from Vitry 
on the night of the 24th, without tlie enemy's being aware 
that it was in the occupation of the allies. 

On the morning of the 25th the sixth corps of the Austri- 
ans, under General Reifski, fell in with the advance above 
mentioned, and drove them back to Connandrey and through 
IjE Fere Champenoise : in the former place a large number 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 207 

of caissons, wagons, and baggage, were taken. In the mean 
time, on the left the Russian cavalry of the reserves, under 
the Grand-Duke Constantine, was equally successful, charging 
the enemy, and taking eighteen cannon and many prisoners. 
But the most brilliant movement of this day occurred after 
the allied troops in advance had passed through La Fere 
Champenoise. A detached column of the enemy, of about 
5,000 men, under the command of General Ames, had been 
making its way, under the protection of Marmont's corps, 
from the neighborhood of Montmirail to join Buonaparte : this 
corps had in charge an immense convoy of bread and am- 
munition, and was considered of great importance with the 
force attached to it, which had just quitted Paris to reinforce 
Buonaparte. The cavalry of Marshal Blucher's army was 
the first to discover this body on their march from Chalons : 
my aide-de-camp. Captain (now Colonel) Harris, who was, 
during the whole campaign, most active and intrepid in all 
his duties, was fortunate enough, looking out with a party of 
Cossacks, to give the first intelligence to Marshal Blucher of 
their position. The cavalry of Generals Korf and Wasiltchi- 
kofi''s corps were immediately detached after them, and they 
were driven upon La Fer6 Champenoise as the cavalry of the 
grand army was advancing from that village. Some attacks 
of this cavalry were made on this French corps, which had 
formed itself into squares; and it is but justice to say, de- 
fended itself in the most gallant manner, notwithstanding it 
was composed of young troops and garde nationale. When 
completely surrounded by the cavalry of both armies, some 
officers were sent to demand their surrender ; but they boldly 
resisted the summons, marching on and firing ; and they re- 
fused to lay down their arms until a battery of Russian artil- 
lery liad opened, and repeated charges of cavalry had thrown 
them into confusion. This light battery was especially di- 
rected by the Emperor of Russia in person ; and he moment- 
arily gave the command and charge of the service to t?e 
Earl of Cathcart. Nothing could have been served with great- 
er precision and ability than the guns ; and after a sharp and 
continued fire and a most brilliant resistance. Generals Ames 
and Pacthod, generals of division, five brigadiers, 3,000 pris- 
oners, and twelve cannon, with the convoy, fell into the hands 
of the allies. 

I witnessed here a very interesting, but I fear unfortunately 
too usual an occurrence, that took place in the capture of the 
convoy and enemy's baggage, &c. at La Fere Champenoise. 
Being forward in the melee, I perceived that some of the 
Cossacks, most probably from Bashkir, had not only secured 
a French colonel's caleche and baggage, but one of them had 



208 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

seized his wife, whose cries rent the air, and with the aid o\ 
two other gallant Tartars was placing her behind him. I wils 
)U)t detail the frequent histories of lawless troops, nor add to 
these pages instances of barbarity which I fear have been tou 
justly given of the conduct of the Russian predatory hordes 
in their march through France ; but I reflect with satisfac- 
tion that it was my good fortune to rescue, even for a moment, 
a lovely and most interesting Frenchwoman from the hands 
of these wild soldiers. Being, however, unable to listen to 
her afflicting details, and not knowing in what manner better 
to place her in security, I ordered my own orderly hussar, of 
the King's German Legion, to place her for the moment en 
croupe, and carry her to my billet at the head-quarters. I was 
unwilling, and indeed could not at that moment leave the 
tield; but consoled myself with the thought that when I re- 
turned at night to my quarters I should receive the grati- 
tude of a beautiful creature, and pictured to myself romance 
connected with this occurrence. But, alas! how little can we 
reckon on any future event, and how idly do we build des 
chateaux en Espagne ! 

I fear that my precautions were not so great as I flattered 
myself they were : the distance between the chatnp de ha- 
taille and Fere Champenoise was inconsiderable : the town 
was in sight ; and from the number of officers and troops 
moving about, I could not imagine my beautiful prisoner 
would be recaptured ; but, sad to relate, either the same 
Cossacks returned, or others more savage and determined, 
and perceiving my faithful orderly hussar and prize, fell upon 
him, and nearly annihilating him, reseized their victim ; and 
although the strictest investigation was made throughout his 
whole army, by the Emperor of Russia, to whom I immedi- 
ately repaired, and related the melancholy tale, (and who 
heard it v/ith all that compassion and interest it could not fail 
to inspire,) the beautiful and interesting Frenchwoman never 
reappeared again. I drop a veil over the horrible sequel 
which imagination might conjure up, and I took much blame 
for my neglect of a sufficient escort. My hussar crawled to 
me next morning, half dead from ill usage ; and his pathetic 
tale placed me in a state of mind scarcely less deplorable. 



i 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE- 209 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

Pursuit of the enemy — Junction of the alhed armies— Succeosc-s of the Bj- 
fesian armies— Position of the grand army— Partisan-corps— Rapid march 
of Napoleon to regain the capital— Progress of the allies— Concentration 
of forces — Actions with the enemy — Explosion of a magazine — Advance 
of the allies — they pass the Marne — Napoleon attacks Winzingerode, who 
is compelled to retreat— Movement on the rear of the allies— Bold decision 
of the Emperor Alexander— Allied march on Paris— Sir R. Hill at Bour- 
deaux— Intercepted letter from the Empress Maria Louisa to Napoleon- 
Affair at Claye— Rapid movements of the allies towards the capital- 
arrive before it— Battle of Montraartre— Defeat of the French— Entrance 
of the allied sovereigns into Paris— Temper of the people— Popularity of 
the Emperor Alexander— Grand review in the Champs Elys6es— Napoleon 
hastens towards Fontainebleau— The allies march to oppose him— The 
Emperor Alexander forms a cabinet— its preponderance— Absence of the 
Emperor of Austria— Talleyrand gained over— The provisional govern- 
ment—Due de Vicenza— D'Alberg, &c. — Interviews with the Emperer 
Alexander. 

After the last battle the rear-guards of Marmont's and 
Mortier's corps appeared to have drawn off in the direction 
of Sezanne, and it was now difficult to say whither they 
would be able to effect their escape, as every disposition was 
making to harass and surround them. The grand army 
marched to Mailleret : the head-quarters were now at Tref- 
faux ; and the advance pushed as far as La Ferte Gauchere. 
Marshal Blucher was at Etages, and was to advance towards 
Montmirail. 

Upon the retreat of Marmont and Mortier's corps before 
the several columns of the allied armies, whose junction had 
been effected between La Fere Champenoise and Chalons, 
above eighty pieces of cannon and a great number of caissons 
fell into our hands, independent of the convoy before alluded 
to. The guns were abandoned in all directions by the enemy 
in their rapid retreat, and were captured not only by the 
cavalry under the Grand-Duke Constantine and Count Pahlen, 
hut also by the corps of Riefski, and of the Prince Royal of 
Wirtemburg. 

Generals D'Yorck and Kleist, who moved from Montmirail 
on La Ferte Gauchere, where they arrived on the 26th, greatly 
augmented the enemy's discomfiture. General D'Yorck's 
corps was seriously engaged with the enemy at the latter 
place, and took 1500 prisoners. It may be fairly estimated 
that this part of Buonaparte's army had been so roughly 
handled as to have lost one-third of its efficient men, w'ith 
nearly all its artillery. Nothing but continued forced marches 
could have enabled any part of these corps to elude their 
victorious pursuers; and when I state that Marshal Blucher'a 

S2 



210 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR 

army was at Niemes on tlie 24th, and was fighting at La 
Ferte Gauchere on the 26th, making a march of t\yenty-six 
leagues, it will be evident that no physical energies could 
exceed those that the present unexampled crisis brought into 
action. 

The o-rand army was in position at Mailleret on the 26th. 
The march was continued in three columns from Jm Fere 
Champenoise. The head-quarters of the sovereigns and Prince 
Schwartzenberg were at Treffaux; the cavalry of Count 
Pahlen were pushed beyond La Ferte Gauchere, joining the 
corps of Generals D'Yorck and Kleist. The cavalry of tlie 
reserves were bivouacked at La Vicquiere, on the right of 
the great road; the sixth and fourth were in the centre, the 
fiilh on the left, and the third remained in the rear to cover 
all the baggage, artillery, parks, and train, and to make the 
march of the whole complete. Generals Kaiseroff's and 
Leschavian's partisan-corps occupied and observed the coun- 
try about Arcis and Troyes, and between the Marne and tlie 
iSeine rivers. Intelligence was received from General Win- 
zingerode, who with General Czernicheff, and 10,000 cavalry, 
and forty pieces of artillery, continued following Buonaparte's 
rear, that the latter was marching by Brienne to Bar-sur- 
Aube and Troyes, hastening back to the capital witli the ut- 
most precipitation ; a plain demonstration (if any were want- 
ing) that superiority of manoeuvring, as well as of force, was 
in his adversaries' scale. 

Tiie Prince Marshal continued his march without inter- 
ruption: his head-quarters were established at Colomiers; the 
sixth corps arrived at Moison : Count Pahlen's cavalry and 
the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg, who were sent to turn the 
enemy's right, followed one part of the corps before us, which 
seemed now^ to have separated, to Crecy; while Generals 
D'Yorck and Kleist pushed the other by advancing from La 
Ferte Gauchere to Meaux, where they secured the passage 
of the Marne for Marshal Blucher's army. The 5th corps 
took up its ground near Chailley ; the third at Mercelon, and 
the cavalry of the guard, the guards, and reserves, at Colo- 
miers. 

Marshal Blucher's head-quarters were now at La Ferte 
Jouarre ; and his army passed the Marne, which it was ex- 
pected the grand army would do at Lagny ; thus concentrating 
nearly their whole force on the right bank of the river, and 
taking position on tlie heights above Paris. I was ignorant 
of the motives that might have directed the corps of tlie 
enemy in our front: whether a part had fallen back to form 
a noyau to les gardes nationalcs at Paris, with which they 
might attempt to defend the passage of the Marne; or 



IK GERM.UvTY AND F^A^XE. 211 

whether they were moving by Provina to join Buonaparte, 
remained yet to be seen. 

\Vhatever the ultimate result of the operations in progress 
might be, however brilliant they might appear, the sovereigns 
who were present, and the Prince Marshal wlio led these 
armies, had the proud and consoling reflection, that by their 
intrepid manoeuvres, they pursued the true interests and 
glory of their countries, their people, and the great cause 
they had resolved to bring to an issue : that issue, after such 
a decision, rested with Providence. 

On tlie 28th the grand allied army, and that of Silesia, con- 
tinued their advance to Paris. The sixth corps, the Austrian 
grenadiers, the guards and reserves, and the cavalry of the 
Grand-Duke Constantine, took up their ground in the neigh- 
borhood of Conilly and Manteriel. The third corps was this 
day at Moison, and the fifth remained at Chailley, with the 
advanced-guard in the direction of La Ferte Gauchere, ob- 
serving the routes of Sezanne and Provins ; the head-quarters 
were established at Quincy. The passage of the Marne at 
Meaux was effected by the sixth corps with little resistance. 
Part of Marshal Mortier's corps, under the immediate com- 
mand of General Vincent, who retired through that place, 
broke down the bridge in their retreat, and delayed the allies 
in their pursuit. About 10,000 of the national guards, mixed 
^vith some old soldiers, endea^'ored to make a feeble stand 
before the army of Silesia, between La Ferte Jouarre and 
Meaux; but General Korf gallantly placing himself at the 
head of some squadrons of cavalry, attacked and pierced a 
mass of infantry, drove them from their position, and took 
tlio French commander prisoner. The passage of the river 
WIS also disputed at Tressort, where the army of the Marshal 
})assed ; but notwithstanding the iire of the enemy, the bridge 
Vv'Ms soon re])aired, and the whole of this army passed the 
Marne on the iOth, The French, on their retreat from Meaux, 
cau-sod a magazine of powder, of an immense extent, to be 
blown up, without giving the slightest information to the in- 
habitants of the town, who expected instant destruction from 
the explosion. Not a window in the town but was shivered 
to atoms ; and great damage was done to every Jiouse, and 
to the magnificent cathedral. 

The corps of Generals D'Yorck and Kleist advanced on tiro 
I3d to Claye : the corps of General Langcron was on their 
right, General Sacken's in reserve, and that of General Wo- 
ronzoft' in tlie rear, at Meaux. Various bridges were con- 
structed on the Marne to enable the grand army to file over 
in diflbrent columns. 

As soon as the passage was effected, the allied armies, 



212 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

which had abandoned their communications, immediately 
opened others more advantageous, considering tije exhausted 
state of the country which they had left. 

It must always be distressing to great armies to be without 
direct communications, and to depart from the base of their 
operations : but the line of Brussels, the Low Countries, and 
along the coast, would now afford so many facilities, that from 
the moment of the passage of the river, I conceived the 
armies might be deemed in security. It was not improbable 
that Buonaparte would attempt, by an operation on the rear 
of the allies, by Chateau-Thierry, or some other point, to act 
in the above direction : but it would have been hazardous 
in the face of the army of the Prince of Sweden, and of 
that in Holland. General Bulow's corps blockaded Soissons, 
and was in march towards the Marne. This movement af- 
forded additional security. General Winzingerode, who had 
followed Buonaparte's rear towards St. Dizier, was assailed 
on the evening of the 26th, and the morning of the 27th, 
by a very preponderating force of the enemy, especially of 
infantry. The details of the affair are not of great moment, 
but it appeared that the general was obliged to retreat in the 
direction of Bar-le-Duc. 

From the most recent reports, Buonaparte was himself at 
St. Dizier on the 27th, and it was said that his advanced 
guard was at Vitry : it thus appeared that he was marching 
after the allies, or directing himself on the Marne. 

- Paris was now to be summoned, and the appeal was to be 
made, not as conquerors, but as deliverers, implying a deter- 
mination to support the wish of the nation. The Emperor of 
Russia, without the ministers of England and Austria, who 
were left in the rear of the army, was of course supreme ; 
and it is but justice to say, that the determination and bold- 
ness of the enterprise of the march on Paris was mainly his 
own. When he decided on the advance, the Emperor of 
Austria and the allied ministers remained behind, as before 
stated, and there was no prospect of communication with 
them until the crisis was over. Paris was to be occupied as 
under a secret treaty, which it vvas said had been made. A 
report was prevalent that Buonaparte had left his own army, 
and by a rapid movement had reached Paris in person ; but 
this did not turn out to bo correct. 

The allies were very anxious for a disembarkation of troops, 
liowever small, in Normandy, from Jersey. All the prisoners 
in that quarter, near 20,000, would, it was supposed, join 
them. 

Reports of Sir R. Hill bouig at Bourdeaux, and the white 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 213 

cockado having been hoisted, were now prevalent, but there 
was no official news of it. 

A very interesting intercepted letter from the Empress to 
Buonaparte was at this period shown to me, in which, after 
expressing great affection, she states the effect which his 
late victories had produced at Paris ; and ends by relating an 
anecdote of the king of Rome having a dream, in which he 
cried most bitterly, calling frequently on his papa; and when 
lie awoke and was questioned as to the cause, no entreaty or 
threat would induce him to give the smallest explanation, or 
reveal the nature of his dream. This made the child very 
melancholy, and the Empress partook of it, though she rode 
daily in the Bois de Boulogne. It is quite certain that no 
princess ever performed the various conflicting duties of her 
situation so admirably as the Empress Maria Louisa. What- 
ever sacrifices she made to what was considered her country's 
welfare at the period of her alliance with Napoleon, from 
tiiat period during the remainder of her reign she acquitted 
herself in the most trying circumstances as Empress of 
France, as a wife, and as a mother, in a manner that must 
hand her name down to posterity as a character of the first 
order. 

On the 28th, in the evening, a very sharp affair occurred 
at Claye, between General D'Yorck's corps and the enemy's 
rear. The ground the latter were posted on was very favor- 
able for defence, and in a very severe tiraillade the Prussians 
lost some hundreds of men ; but the enemy were driven bacli 
at all points. 

On the 29th, the army of Silesia, leaving a corps on the 
IMarne, was directed with its right to advance on the great 
road from Soissons to Paris. General Langeron was on the 
right near the village of Villapanto, Generals D'Yorck and 
Kleist were on the left, and Generals Sacken and Woronzoff 
in their rear. The sixth corps passed Triport, and reached 
Bondy and the heights of Pantin at night. The fourth corps 
crossed at Meaux, with the guards, the reserves, and the 
cavalry. The former were immediately directed to gain the 
high road from Lagny to the capital, and to take post on the 
heights of Chelles : the third corps was to support the fourth ; 
the fifth moved to Meaux, and remained on the left of the 
INIarne, having its cavalry at Crecy and Colomiers. 

On the advance of the sixth corps to Villeparisis, some re- 
sistance was made ; and as it was necessary to relieve Gene- 
rals D'Yorck and Kleist, to enable them to move to the right, 
a cessation of hostilities for four hours was agreed upon by 
mutual consent. This delay prevented the march forward 
being so rapid as it otherwise w'ould have been. The army 



214 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

this night had their right in a position towards Montmartre, 
and their left near the wood of Vincennes. 

After a brilliant victory on the 30th, it pleased Providence 
to place the capital of the French empire in the hands of the 
allied sovereio-ns ; a just retribution for the miseries inflicted 
on Moscow, Vienna, Madrid, Berlin, and Lisbon, by the deso- 
later of Europe. 

It would be injustice not to declare, that if the continent 
had so long borne the scourge of usurpation under the iron 
sway of Buonaparte, it was also crowned with the blessing 
of possessing amongst its legitimate sovereigns one who, by 
a firm and glorious conduct, richly deserved the appellation 
of the liberator of mankind. This sovereign I have no hesi- 
tation at this moment in denominating the Emperor Alexan- 
der ; for it is impossible to estimate too highly his energies 
and noble conduct in the short campaign from the Rhine to 
Paris. 

The enemy's army, under the command of Joseph Buona- 
parte, aided by Marshals Marmont and Mortier, occupied 
with their right the heights of Fontenay, Romainville, and 
Belleville ; their left was on Montmartre, and they had seve- 
ral redoubts in the centre, and an immense artillery along 
the whole line. 

In order to attack this position the army of Silesia was di- 
rected on St. Denis, Montmartre, and the villages of La Vil- 
lette and Pantin, while the grand army attacked the enemy's 
right on the heights before mentioned. Marshal Blucher 
made his own dispositions for his attack : the sixth corpp, 
under General Riefski, moved from Bondy in three columns, 
supported by the guards and reserves, and leaving the great 
road of Meaux, they attacked the heights of Romainville and 
Belleville. (These as well as Montmartre are strong positions : 
the ground between is uneven and covered with villages and 
country-seats, and their possession commanded Paris and the 
country round.) Prince Eugene of Wirtemburg's division 
of the sixth corps commenced the attack, and with the great- 
est steadiness endured for a long period a very galling fire of 
artiller3^ The division was supported by the reserves of grena- 
diers; and after some loss the heights of Romainville were 
carried, the enemy retiring to those of Belleville. The fourth 
corps, under their gallant commander, the Prince Royal of 
Wirtemburg, were engaged in tlie attack more to the left, di- 
rected a.gainst the heiglits of Bourg and Charonne: the eighth 
corps was placed in echelon near Neuilly-sur-Marne in re- 
serve, as well as the cavalry. 

The attack of the grand army had commenced some short 
period before that of Silesia (delayed by some accident); but 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 215 

it was not long- before Generals D'Yorck and Kleist de- 
bouched near St. Denis on Aubervilliers. Here and at Pantin 
a most obstinate resistance was made. His Royal Highness 
Prince William of Prussia with his brigade, together with 
some Prussian guards, much distinguished themselves. The 
enemy's cavalry attempted to charge, but were brilliantly 
repulsed by the Brandenburg and black hussar regiments. 

A strong redoubt and battery of the enemy's in" their cen- 
tre kept General D'Yorck's corps in check for some part of 
the day. 

The enemy's right flank having been gained by the heights 
of Belleville, their great loss in every part of the field, and 
their complete discomfiture on all sides, reduced them to the 
necessity of sending a flag of truce to demand a cessation 
of hostilities, they agreeing to give up all the ground with- 
out the barriers of Paris until further arrangements should 
be made. 

The heights of Montmartre were to be placed by the stated 
generosity of a beaten enemy in our possession (Romainville 
and Belleville having been carried) at the very moment 
Count Ijangeron's corps was about to storm them, and had 
already got possession of the crest of the hill. 

General VVoronzofF's division also carried the village of 
La Villette, charging with two battalions of chasseurs : they 
took twelve pieces of cannon, and were only stopped at the 
barrier of Paris, which they had forced, by the flag of truce. 
However, the Emperor of Russia, the king of Prussia, and 
Prince Schwartzenberg, with that humanity which must ex- 
cite the admiration of Europe, acceded to a proposition to 
prevent the city of Paris from being sacked and destroyed. 
Count Orloff, aide-de-camp to the Emperor, and Count Paar, 
aide-de-camp to Prince Schwartzenberg, were sent to arrange 
the cessation of hostilities; and Count Nesselrode, His Impe- 
rial Majesty's minister, went into Paris to hold a conference 
with the constituted authorities at five o'clock the same 
evening, as soon as the battle ceased. 

The results of this victory could not yet be known: numer- 
ous pieces of artillery, and a large number of prisoners, fell 
into our hands. Our loss was considerable ; but we had the 
consolatory hope that the brave men who fell had shared in 
accomplishing the downfall of despotism, and had assisted in 
rearing the standard of renovated Europe, about to return 
to its just equilibrium, and the dominion of its legitimate 
sovereigns. 

I feel it impossible to convey an accurate idea, or a just 
description of the scene that presented itself on the 31st in 
the capital of the French empire, when the Emperor of Rus- 



216 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

sia, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwartzenberg, made 
their entry at the head of the allied troops. 

The enthusiasm and exultation generally exhibited must 
have very far exceeded what the most sanguine and devoted 
friend of the ancient dynasty of France could have ventured 
to hope ; and those who were less personally interested, but 
equally ardent in that cause, could no longer hesitate in pro- 
nouncing that the restoration of their legitimate king, the 
downfall of Buonaparte, and the desire of peace, had become 
the first and dearest wish of the Parisians, who had by the 
events of the last two days been emancipated from a system 
of terror and anarchy which it is impossible to describe, and 
from a state of ignorance of what was passing around them, 
in which they had been hitherto kept by the arts of falseh«x)d 
and deceit, almost incredible to an enlightened people, and 
incomprehensible to the reflecting part of mankind. 

The cavalry under His Imperial Highness the Grand-Duke 
Constantine, and the guards of all the allied forces, were 
formed into columns early in the morning on the road from 
Bondy to Paris. The Emperor of Russia, with all his staff, 
his generals, and the suites present, proceeded to Pantin, 
where the King of Prussia joined him with a similar cortege. 
The sovereigns, surrounded by all the princes and generaLs 
in the army, together with the Prince Field Marshal and the 
Austrian etat-major, passed through the barrier of Paris, and 
entered the Fauxbourg St. Martin about eleven o'clock, the 
Cossacks of the guard forming the advance of the march. 
The crowd was already so great, and the acclamations were 
so general, that it was difficult to move forward ; but before 
the monarchs reached the Porte St. Martin to turn on the 
boulevards, it was next to impossible to proceed. All Paris 
seemed to be assembled and concentrated on one spot; one 
mind and one spring evidently directed their movements. 
They thronged in such masses around the Emperor and the 
King, that notwithstanding their condescending and gracious 
familiarity shown by extending their hands on all sides, it 
was in vain to attempt to satisfy the populace, who made the 
air resound with the cries of "Vive I'Empereur Alexandre! 
Vive le Roi de Prusse ! Vivent nos Liberateurs !" Nor were 
these cries alone heard ; for with louder acclamations, if pos- 
sible, they were mingled with those of " Vive le Roi ! Vive 
Ijouis XVIII. ! Vivent les Bourbons ! A has le tyran !" The 
white cockmle appeared very generally, and many of the 
national guards wljom I saw Vv'ore them. 

This clamorous applause of the multitude was seconded by 
a similar demonstration from the higher classes, who occupied 
the w^indows. and terracen of the houses along the line to the 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 217 

Champs Elysees. In short, to form an idea of such a mani- 
festation of public feeling- as the city of Paris displayed, it 
must have been witnessed, for no description can convey any 
conception of it. 

The sovereigns halted in the Champs Elysees, where the 
troops passed before them in the most admirable order ; and 
the head-quarters were now established at Paris. 

I ought here, perhaps, to close this narrative : the objects 
of the war were established ; the standards of the allies were 
planted on the walls of Paris ; and Napoleon's political ex- 
istence, at the same moment, was terminated. In my further 
short resume I shall therefore merely add a few general ob- 
servations that may be interesting, by way of explanation. 
Buonaparte moved his army from Troyes by Sons towards 
Fontainebleau, where the debris of Marshals Marmont's and 
Mortier's corps joined hira. He arrived in person at Fro- 
menteau (three quarters of a post from Paris) on the 30th, and 
would have been there that evening had not the capitulation 
secured it to the allies. On learning what had occurred, he 
retired to Corbeil, collecting his army in the neighborhood of 
Fontainebleau ; and it could not amount to more than 50,000 
men. That he might make a desperate attempt was still 
possible, provided the army stood by him ; but the senate 
and the nation now declared against him. The allied armies, 
with the exception of the guards and reserves, who remained 
at Paris, marched towards Fontainebleau, and were to be 
regulated by the movements of Buonaparte. 

The emperor of Russia and his minister, Count Nesselrode, 
together with M. d'Arnstedt, and General Pozzo di Borgo, 
now formed a cabinet, in whose hands the great arrangements 
of negotiation seemed chiefly to lie ; and I must do them jus- 
tice in finding fault with nothing but the preponderance which 
this state of things made visible. Prince Schwartzenberg, by 
nature easy and complying, had, to all outward appearance, 
given up the command of the array, except indeed nominally ; 
and as Prince Metternich did not arrive in the commence- 
ment, to supply in ability and talents what the other wanted 
in firmness and management, I am not sure whether things 
did not turn out altogether for the best. It seemed, indeed, 
almost like a merciful dispensation, that the Emperor of Aus- 
tria should have been separated from the head-quarters at 
such a moment, and thus prevented from witnessing the hu- 
miliation of a daughter, a son-in-law, and a grandson. 

The emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia dined on 
the 31st incognito with M. de Talleyrand. The latter was 
some time before he took his decision ; but he did it in the end 
in a most decided manner. The proclamation directing the 

T 



218 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

formation of a provisional government was hardly sufficiently 
known at this juncture to judge of its effects. M. de Talley- 
rand was to be at the head of this government. M. Barthele- 
my, the Due d'Alberg, and some others, were to be members. 
M. de Caulaincourt was at Paris during the battle of the 30th. 
The following morning he came out certainly in a most unac- 
countable manner to the Emperor of Russia at Bondy, with 
the deputation from the municipality, who presented them- 
selves to make arrangements for the occupation of the town. 
I was sorry that the Emperor thought proper to receive M. de 
Caulaincourt. At the interview, I learnt that he declared he 
would sign the Chatillon project, or any other, immediately. 
No answer was given to this offer. He then stated that lie 
did not come in the character of minister of foreign affairs, 
but as one of the municipality of Paris. Prince Schwartzen- 
berg afterwards saw him. It seemed that M. de Talleyrand, 
who was personally a friend of M. de Caulaincourt's, had 
been endeavoring to keep him with the party of the new gov- 
ernment, and to make him remain at Paris, as he was con- 
sidered a man of considerable influence and interest, and amia- 
ble, and well-meaning, in regard to promoting a peace. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

Emisearies of Napoleon — Opinion of the Due de Vicenza — Deliberations of 
the senate — Desertion of Marshal Moncey — Lord Wellington at Toulouse 
— Great battle — Abdication of Buonaparte pronounced by the senate — 
Direction of affairs by the Emperor Alexander — Absence of the English 
minister — and of the Bourbons — Anecdotes of the Emperor of Russia's 
conduct — New government — Appointment of French ministers — Deser- 
tion of Marmont and his army — followed by Kellermann, Victor, Nan- 
aoiity— Efforts to form a regency for the king of Rome— Offer of Elba and 
a pension to Napoleon— Declaration of the Emperor Alexander in favor 
of the Bourbons — Napoleon accepts the terms proposed — Abandoned by 
his officers — His army directed towards Paris — Colonel Lowe sent with 
dispatches to England — Considerations of the policy adopted towards 
Napoleon — Bold tone assumed by Russia — Concessions of the other powers 
— Alarmof Austria— Influence of Great Britain— Policy of Prince Metter- 
nich — Opposition to the designs of Russia — Appeal to a Congress at 
Vienna. 

Paris was now quite tranquil ; and notwithstanding seve- 
ral of Buonaparte's eniL^.-xjries were in tlie city endeavoring to 
work on the people witli money and promises to rise on 
the allies, no instance of disorder occurred. 

So much did M. Caulaincourt nt length despair of the pos*- 
eibility of Buonaparte's return, tliat he sounded M. de Talley- 
rand and the Due d'Alberg as to tlis mlention of the allies 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 2l9 

with regard to his Emperor's fiittire lot, as he considered him 
a lost man. The senate met to deliberate and to pronounce 
their decision ; but since the declaration of the Emperor Alex- 
ander in the name of the allies, they had but one course to 
adopt, which was to declare Buonaparte hors de la loi. 

The national guards, who had been commanded by Marshal 
INIoncey, were without a leader, he having fled. Comit Mont- 
morenci remained, and what part he would take was yet un- 
certain. The brother-in-law to the late General Moreau was 
mentioned as likely to be placed at the head of the national 
guards; but hitherto every arrangement was necessarily in- 
complete. 

A report now arrived by a letter from Toulouse, of a great 
battle having been fought on the 23d ult. between Lord Wel- 
lington and Marshal Soult, in which the latter had been com- 
pletely defeated, and driven into Toulouse, with only one 
piece of artillery left. 

The decision of the senate, who met on the 1st of April, de- 
clared, that as Napoleon Buonaparte had deserted the govern-- 
ment of France, they felt themselves called upon to choose 
another chief; and that they were unanimous in calling to 
the throne their legitimate sovereign, Louis XVIIL 

The management of every new measure undoubtedly lay 
with the Emperor of Russia and the confidential cabinet which 
he had formed. Count Nesselrode, at no time very indepen- 
dent, fell somewhat into the hands of M. de Talleyrand, aa 
well as General Pozzo di Borgo : the latter was now the per- 
son accredited by his Imperial Majesty to the provisional gov- 
ernment of France ; a man of consummate ability, but not yet 
of sufficient weight in Paris to afford any check to the mode 
of proceeding of the new French ministers. 

It was to be lamented that the English secretary of state 
for foreign affairs by accidental occurrences had been thrown 
out of the way of affording that invaluable benefit which his 
presence at this crisis could not have failed to produce. The 
provisional government were now endeavoring, and straining 
every nerve to consolidate their power ; in which they suc- 
ceeded so effectually, that on the arrival of Louis XVIII. or 
his representative, it seemed as if he would find himself only 
the shadow of a king, dependent on these people, and mixed 
up with their proceedings. Every office in the government 
was filling up ; the constitution was to be formed precisely as 
the provisional government pointed out ; and the senate and 
corps legislatif were to declare it, the new government to 
approve it, and it was to be presented to the King for liis ac- 
ceptance. Buonaparte had managed every thing by his im- 
mense military power and the satellites appertaining to it, 



220 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

and M. de Talleyrand was no doubt endeavoring to become 
as absolute as a minister as the circumstances of the times 
enabled him. 

It was now of the first importance that Monsieur, or some 
one of the royal family, should arrive in the capital with the 
least possible delay ; as a surveillance over the measures of 
the new government, and some immediate control, became 
essentially necessary for the satisfaction of the great majority 
of the people of France, and the successful issue of the cause 
of the Bourbons. It became the more essential, because it 
was evident that the Emperor of Russia's policy was tliat of 
ingratiating himself with the nation, rather than making any 
public or manifest declaration of any wishes relative to Louis 
the XVIII. Of this there occurred a remarkable instance, 
which was subsequently much discussed. When the Em- 
peror of Russia received the deputation of the senate, his 
declaration relative to the release of the French prisoners 
was made to them alone, and at their instance, when it af- 
forded so favorable an opportunity to have done this popular 
act in the name of their legitimate monarch. 

This anecdote, coupled with others, gave rise to conjectures 
as to whether the Emperor had not some secret designs ; and 
his conduct since his arrival at Paris had been carried on 
with so much address, that it was incalculable what influence 
he had obtained over the Parisian character. The allies, and 
Great Britain in particular, had little more to hope for from 
the actual provisional government than the commencement 
of a new order of things; whereas, if the ancient govern- 
ment of the Bourbons had been at first re-established, they 
would have had every thing to expect, and there would have 
been less of that intrigue, ambition, and personal animosity, 
which so much governed the present proceedings of the 
capital. 

It was universally known that the persons whom M. de 
Talleyrand protected could now be employed in any situations 
they pointed out. In the provisional government, every man, 
except the Abbe de Montesquieu, was devoted to M. de Tal- 
leyrand. M. Caulajncourt would have been included by M. 
de Talleyrand in his arrangement, if he could have prevailed 
on him to desert Napoleon ; but after a good deal of negotia- 
tion, Caulaincourt remained firm. M. de Jaucourt was no 
doubt a sensible man, but M. de Talleyrand's interest made 
him a senator, and afterwards a chamberlain ; he was there- 
fore entirely under his control, as was also General Bour- 
nonville, who was a man of less consequence. M. de Bar- 
theleniy was equally devoted to M. de Talleyrand : and the 



m GERMAXY AXD FRAXCE. 221 

Abbe Louis, another dependant of his, was appointed a min- 
ister of finance. 

Three senators, who were Dutchmen, three Italians, and 
one or two Germans, who were introduced when Holland, 
Italy, and part of Germany were provinces of France, still 
remained, taking- part in the deliberations. This gave offence ; 
and there was much observation on the subject of their being 
now permitted to remain. 

Two articles appeared in the Moniteur, and other papers, 
at this time, which afforded much discussion, and tended to 
create suspicions injurious to the allies: one was the account 
of the rupture of the negotiations at Chatillon of the 18th of 
March, by which it appeared that if Buonaparte had accepted 
the projet of the allies, we should have treated with him : 
the other was Lord Wellmgton's proclamation, dated Febru- 
ary 2d, relative to the Bourbons. It was asked, and justly, 
how such different measures were to be reconciled. 

The revolution certainly appeared to be carrying forward 
with a degree of tranquillity very unaccountable ; and the 
different appointments in the government, those of General 
Dessolles to be governor-general of Paris, and commandant 
of the national guard, and of General Dupont to be minister 
of war, were very highly approved : M. de Malhouet, minis- 
ter of the marine, was also a good appointment. 

In an accidental conversation I had with M. de Talleyrand 
at this period, he told me that steps were taking to communi- 
cate with all the armies and the fortresses. He believed 
strongly in a movement among tlie troops favorable to the 
new order of things. Marmont and Le Fevre were the mar- 
shals who it was thought would declare first. On the other 
Iiand, it was said Buonaparte had an immense number of 
emissaries in Paris. M. Girardin, Marshal Berthier's aide- 
de-camp, was in the city with large sums of money at his 
disposal: some hundreds of the old guard had been introduced 
into Paris to head an insurrection, and Buonaparte w^as deter- 
mined, at any risk, de sefaire jour dans Paris. 

These various histories amused the alarmists of the day ; 
but an excessive tranquillity, and even indifference, reigned 
around. Much of this, it appeared to me, would have ceased 
if there had been on the spot some individuals who were free 
from all the guilt and suspicion which twenty-five years of 
revolution had more or less fixed on all those who were now 
carrying on the government. 

Upon a communication which was now made to Marshal 
Marmont, he consented to pass over with his wliole corps 
d'ormee, amounting to between 9 and 10,000 men, and emol 
himself and his followers in the cause of their legitimate 

T2 



222 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

sovereign. He stipulated two principal conditions : the one, 
that Buonaparte's person, if taken, should not be sacrificed : 
the other, that if in his march he should be attacked, the al- 
lied troops were to support him. This very favorable event, 
so decidedly denoting the downfall of the last hopes of Buo- 
naparte, proclaimed the peace of the world to be accom- 
plished. Marshals Victor, Nansouty, Kellermann, and several 
other officers of note in Paris, then declared themselves in 
favor of the good cause. The allied army remained in position 
at Chevilly. 

The army of Silesia experienced at this juncture, by the 
illness of its gallant and veteran leader, an irreparable loss ; 
but it was hoped that he would speedily be restored to such 
a state of health as would enable him to enjoy the laurels 
which encircled his brow. 

General Barclay de Tolly was placed at the head of the 
army of Silesia, with General Diebitsch as chief of his staff! 
General Gnisenau succeeded to General Knesebeck's situa- 
ation near the King of Prussia, the latter officer having been 
left sick at Chaumont. 

Marshals Ney and Macdonald, and M. de Caulaincourt 
next arrived in Paris, for the purpose of endeavoring to treat 
for some sort of terms regarding the future fate and existence 
of Buonaparte. Great efforts were made to place Buona- 
parte's son on the throne of France, with a council of re- 
gency ; but this was most peremptorily rejected. Negotiationy 
for a peace were carrying on with the army on the base of 
assuring to Buonaparte specific terms, and also providing for 
many others. 

The conferences which the French marshals now had, 
both collectively and separately, with the Emperor of Russia, 
led to the determination to offer Buonaparte the island of 
Elba, as a retreat, with an income of six millions of francs, 
three millions for himself and Maria Louisa, and three to be 
divided between his brothers and sisters. 

M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Ney were very urgent 
and persevering in their endeavors to obtain a regency, Buo- 
naparte having abdicated with that view. The Emperor of 
Russia was, however, firm, and gained over Marshal Mac- 
donald (Marmont having been before secured). His Imperial 
Majesty declared that the allies had already announced they 
would not negotiate with Napoleon Buonaparte or any of hia 
family, and that they were determined by the voice of the 
nation to proclaim the restoration of I^ouis XVIII. 

Napoleon Buonaparte at length accepted the terms offered 
by the allies for his future existence and that of his family. 

The exit of this individual from the stasfe where he had so 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 223 

long exhibited, was marked by a degradation which his career 
had in some measure deservedly entailed upon him. Provi- 
dence seemed to have taught the nations of the world a lesson 
winch future ages would do well to record ; and the events 
of the French revolution, connected with that of 1814, will 
hand down to posterity an awful and an instructive example. 
Marshal Ney announced that Buonaparte accepted the island 
of Elba, and the pensions granted by the bounty of the allies : 
that he was ready to proceed to such place as might be indi- 
cated ; and requested that his family might be sent to him 
without delay. 

The French army was to move to the environs of Paris. 
Every individual officer, even Berthier, left Buonaparte, wiiose 
present predicament could only deserve that pity which is 
extended by Christians to the most atrocious as well as to the 
most unfortunate of their fellow-creatures. 

I now deemed it right to send Colonel Lowe, who had been 
attached to me during the campaign, by Calais to England, 
furnishing him with copies of every official document of the 
provisional government, as well as an abstract of the act of 
the new constitution, which I received from the Prince de 
Benevento. 

So much had been done, so various were the important 
objects to consider, and so multiplied were the reasonings that 
might be brought forward on every proceeding, that I deem 
it most prudent on all these points to say little. I also dis- 
patched Colonel Cooke, at the request of M. de Talleyrand, 
with a French officer of equal rank, to the Marquess of Wel- 
lington and Marshal Soult. 

Very considerable apprehension arose, after the Emperor 
of Russia made the offer of the island of Elba to Napoleon 
Buonaparte, as to the mischief and ultimate danger that might 
accrue if he were put in possession of it. Its extreme prox- 
imity to the shores of Italy, the power and influence Buona- 
parte still had there, the popularity of Eugene Beauharnois, 
the possible tergiversation of Murat, and finally, the number 
of discontented French who might follow Buonaparte's for- 
tunes to that quarter, were adduced, together with many 
other reasons, to throw great doubt on the policy of this ar- 
rangement. If Napoleon could have possessed himself of 
Italy by any future manoeuvres, which certainly would rather 
live under his sole dominion than be parcelled out as it was 
likely to be ; if he could have carried French soldiers and 
followers into that country; if his large pension was paid 
him ; and if the other dangers I have above alluded to were 
to have been apprehended, it would no doubt have been wiser 
to have considered further before the act was irretrievable, 



224 NARRATIVE OF THE V/AR 

whether a far lesa dangerous retreat might not have been 
found, and whether Buonaparte might not bring the powder 
to the iron mines, for which the island of Elba was so famed. 
It was of the greatest moment that all this should have been 
duly weighed. The offer of such an arrangement was made 
by the Emperor Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt. M. de 
Talleyrand and the French government I heard at the time 
much disapproved of it, as well as other powers; and the 
more so, the more it was brought under consideration ; still 
it WIS ultimately arranged. 

Having stated above how much the Emperor of Russia 
seemed to assume and direct the general march of affairs at 
this juncture, and having often expressed my great personal 
respect and attachment to that monarch, I have less difficulty 
in entering a little at large into my own views of the various 
causes and different grounds which directed his actions at this 
eventful epoch. 

The Emperor undoubtedly began to presume on his suc- 
cess and popularity, and the decided influence he had gained 
over the King of Prussia, and he adopted a tone of superi- 
ority in the alliance, evmcing a determination to make the 
arrangements connected with Russian policy no longer a 
matter of fair and amicable negotiation, but one of authority 
and dictation. 

In order to soften this tone of assumption, Austria and 
Prussia, with a view to their own objects, went so far in con- 
cession to Russia in confidential communication with the Em- 
peror (as I was given to understand) as to admit the advance 
of his frontier as far as Kalisch at the general congress ; not 
meaning, however, the one to cede Thorn, or the other to 
cede Cracow or Zamoski, and not conceiving that the king- 
dom of Poland was to be revived under the Russian dynasty. 

These great overtures of concession, however, did not sat- 
isfy the Emperor, who soon announced his intentions as to 
reviving the kingdom of Poland, and of retaining Thorn, 
Cracow, and Zamoski. He privately intimated that he had 
an army of- 480,000 men ready for action ; that he must have 
Thorn ; and that he would not give a single village to Aus- 
tria. 

This tone of authority, and this resolution to retain the 
frontier fortifications commanding the roads to Berlin and Vi- 
enna, gave natural and just alarm to the two courts ; at the 
same time the concessions they had prepared themselves to 
make seemed to reduce the grounds for a new war in Eu- 
rope, from the great question of a preponderance displayed by 
Russia unsafe to other states, to the narrow question whether 
Russia should or should not possess two or three districts and 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 225 

two or three towns, more or less ; and it seemed that a new 
war originating' upon so narrow a question, would not be un- 
derstood by Europe, and would be easily misinterpreted in 
Great Britain. 

This view of the argument had also, as I believe, particu- 
lar weight in directing the King of Prussia's feelings. The 
manner of dictating on the Polish question by Russia, the 
danger to be apprehended from re-embodying the Poles un- 
der a dynasty nominally national, though really Russian, the 
advancing the Russian frontier, protected by flanking for- 
tresses and a great river, almost into the heart of Germany, 
discovered such dangerous designs, and afforded such efficient 
means for realizing them, that when the settlement of the 
Polish system and limits came into real discussion, I believe 
that the two powers began to recoil at the dangers which 
threatened them. These two powers were at the time dis- 
united in several of their other views. Russia to gain Prus- 
sia had promised Saxony to her, which Austria wished to re- 
store to her natural sovereign as a frontier to Bohemia ; and 
Austria had made private engagements to Bavaria respecting 
Mayence ; whilst Prussia was resolved that it should never 
be given to that power, but at least be a confederate city. 

Austria had been so alarmed by Russia, coupled with the 
subserviency of Prussia, and her views in Saxony, that at an 
early period she put forward the language of resistance ; but 
when she was fairly questioned on the subject, and obliged to 
compare her powers with the joint forces of Russia and Prus- 
sia, she soon abandoned her warlike tone. It was evident 
she could not hope for a successful issue by arms without in- 
viting and accepting the assistance of France ; and the dread 
of bringing again a French army across the Rhine to fight 
German battles, appeared pregnant with more fatal conse- 
quences than a submission to Russia. At the same time it 
was ascertained that regenerated France was willing to sup- 
port Austria on the Polish and Saxon question, in return fo^ 
a compromise on the Neapolitan. 

In this state of things, let me next consider what was the 
part, in my humble opinion, of the British minister. He must 
have felt the danger which threatened the adjustment of any 
equilibrium in Europe, if the Russian designs, aided by Prus- 
sia, were to be carried into effect contrary to the consent of 
Austria. It was evident, or at least feared, that the two 
powers who could dictate such arrangements must command 
in all others. He felt also equal danger, I should suppose, in 
case Austria, by similar management, should be induced to 
join in the plan, and lest it should lead to the complete sub- 
jection of Europe to a triple alliance. He felt equally the 



226 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

inexpediency of a new war, upon grounds which could be 
stated to be of very limited import, and which might not be 
generally felt or understood ; and he was sensible of the dan- 
ger of brinofinof France forward in the scene. The last ob- 
jection also made him naturally averse to any public appeal, 
because such a measure would give open grounds to France 
for interference and action. His object therefore was natu- 
rally to effect the abandonment of her designs by Russia 
through a similar kind of management ; to dissuade the Em- 
peror of Russia from perseverance in his projects by statement 
and argument; and by showing the dangers which threatened 
the two courts, to endeavor to separate Prussia from Russia, 
and to induce the former to join Austria in closer alliance ; 
under which, aided by Great Britain, and the German powers, 
they would be enabled to form a complete barrier against 
Russia on one side, and France on the other. I have reason 
to think the efforts of British councils with Prussia had an 
early appearance of being attended with complete success. 
The Prussian minister seemed cordial and decided ; but wlicn 
this progress towards the alliance had shown advances to 
maturity, the influence of the Emperor of Russia over the 
mind of the King of Prussia induced him to overthrow the 
scheme. 

The statements made to the Emperor of Russia had the 
effect of obliging him to lower his pretensions, and accede, 
in appearance at least, to the principle of negotiation; but 
from the security the Emperor felt in the King of Prussia's 
personal adherence to him, the advantages to be hoped by 
negotiation soon vanished ; for the Emperor considered him- 
self as secure of carrying his plans by negotiation as by mere 
authority. 

If the Prussian minister, whose sincerity was believed, 
had been cordially supported by his monarch, there was every 
reason to conclude that such a plan as I have detailed, if aided 
by a British minister, would have succeeded. Had Austria 
and Prussia reconciled their points of difference to the great 
consideration of limiting Russian encroachment, forming a 
barrier agamst her, and maintaining the balance of power in 
Europe, there can be little doubt but the plan above stated 
must, as has been affirmed, have completely succeeded. Rus- 
sia could not have ventured singly to contend against Austria, 
Prussia., and Great Britain, Bavaria, Holland, Hanover, Hesse, 
&c., when united against her, aided by the general voice of 
Europe. 

The Emperor of Russia still persevered in his designs; but 
with the pretence of satisfying tlie jealousies of his allies, he 
made a merit of offering that Thorn and its Rayon, Cracow 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 227 

and its Rayon, should be neutralized, Prussia getting the 
whole of Saxony ; while Austria, from dread of war, felt a 
disposition to lend herself to the Polish point, provided she 
might restore the King of Saxony to his capital, and to that 
part of his dominions bordering on Austria. 

It is obvious that this arrangement would not have sub- 
stantially varied the state of things. Russia would have car- 
ried her frontier triumphantly near to the banks of the Oder ; 
Prussia would have been proved to be a mere vassal ; and 
Austria an intimidated power. The equilibrium of Europe 
would have been still lost, for a time at least, under Russian 
preponderance : it therefore occurred that a new effort ought 
to be made, and that the least objectionable mode of making 
such an effort was by an armed mediation of Great Britain, 
France, and Holland, possibly joined by other powers, for 
settling the points in discussion between Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia. 

The advantages of this position were : 1st. It was a measure 
not of war, but preventive of war. 

2d. If war should ensue, it made the ground of it intelligi- 
ble and popular to all Europe, by the open refusal of Russia 
to admit of fair arrangement. 

8d. It brought forward France in the best manner in which 
she could be brought forward as a mediating, not an invading 
power, for the accomplishment of a just settlement. 

4th. It gave such immense accession of strength to Austria 
as would probably have intimidated Prussia by destroying all 
her hopes of getting the whole of Saxony, and of extending 
her possessions to the Rhine, and beyond it, by force ; and it 
would also have induced her to abandon at once the cause of 
Russia, and join the cause of Europe. 

When, however, this suggestion was opened to M. de Met- 
ternich, which I understood was the case, he recoiled at the 
very idea of bringing France into action, even as a mediator 
under the control of Great Britain ; he felt still some hopes 
that a relaxation would be admitted on the Saxon point, so as 
to give an escape to Austria, without the entire loss of her 
respectability and dignity. He thought another tentative 
might be made, and of course the above proposal was dropped. 
It could only be successful if embraced with cordiality and 
spirit by Austria; and in a case, where Austrian interests 
and security were pressing and immediate, and those of Great 
Britain more problematical and distant, it was the duty of the 
British minister to show a readiness to act if required, but by 
no means to force a reluctant feeling, or obtrude an unac- 
ceptable line of policy. 

A new tentative was accordingly now thought of by Prince 



228 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Hardenberg upon a joint proposal of the two courts confined 
to the Polish question. Tliorn, with the line to the Wartha, 
was demanded for Prussia ; and Cracow and its districts to 
the Nidda and Zamoski, with its territory, for Austria. To 
this overture the Emperor of Russia signified that he was 
resolved not to recede from his pretensions as to the duchy of 
Warsaw : but that as Thorn and Cracow had been considered 
as aggressive points, he would consent that Thorn and its 
Rayon, Cracow and its Rayon, should be formed into inde- 
pendent cities, and be made like Hanseatic cities, with inde- 
pendent privileges ; but upon these conditions, as a sine qua 
non, that in consideration of the concession made as to 
Thorn and Cracow, the integrity of Saxony should be simul- 
taneously confirmed to Prussia, and Mayence be made a city 
of the confederation of Germany, to be garrisoned by confede- 
rate troops. 

In announcing this determmation to Prince Metternich, 
Prince Hardenberg, whilst he expressed his acquiescence in 
it, and whilst he considered it as preferable not only to any 
quarrel, but even to any coldness with Russia, suggested the 
possibility that Cracow and Thorn might be possibly ceded, 
the one to Prussia, the other to Austria, on condition of their 
not being fortified ; and he offered some small accessions to 
Austria in Silesia, in compensation for minor cessions to be 
made to Prussia in return ; and further suggested the pro- 
priety of demanding from the Emperor of Russia the nature 
of the government and constitution he intended to give to 
the kingdom of Poland, in order that the arrangements as to 
the parts of Poland still remaining to the two powers might 
be modified. From all the above considerations and data, it 
became a most delicate question to examine, whether, if the 
great powers could not be brought to agree, it would be most 
politic to bring matters to a decision, which might lead to 
arms, to a public declaration of the opinion of Europe in a 
congress, or to keep matters in suspense, and negotiation 
open for a favorable moment, and finally to manage by 
delays. 

The latter question depended much upon the principle of 
actual possession, or such possessions as might be privately 
contemplated and obtained. The great obstacle was, that 
Russia was not only in military possession of the duchy of 
Warsaw, but also of Holstein. If she could be induced to 
retire from the latter, there would be little difficulty as to 
the rest. Prussia could be arranged, and she had Saxony 
in possession ; and the longer her possession the better her 
title. Hanover was in British possession : Holland also en- 
joyed the same right. Hesse, too, was in possession ; Baden 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 229 

and Wirtemburg- nearly so ; and arrangements might be 
made with Bavaria. Austria was similarly circumstanced. 
Sardinia might take Genoa; and France, Spain and Por- 
tugal. 

In this state of things, and under all the great embarrass- 
ments and difficulties that presented themselves, the assem- 
bling of a general congress at Vienna appeared the most 
desirable arrangement. 



CHAPTER XX. 

Strictures on the project of the Emperor Alexander— dangers to be appre- 
hended from it — its extreme unpopularity— opposed by the English gov- 
ernment—Influence and preponderance of the Russian policy — High char- 
acter of Great Britain— State of aflTairs at Paris— Publicity of events 
after its occupation— Lord Burghersh's memoir— Plans of ground and 
battles— The allied sovereigns prepare to visit England— her triumphant 
efforts- Recapitulation of military events— Last struggle of Napoleon— 
His design to attack Paris— Prince Schwartzenberg assembles the allied 
army— Intrigues and treachery — Napoleon deserted by his officers and 
troops— Public festivities at Paris— Anecdotes of the day — The author 
repairs to Toulouse — The Duke of Wellington appointed ambassador at 
Paris— Napoleon presented by his marshals with the act of the senate — 
Signs the act of abdication — Departs for Elba— Peace concluded with 
France— Reception of the allied sovereigns in London — George the Fourth 
and the Emperor Alexander — Preparations for the European congress — 
Splendid military reviews — Opinion of the Duke of Wellington — Inter- 
views with the Emperor of Russia. 

Before I dismiss the consideration of the policy of the 
Emperor of Russia, as to his fixed and determined projects 
upon Poland, I cannot avoid recording that many of the sin- 
cerest friends of His Imperial Majesty regarded with deep 
anxiety and sorrow the false system which he had unfortu- 
nately adopted. He now declared his determination of pos- 
sessing himself irrevocably, in defiance of his allies, and the 
universal voice of Europe, of almost the whole duchy of 
Warsaw ; while he meant to gratify, if possible, his friend 
the King of Prussia with the kingdom of Saxony. His de- 
sign was to erect all the Polish provinces attached to the 
Russian empire into a new kingdom, to be called the king- 
dom of Poland, and to be governed by the Russian Emperor 
under a free constitution. This measure was viewed in two 
lights : first, as a mere project of Russian aggrandizement, 
giving her an accession of four millions of subjects, and in 
fact the keys of Berlin and Vienna.; and secondly, as obtain- 
ing a complete command over Prussia, and a most dangerous 
influence in Germany, rendering also the former subservient 
to Russian views as a vassal power. 

U 



230 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

The king of Prussia, by the above measures, would be 
driven to compensate the loss of his frontiers by a measure 
extremely unpopular throughout Germany; and under this 
view, the idea of a free constitution for Poland was consider- 
ed as a false pretext. It added weight to alleged projects of 
Russian ambition, by exposing the policy of the Emperor 
Alexander to the charge of duplicity, as regarded his Polish 
subjects, and of injustice to the king of Saxony. It was, 
moreover, taking uujust advantage of the King of Prussia, 
assuming a threatening attitude towards Austria, and an undue 
influence over Germany ; usurping, in short, a preponderance 
which might be fatal to Europe. This arrangement was 
viewed also on the principle that the Emperor of Russia's 
design, as to giving his new Polish kingdom a free constitu- 
tion, was sincere ; that he really intended, on the principles 
he proposed, to erect twelve millions of Poles into a distinct 
kingdom, and to separate all the Russian-Polish provinces 
from the Russian empire for that purpose; to govern that 
kingdom by a separate constitution exclusively Polish : viz. 
a Polish senate, Polish chambers of police and finance, and 
a Polish army ; all his Russian governors, employes and 
troops, to be removed within the ancient limits of Russia. 

In the event of this latter plan succeeding, the danger to 
p]urope was considered the same, if not greater at the mo- 
ment ; but it was compensated by the prospects it held out, 
that at no distant period Poland, having acquired at once free- 
dom and consistency, might, when Alexander was no more, 
become impatient of subserviency to a Russian monarch. In 
its consequent struggle it might be supported by the neigh- 
boring states in establishing its independence, by choosing a 
sovereign from among its own hereditary race of princes. 
This latter view of the subject caused, I believe, some alarm 
among His Imperial Majesty's Russian subjects, who were 
sensible of its more than possible danger, and who thought 
themselves bound in duty to resist in their monarch a project 
at once deemed dangerous and chimerical. It was, however, 
to promote this great event (as a measure of duty early im- 
posed on his conscience, and according to his own creed) that 
the Emperor was determined to act. For this he was ready 
to resign all the reputation, character and glory he had ac- 
quired ; to be no longer considered as the savior, the pacifica- 
tor of Europe, but to be looked on as a monarch who disre- 
garded treaties and engagements for an object of ambition 
and caprice; and to incur, finally, the odium of many of his 
own subjects, and defy the sentiments of Europe. 

Great Britain, from her unrelenting opposition to the plans 
of Buonaparte, had long been considered as the only remain- 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 231 

ing bulwark of the European continent ; and the success of 
her resistance, added to her immense contribution to the gene- 
ral cause, had raised her to the highest elevation of character, 
commanding the admiration and applause of the nations of 
Europe. 

The magnanimous efforts of the Emperor of Russia, his 
unparalleled firmness and constancy, his multiplied victories, 
and his unrelenting perseverance, crowned with ultimate gen- 
erosity and moderation towards France, turned aside gradual- 
ly the current of admiration from Great Britain, and directed 
the gratitude of the world as due to the Russian Emperor. 
When the settlement of France, and the treaty of Paris, came 
under discussion, it may be affirn)ed, without exaggeration, 
that the Emperor of Russia stood upon the most elevated pin- 
nacle of human grandeur that was ever attained by a mon- 
arch. The glory of Great Britain was eclipsed before him : 
but from the moment of his opening his Polish project, his 
splendor began gradually to decrease, till it almost vanished, 
and the untarnished character of Great Britain rose again to 
its former superiorit}^ 

It was at this time generally known that the minister of 
Great Britain had submitted to the Emperor a most strongly 
reasoned argument against his Polish projects ; but the se- 
quel of the congress of Vienna demonstrated what Russian 
power originally planned, Russian means were enabled, in 
spite of all t]]e efforts of Great Britain, in a great measure to 
accomplish. 

The whole tenor of the correspondence above alluded to, 
should it ever come to light, is calculated, I will venture to 
say, to raise the character of the government of Great Britain 
as the real protectress of the true equilibrium of Europe, and 
to mark the Emperor of Russia's conduct as a mere attehipt 
by the removal of French tyranny in the south to substitute 
Russian predominance in the north, and to characterize this 
spirit as founded upon the most dangerous of public principles. 

It was evident, from the tenor of the diplomacy at this 
crisis, that, from the good principles inculcated on the one side, 
and the mistaken ones vindicated on the other, the confidence 
of the continent in the British character rose in a considera- 
ble degree, so as to induce every nation to view, with dimin- 
ished jealousy, her maritime preponderance, and to consider 
their own safety as combined in the policy of supporting it; 
whilst, on tiie other hand, Russia was held up to the jealousy 
and hatred of Europe ; and every nation was induced to be- 
lieve that it was necessary for their preservation to combine 
against Russian power. As Russia, moreover, from her con- 
duct, could no longer hope to effect a combination against the 



/ 



232 NARRATH^E OF THE WAR 

maritime power of Great Britain, she was sensible that her 
kingdom was so circumstanced, in regard to commerce, and 
that her interests were so intimately connected with the con- 
sumption of British produce, that she could not interdict her 
intercourse with England without serious internal danger to 
herself. 

To revert to the state of affairs in the capital of the French 
empire : there remains little more for me to detail, as the 
public prints of the day, and the intercourse which was now 
established with England, gave the full accounts of all trans- 
actions, military and political, from the moment when the al- 
lied armies entered Paris. Besides, ample particulars are af- 
forded in an able memoir, which I have before alluded to, of 
Lord Burghersh. It winds up with accuracy and brevity the 
most important events of this period ; and I would refer my 
readers especially to the plans of ground and battles which 
it presents, and which I have not been able to procure with 
so much precision. 

The sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, attended by all the 
military heroes of the day, now prepared to embark for the 
shores of Great Britain, to gratify and render homage to the 
powerful and enlightened sovereign of that nation ; who had 
never ceased, under every conflicting disadvantage, perseve- 
ringly to oppose alike the outrageous views of jacobinism and 
the designs of despotism. 

The magnanimous efforts of the English people were at 
length justly rewarded by the interesting scenes of victory 
and triumph which the arrival of the sovereigns and warriors 
of Europe occasioned in London. 

To recapitulate, in a few words, the close of the military 
events, as far as they came within my knowledge, is all that 
now remains for me to do to wind up this humble narrative. 

It was on the 31st that Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau, 
v/hen he was joined by Marshal Marmont, whom he ordered 
to take up a defensive line at Essonne and Corbeil, which 
position he inspected himself on the following days, with a 
view of making an offensive movement on Paris. For this 
purjx)se he gave the necessary orders, and formed his dispo- 
sitions on the 5th of April. 

Prince Schwartzenberg, in consequence of the intelligence 
of Buonaparte's movement, inarched from Paris, and assem- 
bled his forces at Lanjunais. The whole of Marshal Blucher's 
and Prince Schwartzenberg's army were then collected, 
except the guards and reserves, which occupied Paris ; and 
the marshals took up their head-quarters at Chevilly. 

The negotiations and dispatching of emploijes and couriers 
here commenced ; and there was no end to the diplomacy, 



m GERMANY AND FRANCE. 233 

manoeuvring, and treachery that appeared to reign on all 
sides. But glorious as the moment was for the allies, and for 
Englishmen in particular, it was an awful lesson for ambition 
to see a mighty chief deserted, one by one, by all his great 
companions in arms, whom he had raised and called to their 
present glory ; and to witness those troops, whom he had so 
often led to victory and triumph, under the animating cries 
of Vive r Empereur, now turning from their colors, and de- 
manding only la paix et leur roi legitime ! 

In the city every demonstration of joy, luxury, and gaiety 
was exhibited. The theatres and public places, the balls, 
and the entertainments, kept the conquering armies in a 
fever ; and no soldier who witnessed the takhig possession 
of Paris could ever have pictured to himself such a scene, 
while it is impossible that it should ever be effaced from his 
memory. 

Amongst the various anecdotes of the day, I cannot help 
here inserting an extraordinary adventure and escape, which 
happened one night to myself I had been at the opera, and 
afterwards at a ball, and had returned late to the hotel de 
Montesquieu, in la rue de Monsieur, where I was fortunate 
enough to be quartered ; and here it may be observed, that 
on the entrance of the hostile armies into Paris the best hotels 
were taken possession of by the sovereigns and their suite, 
the ambassadors, general officers,. and ministers belonging to, 
or at the respective head-quarters. In these magnificent 
palaces, for some time, the new inmates lived at free quarters, 
until regularity and order became established in the capital. 
I can never forget the kindness with which I was treated at 
the hotel above mentioned, nor the hospitality and friendship 
1 received from its possessors. Returning home at two o'clock 
in the morning, as I before stated, I partook of my usual sup- 
per, which was always prepared for me, and taking off my 
hussar jacket and trappings, I threw them on my bed. On 
my pelisse I w^ore my stars and foreign orders (some of which 
I had set in diamonds). My bed-room and suite of apartments 
were on the 7'ez de chaussee, and large French folding sashes 
opened into the garden, which communicated with the boule- 
vards that surround Paris. These, owing to the heat of the 
night, were all open. On the tables in my room were my red 
dispatch boxes, containing interesting and valuable papers 
and documents, and every thing of real worth I had in the 
world. 

Disembarrassing myself of my clotlies, and overcome by 
fatigue and sleep, I got into bed, and my slumbers, fortunately, 
were profound, for when I awoke in the morning I found 
thieves, (and no doubt assassins, if I had stirred from my heavy 

U2 



234 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

sleep) had entered in the night, and had cleared the room of 
every article belonging to me ; my official boxes, uniforms, 
and clothes taken from my very bed ; my swords and pistols ; 
all my stars and orders ; and in short every thing I possessed. 
I actually found myself without the means of getting up ; for 
the commodes were also pillaged, and the whole clean carried 
off. This daring robbery made much noise at Paris at the 
moment, and every effort was tried by the police to lead to a 
discovery ; but all proved vain. I had reason to believe after- 
wards that a French valet de chambre I engaged on entering 
Paris was an accomplice, if not the chief actor in this robbery, 
from the following circumstance. 

It will be remembered that the Duke of Wellington closed 
his glorious career in the Peninsular war at the battle of 
Toulouse, after defeating Marshal Soult before that town on 
the 10th of April. After the arrangements were entirely 
completed, by the arrival of all the ministers in the city, and 
more especially by the presence of the English secretary of 
state for foreign affairs, one of the first acts of this ever-to-be 
lamented individual was to take the King's pleasure on ap- 
pointing that warrior His Majesty's representative at Paris, 
who had, with the aid and means afforded him, conquered 
peace in the Peninsula. It was my lot to receive my sove- 
reign's commands through the principal secretary of state to 
proceed to Toulouse to offer the Duke of Wellington iJie 
post of His Majesty's ambassador to His Most Christian 
Majesty. I likewise was the individual who, on a former 
occasion, delivered to my commander the insignia of the 
Order of the Garter; as the letter in the Appendix will 
show. 

I arrived at Toulouse on the evening the Duke of Wel- 
lington was engaged at the hotel de ville at a magnificent ball, 
given by the inhabitants to the British army. It will not be 
easy for me to forget that moment of my life. The embassy 
was accepted by the Duke of Wellington ; and I returned to 
Paris without rest, and (what opened my eyes to my robbery) 
without a valet de chambre. The rascal absconded at Tou- 
louse, probably in the full possession of all my interesting 
valuables, and I never heard more of him. 

But to return to more serious and important matters, anrl 
to wind up the concluding days of Napoleon's history at this 
period. It appears that after haranguing his army on the 5th 
of April, and promising them (as before mentioned) the pil- 
lage of Paris for forty-eight hours, amidst the cries of Vive 
r Empereiir, Marshal Ney and all the chief officers assembled 
round him ; when the former stepping forv/ard, at once an- 



IN GERMANS' AND FRANCE. 235 

nounfted to him that he was no longer Emperor, and present- 
ed him the act of his dethronement by the senate. 

Buonaparte appeared thunderstruck, and with violent im- 
petuosity at first seemed to resist the order of the senate. 
But no longer finding fealty among his troops, nor devotion 
in his officers, he was soon convinced of the absurdity and 
folly of resistance. 

Referring himself therefore to the direction of Marshals 
Oudinot, Victor, and Caulaincourt, he sent them to Paris, to 
m.ake the best terms for himself and his family, and to obtain 
what other objects they could for his advantage. 

Marshal Marmont's corps d'armee had passed over to the 
allies on the 4th of April ; and, as the first French general, he 
placed himself at the disposition of Louis XVIII. 

On the lltli of April Napoleon signed the formal act of 
abdication, having failed in all attempts at gainmg various 
conditions which he had attempted to negotiate. (For the 
act of treaty, see Appendix.) 

Napoleon took his departure for the island of Elba, ac- 
companied by four commissioners from each of the great 
powers, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. 

On the 25th of April the plenipotentiaries of the allied 
forces and the Count d'Artois signed a formal armistice. The 
allied armies were to evacuate France ; and, on the 30th of 
May, a definitive peace was concluded, and signed with 
Louis XVIII. 

•Such was the close of this eventful campaign, restoring 
the legitimate dynasty of the Bourbons to the throne of 
France, and rendering Germany, and indeed Europe, once 
more independent. 

Little was it supposed at this moment, when the tyranny 
of Napoleon ceased, and every fair indulgence had been 
granted to France in the terms she had received from the 
allied powers, that the flame of war was shortly to be re- 
kindled, and that the hero whose exit was believed to l)e 
eternal was shortly to reappear upon the same theatre, under 
uiore extraordinary circumstances, and seconded by a more 
powerful impulse of public feeling throughout France, and 
amongst his legions, than by any possible reasoning could 
either be accounted for or explained. 

The details of the campaign of 1815, ending with the 
glorious battle of Waterloo, with all the various interesting 
circumstances and events at the first opening of the congress 
of Vienna, are points of too mucli magnitude to be treated 
of at the close of the narrative of 1813 and 1814, which I 
have endeavored to relate. At some future period, if the 
present work, and its predecessor on the Peninsular War, 



236 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

should be approved, it may be my lot to offer to the public 
the whole account of the transactions of Vienna to which I 
was a witness, and in which I was engaged ; as also to give 
all the military details and correspondence of the different 
officers employed under me, with the Austrian and Prussian 
armies, when they again took the field on Napoleon's escape 
from the island of Elba. 

Declining for the present to enter into the great and im- 
portant events that occurred in 1815, it remains for me merely 
to state generally to my readers, which I shall presently do, 
what the military position and forces of the allied powers ap- 
peared to be for meeting another new and unexpected cam- 
paign. Hereafter I may give a farther development of the 
whole of the proceedings of the year. 

The allied sovereigns, except the Emperor of Austria, as it 
is well known, paid London a visit at the conclusion of the 
peace of Paris. Their brilliant reception, the enthusiasm 
which was demonstrated, especially in favor of the Silesian 
hero, the sumptuous and splendid entertainments that were 
exhibited by a British sovereign and his city of London, which 
in one single fete to Alexander expended 25,000/. sterling, 
are subjects so well Imown, and still so recently in the recol- 
lection of many, that it would be entirely superfluous to de- 
scribe them. I constantly accompanied my friend Marslial 
Blucher to all the feasts and diimers given to him ; and it wag 
my pride and pleasure to translate his animated speeches, 
which were always given in German, to the public company. 

Two other points, also, I wish to record, as deeply rooted 
in my memory. I was the only individual present, when I 
saw England's king clothe his august ally, the Emperor of 
Russia, with the robes of the garter. 

The graceful manner and indescribable amiability with 
which the one performed his task, and the difficult and awk- 
ward mode in which the other ultimately managed to get 
into and put on the magnificent paraphernalia, cannot easily 
be forgotten; indeed the scene surpassed description. 

Again ; it was on the steps at the fete at Guildhall that I 
knelt dowm and kissed my sovereign's hand on his appointing 
me his ambassador to the court of Vienna, and at the same 
moment nominating me one of his lords of the bed-chamber ; 
a ch'cumstancc entirely unlocked for and unexpected by me. 

These appointments carried to my mind the grateful reflec- 
tion that I had done, my duty. 

Afler the series of brilliant rejoicings in England, the sove- 
reigns returned to Paris, preparatory to repairing to Vienna, 
and making arrangements for the European congress that was 
to be assembled. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 237 

It would be wrong m me, however, to o^'erlook, without 
comment, the two great military reviews and manoeuvres that 
took place in France previous to the allied troops withdrawmg 
from their cantonments within that country ; namely, those of 
all the Russian forces at Vertu, and subsequently of the Aus- 
trians at Dijon. 

The concentration of two such immense masses of foreign 
force in two very small champs de parade, in the midst of the 
French empire, will, it is hoped, remain a useful memento of 
the vicissitudes of war to French vanity, and a glorious re 
cord of European valor. 

It was either on the 9th or 10th of September, 1814, that I 
left Paris, to witness the great review of the Russian army, 
for which preparations had been makhig for nearly a month 
before. The number of the forces collected was so considera- 
ble, that it was not easy to bring them into a space sufficiently 
small for the parade movements of review ; but it was at 
length effected; and they mustered, when we saw them, 
28,000 cavalry, 132,000 infantry, and 540 pieces of caimon. 
This was made known from field returns, which were given 
to the sovereigns who were present. I was accompanied by 
my aides-de-camp, Sir Henry Brown, Colonel Harris, Captain 
Charles Wood ; and I ought here to particularize especially 
the services of Mr. Jolm Bidwell, of the foreign office, who 
was also with me. This gentleman had been attached to all 
my fortunes since the moment of my landing in the north of 
Germany. His constant and unremitting labor in carrying 
forward the various and voluminous correspondence with the 
foreign and war departments, I never can too highly appre- 
ciate ; and it is always the most grateful task for my mind to 
acknowledge the merit, and to state what I feel I owe to the 
exertions and zeal of others. Sir Henry Hardinge also was 
of my party, having made his expedition en courier to Vertu 
in a manner that showed his active and tried zeal in the great 
cause, of gallantry, and his devotion to the service. 

The day was exceedingly sultry, but tolerably clear; an 
the spot where the head-quarters first assembled to have a 
sort of bird's-eye view of the v/hole, was a small hill in the 
centre of a large plain, near the village of Vertu, a short dis- 
tance from Chalons. Several English ladies, togetlier with all 
the princesses, duchesses, and first persons of Paris, were as- 
sembled (having been invited), and made parties to proceed 
from the capital to witness this magnificent spectacle. Amongst 
our own countrywomen were Eadies Castlereagh, Comber- 
mere, Grantham, Mrs. Arbuthnot, Miss Fitzclarence, and 
others, whose names it would be tedious to enumerate, who 
graced this most brilliant and unparalleled sight. 



238 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

In going through the field, several of the ladies rode in 
company with the gallant chiefs; and English beauty was 
signalized by the Emperor of Russia's presenting a beautiful 
black charger to one of our fair countrywomen, to carry her 
through the ceremonies of the day ; but I never riglitly un- 
derstood the feeling that recalled this war-horse back to the 
imperial stables on the following morning. A flag-staff" had 
been placed on the top of the hill, having an ensign ready to 
be hoisted on the arrival of the sovereigns at tlie spot. We 
were on horseback about seven o'clock; and at eight the 
King of Prussia, attended by the commanders-in-chief of 
the allied armies, the ambassadors of nearly all the powers of 
Europe, and many of their prime ministers, with several of 
the French marshals, and an immense staff" of aides-de-camp, 
&c. &c. began to ascend the height. 

On the arrival of the sovereigns at the spot fixed upon for 
them, the ensign was unfurled, and a salvo of guns announced 
their presence ; and the whole Russian army tlien assembled 
was seen drawn up in three lines, extending as far as the eye 
could reach. The sun glittered on their arms, and on the 
drawn sabres of the cavalry, to a distance that appeared almost 
imagmary. The eye had scarcely time to comprehend so vast 
a spectacle, when a single gun fired from the height where 
we stood was the signal for three hurrahs from the troops. 
Even at this distant day these hurrahs sound freshly in my 
ears : a second gun gave the time for a general salute. The 
cannon and musketry began at once, and the fire ran aiong 
the three extended lines, showing more distinctly than any 
thing else could have done the vast space they occupied, by 
the distant flaslies and retiring sound of the musketry. I for- 
get exactly how long a time was necessary for three rounds 
from these saluting tens of thousands. 

We rode down the hill, and the Russians broke from their 
lines into grand columns of regiments ; and no one but a sol- 
dier can conceive the beauty of this great simultaneous change. 
A spot was then fixed upon for these masses to march by tlie 
sovereigns ; and the Emperor of Russia putting himself at the 
head of the leading regiments, thus formed in colunm, 
marched past, and saluted the Emperor of Austria and King 
of Prussia ; then placing himself by tlieir side to see the rest 
of tlie army go by. The whole of tlie day was only sufficient 
to give time for a re-formation into line, and an opening of 
ranks, along whicii the cavalcade of monarchs and their im- 
mense suite rode. 

The Emperor of Russia appeared greatly occupied with 
the Duke of Wellington (who was at this period our ambas- 
sador at Paris), as if anxious for liis opinion of what was 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 239 

passing before them ; and his whole attention was given to 
him when not taken up with his fair companions, who rode 
on both his flanks. Thus closed the first day, never to be 
forgotten by those who witnessed the grand military display 
it presented. Great dinners at different bivouacs were given 
on the ground ; and my party of ladies and friends will make 
me long remember the day. The Duke of Wellington and 
Sir Lowry Cole, and various military friends, met together 
in the evening fit my quarters, full of admiration of the move- 
ments they had seen ; and I well remember the Duke of 
Wellington saying to me, " Well, Charles, you and I never 
saw such a sight before, and never shall again : the precision 
of the movements of those troops was more like the arrange- 
ments of a theatre than those of such an army — I never saw 
any thing like it." 

Much, however, as the duke was struck with the extraor- 
dinary perfection of tlie Russian formations, he was by no 
means satisfied with their slowness ; and I remember a re- 
mark from him, " that his little army would move round them 
in any direction whilst they were effecting a single change ;" 
an opinion which all who heard it re-echoed. 

On the following morning this great army heard divine 
service in masses of 20,000 each ; and the following day the 
Emperor selected from them 10,000 men, to be added to his 
guards. 

Afterwards these forces broke up for the cantonments, from 
which they had been drawn for this review. 

The impression given by this great military parade was 
certainly very favorable to the efficiency of the Russian army. 
The artillery was in beautiful order, and more particularly 
the horse-artillery, every part of the equipment appearing 
perfect; and the wild-looking little horses, three abreast, gal- 
loped along with the well-polished nine-pounder, as though 
they were scarcely sensible of its weight. These horses are 
Tartars, and are of excellent blood, and always keep their 
condition beautifully, as I have before stated. The clothing 
and appointments appeared excellent ; and the horses of the 
hussars in perfect order. 

On onr return to Paris, it was said that the Emperor Alex- 
ander called the Duke of Wellington to fix some time for 
him to see the English army, and that the duke said they 
might be seen on the morrow if Alexander wished it. I be- 
lieve they were reviewed on the day following, without pre- 
paration of any kind, under Montmartre, where they were 
put through the movements of the battle of Salamanca. 

It is not for me, however, to describe this army nor their 
exhibition. 



240 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

The Austrians had assembled all their troops at Dijon ; and 
here the sovereigns now repaired to review this army. The 
Emperor Francis had determined to visit his Italian states 
previous to his return to Vienna, and it was convenient to his 
route to take Dijon in his line to Vienna and Milan. A re- 
turn of the strength of the army, as it appeared, will be found 
in the Appendix. 

Their movements were confined to a simple feu de joie^ 
and deploying before their majesties. The ground was neither 
so favorable nor so picturesque as at Vertu ; neither were 
there any of those temptations at hand which always add 
zest to military spectacles. The inhabitants of the interior 
of France were now not well disposed to the Austrians. Few 
persons moved out of the town of Dijon : the day was not 
favorable, and the spectacle purely military. The Emperor 
of Austria gave a grand convert dinner after the review, and 
proceeded on the following day on his route to Italy. The 
other sovereigns repaired to their different destinations. 



CHAPTER XXI. 

Military opinions, and basis of operations for the campaign of 1815— Meet- 
ing of the great congress at Vienna — Tidings of Napoleon's escape from 
Elba — Tumult and dismay in France — Military conference and arrange- 
ments for the new campaign — Interesting military memoirs— Opinions 
of Prince Schwartzenberg — Views of Austria — iEstimate of relative 
forces— Considerations and military sentiments of the Prince Field-Mar- 
shal, Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces; of the chief of the Prus- 
sian etat-major, General Knesebeck; and the military ideas of the Duke 
of Wellington on the approaching campaign in Belgium, sent from Brus- 
sels to Vienna. 

Having now brought my military narrative to a conclusion 
as far as the year 1814, I shall not, as before stated, enter 
upon the last epoch of Buonaparte's career, nor into any of 
the critical details of the congress of Vienna. I am never- 
theless disposed to gratify my military readers by adding to 
this work those recorded military opinions which formed the 
basis of the operations and movements of the allied forces in 
the campaign of 1815, previous to the battle of Waterloo, 

These memoirs of some of the greatest military charac- 
ters of the age, must be invaluable for the study and perusal 
of every officer. It is on this account that I have annexed 
them to the present vvorlc ; and I shall do so without further 
comment, reserving to myself, when I enter into the history 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 24 1 

of the year 1815, to show how far these sentiments were 
acted upon or departed from. 

It will be in the recollection of my readers, that the great 
congress at Vienna assembled early in the year 1815. At 
that period, the eight great European powers, — Great Britain, 
Russia, Austria, Prussia, France, Holland, Spain, and Portu- 
gal, — nominated their plenipotentiaries to assemble at Vienna 
for the purpose of a final settlement of the affairs of Europe. 

The congress had scarcely proceeded to business, and to 
the important objects of their assembling, when Napoleon 
Buonaparte's extraordinary escape from Elba, and his landing 
at Cannes, were announced ; and the rapid march of his suc- 
cesses, the tumult and dismay in France, and the retreat of 
the king from Paris, soon turned the political disquisitions at 
Vienna into military conferences. 

At the first of these military conferences that were then 
held, the following arrangements were laid down as the basis 
upon which the allied forces were to enter upon the new 
campaign.* 

Protocol of a Military Conference held at Vienna on the 
Slst of March, 1815. 

A une conference tenue en presence de Sa Majeste I'Era- 
pereur de Russie par Son Altesse le Prince Royal de Wurt- 
emberg, par son Altesse M. le Prince de Schwartzenberg, 
Marechal et President du Conseil de Guerre de S. M. I'Em- 
pereur d'Autriche, et de M. le Marechal Prince de Wrede, 
M. le Prince Wolkonksy, aide-de-camp de S. M. I'Empereur 
de Russie, Son Excellence Milord Cathcart, General-en-Chef 
de S. M. le Roi d'Angleterre, et M. le Baron de Knesebeck, 
Lieutenant-General au service de S. M. le Roi de Prusse, on 
est convenu sur les points suivans : 

II se formera trois grandes armees sur le Rhin, savoir : 

1. Armee sur le Haut Rhin, sous les ordres du Prince 
Schwartzenberg. 

2. Armee sur le Bas Rhin, sous les ordres du Marechal 
Blucher. 

3. Armee dans les Pays Bas, sous les ordres du Marechal 
le Due de Wellington. 



* The Austrian force entering into the campaign of 1815 is nearly the 
same as detailed in the return in the Appendix, of the troops collected at 
Dijon. 

The PrusGian force is also annexed in the Appendix. 

V 



242 NARRATIVE OF TflE WAR 



L'armee du Haut Rhin sera 


composee 


de— 




Autrichiens 






150,000 


Bavarois 






65,000 


Wurtembergeois 






25,000 


Badois 






16,000 


Hessois de Darmstadt 




Total 


8,000 




264,000 



L'armee sur le Bas Rhin sera composee de 153,000 Prus- 
siens. L'armee des Pays Bas par les troupes Angloises, Hol- 
landoises, et Hanovriennes. 

Le reste des troupes du nord de I'Allemagne, savoir, — 
Hesse-Cassel, Mecklenbourg, Nassau, Waldeck, Schwarz- 
burg", Reuss, Lippe, Anhalt, Saxe Royale, Saxe Ducale, 01- 
denbourg, Brunswick, et des villes Hanseatiques, — restent 
encore a distribuer dans les armees du Marechal Wellington 
et du Marechal Blucher. 

On a ete d'abord generalementde I'avis qu'il etoit evidem- 
ment necessaire de renforcer autant que possible le Duo de 
Wellington. 

On a remarque alors sur les inconveniens graves qui re- 
sulteroient militairement de toute mesure tendant a desor- 
ganiser un corps de 14 ou 15,000 hommes de bonnes troupes, 
a une epoque oil il est de la plus grand urgence a reunir sur 
les frontieres menacees un nombre suffisant de troupes alliees. 

On est convenu en suite sur les premiers cantonnemens a 
prendre par l'armee du Haut Rhin, savoir : 

L'armee Bavaroise, sous les ordres du Marechal Wrede, 
prendra les cantonnemens outre Mayence, Frankfort, et 
Manheim, et poussera une 'division sur la rive gauche du 
Rhin, 

Le Marechal Wrede se charge de la construction de deux 
tetes-de-ponts, une a Manheim, et une autre a Germersheim. 

Lc corps du Prince Royal de Wurtemberg cantonnera 
entre Bruchsal, Manheim, et Heidelberg, poussera une divi- 
sion sur la rive gauche du Rhin. 

Le corps d'armee du General Colloredo prendra ses can- 
tonnemens entre Bruchsal, Offenbourg, et Pforzheim. 

Le corps d'armee du General Prince de Hohenzollern can- 
tonnera entre Offenbourg, Freybourg, et Rothweil. 

La reserve Autrichienne sera cantonnee entre Heilbrun, 
Halle, Ulm, et Eslingen. 

L'armee Russe sous les ordres du Marechal Barclay de 
Tolly sera cantonnee entre Wiirzbourg, Nurembourg, et 
Bamberg. 

Les chefs d'etats-majors des differens corps se concerteront 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 



243 



dans une autre conference sur les details de differens can- 
tonnemens et routes militaires pour leurs corps d'armee. 

La garnison de Mayence se formera par Autrichiens 4000 

Prussiens . . 4000 

Bavarois 3000 

De Frankfort, Isenbourg et Reuss .... 3000 

De Nassau 1500 

De Hesse-Cassel 4500 

Mayence sera consideree comme une place d'armes pour 
les armees du Haut et Bas Rhin, 

La forteresse aura un gouverneur Autrichien et un com- 
mandant Prussien. Les Cours Allemandes les plus rappro- 
chees des frontieres Fran9aises seront incessamment invitees 
a prendre des mesures de police generale, pour empecher, 
autant que possible, Tespionnage de I'ennemi. 

After these general heads of disposition and agreement 
were entered into on the 31st of March, 1815, the following^ 
interesting memoirs were handed in for the consideration of 
the grand military assembly : — 

Opinions of Prince Schivartzenberg. 

Vienne, ce 20 Avril, 1815. 

A Touverture de cette campagne, I'Autriche part de cer- 
tains principes generaux. 

Le but de cette guerre est le repos et la securite de I'Eu- 
rope, menacees par le caractere entreprenant et hardi d'un 
chef et d'un armee licencieuse. 

Les forces qu'on a destinees a cette entreprise peuvent 
etre au moins evaluees au double de celles qui leur sont op- 
posees par le chef des Fran9ais. Elles ne peuvent done se 
trouver en inferiorite, que dans le cas — 

Ou, en se divisant trop, elles offriroient a I'ennemi une re 
sistance trop faible sur de certains points, et I'occasion de re- 
unir avantageusement ses moj'-ens d'aggression. 

Ou bien, en se resserrant trop elles formeroient un colosse 
immobile, qui n'auroit pas les moyens de se devellopper, et 
entraineroit meme I'impossibilite de pourvoir aux subsistances 
des armees. 

Ou bien, si une partie des armees se portoit en avant avec 
trop de precipitation, et sans avoir suffisamment assure ses 
communications centre les mouvemens qui seroient a re- 
douter de la part des habitans du pays, s'ils etoient appuyes 
par les garnisons des forteresses qu'on seroit oblige de laisser 
en arriere. 



244 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Detruire Tarmee et son chef est done Is premier but de 
cette guerre — eviter les dangers surmentionnes en est le 
second. 

II seroit dangereux de se laisser aller a des illusions flat- 
teuses : — le terns qui pouvoit etre favorable a un projet d'Jn- 
vasion est deja passe, les armees des allies etant generalement 
trop eloignees des frontieres de la France. Les moyens de 
resistance des Francais sont nombreux, et nous ne pourrona 
esperer de les combattre avec avantage, qu'en autant que 
nous nous attacherons a opposer un grand esprit d'ordre mili- 
taire et I'accord le plus parfait dans nos mesures, au principe 
du desordre et de brigandage, que Napoleon ne manquera 
pas de mettre en usage contre nous. 

Ces considerations nous portent a etablir les principes sui- 
vans : 

1. Chacune des armees doit s'attacher a la base d'operation 
qui lui est la plus naturelle. 

2. Toutes les armees doivent avoir un objet d'operation 
commun entr'elles, afin qu'elles puissent diriger tous leurs 
efforts vers le raeme point. 

3. La route qui conduit de la base a ce point d'operation, 
doit etre suffisamment assuree, soit par des retranchemens, 
soit par I'etablissement de corps de reserve; — en un mot, 
I'armee doit se trouver dans la plus parfaite securite, quant a 
ses derrieres. 

II n'est pas probable que I'ennemi puisse opposer 400,000 
aux 800,000 hommeSj-que nous mettons en movement contre 
la France : il sera done force, ou de diviser ses forces en 
adoptant un systeme de lignes, etendues, ce qui ne pent 
nianquer de le conduire a sa perte ; ou bien, il reunira la 
majeure partie de ses forces pour nous attaquer avec superi- 
orite sur un point. 

"4. Les armeea qui avancent doivent done etre disposees de 
maniere qu'elles puissent contraindre I'ennemi a decouvrir 
entierement une partie de ses possessions, s'il etoit tente 
d'agir offensivement d'un cutre cote, 

5. Le moyen le plus efficace pour atteindre ce but seroit 
de menacer differens points assez distans les uns des autres 
pour pouvoir, dans le cas qu'une de nos armees essuyat des 
revers, retablir les affaires en agissant avec vigueur d'un 
cote different, I'empecher de poursuivre ses avantages deja 
acquis, et I'obliger peut-dtre a gagner avec rapidite un point 
oppose de sa monarchic, 

Ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'une de nos armees battue gagneroit le 
tems necessaire pour prendre I'offensive, et que meme en ad- 
mettant un second revers, I'ennemi finiroit par succomber a 
la continuite de ses efforts. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 245 

La base d'operation naturelle a I'Autriche n'est peut-^tre 
que cells qui favoriseroit, en la ligne la plus directe, la com- 
munication de son armee d'ltalie avec celle de TAllemagne, 
ainsi que le secours reciproque qu'elle pourroit se porter. 

Son aile droite est appuyee par la place de Mayence ; sa 
gauche par les gorges du Piemont ; son centre par celle de la 
Suisse. 

La base d'operation de I'armee Prussienne s'etend sur sa 
gauche jusqu'a Mayence ; sa droite est couverte par Parmee 
Angloise: done les operations, concertees avec les mouve- 
mens de la premiere, ne peuvent etre basees que par la Hol- 
lande et les Pays Bas. 

Celles-ci paroissent les bases naturelles, qui s'oftrent aux 
puissances mentionnees ci-dessus; il n'y a que I'armee Russe 
qui en soit depourvue dans cette guerre, attendu qu'elle se 
trouve a une trop grande distance de son pays. La tache 
qu'elle a a remplir se presente d'elle-meme ; elle doit rem- 
plir le grand intervalle, que la nature meme des operations 
des armees alliees Autrichiennes, Angloises et Prussiennes 
formera infailliblement. Elle doit etre prete a porter des 
secours a celle d'entre les armees alliees qui en auroitbesoin, 
non pas comme une armee de reserve, mais placee sur la 
meme ligne ; enfin, de pouvoir se porter a droite ou a gauche 
selon le besoin. 

L'ofTensive des Autrichiens doit etre dirigee sur la gauche, 
et, en partant de son aile gauche, celle des Anglois et des 
Prussiens sur la droite ; et par consequent, partant de leur 
aile droite, il en resulte, qu'independarament des autorites 
militaires, il y a trois grandes masses a disposer, savoir : 

1. Une armee combinee Autrichienne sur le Haut Rhin, 

forte de 165,000 

('orps de Bavarois 60,000 

Wurtembergeois 25,000 

Troupes de Bade 16,000 

Do. Darmstadt . . . . . 8,000 

Armee Autrichienne en Italic . . . . 70,000 



Total . . . 344,000 

2. Armee Prussienne et Angloise, consistant en Anglois, 
Hanovriens, Hollandois .... 60,000 

Prussiens 160,000 

Saxons et Hessois . • . . . . 30,000 



Total . . . 250,000 

3. Armee Russe, forte de . . . . 200,000 

V2 



246 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Les bases de ces armees sont donnees ; leur objet d'opera- 
tion est Paris, et la masse de Tarmee Francjoise par-tout ou 
elle se presentera. En consequence de ces principes, I'armee 
Prussienne feroit un mouvement sur sa droite, et I'armee 
Autrichienne sur sa gauche, aussitot que I'armee Russe seroit 
arrivee; I'operation principale ne peut cependant commencer 
avec avantage, avant que 50,000 Russes n'aient rejoint I'ar- 
mee Prussienne aupres de Coblentz, et que le meme nombre 
ii'ait fait sa jonction avec I'armee Autrichienne aupres de 
Manheim. 

Le g-ros de I'armee Russe se porteroit en marches forcees 
sur Mayence et Coblentz ; et quand la tete de leurs colonnes 
y sera arrivee, on sera a portee de jug-er, si c'est sur la droite 
que le corps Anglo-Prussien, ou sur la gauche que le corps 
Autrichien aura le plus besoin de son appui. 

Tels sont les principes generaux sur lesquels il faut tomber 
d'accord avant d'ouvrir la campagne. 

Pour les details des operations, pour les moyens les plus 
propres a attendre le but general, il faut s'en remettre k V ex- 
perience et aux lumieres des quatre generaux en chef; et 
eux-memes ne pourront les determiner, que quand leurs forces 
seront reunies, qu'ils connoitront celles des ennemis, et les 
positions qu'ils auront occupees. 

Cependant ces principes generaux devroient etre dictes 
par leurs Souverains respectifs aux quatre generaux en chef, 
pour leur direction generale. 

II resulte toutefois de cet expose, qu'une operation offensive 
ne peut etre ouverte avant le 16 de Juin. Tout ce que I'en- 
nemi pourroit vouloir entreprendre jusqu'a cette epoque, 
devroit etre soumis aux memes principes que nous venona 
d'etablir par rapport a I'ofTensive, c'est-a-dire, qu'un corps 
de troupes, attaque avec superiorite, se retireroit sans se 
comprometre, jusqu'a ce que tons les autres eussent fait des 
demonstrations energiques pour le degager. 

Si peut-etre des raisons majeures engagent S. M. I'Empe- 
reur de Russie a desirer la reunion des forces Russes entiere- 
ment sur un point, ou sur la droite ou sur la gauche, sans 
acceder au detachement propose de 50,000 hommes, on croit 
que cela n'attaqueroit pas essentiellement les principes gene- 
raux etablis dans ce memoire, pourvu que le total de cette 
armee occupe au plus t6t la position qu'on avoit indiquee en 
premiere ligne h I'armee de 100,000 hommes. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 247 

Considerations upon the military operations that may take 
place at different periods^ by the Prussian General Kne- 
sebeck. 

Vienne, ce 18 Avril, 1815. 

Par les memoires ci-joints on a tache de montrer : 

1. La necessite de donner derechef de Tensemblc aux 
operations des difFerentes armees ; 

2. De bien distinguer les epoques, afin de ne pas se trom- 
per sur le calcul des forces de I'ennemi. 

Essayons maintenant quelques considerations sur ces opera- 
tions memes. 

L'epoque, ou un mouvement isole et rapide pour le soutien 
de Paris auroit pu produire un grand resultat, paroit ^tre 
passee. 

Cette operation n'etoit bonne qu'aussi long-tems que le 
Roi de France etoit a Paris, et que Paris se maintenoit. La 
celerite de Buonaparte, et la decheance complette de I'armee 
Fran^aise, I'a fait manquer. 

Une autre question se presente pour le moment, savoir : 

Si I'on doit rester passif jusqu'a ce que I'armee Autrichi- 
enne sera arrivee sur le Rhin ; ou si les operations doivent 
commencer avec les forces rassemblees deja ; savoir done 
avec 50,000 hommes qui se trouvent deja sur le Haut Rhin, 
50,000 Prussiens sur la JNIeuse, 43,000 de I'armee Anglo- 
Belgique. 

Les raisons qui parlent pour une telle offensive a I'instant, 
sont: 

1. De soutenir le parti Royaliste du Midi de la France 
ct de la Vendee, avant que Buonaparte parvienne a le sup- 
primer. 

2. D'empecher que Buonaparte ne profile pas de I'intervalle 
pour consolider son gouvernement, et gagner I'opinion de la 
nation, comme celle de I'armee s'est deja prononcee pour lui. 

II n'y a pas de doute que ces deux raisons sont d'une tres 
grande consequence ; mais ceux qui s'y opposent ne sont pas 
moins fortes. 

1. II faut se demander, si I'entree des armees alliees sur le 
sol Fran9ais n'eveillera pas la nation et la ralliera autour de 
Buonaparte, au lieu de I'eloigner de lui. 

2. Le memoire B. montre que la force disponible de Buo- 
naparte egalera la notre jusqu'a la fin de Mai ; savoir, qu'il 
pourra paroitre en campagne encore avec 120,000 hommes, 
apres avoir laisse des garnisons dans les places fortes, et des 
corps pour combattre la Vendee, le Midi, et observer Paris. 

A cela il faut compter, que les forteresses, que les allies 
trouveront a I'instant qu'ils auront passe les frontieres de la 



248 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 



France, et qu*ils doivent necessairement bloquer ou assie- 
ger, affoibliront tellement leurs armees, que Buonaparte 
en se concentrant derriere ces forteresses leur sera prepon- 
derant en forces. Si on ajoute a cela que les allies, par la 
situation geographique de la France, manoeuvrent sur le 
circuit du cercle, et que Buonaparte a ses forces concentrees 
dans le centre ; la situation militaire sera si defavorable pour 
lee armees alliees, s'ils entrent en France sans forces suf- 
fisantes, qu'une telle operation, autant que les raisons alle- 
guees semblent I'exiger, a trop de chances defavorables, 
qu'elle pourroit etre conseille autrement, que dans le seul 
cas, que la Suisse, en joignant see forces a celles des allies, 
permettroit un iibre passage a I'armee du Haut Rhin, et que 
cette expedition, qui se dirigeroit alors sur Lyon, seroit en 
m^me tems soutenue directement par la marche des troupes 
du Roi de Sardaigne sur Grenoble et Chambery, et indirecte- 
ment par les manoeuvres des armees de Blucher et de Wel- 
lington, qui auroient la tache d'attirer les forces de I'ennemi 
de leurs cotes, et de les occuper sans pourtant s'engager au- 
trement a un combat general, qu'a des chances tres fav^orables 
pour eux. 

Telles sont les considerations qui se presentent pour les 
operations qui pourroient avoir lieu pour le moment; celles 
de I'avenir semblent devoir etre bien distinguees pour les 
deux epoques marquees dans le memoire B. savoir celle au 
commencement du mois de Mai, ou quatre semaines plus tard. 

La premiere epoque demandera beaucoup plus de circon- 
spection pour les mouvemens que la second, qnoique le plan 
en general paroit pouvoir rester le meme. 

Devoit-on se decider a ne rien entreprendre pour le mo- 
ment, mais d'attendre jusqu'a ce qu'on pourra entrer en 
France, en forces, de toutes parts, il paroit que voici doivent 
etre les lignes fondamentales d'une telle operation. 

Battre les armees de Buonaparte, delivrer la nation Fran- 
chaise du joug sous Icquel elle gernit, tel est le but de la 
guerre. 

Tomber sur Tarmee Buonapartienne avec tant de forces 
quo possible ; done, diriger les mouvemens des differentes 
armees alliees de raaniere que jamais une d'elles risque 
d'etre accablee separement; mais au contraire, quo plusieurs 
doivent toutefois se trouver ensemble, et, s'il est possible, re- 
unis au jour de bataille generale ; voila le moyen d'atteindre 
CO but. II resulte de cette consideration, que si pour desti- 
tuer Buonaparte, Paris doit etre derechef Tobjet que les ar- 
' mees alliees se proposent, ils doivent se trouver sur la meme 
hauteur avant do commencer un mouvement combine sur 
cette capitale. 



i 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 249 

II semble done que Varmee de Wellington doit prendre 
position entre Enghien, Halle, et Gemappe, tenant des postee 
d'observation a Charleroi et sur sa droite jusqu'a Ostende. 

Cette armee doit regarder Anvers comme le point duquel 
ses operations doivent partir et ou elle doit s'etre reserve et 
prepare un asile au cas d'une stricte defensive ; enfin Anvers 
doit etre en Hollande pour I'armee Angloise ce qu'etoit Lis- 
bonne pour elle en Portugal. 

Au cas qu'elle se voit attaquee par des forces superieures, 
elle se retire sur cette direction, et y prend position jusqu'a 
ce que les operations des autres armees viendront la dcgager. 

L'armee de Blucher prendra position sur la rive droite de 
la Meuse, entre Namur, Huy, et I'Ourte. 

Cette armee s'etant eloignee de Mayence, prendra pour le 
moment Juliers ou Wesel pour place d'armes. 

Les circonstances que les capitaines experimentes de ces 
deux armees jugeront le mieux sur les lieux, leur indiqueront 
ce qu'il y aura a faire, et on laisse a leur sagesse d'en pro- 
fiter. 

On croit cependant devoir les prevenir, que jusqu'au com- 
mencement du mois de Juin, l'armee du Haut Rhin ne pourra 
pas etre rasserablee, ni passer cette riviere en forces. 

Le fardeau de la guerre pesera done jusque-la seul sur les 
forces reunies sur la Meuse, et le soutien de l'armee du Haut 
Rhin devra se borner a des diversions ou vers le Midi de la 
France ou vers la Lorraine. 

Des raisons majeures, comme par exemple la vraisemblance 
d'une contre-revolution a Paris, ou la certitude que I'ennemi, 
ayant ete dans la necessite de faire de fortes detachemens 
pour le Midi, ne se trouveroit pas en force du cote des Pays 
Bas, peuvent donner la possibilite de battre un corps d'armee 
de I'ennemi, ou de surprendre une des places fortes. Mais 
ei cependant ces raisons ne determineroient pas les deux ar- 
mees a prendre a I'instant une vive offensive, il paroit que 
pour le moment leurs operations doivent se borner a une 
defensive active, et de se soutenir reciproquement jusqu'a 
ce que l'armee du Haut Rhin pourra lier ses operations aux 
leurs. 

Quand les forces de I'ennemi tomberoient sur I'une de ces 
armees, sans que I'autre seroit pressee, celle-ci manceuvreroit 
en attendant sur le flanc de I'ennemi. Par exemple, quand 
l'armee de Wellington seroit contrainte de se retirer sur An- 
vers, et l'armee de Blucher pas pressee en meme terns, celle- 
ci s'avanceroit sur le flanc de I'ennemi pour degager l'armee 
de Wellington, avec recours de ne pas trop s'eloigner de la 
Meuse et des points de Namur et de Liege. De mime, quand 
l'armee de Blucher devroit ^tre menacee, I'armee de Wei- 



250 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

lington passeroit la Meuse pour soutenir Blucher. Si I'ennemi 
se porteroit avec toutes ses forces du cote de la Moselle, les 
deux armees marcheront a la gauche sur Luxembourg et 
t^cheront de le couper de ses ressources. En meme terns un 
inouvement semblable se fera du cote de Manheim sur Treves 
par Tarmee du Haut Rhin. 

Dans cette position les deux armees resteront jusqu'a ce 
que I'armee du Haut Rhin passera le Rhin. Quand le mo- 
ment de ce passage sera venu, les armees de Blucher et de 
Wellington tacheront de le faciliter par un mouvement of- 
fensif de leur cote. 

L'armee du Haut Rhin continuera, en attendant, de se ras- 
sembler sur les lieux indiques. Le moment de son passage 
etant venu, elle se rassemblera vite sur un point, jettera des 
ponts et passera cette riviere, d'apres les circonstances ou a 
B^le ou entre Huninguen et Brisach, attirant I'attention de 
I'ennemi du cote de Spire par un corps qu'elle tiendra de ce 
cote. Le point d'appui de Tarmee du Haut Rhin doit rester 
derechef sur la Suisse, sans pourtant y passer qu'avec con- 
sentement du gouvernement Suisse. Mais comme il est in- 
dispensable pour l'armee Autrichienne d'avoir une communi- 
cation directe par la Suisse avec Tltalie, ainsi qu'il est de la 
plus haute consequence et pour les operations militaires en 
general, et pour la surete de la Suisse elle-meme, d'avoir un 
libre passage par Bale et Geneve, on entamera une negocia- 
tion avec le gouvernement Suisse, pour obtenir une route 
militaire entre la Souabe et I'ltalie, et le passage par les deux 
points indiques. 

La ligne d'operation de cette armee sera Bale, Befort, 
Langres, Muhlhausen, Epinal. 

D'apres cette esquisse on verra que les armees alliees ne 
formeront jusqu'a I'arrivee de l'armee Russe que deux 
grandes masses; I'une groupee sur la Meuse, I'autre du cote 
de la Suisse. La situation des circonstances a amene cette 
position ; et sans vouloir exposer i'armee de Wellington ;i 
un echec, il ne faudra rien y changer. Aussi se pourra-t-il 
que I'ennemi par-la se voit force de former de son cote dn 
meme deux armees ; done, de partager ses forces. Mais s'il 
re le fait pas, la trop grande distance entre la Meuse et le 
Rhin lui donne I'avantage de manoeuvrer long-tems sous la 
protection de ses forteresses et du Rhin, du cote de Stras- 
bourg, pendant qu'il pourra tombcr avec preponderance sur 
l'armee de la Meuse ; et s'il devroit reussir a la battre, de 
I'achever entierement avant qu'elle pourra etre soutenue. 

Ces considerations n'echapperont pas sans doute aux illus- 
tres capitaines qui commandent les deux armees de ce cote 
la, et les determineront a ne rien hazarder. 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 251 

Si I'ennemi vouloit profiter de la lacune qui jusqu'a I'arri- 
vee des Russes se trouve entre I'armee du Haut Rhin et de 
la Meuse, et se Jeter dans cet intervalle, il semble qu'il faut 
etre bien d'accord de se porter sur ses communications de 
toutes parts. 

Voila, a ce qu'il paroit, la disposition generale jusqu'a 
I'arrivee des reserves et de I'armee Russe. Si les circon- 
stances n'ont pas change jusque-la, alors un mouveraent ge- 
neral pour I'interieur de la France pourra se faire avec as- 
surance de tous cotes. 

En attendant on aura soin de preparer a toutes les armees 
un train d'artillerie de siege, d'accelerer les marches des 
troupes en arriere, de les former en corps avant qu'ils passe- 
ront le Rhin, et de bien preparer les moyens pour rester, pen- 
dant toute la guerre, toujours au grand complet. 

L'armee d'ltalie ne peut entrer pour le moment dans ce 
calcul des operations, et doit agir separement jusqu'a ce que 
peut-etre a I'avenir elle pourra Tier ses operations directement 
a ceux des autres armees. 

Vienne, 24 Avril, 1815. 

D'apres les memoires successives que le soussigne a eu 
I'honneur de soumettre aux yeux des illustres Souverains, 
reste encore a faire I'esquisse, de quelle maniere qu'il faudra 
manoeuvrer, quand le moment sera venu, de marcher vers 
Paris, 

La situation de la France presente deux operations pour 
atteindre ce but : 

L'une, les allies ont suivi dans la derniere campagne, en 
s'avancant avec leurs plus grandes forces par les routes de 
Langres et de Dijon ; 

L'autre peut se faire par la droite, en portant les plus grandes 
forces entre la Marne et I'Oise. Considerant que les armees 
de Blucher et de Wellington partant de Mons et Namur 
n'auront a faire que la raoitie de chemin que ceux du Rhin, 
il paroit qu'il faudra donner la preference a la seconde ope- 
ration.. 

Si Ton s'y devroit resoudre, voici a ce qu'il paroit doivent 
etre les dispositions. 

Les corps de Wrede et du Prince Royal de Wurtemberg 
doivent marcher sur la Sarre ; I'armee Russe s'y portera de 
meme aussitot que possible. 

L'armee Autrichienne restera sur le Haut Rhin. Le quar- 
tier-general des Souverains sera pris a Fribourg: on t^chera 
de repandre de toutes parts les bruits, qu'on suivra a-peu-pres 
le meme plan de campagne que I'annee passee ; que la grande 
armee s'avanceroit derechef sur la route de Basle et Langres; 



252 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

qu'elle seroit secouree par Tarmee d'ltalie et les Suisses ; que 
les Anglois auroient insiste de faire le sieg-e de Dunkerque, 
ce qui contraindroit Blucher de rester sur la defensive, et de 
faire une guerre methodique ; qu'il en etoit furieux, etc. etc. 
S'il est possible, il faut vendre de telles nouvelles et un tel plan 
a un des emissaires de Buonaparte, et en general rien negliger 
pour attirer les forces de Buonaparte vers les frontieres de la 
Suisse ou de I'ltalie. 

Si Ton reussit par ces stratagemes a detourner les forces 
militaires de Buonaparte de Paris, et de les attirer sur le 
Haut Rhin, alors il faut vite reunir les armees du Haut Rhin 
avec celle de la Russe ce qui feroit — 
Armee du Haut Rhin : 

Colloredo 40,000 

Hohenzollern 36,000 

Reserve 50,000 

Wrede 60,000 

Prince Royal de Wurtemberg 50,000 

236,000 
L'armee Russe 120,000 

En tout ...... 356,000 

et marcher a lui, pour lui livrer bataille, ou I'occuper et forcer 
de rester sur le Haut Rhin, pendant que Blucher et Welling- 
ton se porteront brusquement sur Paris. 

Si on decompte de ces 350,000 hommes cinquante, pour 
observer les forteresses de I'Alsace, on garderoit toujours 
300,000 pour marcher sur Buonaparte, et lui livrer bataille, 
et Wellington et Blucher executeroient le manoeuvre sur 
Paris avec 120,000. 

Si on ne devroit pas reussir a attirer la plus grande masse 
des forces de Buonaparte vers la Suisse, I'ltalie, ou le Haut 
Rhin ; I'alternative se presente — ou, que Buonaparte, se 
voyant menace de Wellington et Blucher, marche vers eux 
avec des fo'ces superieures; ou, qu'il attend dans un cercle 
resserre autour de Paris, (a-peu-pres a la hauteur de Peronne, 
Laon, Rheims, ChAlons, Troyes,) les manoeuvres des allies. 

Dans le premier cas Wellington et Blucher doivent avoir 
la liberte de disposer des corps de Wrede et du Prince Royal 
de Wurtemberg, et pour les attirer directement a eux, et pour 
les faire marcher dans le flanc de I'ennemi. 

Bans le second cas, que Buonaparte devroit rester dans le 
cercle marque, pour attendre jusqu'a ce que les manoEuvres 
des allies se soient entierement developpes, voil^ ce qu'il 
paroit qu'il faudroit faire : 



IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 253 

J5Ha"sl?r?di ( ^^^ ^°^P® ^^ Wrede de . . 60,000 
c6t6 de Deux- } et du Prince Royal de Wurtemberg 50,000 

ponts. J — 

{ En tout, de . 110,000 

oil passe le /^ 
Rhin a Man- I 

heim. se por- I L'armee Russe de 120,000 passe le Rhin k 
miia'lnr^'fU Oppenheim, se dirige derriere l'armee Bava- 
Sarre et de lA j roise par Kreutznach, Birkenfeld, Treves, d 
par des march- Luxembourg. 

es rapides sur ° 

Btenay. *^ 

L'armee Autrichienne de 125,000 passe le Rhin entre Stras- 
bourg et B^le. Chaque armee destine un corps de vingt jusqu'a 
trente mille hommes, qui restera en arriere d'elle, pour con- 
tenir le pays, observer les forteresses, et soigner I'approvi- 
sionnement des armees. Tout ce qu'il y a de landwehr dis- 
ponible, se joigne a eux. Cette disposition faite, les opera- 
tions commencent. 

L'idee generale est — 

1. Qu'on presente a I'ennemi trois masses a-peu-pres egales, 
dont le centre est destine de se porter d'apres les circon- 
stances ou sur la droite, ou sur la gauche, et de renforcer de 
cette maniere, par un mouvement rapide, une des ailes, pour 
lui donner une telle preponderance de forces qu'il pourra 
livrer bataille a I'ennemi avec I'espoir de la victoire : 

2. Si done ce mouvement doit avoir lieu sur la droite, les 
armees Russes, Prussiennes, Angloises et Bavaroises t^chent 
de se reunir sur la Meuse aussi vite que possible ; reunies, ils 
chercheront I'ennemi pour lui livreiYj^ataille, ou marcheront 
brusquement sur Paris, tdchant de le battre s'il s'y oppose, 
ou de se tourner sur lour gauche, si I'ennemi cherche de les 
prendre en flanc par Chdlons, ou en longeant la Meuse, ma- 
ncEuvre auquel il faudra s'attendre si Buonaparte est reste 
concentre dans le cercle de Troyes, ChMons, et Rheims : 

3. Que le Prince Royal de Wurtemberg entretienne les 
communications entre ces armees et l'armee Autrichienne, 
et que celle-ci manceuvre dans le flanc de I'ennemi, cherchant 
a I'attirer de son c6te, de le detourner du cdte de Paris, ou 
de le suivre s'il se tourne vers les armees de Wellington et 
de Blucher. 

Pour cet efFet, l'armee Autrichienne s'avencera premiere- 
ment sur Langres, le Marechal Wrede sur Verdun, le Prince 
Royal de Wurtemberg sur Nancy, Toul, et Commercy; 
l'armee Russe en tournant Sarre-Louis, Thionville, Longwy, 
sur Stenay ; l'armee de Blucher sur Mezieres ; Wellington 
sur Chimay, Chaque armee adopte en principe, de surprendre, 
s'il est possible, sur son cherain, quelques places fortes, et de 
ne pas s'engager avec des forces superieu.res. 

W 



254 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

Si Tennemi tache de percer au centre, le Prince Royal de 
Wurtemberg se replie, et trouvera dans le cas le plus mal- 
heureux toutefois dosasiles surs a Mayence ou Luxembourg", 
pendant que les autres armees se porteront sur le flanc de 
I'ennemi pour le battre ou le prevenir a Paris.* 

The sentiments of the Duke of Wellington, then at Brus- 
sels, were earnestly solicited ; and I have reason to believe 
that he gave them in the following terms ; though I cannot 
vouch positively for their accuracy in all points. The state- 
ment hereafter detailed was, I know, communicated to the 
military conference before mentioned. 

" I saw Clarke yesterday, and he told me that a person of 
the war-office, upon whom he could depend, had informed 
him that on the 30th of April the enemy's regular army 
amounted to 139,000 men, and the guards to 25,000. Gendar- 
merie and national guards raised, and expected to be raised, 
would make it 280,000 ; this was the utmost expected. 

" Bournonville, who ought to know, told me this day, that 
we ought to reckon that the enemy had an effective force of 
200,000 men. He says the king had 155,000 when he quit- 
ted Paris, and that he had granted above 100,000 conges, 
which had been called in ; but that not above half could be 
reckoned upon as likely to join. I understood, likewise, that 
there were above 100,000 deserters wandering about France. 

" In reference to these different statements I beg to ob- 
serve, that Clarke speaks from positive information ; Bour- 
nonville from conjectusa. According to Clarke's account, the 
army gained in strength only 3000 men in the last fifteen 
days ; but then it must be observed that the guards have 
gained about 19,000; being the difference between 6000, 
which they were, and 25,000, which they are now. 

" In respect to periods of commencing operations, I had 
adopted the opinion that it was necessary to wait for more 
troops as far back as the 13th of April. After, however, we 
shall have waited a sufficient time to collect a force, and to 
satisfy military men that their force is what it ought to be, 
to enable them to accomplish the object in view, the period 
of attack becomes a political question, upon which there can 
be no difference of opinion. Every day's experience con- 
vinces me that we ought not to lose a moment which could 
be spared. 

* In addition to the views of the allied military authorities and generals, 
it may not be uninteresting to see the sentiments of the French ministers 
who had Joined the congress; and therefore the memorandum of that intel- 
ligent and able minister the Due D'Albcrg, which was in circulation at this 
period, is annexed in the Appendix. 



IN GERiMANY AND FRA^XE. 255 

"I say nothing about our defensive operations, because J 
am inclined to believe that Blucher and I are so well united 
and so strong-, that the enemy cannot do us much mischief. 
I am at the advanced post of the whole ; the greatest part of 
the enemy's force is in my front ; and, if I am satisfied^ 
others need he under no apprehension. 

" In regard to offensive operations, my opinion is, that how- 
ever strong we shall be, in reference to the enemy, we should 
not extend ourselves further than is absolutely necessary, in 
order to facilitate the subsistence of the troops. I do not ap- 
prove of an extension from the channel to the Alps ; and I 
am convinced that it will be found, not fatal, but only that 
the troops at such a distance on the left of the line will be 
entirely out of the line of the operations. 

" We are now, or shall be shortly, placed on the French 
frontier in the form of an echelon ; of which the right, placed 
here, is the most advanced of the echelons, and the left, upon 
the LFpper Rhine, is the most retired. Paris is our object ; 
and the greatest force, and greatest military difficulties, are 
opposed to the movements of the right, which is the most ad- 
vanced part of our general line. Indeed, such force and diffi- 
culties are opposed to us in this part, that I should think that 
Blucher and I cannot move till the movements of others of 
the allied corps shall have relieved us from part of the ene- 
my's force opposed to us. Then it must be observed, that we 
cannot be relieved by movements through Luxembourg. In 
my opinion the movements of the allies should begin with 
the left, which should cross the Rhine between B^le and 
Strasbourg. 

" The centre, collected upon the Sarre, should cross on the 
day when the left should be expected to be at Langres. 

" If these movements should not relieve the right, they 
bhould be continued ; that is to say, the left should continue 
its movements on both banks of the Marne, while the centre 
should cross the Aisne ; and the distance between the two 
bodies, and between each and Paris, should be shortened daily. 

" But this last hypothesis is not probable : the enemy would 
certainly move from this front upon the earliest alarm of the 
movements on the Upper Rhine, and the moment that he did 
move, or that the operations be practicable, Blucher's corps 
and mine should move forward, and the former make the 
siege of Givet, and the latter of Maubeuge ; and the former 
likewise aid the movement of the centre across the Meuse. 

" If the enemy should fall upon the centre, it should either 
retire upon Luxembourg, or fight, according to the relative 
strength ; and, in either case, Blucher should act upon the 
enemy's communications upon the Aisne. 



256 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 

" But the most probable result of these first movements 
would be the concentration of the enemy's forces upon the 
Aisne ; and accordingly we hear of the fortification of Soisson 
and Laon, of an intrenched camp at Beauvais, &c. We must 
in this case, after the first operation, throw our whole left 
across the Marne, and strengthen it if necessary from the 
centre and left. It should march upon Paris between the 
Seine and the Marne, while the right and the centre should 
either attack the enemy's position upon the Marne, or en- 
deavor to turn its left ; or the whole should co-operate in one 
general attack upon the enemy's position. 

"I come now to consider the strength required for these 
operations. The greatest strength the enemy is supposed to 
have is 200,000 men effective, besides national guards for the 
garrisons ; of this number it can hardly be believed that he 
can bring 150,000 to bear upon any one point. 

" Upon this statement let our proceedings be founded. Let 
us have 150,000 men upon the left, and 150,000 upon the 
right, and all the rest, whatever they may be, in the centre ; 
or, after a sufficient centre is formed, in reserve for the right, 
left or centre, as may be most convenient for their march and 
• subsistence, and I will engage for the result, as they may 
be thrown where we please. Let us begin when we shall 
have 450,000 men. Before the Austrians upon the left will 
be at Langres, the Russians will have passed the Rhine, and 
the whole Prussian army will be in line. 

"These are my general ideas, which I don't think differ 
much from General Knesebeck's. Mind, when I think of the 
siege of Givet and Maubeuge, I don't mean by the whole of 
the two armies of the right, but to be carried only by detach- 
ments from them. The centre should besiege Sedan, which 
is not strong or garrisoned, and observe Longwy, Thionville, 
and Metz. The left will have to observe Huningen and the 
fortresses in Alsace. 

" In regard to the force in Piedmont, I confess that I wish 
that the whole of the Austrian army in Italy were entirely 
employed against Murat, with the exception of the garrisons. 
Murat must be destroyed early, as he will hang heavily upon 
us. 

"If any force should be employed from Piedmont, its ope- 
rations should be separate from those of the great confeder- 
acy. They cannot be connected without disconnecting those 
of what I have hitherto considered the left, from the remain- 
der of our great line ; however, they may be calculated to 
aid that left, particularly by being directed upon Chamberry, 
or by keeping that post in check ; — their basis is, however, 
different, and cannot easily be otherwise. 



L\ GERMANY AND FRANCE. 257 

*'God knows whether the allies will allow their forces to 
be divided as I suppose, and particularly whether the Prus- 
sians will act in two corps, one under Blucher here, and an- 
other from Luxembourg, with the centre ; or whether the 
other allies will like to commence till the whole Russian 
army is in reserve : but I am convinced that what I have prO' 
posed, is so clearly the plan of operations, that I do n^ doubt 
it will be adopted with but little variation.'''' 

Statement of the Due de Feltre. 

L'etat des forces de I'armee Fran9aise, tel qu'il m'a ete 
communique par un employe de la guerre, etait le premier 
de ce mois porte a 200 mille hommes effectifs; raais les 
homines qui devoient completer les ladres des regimens, pour 
produire ce nombre, n'etoient pas encore repartis dans leur 
corps respectifs, et leur completement exige encore trois 
semaines. 

Le materiel de la guerre, le train d'artillerie, les chevaux, 
les fusils, manquoient en grande partie : aussi a peine evalue- 
t-on la cavalerie actuellement montee a 20,000 hommes. Ce- 
pendant, on voit presque tons les jours arriver une petite 
quantite de remontes, qu'on envoie des provinces. 

Quoiqu'il n'ait pas encore ose rendre un decret pour faire 
revivre la conscription, il a neanmoins envoye aux prefets 
des departemens I'ordre de faire rentrer dans Tarmee tous 
les hommes qui ont servi, et d'employer en outre le moyen 
de procurer le plus grand nombre d'hommes possible par une 
cspece d'enrolement volontaire, male qui en efFet devient co- 
ercitif 

Lignes occupees par I'armee Fran^aise. 

Toute I'armee est repartie en six divisions ou corps d'armee. 

La premiere s'etend sur la ligne de Lille, Douay, Arras, 
6ic. et est commandee par le General Excelmans. 

La seconde va depuis Calais jusqu'a Dunkerque, sous les 
ordres du General Beil. 

La troisieme, commandee par le General D'Erlon, est tra- 
cee depuis Dunkerque jusqu'a Verdun. 

La quatrieme s'etend depuis Verdun jusqu'a Landau, sous 
les ordres du General Lobau. 

La cinquieme, commandee par le General Girard, va 
jusqu'a Strasbourg. 

La sixieme est confiee au Marechal Suchet, et s'etend 
jusqu'a Huningen : c'est a tort que les journaux ont donne 
ce commandement au Marechal Ney. 

Sur toute la route depuis Paris jusqu'a Peronne, je n'ai 
pas rencontre un seul soldat, un seul chariot de munitions, ou 

W2 



258 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR, &c. 

tout autre objet qui indiquerait des preparatifs militaires. A 
Peronne, qui nage pour ainsi dire au milieu des eaux, il n'y 
a qu'un seul bataillon ; le huitieme regiment de dragons, qui 
y etait, est parti pour Lille le 5. Je n'ai apperou que deux 
pieces de canon dans la partie de la place ou je suis entre. 

On travailloit a des batteries a Cambray, et les palissades 
devant la porte de Bouchain n'avaient ete commencees que 
depuis quelques jours. La porte de sortie etoit deja condamne 
le sixieme. La garnison etait composee de deux regimens 
d'infanterie et d'un regiment d'artillerie. II parait que toutes 
ces places manquoient de canon de gros calibre ; car je n'ai 
vu en batterie que de pieces de campagne. Valenciennes, 
qui est dans un bon etat de defense, ne renferme que 4000 
hommes de garnison, dont le premier regiment d'infanterie ou 
regiment du roi, et le septieme de hussards, font partie. 

The scientific report made by the Duke of Wellington, on 
the most judicious mode of conducting the military operations 
in 1815, is so clear and explicit, and the reasoning so conclu- 
sive, that I hope I shall stand excused with the high authority 
from whom it emanates, if I should have trenched in any 
manner on communications within my knowledge, for the 
benefit of the profession, the British army, and posterity. 
And as these sentiments are in the possession of the cabinets 
and councils of the different pov/ers, they are no doubt in the 
hands of many, and in the archives of the chancellerie of 
Europe. 

My present offering to my companions in arms now closes. 
If they kindly approve my labor, I maj'- in another year or 
two, if I should find leisure, once more appear before tliera. 



APPENDIX, 



No. L— p. 17. 

From Baron Hardenberg, Topliiz, 29th of September, 1813. Acknow- 
ledging how much the exertions of the Prussians were owing to Eng- 
land's aid. 

Le Chancelier d'Etat soussigne a I'honneur de mettre sous les yeux 
de son auguste Souverain les offices que Monsieur le Lieutenant- 
General Stewart, Envoye extraordinaire, Ministre Pl^nipotentiaire de 
Sa Majeste Britannique, a bien voulu lui communiquer en dale du 23 
et 87 de ce mois : Sa Majesty y retrouve avec une vive satisfaction 
les marques precieuses de I'interet et de I'amitie active de Son Altesse 
Royale le Prince Regent. II sera beau de devoir le triomphe de la 
grande cause a I'union intirae des primieres puissances de I'Europe et 
aux efforts reunis de leurs peuples. Ceux de la Prusse surpassent de 
beaucoup nos moyens. II lui deviendroit impossible de soutenir cette 
lutte penible, si elle ne trouvoit, a cote des ressources que lui offre 
I'enthousiasme des habitans, celles que lui fournit I'Angleterxe, et qui 
deviennent toujours plus urgentes a mesure que les evenemens se 
devoloppent. 

Sa Majeste, en m'autorisantd'exprimer ses sentimens a Son Excel- 
lence Monsieur le General Stewart, m'a charge de lui temoigner en 
nieme terns combien elle est reconnoissante des fournitures en armes 
et munitions que S. A. R. le Prince Regent a fait mettre a la dis- 
position du Roi, sans en deduire le montant sur les subsides. 

Le Roi a ete extremement sensible a cette nouvelle marque de 
I'interet de S. A. Royale : il le merite par I'afTection sincere qu'il 
porte a ce Prince. 

Le soussigne a I'honneur d'offrir a Monsieur le General Stewart 
I'aseurance reiteree de sa plus haute consideration. 

Hardenberg. 
Toplkz, le 29 Septembre, 1813. 



No. IL— p. 24. 

Observations on the Trade between Great Britain and Prussia at the 
period of the Russian treaty with Great Britain in 1813. 

Immediately after the declaration of war against France, a procla- 
mation was issued prohibiting altogether the importation of the pro- 
duce of the soil xmd manufactures of that country ; and allowing, 
w-ilhout any restriction, the importation of British goods at the lowest 
duties which had existed previous to or after the war of 1806. 



260 APPENDIX, 

It is to be observed, that after the peace of Tilsit, and exclusively with 
a view to the trade carried on with England during the three first years 
that followed this event, — trade kept open to a large extent, in spite 
of the French interference ; almost every article of foreign growth 
and manufacture formerly prohibited was allowed to be imported upon 
paying a certain per-centage: so that the manufactures that may at 
this time be imported from England into Prussian ports, and by way 
of transit be conveyed to the adjacent countries through her prov- 
inces, are far more numerous than they were formerly, before the old 
regulations were repealed. 

Unfortunately, the right of regulating the duties, which in some in- 
stances did not appear applicable to present circumstances, was grant- 
ed to a gentleman at the head of the board of public revenue, who. 
from want of information and judgment, committed the grossest mis- 
takes, and excited the well-founded complaints of our trade. His only 
end was to create a revenue; and he was little aware that his regu- 
lations not only defeated the king's intentions to give the greatest ac- 
tivity to British trade in our ports, but likewise destroyed the revenue 
"which would have arisen from it. These measures raised a general 
cry, especially in East Prussia ; and the petitions of the estates of that 
province, and of the city of Konigsberg, procured redress, though not 
the punishment of the author of the mischief An exorbitant duty 
was thus imposed upon the exportation of wheat, Avhich we succeed- 
ed ia having repealed, and that which was in force in 1806 was re- 
stored. That year having been an abundant harvest in England, with 
very little importation from the Baltic, the duties upon exportation, 
too much fluctuating according to our old system, were very low. 
This is not alleged as a service rendered to England, although such 
reductions of foreign duties may have some influence upon the price 
of corn at London. It was chiefly intended for the relief of our own 
country, where the proprietors, for several years, had suffered from 
exceeding low prices. But such a system cannot fail to encourage the 
trade upon both sides, as we cannot possibly import without exporting. 

The mistake committed operated for some time, and trade was very 
dull. Fortunately the military government of East Prussia having the 
produce of the customs assigned for the armaments, took upon them- 
selves to reduce the duties upon colonial produce below the an- 
cient rate ; and this has completely succeeded in attracting British 
ships to our ports. In the course of the month of May, upwards of 
120 English ships, charged with colonial produce, arrived at the port 
of Memel alone. The value of tlieir cargoes far exceeds the sum 
granted by Great Britain to Prussia as a subsidy : and if our govern- 
ment take care to favor the British trade with our ports, and the events 
of the war do not prove quite unfortunate, the exchange of England, 
notwithstanding the subsidies paid, must improve, as far as it depends 
upon the balance of trade in ihe Baltic. 

The sufferings of these last six years have produced everywhere 
the conviction that a full and free trade with Great Britain is indis- 
pensable to the prosperity, nay, to the preservation of every country 
bordering on the sea. All sensible men are of course more disposed 



APPENDIX. 261 

than ever to adopt such commercial regulations as may be beneficial 
to British trade above that of any other country. Such regulations 
might be entered into with Prussia as a permanent national system, 
provided Great Britain would consent to repeal some of those laws 
which affect the Prussian trade in a manner certainly not contem- 
plated towards a friendly nation. Our complaints are chiefly di- 
rected against the duty upon the Baltic timber, imposed in 1810, and 
against those which exclude the Silesian linens from the American 
markets, without benefiting the Irish linen trade: all the other objects 
are of less consequence. We, on our side, provided we regain our 
national independence, may, without hurting our interests, grant such 
privileges to British trade as, in an exceedingly short time, would 
amply repay all the assistance granted to us in this contest; and, at 
the same time, promote an intimate communication between both 
nations, which, in an age tending to establish public opinion as a 
political power, will be the best security for a permanent alliance. 

It is to be understood that no man will sacrifice the interests of his 
own nation to that of any other ; but a Prussian statesman who in 
several instances would think it necessary to preserve protecting 
duties for the manufactures of his own country, may, at the same time, 
exclude the prohibiting system altogether, and secure to British mer- 
chandise, both colonial and raanufactural, such advantages above 
those of any other nation as, in his country, would make their admis- 
sion merely nominal in most provinces. 



No. III.— p. 58. 

Heads of the Arrangement touching the Armistice and Negotiations. 

The Duke of Bassano on the 29th of June declared Buonaparte's 
satisfaction that the delay in the negotiation was not to be attributed 
to Austria, and that he was in possession of full power for negoti- 
ating a convention towards entering into a negotiation for peace. 
Count Metternich stated, his object was to fix and ascertain Buona- 
parte's acceptance of the mediation of Austria. The Duke of Bassano 
sends a project of convention, and proposes a congress either at Prague 
or Vienna, to which England, the King of Spain, the Regency a 
Cadiz, and all the powers engaged in the war, dans les masses, migh 
send plenipotentiaries ; and that the negotiations might continue, tike 
those of Munster, Nimeguen, Ryswick, Utrecht, and Osnaburg, al- 
though any of the powers should think it advisable to put an end to 
the armistice. The articles in this project were very artfully drawn 
up, in order to establish a separation of interests on the part of Austria 
from the allies, and to declare that that power did not interfere 
" comme arbitre, mais comme mediatrice armee et parfaitement des- 
interessee." Count Metternich rejected this project, upon which the 
Duke desired to recall it ; but Count Metternich refused to return it, 
declaring his intention eventually to print it. Count Metternich in- 
forms the Duke of Bassano that the Emperor of Russia and King of 



262 APPENDIX. 

Prussia have accepted the mediation of Austria, and are ready to 
submit to arbitration: he therefore desires to know if Buonaparte is 
ready to do the same. 

A military report is now sent from Prince Schwartzenberg to the 
Emperor Francis, dated Brandeis, 28th of June. Its object was to 
demonstrate the expediency of prolonging the period of negotiation to 
the 10th of August, for the following reasons: 

The Bohemian army would not be more than entirely complete on 
the 20th instant. The vast and unexpected preparations of France 
render an increased armament on the part of Austria necessary ; 
therefore every unappropriated regiment of the line, the landwehr, 
and the Hungarian insurrection, must be called out and put into ac- 
tivity. Supposing the difficulty of supplying them with necessaries 
and clothing to be got over, yet it was impossible to bring the most 
distant regiments from the south-east provinces to Znain and Presburg 
before the 14tli of August, and the other troops in proportion. 

Besides the troops raised in Bavaria, 66,000 men under the Vice- 
roy had passed the Tagliamento, and large reserves were assembled 
atWurtzburg and Fulda. As these measures directly menaced Vienna 
and Gratz, it was necessary to assemble force to cover them, (Klagen- 
furth was the place proposed,) and a lesser force nearer to Vienna. It 
was absolutely necessary that these measures should be carried iiito 
effect without making any detachments from the Boliemian army. 
Carriages could not be procured in time to supply Russia with the 
provisions which she had desired to receive from Bohemia for a par- 
ticular service ; and as the extension of the French line on the Elbe 
might render it expedient that part of the allied army should move 
into Bohemia, it was most desirable that there should be sufficient 
time to prepare means of supplying such force; and that in the mean 
time the wants of the allies may be supplied from Galicia. 

A convention was then signed the 30th of June by Count Melter- 
nich and the Duke of Bassano, the heads of which were as follows ; 

Art. 1. Austria offered her mediation. 

Art. 2. France accepted the mediation. 

Art. 3. Plenipotentiaries on the part of Austria and France, and 
also Russia and Prussia, were to assemble at Prague on or before the 
5 th of May. 

Art. 4. The period limited for negotiation, viz. 20th of June, being 
too short, the Emperor and King will agree to extend the same to the 
10th of August; and the Emperor of Austria reserves to himself to 
endeavor to obtain the accession of the Emperor of Russia and King 
of Prussia to this prolongation. 

Art. 5. Ratifications were to be changed within four days. The 
Emperor Francis ratified the convention, agreeing to prolong the 
"terme obligatoire de negociation" to the lOlh of August. 

This ratification was so worded as not to render any communica- 
tion necessary on the part of Russia and Prussia. Count Metiernich'.s 
first and principal object was to urge the expediency of prolonging 
the period of negotiation to the lOtli of August, for reasons stated in 
Prince Schwartzenberg's report. 2d, He was desirous that Count 



APPENDIX. 263 

Stadion should accompany the Emperor to Trachenberg, who was to 
be instructed to use his utmost to strengthen and decide the Prince 
Royal of Sweden in his intentions to co-operate with the allies. 
Count Metternich now declared that the Emperor Francis' determina- 
tion was to support the justice of the cause for which the Emperor 
Alexander had employed such great resources (beaux moyens). 

It was then strongly urged in favor of the prolongation of the term, 
that the French would not benefit by it, because their preparations 
would be complete by the 20th inst. 

The Emperor of Russia had not stated his determination respecting 
the prolongation of the term to the 10th of August, and it was sup- 
posed he would not do so until after the conferences at Trachenberg. 



No. IV.— p. 70. 

Conditions of equipment of the Hanseatic legion and other corps. 

The Hanseatic legion, consisting of cavalry, artillery, and infantry', 
agrees under the following conditions to enter into the service of His 
Britannic Majesty under the present state of affairs in the north of 
Germany : — 

1st. The Hanseatic legion is to receive the same pay as the Hano- 
verian levies from Great Britain, and is to serve during the war on 
the continent of Europe. 

2d. The Hanseatic legion agrees while in the pay of Great Britain 
to serve under the orders of the general or other officer who may be 
appointed by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent in the same 
manner as the Electoral troops. 

3d. The legion is to retain its denomination and establishment, but 
is to be subject to such dislocation in its formation as may be neces- 
sary for the improvement and amelioration of its discipline, or the 
general interests of the service which the general officer commanding 
may deem necessary. 

4th. Should the Hanseatic towns become again free, the legion shall 
continue under the immediate orders and service of His Britannic 
Majesty no longer than is necessary to form an arrangement with the 
Hanseatic government for its return ; but, until such arrangernent be 
formed, the corps will continue to serve on the footing prescribed in 
the foregoing conditions. 

5th. In case of vacancies or promotions in the officers, the same 
shall be conducted according to the manner now practised in the 
Hanoverian levies, so long as the legion remains in British pay. 

6ih. The British government will keep the legion equipped in like 
manner with the Hanoverian levies. 

7th. The general officer commanding on the part of Great Britain 
is to have the right of appointing officers to superintend and improve 
the discipline of the corps. 

8th. Officers and men who may become incapable of further ser- 
vice by wounds shall receive the same pension or allowances as are 



264 APPENDIX. 

granted to His Majesty's Electoral troops, until the Hanseatic towns 
become liberated, and shall be enabled of themselves to provide for 
them. 

Goldberg, 21 st Jxdy, 1813. 



No. v.— p. 73. 

Copy of a Letter from Lord Castlereagh to His Royal Highness the 
Prince Royal of Sweden, dated London, March 23<f, 1813. 

Sir, 

In transmitting, by the Prince Regent's command, the inclosed 
letter, I cannot refrain from expressing to your Royal Highness my 
grateful sense of your reception of general Hope's mission; of the 
cordiality with which your royal Highness's influence was employed 
to smooth every difficulty, and to combine the cause of Sweden with 
the great cause in which her true interests must ever be indissolubly 
bound up. 

General Hope has conveyed to me the substance of the many in- 
teresting and confidential conversations he was permitted to hold 
with your Highness. 

He has further flattered me by repeating the gracious notice your 
Royal Highness was pleased to take of my endeavors to unite the 
councils and interests of our respective states. I trust the auspicious 
prospect which awaits your Royal Highness's approaching operations 
may enable me, in the discharge of my public duties, more intimately 
to cultivate your Royal Highness's confidence, and to deserve your 
esteem. My firet wish is to see your Royal Highness at the head of 
a powerful army, liberated from all the embarrassments of a first 
landing, and enabled, without the necessity of losing much precious 
lime in securing your rear, to take that prominent station in the ad- 
vanced operations of the allied armies to which your name and ser- 
vices, in the expectation of Europe, at this moment destine you. 

The magnificent career of the Russian troops, sweeping every 
thing before them, in the midst of a severe winter, from Moscow to 
the Elbe, has opened to your Royal Highness new facihties. The 
combinations required to assemble your army from distant points may 
now, I trust, be brought within narrow limits, and the Russian auxili- 
ary force be saved the inconvenience of an embarkation. If Den- 
mark should still refuse to accommodate to the general interests 
(which seems impossible), I trust your Royal Highness will soon ex- 
tinguish that portion of her military resources which is to bo found in 
her continental provinces, and which can alone, whilst Zealand is 
blockaded, give any jealousy to your movements. I shall deeply 
lament this, or any other delay which may retard the moment when 
your operations may assume a more enlarged character. 

General Hope has represented, with the zeal which your Royal 
Highness knows so well how to inspire, your Royal Highness's senti- 
ments on several detailed suggestions which it was your wish to have 



APPENDIX. 265 

considered by His Majesty's government. Upon all the most promi 
nent in importance, and which are the most pressing in point of time, 
as connected with your first movements, I hope your Royal Highness 
will find Mr. Thornton already instructed. I shall not lose sight of 
any suggestions which come recommended by the sanction of either 
your Royal Highness's wishes or judgment; and when it is not acted 
upon, you will, I am sure, attribute it to the variety of the many ser- 
vices that at this moment press upon the resources and military force 
of Great Britain. 

Entreating your Royal Highness to accept the tribute of my re- 
spectful good wishes for your personal glory and prosperity, in which 
X consider the best interests of the world to be at the present moment 
largely involved, I remain, with great deference and consideration. 

Your Royal Highness's most obedient 

And most humble servant, 

(Signed) Castlereagii. 



No. VI.— p. 77. 

Convention signed at Trachenberg, 12th of July, 1813, as a basis for 
the Operations of the Campaign. 

II a ^te convenu d'adopter pour principe general, que toutoa lea 
forces des allies se porteront toujours du cote ou les plus grandes 
forces de I'ennemi se trouveront : de-Ik il s'ensuit : 

1. Que les corps qui doivent agir sur les flancs et k dos de I'ennemi 
diviseront toujours la ligne qui conduit le plus directement sur la 
ligne d'operations de I'ennemi. 

2. Que la plus grand e force des allies doit choisir une position qui 
la mette k meme de faire face partout ou I'ennemi voudra se porter. 
Le bastion saillant de la Boheme paroit donner cet avantage. 

Suivant ces maximes gen^rales, les armees combin^es doivent done 
avant I'expiration de I'armistice etre rendues aux points ci-dessus 
^nonces, savoir : — - 

Une partie de I'armee alliee en Silesie. forte de 98,000 a 100,000 
homraes, se portera quelques jours avant la fin do I'armistice par les 
routes de Landshut et de Gratz sur Zoimg, Bunzlau, et Brandeis, 
pour se joindre dans le plus court delai k I'armee Autrichienne, afin 
de former avec elle en Boheme un total de 200,000 k 220,000 com- 
battans. 

L'armee du Prince Royal de Suede, laissant un corps de 15 k 
20,000 hommes centre les Danois et les Fran^ais en observation vis- 
k-vis de Lubeck et -de Hambourg, se rassemblera avec une force 
k-peu-pres de 70,000 hommes dans les environs de Trauenbrutzen, 
pour se porter au moment de I'expiration de I'armistice vers I'Elbe, 
et passer ce fleuve entre Torgau et Magdebourg, en se dirigeant de 
suite sur Leipzig. 

X 



266 APPENDIX. 

Le reete de I'arm^e alli^e en Silesie, fort de 50,000 hommes, auivra 
I'ennemi vers I'Elbe. Cette armee evitera d'engager una affaire 
g^nerale a moins qu'elle n'ait toutes les chances de son c6t6. En 
arrivant sur I'Elbe, elle tachera de passer ce fleiive entre Torgau et 
Dresde, afin de se joindre a I'armee du Prince Royal du Suede; ce 
qui fera monter celle-ci a 120,000 combattans; si cependant les cir- 
constances exigeroient de renforcer I'armee alliee en Boheme, avant 
que I'armee de Silesie se joigne a celle du Prince Royal du Suede, 
alors I'armee de Silesie marchera sans delai en Boheme. 

L'armee Autrichienne, reunie a I'armee alliee debouchera d'apres 
les circonslances ou par Eger et Hoff, ou dans la Saxe, ou dans la 
Silesie, ou du cot^ du Danube. 

Si I'Ernpereur Napoleon, voulant prevenir I'armee alliee en Bo- 
heme, marchoit a. elle pour la combattre, I'armee du Prince Royal 
de Suede tachera par des marches fbrcees a se porter aussi vite que 
possible sur les derrieres de I'armee ennemie : si au contraire I'Ern- 
pereur Napoleon se dirigeoit contre I'armee du Prince Royal, I'armee 
alliee prendroit une offensive vigoureuse, et marcheroit sur les com- 
munications de I'ennemi pour lui livrer bataille ; toutes les armies 
combinees prendront I'offensive, et le camp de I'ennemi sera leur 
rendezvous. 

L'arm6e de reserve Russe .sous les ordres du Gen^rale Bennigsen 
s'avancera de la Vistule par Kalish vers I'Oder dans la direction de 
Glogau, pour ^tre a port6e d'agir suivant les memes principes, et de 
se diriger sur I'ennemi, s'il reste en Silesie, ou de I'empecher de tenter 
une imvasion en Pologne. 



No. VIL— p. 79. 
Declaration Autrichienne, Aout, 1813. 

Le soussigne, Ministre d'etat et des affaires etrangeres, est charge 
par im ordre expres de son auguste Maitre, de faire la declaration 
suivante k S. E. Monseigneur le Compte de Narbonne, ambassadeur 
de S. M. I'Empereur des Fran9oi9, Roi d'ltalie. 

Depuis la demiere paix, sign^e avec la France en Octobre 1809, 
S. M. I. a voue toute sa sollicitude, non-seulement k ^tablir avec cette 
puissance des relations d'amiti^ et de confiance, dont elle avoit fait la 
base de son systeme politique, mais a faire servir ces relations au 
maintien de la paix et de I'ordre en Europe. Elle s'etoit flalt6e que 
le rapprochement intime, cimente par une alliance de famille con- 
tractee avec S. M. I'Empereur des Franc^ois, contribueroit a lui donner 
sur sa marche politique la seule influence qu'elle soit jalouse d'acquerir, 
celle qui tend tt communiquer aux Cabinets de I'Europe I'osprit de 
moderation, le respect pour les droits et les possessions des etats 
ind(^pendans, qui I'animent elle-m6me. 

S. M. I. n'a pu se livrer long-tems a de si belles esp^rances. Un 
an ^toit k peine ecouM depuis I'epoque qui sembloit mettre le comblo 



APPENDIX. 267 

k la gloire militaire du Souverain de la France, et rien ne paroissoit 
plus manquer k sa prosperite, pour autant qu'elle dependoit de son 
attitude et de son influence au dehors, quaad de nouvelles reunions an 
terriloire Francois, d'etats jusqu'alors independans, de nouveaux mor- 
celemens et dechiremens de I'Allemagne, vinrent reveiller les inquie- 
tudes des puissances, et preparer, par leur funeste reaction sur le nord 
de I'Europe, la guerre qui devoit s'allumer en 1812 entre la France et 
la Russio. 

Le Cabinet Fran9ois sait, mieux qu'aucun autre, combien S. M. 
I'Empereur d'Autriche a eu a coeur d'en prevenir I'eclat par toute 
les voies de conciliation que lui dictoit son interet pour les deux pui 
eanceB, et pour celles qui devoient se trouver entrainees dans la 
grande lutte qui se preparoit. Ce n'est pas elle que I'Europe accusera 
jamais des maux incalculables qui en ont etc la suite. 

Dans cet etat des choses S. M. I'Empereur ne pouvant conserver a 
ses peuples le bienfait de la paix, et maintenir une heureuse neutral- 
ite au milieu du vaste champ de bataille qui de tous cotes environ- 
noit ses etats, ne consulta, dans le parti qu'elle adopta, que sa fidelitc 
a des relations si recemment etablies, et I'espoir qu'elle aimoit a. 
nourrir encore, que son alliance avee la France, en lui offrant des moyens 
plus surs de faire ecouter les conseils de la sagesse, mettroit des bornes 
a des maux inevitables, et serviroit la cause du retour de la paix en 
Europe. 

II n'en a malheureusement pas ete ainsi : ni les succes brillans de 
la campagne de 1812, ni les desastres sans exemple qui en ont marque 
la fm, n'ont pu ramener dans les conseils du gouvernement Francois 
I'esprit de moderation qui auroit mis a profit les uns, et diminue I'effet 
des autres. 

S. M. n'en saisit pas moins le moment ou I'epuisement reciproque 
devoit ralentir les operations actives de la guerre pour porter aux 
puissances belligerantes des paroles de paix, qu'elle esperoit encore 
voir accueillir de part et d'autre avec la sincerity qui les lui avoit 
dict^es. 

Persuadee, toutefois, qu'elle ne pouvoit les faire ecouter qu'en les 
soutenant des forces qui promettroient au parti avec lequel elle s'ac- 
corderoit de vues et de principes, I'appui de sa co-operation active 
pour terminer la grande lutte ; en ofFrant sa mediation aux puissances, 
elle se decida a I'efibrt penible pour son coeur d'un appel au courage 
et au patriotisme de ses peuples. Le congres propose par elle, et ac- 
cepte par les deux partis, s'assemble au milieu des preparatifs mili- 
taires, que le succes des negociations devoit rendre inutiles, si les voeux 
de I'Empereur se realisoient, mais qui devoient, dans le cas contraire, 
conduire par de nouveaux efforts un resullat pacifique, que S. M. eiit 
pref^re d'atleindre sans effusion de sang. En obtenaut de la confiance 
qu'elles avoient vouee a S. M. le consentement des puissances a la 
prolongation de Tarmistice que la France jugeoit necessaire pour l«.s 
negociations, I'Empereur acquit, avec cette preuve de leurs vues paci- 
fiques, celle de la moderation de leurs principes et de leurs intentions. 
II y reconnut les siens, et se persuade, de ce moment, que ce seroitde 
leur cote qu'il rencontreroit des dispositions sinc^res a concourir au r6ta- 



268 APPENDIX. 

blissement d'une paix solide et durable. La France, loin de raanifester 
des intentions, n'avoit donne que des assurances generales, trop souvent 
dementees par des declarations publiques, qui ne fondoient aucune- 
jnent I'espoir qu'elle porteroit a la paix sur lee sacrifices qui pouvoient 
la ramener en Europe. 

La marche du Congres ne pouvoit laisser de doute a cet egard. 
Le retard de I'arrivee de MM. lee Pl^nipotentiaires Fran9oi8 sous des 
pretextes que le grand but de sa reunion auroit du faire ecarter, I'in- 
suffisance de leurs instructions sur les objets de forme, qui faisoient 
perdre un tems irreparable, lorsqu'il ne restoit plus que peu de jours 
pour la plus importante des negociations, toutes ces circonstances r6u- 
nies ne demontroient que trop que la paix, telle que la vouloient 
TAutriche et les Souverains allies, etoit 6trangere aux vceux de la 
France ; et pour ne pas s'exposer au reproche de la prolongation, ar- 
bitraire de la guerre, en faisant la proposition d'une negociation, elle 
vouloit en 61uder I'effet, ou s'en prevaloir peut-dtre uniquement pour 
separer I'Autriche des puissances qui s'etoient deja reunies a elle de 
principe, avant raeSme que les traites n'eussent consacre leur union 
pour la cause de la paix et du bonheur du monde. 

L'Autriche sort de cetle negociation, dont le r^sultat a trompe ses 
vcBUX les plus eliers, avec la conscience de la bonne foi qu'elle y a 
port^e. Plus zelee que jamais pour le noble but qu'elle s'etoit pro- 
pose, elle ne prend les armes que pour I'atteindre de concert avec les 
puissances animees des m^mes senlimens. 

Toujours egalement disposee a preter les mains au retablissement 
d'un ordre de choses qui, par une sage repartition des forces, place la 
garantie de la paix sous I'egide d'une association d'etats independans, 
elle ne negligera aucune occasion de parvenir a ce resultat desirable ; 
et la connoissance qu'elle a acquise des dispositions des Cours deve- 
nues desormais ses allies, lui donne la certitude qu'elles co-opereront 
avec sincerity a un but aussi salutaire, en declarant, d'ordre de I'Em- 
pereur, a M. le Comte de Narbonne que ses fonctions d'Ambassadeur 
viennent de cesser de ce moment. Le soussigne met a la disposition 
de Son Excellence, ainsi que de S. E. M. le Due de Vicenze, les passe- 
ports dont elles auront besoin pour elles et leur suite. 

Les mSmes passeports seront remis a Monsieur de la Blonde, charge- 
d'affaires de France a Vienne, ainsi qu'aux autres individus de I'am- 
bassade. 

Le soussigne est egalement charge de prevenir S. E. M. le Comte 
de Narbonne que S. M. I'Empereur, fidele a I'engagement eventuel 
verbalement arr^te entre S> M. I'Empereur Napol(5on et le soussigne 
lors de son sejour a Dresde, est decidee a ne faire commencer les hos- 
lilitcs qu'apres le terme de six jours revolus. 

II a I'honneur d'offrir a. cette occasion, etc. etc. 

(Signe) Metternich. 

Prague, Ze 11 Aoiil, 1813. 
A. S. E. M. le Comte de Narbonne, Ambassadeur de S. M. 
I'Empereur des Francois, Roi d'ltalie. 



APPENDIX. 269 

No. VIIL— p. 82. 

Puhllcalion of Central Commission. 

Their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia 
have been pleased to resolve upon the establishment of a council of 
administration of the combined powers for the North of Germany, 
in order to bring unity, coherence and harmony into the management 
of public affairs in tliat country. This council of administration has 
particular instructions to communicate with the different existing gov- 
ernments on every subject which has reference to policy, finances, 
arming of the people, and on all things which may contribute to the 
security, the support, and increase of the armies engaged in the con- 
flict for the restoration of the independence of Germany. 

All public officers, and the inhabitants of the North of Germany, 
are enjoined to comply with the dispositions of the said council of 
administration. 

Their Majesties have been pleased to nominate Charles Baron de 
Stein president of this council. 

At the head-quarters, Kalisch, the 26th March (6th April) 1813. 

In the name of their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the 
King of Prussia, 

(Signed) Prince Kutusoff Smolensko, General, Field-Marshal, 
and Commander-in-chief of the Combined Armies. 



Page 83. 

Evaluation approximative des Armies des Puissances BeUigirantes. 

I. — Armiee FRAN9OISE. 

1. Grande Armee sur leBober, ct celle a Dresde . . . . 120,000 

2. Corps de Davoust, Vandamme 17,000 

3. Corps detaches a Leipzig, Wurtzburg, Frankfurt, &c, . 23,000 

4. Anticipation sur la levee de 1814, en marche . . . 40,000 
N. B. Les autres 40,000 enseront apparemment envoyes 

en Espagne. 

ij. V'ieilles troupes qui Ton retire d'Espagne 50,000 

6. Gamisons Francoises dans les forteressee, non compris 

dans les troupes des contingens que se trouvent dans 

les memes forteresses : 

A. Dantzig 15,000] 

B. Stetlin 7.000 I y^ ann 

C. Glogau 3.000 M®'^^® 

D. Custrin 3,000j 

Total, Francois . . . 278,000 
X2 



270 APPENDIX. 

II. — Contingens Allemands. 

Transportes .... 278,000 

1. Saxone 20,000 

2. Bavarois, a I'arra^e 8,000 > ^^ ,., » 

eiiBaviere , • . . . 12,000^ ' 

3. Wirteinburgeois G,000 

4. Badois 5,000 

5. Nassau 1,800 

6. Frankfort 1,800 

7. Wurtzburg 2,000 

8. Valdeck, Reuss, Yaenbuchen, Hohenzollern, Meiningen, 

Lippe 24,000 

Total .... 358,600 
III. — Troupes Italiennes cl dtrangeres. 

1. Troupes Italiennes a Milan, sur I'lsonzo, Verona, &c. &c. 45,000 

2. Napolitains 6,000 

3. Suisses 8,000 

IV. Gardes Nationales Bavaroises en activite . . 20,000 

V. Polonois 12,000 

VI. Garnisons Polonoises a Modlin et Tauck, &c. 10,000 

Grand Total . . . 459,600 

(Non comprises les troupes en Espagne et dans I'interieur de France.) 



Armee des Allies. 
I. — Russes. 

1. Russes en Allemagne, y compris les renforts qui ar- ) 

rivent sous 1q General Labanoff, et qui ne les ont > 130,000 
pas joint encore ) 

2. Troupes Russes qui doivent bloquer les forteresses de i „« /^,vfw 

Dantzig, Modlin, et Tauck \ iii},VU[J 

II. — Prussiens. 

Y comprise la landwehr enregimentee, mais pas le land- ) . q- „„ _ 
.Sturm, et la landwehr de reserve, au moins . . . \ ' 

3. Suedois 12,000 

4. Mecklenbourgeois et corps francs d'Hanovriens, a-peu-pres 8,000 

Total . . . 360,000 

II y a encore des Russes en Pologne ct Lilluianie 40,000 
Milice sous le Comte Tolstoy 80,000 

Total, . . . 120,000 



APPENDIX. 

Transportes . 
A uirickiejts. 

1. Arm6e autre en Boheme 

2. L'Armee en Illyrie, sut les frontieres de I'ltalie 

Grand Total 



211 

360,OQO 

115,000 
45,000 

520,000 



Sans compter 50,000 de landwelir en Boheme, ni les armees de Ga- 
licie et de Hongrie. 



Page 84. 
Efat des Forces des Allies, transmis comme minimum par M. Ic Chan- 
celier Baron de Hardenberg a son Excellence M- le Comtede Metier - 
nick. 

Reclificalions que VEmpereur 
y a ajoutees. 
Russes en Silesie . . . 80,000 Russes en Silesie . 112,000 

Troupes reglees Prussiennes 40,000 Do 40,000 

Laiidwehr choisioet exercee 30,000 Do 30,000 



En Silesie 150,000 

Corps du Prince Royal 

de Suede. 
Suedois, selon le Prince i 
Roval . . 30,000 C 



182,000 



comptes suelement a 

IjuIovv 

Walnioden 

Woronzoff 

Tauenzein 

Legion Allemande . . 

Dans 1 5 jours elle sera 
de ... 8,000 

Russes a ajouler (C'est le 
corps de Winzingerode 
deja donne au Prince 

Royal) 

Reserves Russes. 

Tolstoy 



25,000 

25,000 

11,000 

4,000 

6,000 

6,000 



8,000 



85,000 



60,000 



D'Orloff 



Labanoff 



Reserves PrussienneTs. 
Resfes de la landwehr 



40,000 Tolatoy entre Gitomie / 

et la Vistule . . ^ 

14,000 D'Orloff entre Bialis- i 40 000 

tock et la Vistule \ ' 

30,000 Labanoff^ se dirigeant f ^,. -.,,^ 

surlaWaitha ^ '"'""" 

90,000 Re.«erves de la land- ? go.QOO 

wehr . . . . ^ 



409,000 



527,000 



272 APPENDIX. 



Trausp. 409,000 Tranep. 527.000 
Autrichiens. 
Troupes rcglees en Bo- t 
hfetne et ailleurs . \ 
Reserves Autrichiennes 100,000 100,000 



160,000 150.000 



659,000 777,000 



Page 111. 

Note from the Chancellor Hardenberg to Lieutenant-Geiieral !Sir 
Charles Stewart, dated Frankfort, 4th December, 1813. 

Monsieur le General, 

J'ai Thonneur de renvoyer a Votre Excellence les pieces relatives 
aux principes etablis en Anglelerre sur les Ordres de Chevaleric 
ctrangers. 

Le Roi, mon auguste Souverain, sous les yeux duquel je me suia 
cmpresse de les mettre, m'ordonne de vous dire. Monsieur le Gene- 
ral, que c'est pour vous donner ime marque publique de son eslime 
distinguee, particulierement de sa satisfaction de la valeur et des talens 
que vous avez deployes a cote de Sa Majeste, dans les differens coni- 
buts auxquels vous avez assistc, et dans lesquels vous avez verso 
votrc sang pour la cause commune, qu'il vous a decore dc ses ordres 
de I'Aigle Noir et de I'Aigle Rouge. 

Vouillez agreer I'assurance reiteree de tout mon attachement et dc 
nia haute consideration. 

(Signc) Hardenberg. 

Au Quartier-general de Frankfort, le 4 Decembre, 1813. 



Page 118. 
General Blucher's disposition for the attack on the 1 6th October. 

On the 16th October, at six A. M., the reserve cavalry of nil three 
corps, with their horse artillery, is to march : viz. — 

The reserve cavalry of the corps of D'Yorck on the great road to 
Lcipsic. As soon as it shall reach the cavalry of the advanced guard, 
the latter are to lead and proceed to Leipsic. 

The reserve cavalry of the corps of Count Langeron to march 
upon Radefeld and Lindenthal. 'J'he cavalry of the advanced guard 
loads theui also. 

But before the march of the cavalry there must be accounts 
whether the enemy be near Dubin, and whether he occupy Do- 
litsch, &;c. 

The cavalry of the reserve and advanced guard, and the horse ar- 
tillery of the corps of Sachen, are to follow the cavalry of the corps 
of D'Yorck over Schevditz to Leipsic. 

Sir C. Stewart will be at the head of this cavalr}-. 



APPENDIX. 273 

If the eneniy thould not be in position on this side the Parlha, the 
rcBerve cavalry of the corps of D'Yorck in to march between Mackem 
and Gohles. 

The reserve cavalry of Langcron's corps, on this side Wcttnitz, and 
the cavalry of the advanced guard, to find tlie enemy, and show me 
the situation of the enemy, either behind the Partha, or on the road 
to Dubin. 

Tiie whole of the infantry to have their provisions ready, so as to 
be able to march at ten o'clock. 

An orderly from each corps is to accompany me; and will carry 
my orders to the respective commanders. 



Page 122. 

Letter from General De Gniesenau to Lieutenant-General Sir Charlee 
Stewart, which shows the great importance of his having effected the 
changes narrated in the Prince Royal's march, October 15th, 1813. 

Le nom du lieu ou le Prince Royal de Suede a pris son quartier- 
g^neral aujourd'hui n'etant pas distinctement ecrite dans votre lettre 
que V0U8 m'avez fait I'honneur de m'adresser aujourd'hui, et ne pou- 
vant pas trouver un tel nom sur la carte, je prends la liberty de vous 
adresser cette lettre pour vous prier de la faire parvonir au Prince. 
EUe contient la disposition pour notre attaque, et la deinande au 
Prince en quelle maniere il compte co-op^rer domain. 

En persuadant au Prince de changer la direction de sa marche, 
vous avez rendu, M. le G^n^ral, un service eminent a la bonne 
cause, etc. 

Ge.neral i>e Gniesenau. 
A. S. E. le Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Stewart. 
Gross Rugel, Octobre 15. 



Page 125. 

Lord Castlereagh' s Letter expressing the Prince Regent's entire approha 
tion of Sir Charles Stewart's conduct, both political and military. 

Foreign Office, November 30, 1813. 

Sir, 

The laudable activity which has marked your official correspondence 
down to the present period, precludes my adverting to the variety of 
topics which have been treated of in your dispatches. 

I must, therefore, in conveying to you the Prince Regent's most 
gracious approbation of your conduct, as well in discharge of your 
political as your military duties, apply myself to the series of im- 
portant events which have taken place since you left Toplitz ; in all 
of which His Royal Highness has had occasion to applaud, not less 



274 APPENDIX. 

your zeal for hiB service than the judgment and abiUty with which 
you have conducted yourself under the most trying circumstances. 
I am, with great truth and regard, Sir, 

Your most obedient humble servant. 

Castlereagh. 
Lie utenant-G ene ral 
The Honorable Sir Charles Stewart, K. B. 



Page 134. 

The Prince Regent's permission for Sir C. Stetvart to accept and wear 
the Swedish Order of the Sword, conferred on him after the battle of 
Leipsic, in a letter from the Prince Royal to His Majesty's govern- 
ment. 

Foreign Office, December 21st, 1813. 
Sir, 
I have received and laid before His Royal Highness the Prince 
Regent your dispatch, No. 127, of the 28th of October last, transmitting 
a letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to you, in which His Royal 
Highness is pleased to express his intention of recommending to His 
Swedish Majesty, that the dignity of a Commander Grand Cross of 
the Swedish military Order of the Sword should be conferred upon 
you, in testimony of the high sense entertained of the zeal, talents, 
and valor displayed by you in the memorable battles near Leipsic, on 
the 18ih and 19th of October in this year. 

I have now the satisfaction to acquaint you, that His Royal High- 
ness the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased to permit you 
to accept and wear the order in question ; and I beg leave to convey 
to you my sincere congratulations upon the occasion. 

I am, with great truth and regard. Sir, 

Your most obedient humble servant, 

Castlereagh. 
To Lieutenant-General 
The Honorable Sir C. W. Stewart, &c. &c. &,c. 



Page 168. 

Memoir from General Walmoden, Dannewitz, November 1813. 

A I'ouverture de la campagne au mois d'Aout le Marechal Davoust 
pent avoir eu 25 a 26,000 Fran^ais, et a re^u par detachemens des 
renforts jusques vers la mi-Septembre ; ils ont en partie compense les 
pertes qu'il a eprouvees: elles se montent a-peu-pres a 2500 pris- 
onniers ; 1500 tues, blesses, et mis hors de combat: il peut avoir 5 a 
6000 hommes dans les hopitaux, et avoir recu pres de 4000 hommes 
de renfort pendant le terns que sa communication a ete ouverle avec 
le Weser. II resulte de la qu'il peut encore disposer de 20,000 
hommes de toute arme. Le corps auxiliaire Danois etoit de 15,000 



APPENDIX. 275 

hommes ; il peut etre reduit par les maladies et autres pertes ti 1 1 Ji 
12 niille hommes. Trente mille combaltana au moins sont done en- 
core sur ce point dans una des plus fortes positions possibles; Lubeck 
a I'abri d'un coup de main; la ligne de la Stecknitz facile a defendre ; 
I'Elbe sur le flanc ; Hambourg, qui est devenu une place forto, 
Brendsbourg et Gluckstadt, sur les derrieres, des positions interrae- 
diaires derriere la Bille et la Trave ; plus loin le canal de I'Eyder. 
Je ne puis juger des intentions des Danois .- — ils ont proclame jusqu'k 
present une guerre defensive ; et, quoiqu'ils aient accompagne Davouat 
a Schwerin, elles peuvent etre restees equivoques: c'est a cela, je 
suppose, qu'est en partie due I'inactivite du Marechal : peut-etre 
aussi a I'incertitude, dans laquelle d'un moment k I'autre 11 pouvoit 
etre sur les renforts qui pouvoient m'arriver, et auxquels je lui ai 
donne lieu de croire autant que possible par des mouvemens ofFensifa 
sur differens points. Effectivement, il etoit difficile qu'il supposat 
qu'un point aussi important pour les operations fut garde si faible- 
ment qu'il I'a ete, surtout des le moment ou, abandonnant, apres la 
defaite de la division Pecheux, la rive gauche de I'Elbe, il m'obligea 
de detacher, pour ne pas perdre les fruits du combats, en ne pas en- 
travant autant que possible ses communications directes avec Magde- 
bourg et la grande armee. II pousse ensuite I'inactivite et la pusil- 
lanimite jusqu'a laisser emporter Bremen par mes detstchemens; et 
cette conduite a etabli une securite k son sujet qui paroit encore avoir 
prevalu, quand on a simplement fixe un corps d'observation de 25,000 
hommes pour le contenir. Encore reste-t-il a savoir, si ce corps doit 
observer et la Stecknitz et la rive gauche de I'Elbe, oii un autre corps 
est destin^ sur ce dernier point tout-a-fait separe devant Harbourg et 
Zottenspeicker. Mais la situation doit changer : cette crise doit, ou 
entramer le Dannemark dans la coalition, ou I'attacher irrevocable- 
ment aux interets de la France ; et la situation militaire sur ce point 
va presenter deux points de vue. Davoust, abandonn^ a ses propres 
forces, doit se jetter dans Hambourg, ou il faudra bloquer pres de 
20,000 hommes, ou il sera soutenu par les Danois, qui alors doivent 
se renforcer, et par une armee qu'ils peuvent augmenter k volonte, 
menacer les allies sur des points ou dejk un grand rassemblement des 
forces ennemies ne laisse pas que de donner, sinon des inq'uietudes, 
au moins de fixer I'altention. Mais suppose meme que les Danois 
restent a leur systeme Francais et defensif en meme terns, quelles 
peuvent etre les operations d'un corps isole de 25,000 hommes k eux 
oppose ? II ne pourra jamais s'etabhr au-dela Stecknitz ; car s'il par- 
venoit momentan^ment k la passer, il n'y auroit pas une position au- 
de\k de cette riviere, ou ce corps de 25,000 hommes, entoure des 
places fortes de I'ennemi, pourroit se soutenir pendant I'hiver. Le 
tout se bomeroit en consequence a couvrir avec d'autant plus de 
peine le Mecklenbourg et les fronticres de la Prusse, que I'ennemi, 
tant qu'il savoit les grandes armees proches, pourroit craindre I'ar- 
rivee des renforts; mais a present, s'il les voyoit engagees dans des 
operations lointaines sur le Rhin, pourroit calculer d'apres I'inactivite 
de ces troupes, qu'on n'auroit laisse que ce qui etoit indispensable 
pour une observation, et baser la-dessus un systeme offensif, qui, vu 



276 APPENDIX. 

la situation dea forces sur I'Elbe, pourroit devenir dangereux, par la 
proximity de Magdebourg et Berlin, les communications necessaires 
aux armees sur la basse Elbe, la situation du pays de Hanovre, on 
1 'organisation militaire exige de la surete, et enfin par toutes les con- 
siderations que pourroit entrainer une diversion puissante. II me 
parait, d'apres cela, qu'il faut, avant de decider sur ce point, etre 
assure du parti que prendra le Dannemark, et le gagner pour la cause, 
ou le forcer a se detacher de celle de Tennemi. Hambourg, aban- 
donne a soi-meme, ne sera pas pour cela pris de sitot, vu I'hiver qui 
s'approche, et qui, sans compter le manque encore existant des 
moyens, en empecheroit le siege. II faut done s'attendre a un 
blocus long et difficile ; le local protege par des eaux des inondations, 
par beaucoup de soins qu'on a mis a le fortifier par une nombreuse 
artillerie et garnison, et des approvisionnemens considerables, amenera 
des difficultes et longueurs ; il faudra un corps considerable pour le 
bloquer, et 25,000 hommes y contiendront a peine 20,000, si Ton veut 
les restreindre a la place et les empecher de consolider les moyens de 
resistance pendant le blocus. Je ne sais quelle sera la suite des de- 
monstrations du Prince Royal: jusqu'ici elles n'en out encore eu d'autre 
que de porter I'ennemi a retirer les troupes qu'il avoit en avant de la 
Stecknitz, a Ratzebourg, aux camps de Ziethen et Schmielau, derriere 
cette riviere, et a les placer en reserve. Les Danois et Fran9ai8 sont 
encore meles a Lubeck, quoique du reste les premiers ont la gauche, 
leur gros sur la Trave, les autres la droite, leur reserve avec le quar- 
tier-general du Marechal, a Tchwayenbeck. MoUn est une tete-de- 
pont retranchee : une reconnoissance faite sur ce point a prouv^ qu'ils 
veulent le soutenir ; elle a coute inutilement cinq officiers et une cen- 
taine d'homraes tues et blesses. Si la suite de ces grandes forces de- 
ployees n'etoit qu'une demonstration, et qu'apres coup on en revint 
a une faible observation, il faut supposer que I'ennemi n'en devien- 
droit pas moins entreprenant ; et vu la situation generale des affaires 
sur I'Elbe, un manque de precaution sur ce point-ci pourroit la rendre 
critique. 

Le corps d'observation sous mon commandement, qui se trouve en 
ce moment sur la rive droite, est fort de 12,000 hommes d'infanterie, 
(Suedois et tout y compris,) et de 3600 hommes de cavalerie, avec 60 
pieces de canon, — total, 15 a 16,000 hommes; la division du G^n^ral 
Tettenbom, forte de 2500 a 3000 hommes d'infanterie et de 1600 
hommes de cavalerie, en ayant et^ d^tachee. On pent encore com|> 
ter ici 3 k 4000 hommes de milice Mecklenbourgeoise (landwehr), 
dont I'organisation n'est point encore tout-i-fait achevee, mais qui 
pourra etre employee dans la quinzaine an plus tard. 

S. Walmoden. 



APPENDIX. 277 



Page 168. 

General Ghiiesenau to Sir Charles Stewart, in which he states his plan 
for an inmsion of Holland, October 31s«, 1813. 

Fulda, ce 31 Octobre, 1813. 
J'ai eu I'honneur, mon cher General, de recevoir voire lettre datce 
du 29 a Mulhausen. Les proijiesses que vous avez bien voulu me 
faire au sujet d'armes, habillemens, etc. pour les nouvelles levees a 
faire, font temoignage du point de vue eleve d'ou vous jugez les af- 
faires politiques. C'est a present le moment de faire de grands efforts, 
s'il en fut jamais. 

Permettez, cher General, que je leve les doutes que vous avez au 
sujet de la conquete de la Hollande. 

Vous dites, mon General, que notre armee a trop souffert, et que 
notre nombre est reduit. Cela est vrai. De 39 mille hommes que 
le corps d'Yorck etoit compose a I'ouverture de la campagne actuelle, 
il ne lui reste plus qu'entre 10 a 11 mille hommes. Mais il nous ar- 
rive 3 mille hommes de renforts ; aux Russes de notre armee il en ar- 
rive 15 mille hommes. Je tacherai de poster les nouvelles levees dans 
nos anciennes provinces cedees a la paix de Tilsit, de 20 a 30 mille 
hommes. Les Hessois probablement se joindront a nous, c'est-a-dire 
a I'armee de Silesie, parceque I'Electeur preferera de confier ses 
troupes a M. le General Prussien. Tout cela composera une armee 
formidable, qui pourra bien entreprendre la conquete de la Hollande. 
Meme avec ce qui nous reste maintenant, nous tacherons de faire une 
tentative, ne fut-ce que pour obliger I'ennemi de disperser ses forces. 
En second lieu, si j'ai con9u le plan de conqueiir la Hollande, 
c'est d'apres une combinaison que je crois assez juste. Je vais vous 
la developper. 

La France a entre 130 et 140 places fortes dans les guerres qui 
ont eu lieu jusqu'ici. Buonaparte a laiss^ sans garnisons la plupart 
de ces places fortes ; ce qui lui a donne la faculte de former de nom- 
breuses armees. Si on le force de mettre garnison dans un grand 
nombre de ces places fortes, ou lui otera la possibilite de mettre en 
campagne une armee assez forte pour nous resister. La Hollande, la 
Flandre, le Brabant, sont herisses de places fortes. Si on passe le 
Rhin, et ai on prend la direction sur Maestricht, on tourne toutes les 
places fortes de la Hollande, et on les isole de la France. L'ennemi 
alors n'a que deux choses a faire ; ou, de jeter au plus vite tous les 
consents qu'il peut ramasser dans ces places, ou de les laisser sans gar- 
nison. Dans le premier cas, nous ne trouverons devant nous une ar- 
mee capable a nous resister, et nous pourrons percer dans I'anoienne 
France elle-meme, si cela nous con\ient. Dans le second cas nous 
pourrons, sans beaucoup de peine, nous emparer des places de la Hol- 
lande, et nous nous y formerons ime base solide d'operations. D'apres 
les renseignemens que nous avons re(;'us, les places de frontiere en 
France sont tres mal pourvues de tout ce qu'il leur faut pour se de- 
fendre, et peut-etre que nous les aurons a bon marche. 

Faitea. mon General, la critique de mes projets militaires, je vous 

Y 



278 APPENDIX. 

en prie, et rectifiez mes idees, si vous ne Icb trouvez pas assez justes. 
J'aime a battre le fer tant qu'il est chaud, et de ne donner de relache 
a I'ennemi vaincu. 

Beaucoup de militaires conseilleroient d'eviter les places fortes, et 
d'atlaquer la France par les cotes qui en sont le moins garnis : mais 
comme I'ennemi a perdu I'annee derniere une armee de 400 mille 
hommes, et dans la campagne actuelle une autre armee de 300 mille 
homraes, il faut choisir une place qui le force d'employer toutes ses 
nouvelles levees dans ses forteresses ; et on y parvient en se mettant 
dans un point central, et ou Ton menace un grand nombre de ces 
places a la fois. 

Ayez la bont^, cher General, de me faire parvenir une autorisation, 
par ecrit de votre main, pour I'officier que je vais envoyer h. Stralaund 
pour qu'on lui remette les armes et effets militaires dont vous parlez 
dans votre lettre. 11 ne faut pas perdre un moment; et il est impor- 
tant d'arranger au plus vite I'affaire des nouvelles levees. Agreez, 
raon cher General, les assurances de mon inviolable attachement. 

Le General de Gniesenau. 



Page 160. 
General Gniesenau to Sir Charles Stevxtrt, December IZtk, 1813. 

Staie of the Prussian army in the month of December^ which shows the 
great want in vihich they were of every necessary, from their extreme 
exertions, which Great Britain supplied. 

Monsieur le General, 

J'ai eu I'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 11 de ce mois, et je 
m'empresse d'y repondre. 

Par les nombreux combats que I'armee Prussienne a soutenue de- 
puis la reprise des hostilites, la consommation des armes a etc ennrme : 
un grand nombre a ^te detruit ou laisse sur les champs de bataille ; 
et, malgre le soin qu'on eut a les ramasser, une pariie en a et^ vol^e. 
Les soldats qui n'^taient pas grievement blesses, prirent leurs armes 
avec eux; mais le d^sordre qui regno dans les nombreux hopitaux en 
fait perdre un grand nombre, et les reconvalescens retoument k leurs 
corps sans armes. De-Ik vient que dans le corps d'Vorck il se trouve 
un grand nombre de soldats sans armes. Sur I'effectif de I'armee 
Prussienne je ne saurois vous donner, mon General, des informations 
}x>sitives. Vers la fin de I'armistice j'en ^tais bien instruit, parceque 
les corps alors etaient au complet, et que je connoissais le nombre des 
corps ; mais maintenanl, que les corps sont divis^ en combattans, et 
que I'eflectif des renforts m'est inconnu, j'en suis moi-m^me tres im- 
parfaitement instruit. La seule personne qui soil en meme temps en 
droit et en etat de vous en donner des informations, c'est M. de Knese- 
beck, qui vous donnera loyalement tous les renseignemens R-dessus. 

Cette disette des armes m'inquiete beaucoup, et, si la guerre se pro- 
longe au-deR de six mois, nous mettra dans de grands embarras. 



APPENDIX. 279 

Toutes les fabriques d'armes de I'Allemagne ne sauroient rtpondre a 
la consommation des armes de 600 mille combattans. Tachez, mon 
General, de fixer I'attention de votre gouvernement sur ce sujet ; car 
sans cela nous aurons les hommes, sans pouvojr les armer. 

Si notre passage du Bas Rhin avoit eu lieu, j'aurais tkche de nous 
emparer des manufactures d'armes qui sont a Liege, et dans les en- 
virons de Namur, etc. etc.; et j'aurois cru de porter un coup mortel 
au gouvernement Fran9ais, en lui otant ou paralysant ses manufac- 
tures d'armes. Si nous n'etablissons pas des magasins d'armes bien 
fournis, desquels nous puissions tirer ce qui nous faut, nous serons dans 
de perplexites etranges. Personne n'y pense. 

J'ai remarque en Angleterre que dans chaque comte il y a un ar- 
senal qui renferme les fusils que le gouvernement a preles aux corps 
de Volontaires, k la Milice Locale, etc. ces armes forment un total de 
700 k 800 mille fusils. Tout cela etait destine k servir centre une 
invasion Fran^aise. Maintenant cette invasion n'aura plus lieu. Ne 
seroit-il pas convenable de rendre ces armes, au moins en partie, aux 
princes d'Allemagne qui en auroient besoin? Embden seroit une 
place tres propre pour d^barquer et emmagasiner ces armes. Veuiller 
agr^er, mon General, I'assurance des sentimens distingues avec les- 
quelfi j'ai I'honneur d'etre, 
Mon General, 

Votre tres humble et tr^ obeissant serviteur, 

R. DE Gniesenau. 
Hochst, le 12 Dicembre, 1813. 



Page 160. 



Statement of the entire Force and Condition of the Austrian Army, in 
the year 1814. 



^ 






eS 






JS 


!C 


<a 


<*- w 


a> 


a 


" c 


G 


o 


00 O 




ts 


S« 


F. 


3 


s 

3 


6 


^ 


2 
66 


21 


44 


8 






11 


6i 


12 


56 


41 


38 


57 


12 


27 


21 




73 


38 


rJ 


44 


15 


3 


o 


10 


36 


52 


15 


10 


4 


19 
316 


4 

]52i 


19 
315 



STATIONS. 



Italy 

Dalmatia 

Mentz 

Bohemia 

Moravia 

Galicia 

Lower Austria .... 
Upper Austria .... 

Hungary 

Siebenburgen .... 
Banat,Sclavonia,theBanat 
and Carlstadt frontiers 

Total 



Effective state. 


Men 


Horses 


106,001 


7,028 


7,320 




15,6e'8 


1,723 


93,759 


5,616 


78,786 


4,586 


74,876 


13,562 


58,206 


7.136 


17,338 


363 


30,972 


9,552 


27,754 


2,351 


43,189 


4,380 


553,889 


.56,297 ! 



Fighting. 



Men 


Horses 


75,232 


6,029 


6,815 




11,994 


1,70(1 


64,738 


5,220 


53,061 


4,375 


30,090 


12,998 


37,602 


6,607 


10,684 


341 


23,302 


9.293 


20,726 


2,061 


35,215 


4,269 


375.459 


52.893 



280 APPENDIX. 



i 
Ordnance ready for the field. j 

! 


A t Praffue Pieces 


200 
]50 
120 
24 
120 






Galicia. • do. 




ItaJy do. 




Total .... 


800 



Page 170. 

Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the King of 
Prussia, Stralsund, June 3d, 1813. 

[ These letters are inserted in the Appendix, to shovj that the Prince Roy- 
aVs sentime?its, as expressed, to Prussia and Russia, gave fair reason 
to look for his most zealous and cordial exertions.] 

Sire, 

Monsieur le Comte de Lurey m'a reniis votre lettre, datee de Bres- 
lau, le 27 Mai. C'est toujours avec iiu nouveau plaisir que j'apprcnds 
quelques Bucces en faveur de la bonne cause ; et je suis doublemeut 
heureux lorsqu'ils sont obtenus par les troupes de Votre Majeste. 

Je ne suis sur le Continent, Sire, que pour agir en conformite dea 
traites ; c'est sur leur garantie que je m'y suis rendu avec trente niille 
hommes. Pour accelerer la paix de I'Europe, avec retablisseiiient 
d'uu equilibre politique, j'ai consenti, sans pretendre renoncer a aucun 
des droits de la Suede sur la Norvege, a agir offensivement sur Ics 
deux rives de I'Elbe, des I'instant que les troupes promises par V. M. 
et par la Russie se sont jointes a moi. V. M. doit sentir avec quelle 
anxiete j'attends et I'arrivee de ses troupes, et I'avis de la ratification 
du Traite signe a Stockholm par Monsieur de Tarrac. Si, conirue je 
Tespere, elle a eu lieu, j'accepte avec plaisir, et en attendant les 
troupes que V. M. me destine, le corps que le General BuIoav cuui- 
mande. Dans ce cas je supplie V. M. de vouloir ordonner a ce General 
de se rapprocher de Wittenberg, afin qu'il puisse se lier aux operations 
que les circonstances commanderont. 

La Dannemarc a toujours etc a la devotion de la France ; sa poli- 
tique est parvenue depuis six mois a jetter entre les Cours alliees le 
soup^on et la mefiance: le voile est lombe plus tard que je ne I'aurai 
cru ; mais enfin ce gouvernement s'est declare notre ennemi. 

J'attends le retour du General Comte de Sowenhielm, que j'ai cn- 
voye au quartier-general de Sa Maje-ste I'Empereur Alexandre, pour 
me mettre en mouvement. 

Je suis, Sire, de Votre Majeste 

Le tres devoue Sexviteur et bon Frere, 

Charles Jean. 

Stralsund, le 3 Juin, 1813. 



APPENDIX. 2^1 



Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the King of 
Prussia, Stralsund, June itk^lSlS. 

Sire, 

Monsieur de Kaas ayant fait dire au G^n^ral Tettenborn et au Gene- 
ral Suedois Boye, que si le Roi consentoit a renvoyer toute discussion 
sur la Norvege jusqu'a la paix generale, le Roi de Dannemarc met- 
troit a ma disposition vingt-cinq mille hommes pour agir centre I'Em- 
pereur Napoleon ; la connoissance que j'ai de la politique de ce Gou- 
vernement ne me permet point d'ajouter foi a ces ouvertures : mais, 
pour n'avoir rien a me reprocher, je voulus bien permettre que M. le 
Baron de Wetterstedt se rendit a Copenhague avee le General Luch- 
telin, le Minislre Anglais Thornton, et le General Hosse. Leur voy- 
age a et^ tout-a-fait infructueux, la permission de descendre a terre 
ne leur a pas meme ete accordee, et les reponses du Roi de Dannemarc 
ont ete declinatoires. Tout ce qui vient de se passer ne ra'etonne pas, 
mais doit prouver a V. M. et a I'Empereur Alexandre qu'il n'y a pas 
de surety pour I'Allemagne, tant que le Roi de Dannemarc ne com- 
battra pas pour notre cause, ou qu'il ne sera pas totalement depossede 
de sa presqu'ile. Par cette occupation, nous sommes maitres de 
Hambourg, de Lubec, du Mecklenbourg, et du cours de I'Elbe ; et 
I'Empereur Napoleon a besoin d'une armee de cent mille hommes 
pour observer mes mouvemens. 

Je viens d'apprendre, Sire, que le corps du General Bulow s'etoit 
poete sur Osoren : si V. M. n'a pas change d'avis, et qu'elle le destine 
toujours a agir avec moi, je la prie de lui donner I'ordre de s'en rap- 
procher. 

Je prie V. M. d'agreer Texpression des sentimens inviolables avec 
lesqueis je suis. 

Sire, De V^otre Majeste 

Le tres devoue Serviteur et bon Frere, 

Charles Je^vn. 

Stralsund, 4 Juin, 1813, 

^('Py 9f o Letter from the Prince Royal to His Majesty the Emperor 
of Russia, dated Stralsund, June lOth, 1813. 

Extremement occupe, il m'a ete impossible d'ecrire de ma main 
cette longue lettre ; mais je ne puis. Sire, resister au plaisir de reiterer 
a V. M. I'assurance que je desire vivement que les circonstances ac- 
tuelles jettent les bases d'une union eternelle entre la Russie et la 
Suede. II faut venger I'Europe, et la sauver. Voila, Sire, notre voca- 
tion : elle sera emplie, j'en atteste les principes de V. M. et les quali- 
tes eminens qui ont fixe sur elle mes premiers regards, et les yeux du 
monde. Que de voeux, que de soupirs, sont dans ce moment presses 
vers le camp Imperial Russe ! V. M, I. n'appartient pas seulement k 
la Russie, mais a I'univers : ce fut le langage que j'ai eu I'honneur 
de lui tenir, il y a dix mois, et certes les affiiires sont loin d'etre dans 
I'etat ou elles .'^e trouvoient alors. L'Autriche et la Prusse etoient 

Y 2 



282 APPENDIX. 

contre vous, Sire : aujourd'hui la Prusse fait cause commune avec V. 
M. ; I'Autriche est au moins neutre ; et I'Allemagne nous appelle ; 
elle s'arme, nous attend, el nous conjure de rester unis. 

Agreez, Sire, mes voeux et mes sentimens pour tout ce qui vous in- 
teresse. 

(Signe) Charles Jean. 

Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the Emperor of 
Russia, dated Stralsund, June lOth, 1813. 

Sire, 

Le Colonel Pozzo di Borgo m'a remis les deux lettres dont V. M. I. 
avail bien voulu le charger pour moi en date de Schweidnitz, le 30 
Mai dernier, et je ne perds pas un instant a y repondre. 

En la lisant, Sire, j'ai eprouve le plus profond chagrin de ce que 
V. M. I. a pu douter de mon coeur et des sentimens qu'il lui a voues. 
Croyez, Sire, qu'au milieu meme des momens les plus difticiles de 
nos discussions ni mon amitie sincere pour V. M. I. ni la confiance illi- 
mitee que j'ai placee en ses promesses n'onl jamais souffert la moindre 
alteration. Connoissant les immenses ressources de voire Empire, 
Sire, je m'etois attache a I'esperance que V. M. trouveroit le moyen 
de me fournir le corps de troupes stipule dans nos Traites, parceque 
cette reunion de forces promettoit a la cause commune les resultats 
les plus heureux ,- mais la lettre que V. M. I. vient de m'ecrire, en 
portant ce caractere de loyaute et d'epanchemenl qu'elle sail .si bien 
exprimer, m'eclaire a la fois sur ce que j'ai a attendre d'elle, et sur la 
marche que mes devoirs et mon attachement pour V. M. ra'indiquent. 

Sire, les grands evenemens qui se precipitent ne vous permeltent 
plus de revenir sur le passe ; que le souvenir d'opinions contraires soil 
enseveli a jamais ! le present nous appartient ; et en fondant une 
nouvelle epoque de confiance mutuelle, il deviendra un nouveau 
gage d'un avenir heureux. La nouvelle de I'Armistice conclu le 5 
de ce mois m'est parvenue hier, et j'attends a lout moment la copie 
de eel acte. Quelque onereux qu'il soit, rien n'est perdu, si ce pre- 
mier pas vers un accommodement avec I'ennemi commun n'est suivi 
d'un autre plus decisif encore, ou il pourroit cimenter, par la plume, 
les avantages qu'il se sera acquis par I'epee. La position militaire do 
I'Empereur Napoleon est Irop aventuree pour qu'il ne doive tout tenter 
en faveur de la paix ; et sa tactique est plus active dans les negocia- 
tions que sur le champ de bataille. La fermete de V. iVI. I. et celle 
de S. M. le Roi de Prusse peul dejoucr toutes ces tentatives, et I'Eu- 
rope peul encore etre sauvce, si nous parvenons. Sire, a nous voucr 
a sa defense. Deja V. M. I. a vu I'ancienne capitalc de son Empire 
consumee par les flammes au milieu des cohortes enneraies, qui etoi- 
ent venues des bords du Rhin pour la conquerir. En cedant alors 
aux insinuations pacifiques de lEmpereur Napoleon, V. M. n'aurait 
appercu des ruuies du Kremlin, que I'Europe dans les fers. Elle re- 
sista aux intrigues et aux menaces : la Russie fut delivree, et les es- 
perances rendues au Continent. Que le meme marche dans ce mo- 
ment soit couronne du meme succes I Plus la crise actuelle est impor- 



APPENDIX. 283 

tante. et plus la coucorde ot la perseverance doit devemr I'apanage 
des Puissances AUiees. Que lout interet particulier s'ajourne devant 
les grands interets de la cause dont nous sommes les defenseurs, et 
mon ccEur et mes calculs m'assurent que nous en sortirons avec gloire. 

En employant les six semaines que nous laisse I'armislice a renforcer 
les arniees, a concerter nos mouvemens, et a agir encore plus puis- 
samment sur le moral de la Cour d'Autriche, a mesure qu'elle noas 
verra en etat de recommencer la guerre d'une maniere efFicace, je 
crois que nous retirerons de cette suspension d'armes une utilite re- 
elle, bien preferable aux chances d'une nouvelle bataille, qui auroil 
pu amener imrnediatement la paix. 

Si V. M. I. et le Roi de Prusse sont decides a remettre encore au 
sort des armes la grand* question de la liberte Europeenne, a moins 
que I'Empereur Napoleon ne se prete a des conditions qui aesurent 
une garantie durable a la pacification, je propose a V. M. I. que si 
I'armee combinee u'auroit pas recu des renforts assez considerables 
avant I'expiration de I'armistice, elle reste derriere I'Oder, jusqu'a 
ce qu'elle soit egale en noinbre a celle de I'ennemi. En attendant je 
pourrai prendre I'offensive, si V. M. I. et le Roi de Prusse mettent de 
suite a ma disposition les corps dont I'etat suit ; en ajoutant a cette 
force 30,000 Suedois, je me trouverai, a I'ouverture de la campagne, 
avec plus de 60,000 hommes, non compris un corps de 15,000 hom- 
nies que je laisserai pour masquer les Danois et les Francois h Ham- 
Iwurg et a Lubec. Ce dernier corps reuni au Landsturm du Mulem- 
bourg, que le Due m'a promis de faire lever, aura dans tons les cas sa 
rctraite assuree sur la presqu'ile du Darz, que je fais retrancher sur 
Kibrutz, qui va devenir un bon poste, et enfin sur Stralsund, qui devieii- 
dra aussi bientot, par les ouvrages que j'ai fait construire, une tete-de- 
pont excellente pour I'lle de Rugen. En me portant sur le flanc 
quar:ier, ou sur les derrieres de I'armee Francaise, elle sera forcee de 
se replier pour venir a moi, et I'armee Russe et Prussienne en Sil^sie 
et en Pologne sera degagee d'autant. Celle-ci, suivant alors les mou- 
vemens de TEmpereur Napoleon, pourra profiler d'un moment oppor- 
tun pour reprendre I'offensive, et le resultat de nos efforts doit devenir 
funeste a I'ennemi. 

C'est ainsi, Sire, que nous devons dissiper les nuages momentanee, 
qui ont obscurci la serenile de nos relations; c'est ainsi que le Conti- 
nent attend encore des forces de votre Empire ; et de la loyaute de 
vos principes, la tranquillite el I'independance qu'il reclame. Les 
peuples de I'Allemagne ne demandent qu'un guide; la Cour d'Au- 
triche ne }x»urra pas rester indifferenle a la vocation brillante que lui 
prcsentent a la fois sa propre suretc, sa gloire, ses forces reelles, et 
les vceux des peuples opprimes. Tous les el6mens pour reussir existent 
encore : separes, ils ne tourneront qu'au profit de nos ennemis ; unis. 
ih assureront le repos du monde. 

Oui, Sire, accepter une paix en ce moment dictee par I'Empereur 
Napoleon, c'est poser la pieri-e sepulcrale sur I'Europe ; el si ce mal- 
heur arrive, il n'y a que I'Angleterre et la Suede qui peuvent renter 
Hitactes. 

Quelles que soient les determinations de V. M. L, soit pour la guerre. 



284 APPENDIX. 

soit pour une paix g^nerale, je la prie de croire que j'lrai en toute oc- 
casion au-devant de ees vobux avec une entiere confiance. Je crois 
qu'il est plus important que jamais que nuUe divergence d'opinion 
n'existe entre nous ; et pour y parvenir, rien ne me parol t plus propre 
qu'une entrevue personnelle. La politique est a cetle occasion d'ac- 
cord avec mon coeur; et je serai heureux si V. M. I. et S, iVI. le Roi 
de Prusse, en profitant du terns de rel^che que donne I'armistice peut 
venir a Berlin, ou a tel autre endroit dans ses environs que V. M. I. 
indiquera. Une heuro d'entretien, surtout dans des circonstances aussi 
pressantes que celles de ce moment, est plus decisive pour la marche 
des affaires qu'un mois de correspondance. 

C'est le Lieut.-Gen. de Skjoldebrand qui aura I'honneur de remet 
tre celte lettre a V. M. I. ayant I'avantage "d'etre dejk connu d'elle, 
et possedant toute ma confiance, je prie V. M. de lui accorder la si- 
enne. 

Que V. M. I., rassuree sur mes intentions et sur mes plans, comnie 
j'espere qu'elle le sera par cette lettre, n'y voie qu'un motif de plus 
de perseverer dans la noble lutte qu'elle a entreprise, et qu'elle ne 
doute jamais de I'amitie inalterable qui sera toujours independante de 
tous les evenemens humains, et de I'attachement sincere avec lequel 
je suis, etc. etc. 

(Sign^) Charles Jean. 

Stralsund, 10 Juin, 1813. 

Corps du Lt.-Gen. Bulow 25,000 

Comte de Janengsen 6,000 

Comte de Walmoden 6,000 

Comte de Woronzoff 4,000 

Bataillons s^pares, qui pourroient 6tre omis du cote de la i ^ ^^^ 
Baltique ou de la Finlande ^ ' 

Total 47,000 



Page 200. 

Declaration of the Allied Plenipotentiaries. 

Chatillon, February 28th, 1814. 
Plusieurs jours s'etant ecoules depuis que le projet des Pr6limi- 
naires d'une Paix gen^rale a ete present^ par les Plenipolentiaires des 
Cours alliees a M. le Plenipotentiaire Fran^aia, et aucune reponse 
n'ayant ete donnee ni dans la forme d'une acceptation ni dans celle 
d'une modification du dit projet; LL. MM. JI. et RR. ont juge con- 
Tenable d'enjoindre aux plenipolentiaires Francais une declaration 
distincte et explicite de son gouvemement sur le projet en question. 
Les plenipoteiuiaires des Cours alliees? pensent qu'il y a d'autant moins 
de motifs de delai de la part du gouvemement Francais a I'egnrd 
d'une decision sur les pr^liminaires proposes, que le projet pr^sente 
par eux etait base en sub.stancc sur ime offre faite par le plenipoten- 



APPENDIX. 285 

tiair6 de France dans sa lettre au Prince de Metternich, datee le 9 de 
ce niois, que le Prince a soumise aux Cours alliees. De plus, les 
plenipotentiaires des Cours alliees sont charges de declarer au nom do 
leurs Souverains, qu'adh^rant pleinement a la substance des de- 
mand es contenues dans ces conditions, qu'ils regardent comme au&si 
essentielles a la surete de I'Europe, que necessairee a Tarraugement 
d'une paix generale, ils ne pourraient interpreter tout retard ulterieur 
d'une rcpouse a leur propositions que comme un refus de la part du 
gouvernement Frangais. 

En consequence, les plenipotentiaires des Cours alliees, prets a tc 
concerter avec M. le plenipotentiaire Fran9ais a I'egard du tems in- 
dispensablement necessaire pour communiquer avec son gouverne- 
ment, ont ordre de declarer que si, a I'expiralion du terme recoimu 
suflisant, et dont on sera convenu conjointement avec M. le plenipo- 
tentiaire de France, il n'etait pas arrive de reponse qui fiat en sub- 
stance d'accord avec la base 6tablie dans le projet des allies, la n6go- 
ciation seroit regardee comme termin^e, et que les plenipotentiaire* 
des Corns alliees retourneroient au quartier-gen^ral. 



Page 216. 
Capitulation of Paris. 

Art. 1. Les corps des Marechaux Dues de Tr^viso (Morticr) etde 
Raguse (Marmont) evacueront la ville de Paris, le 31 Mars, a 7 
heures du matin. 

Art. 2. lis emraeneront le materiel de leur armee. 
Art. 3. Les hostilites ne pourront recommencer que 2 heures apres 
I'cvacuation de Paris, c'est-a-dire, le 31 Mars, a 9 heures du matin. 

Art. 4. Tous les arsenaux, ateliers, edifices militaires, et magasins 

resteront dans I'etat ou ils se Irouvoient avant la presente capitulation. 

Art. 5. La garde nationale, ou garde urbaine, est entierement 

K^paree des troupes de ligne. Elle sera conserv6e, desarmee ou licen- 

ciee selon que les Souverains allies le jugeront necessaire. 

Art. 6. Le corps de la gendarmerie municipale partagera en tout 
le sort de la garde nationale. 

Art. 7. Les blesses et maraudeurs qui 7 heures apres seront en- 
core a Paris seront faits prisonniers de guerre. 

Art. 8. La ville de Paris est recommandee a la generosite dee 
Hauts Allies. 

Fait a Paris, le 31 Mars, 1814, a 2 heures du matin. 

(Signe) 
Le Colonel Orloff, Aide-de-camp de S. M. I'Empereur de Russie. 
Le Colonel Comte Paar, Aide-de-camp general de S. A. le Feld- 

Mar^chal Prince de Schwartzenberg. 
Le Colonel Fabvier, attache a I'^tat-major de Son Excellence 

le Marechal Due de Raguse- 
Le Colonel Denys, premier Aide-de-camp de S. E. le Marechal 
Due de Raguse. 



I 



286 APPENDIX. 



Page 234. 

Letter to Sir Charles Stewart, sending the Order of the Garter to the 
Duke of Wellington. 

College of Arms, March 10th, 1813. 
Sir, 
I have the honor to inclose the Royal Warrant, under the sign- 
manual of the Prince Regent, and the signet of the Most Noble Or- 
der of the Garter, bearing date the 5th instant, authorizing you to de- 
liver unto his Excellency the Marquess of Wellington, knight of that 
most noble order, the Gold George, and Garter of blue velvet, with 
gold letters, buckle and pendant ; which ensigns are herewith trans- 
mitted to you for that purpose. 

I have, at the same time, to request your obliging care of the pack- 
et addressed to His Excellency, which I also inclose, and which 
contains the Royal Warrant, signifying his election into the Order. 

I beg leave to observe that there is not any prescribed ceremony 
for the delivery of the ensigns transmitted to the Marquess ; as I have 
communicated in my dispatch to His Excellency. 

You will have the goodness to transmit me a line acknowledging 
the receipt of this letter, and of the ensigns ; and I have the honor to 
be, Sir, 

Your most obedient, humble servant, 

Isaac Heard, Garter. 
Major-General The Hon. Sir Charles William Stewart, 
K. B., &c. &c. &c. 



Page 235. 
Conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, April llth, 1814. 

Art. 1. S. M. I'Empereur Napoleon renonce pour lui et ses suc- 
cesseurs et descendans, ainsi que pour chacun des raerabres de sa 
famille, b. tout droit de souverainete et de domination, tant sur I'em- 
pire Fran9ais et le royaume d'ltalie que sur tout autre pays. 

Art. 2. LL. MM. I'Empereur Napoleon et I'lmperatrice Marie 
Louise conservent ces litres et qualites pour en jouir leur vie duranf ; 
la mere, les freres, soeurs, neveux et nieces de I'Empereur, conserve- 
ront egalement, partout ou ils se trouveront, le titre de princes de sa 
famille. 

Art. 3. L'lle d'EIbe, adoptee par I'Empereur Napoleon pour le 
lieu de son sejour, formera, sa vie durant, une principaut6 separee, 
qui sera possedee par hii en toute souverainete et propriete. 11 sera 
donne en outre, en toute propriete, k I'Empereur Napoleon, un revenu 
annuel de deux millions de francs, en rentes sur le grand livre de 
France, dont un million reversible a I'lmperatrice. 

Art. 4. Toutes les puissances s'engagent a employer leurs bons offi- 
ces pour faire respecter par les barbaresques Ic pavilion et le territoire 



APPENDIX. 287 

de I'lle d'Elbe, et pour que dans ses rapports avec les barbaresques 
elle soit assimilee a la France. 

Art. 6. Les Duches de Parme, Plaisance, ot Guastalla seront don- 
nas en toute propriete et souverainete k S. M. I'lmperatrice Marie 
Louise ; ils passeront a son fils et k sa descendance en ligne directe. 
Le Prince son fils prendra des ce moment le nom de Prince de Parrae, 
Plaisance, et Guastalla. 

Art. 6. II sera reserve dana les pays auxquels I'Empereur Napo- 
leon renonce, pour lui et safamille, des domaines, oudonn6 des rentes 
Bur le grand livre de France, produisant un revenu annuel net, et 
deduction faite de toute charge, de 2,500,000 francs. Ces domaines 
ou rentes appartiendront en toute propriete, et pour en disposer com- 
me bon leur semblera, aux Princes et Princesses de sa famille, et se- 
ront repartis entr'eux de maniere a ce que le revenu de chacun soit 
dans la proportion suivante, savoir : k Madame Mere, 300,000 francs ; 
au Roi Joseph et la Reine, 500,000 francs ; au Roi Louis, 200,000 
francs ; a la Reine Hortense et a son enfant, 400,000 francs ; au Roi 
Jerome et la Reine, 500,000 francs ; a la Princesse Elisa, 300,000 
francs; a la Princesse Pauline, 300,000 francs. Les Princes et Princes- 
ses de la famille de I'Empereur conserveront en outre tous les biens, 
meubles et immeubles, de quelque nature que ce soit, qu'ils poesedent 
a litre particulier, et notamment les rentes dont ils jouissent egalement 
comme particuliers sur le grand livre de France ou le Mont Napxj- 
leon de Milan. 

Art. 7. Le traitement annuel de I'lmperatrice Josephine sera 
r^duit a un million on domaines ou en inscriptions sur le grand livre 
de France. 

Elle continuera k jouir, en toute propri^t6, de ses biens meubles 
et immeubles particuliers, et pourra en jouir conform^raent aux loix 
Fran9aises. 

Art. 8. II sera donn6 au Prince Eugene Viceroi d'ltalio, un eta- 
blissement convenable hors de France. 

Art. 9. Les proprieies que S. M. I'Empereur Napoleon possede en 
France, soit comme domaine extraordinaire, soit comrae domaine prive, 
resteront a. la couronne. Sur les fonds places par I'Empereur Napo- 
leon, soit sur le grand livre, soit sur la banque de France, soit sur les 
actions des forets, soit de toute autre maniere, et dont S. M. fait I'aban- 
don a la couronne, il sera r&erv^ un capital qui n'exc^dera pas deux 
millions, pour etre employe en gratifications en faveur des personnes 
qui seront portees sur I'etat que signera I'Empereur Napol6on, et qui 
sera remis au gouvernement Francais. 

Art. 10. Tous les diamans de la couronne resteront It la France. 

Art. 11. L'Empereur Napol6on fera versemens au tr^sor et aux 
autres caisses publiques de toutes les sommes et efiets qui auraient et6 
deplaces par ses ordres, a I'exception de la liste civile. 

Art. 12. Les dettes de la maison de S. M. I'Empereur Napoleon, 
telles qu'elles se trouvent lors de la signature du present traite, seront 
immediatement acquittees sur les arrerages dus par le tresor public k 
la liste civile, d'apres les ^tats qui seront sign6s par un comraisaaire 
nomme a cet eflet. 



288 APPENDIX. 

Art. 13. Les obligations du Mont-Napoleon de Milan envers tous, 
ces creanciers, soit Francais solt etrangers, seront exactement remplies 
sans qu'il soit fait aucun changement a cet egard. 

Art. 14. On donnera tous les sauf-conduits necessaires pour le libre 
voyage de S. M. I'Empereur Napoleon, de I'lmperatrice, des Princes 
et Princesses, el de toutes personnes de leur suite qui voudront les 
accomjjagner ou s'etablir hors de France, ainsi que pour le passage de 
tous les equipages, chevaux et efFets qui leur appartinnent. Les Puis- 
sances alliees donneront en consequence des officiers et des hommes 
d'escorte. 

Art. 15. La garde Imperiale Francaise fournira un detachement 
de 12 a 1500 hommes de toutes armes, pour servir d'escorte jusqu' a 
St. Tropez, lieu de I'embarquement. 

Art. 16. II sera fourni une corvette armee, et les batimens neces- 
saires pour conduire au lieu de sa destination S. M. I'Empereur Napole- 
on ainsi que sa maison ; la corvette demeurera en toute propriete a S. M. 

Art. 17. S. M. I'Empereur emmenera avec lui, et conservera pour 
sa garde, 400 hommes de bonne volonte, tant officiers que sous-offi- 
ciers et soldats. 

Art. 18. Tous les Francais qui auront suivi S. M. I'Empereur Na- 
poleon ou sa famille, seront tenus, s'ils ne veulent pas perdre leur 
qualite de Fran9ais, de rentrer en France dans le terme de trois ans, 
a moins qu'ils ne soient compris dans les emplois que le gouverne- 
ment Fran9ais se reserve d'accorder apres I'expiration de ce terme. 

Art. 19. Les troupes Polonaises de toutes armes, qui sont au ser- 
vice de France, auront la liberie de relourner chez elles, en con- 
servant armes et bagages, comme un temoignage de leurs services 
honorables ; les officiers, sous-officiers et soldats, conserveront les 
decorations qui leur auront ete accordees, et les pensions affectees a 
ces decorations. 

Art. 20. Les Hautes Pui.ssances alliees garantissent I'execulion de 
IOU9 les articles du present traite. Elles s'engagent a obtenir qu'elles 
soient adoptees et garanties par la France. 

Art. 21. Le present traite sera ratifie. 



Page 240. 

RETURN OF THE ARMY ASSEMBLED AT DIJON, IN 1814. 



Isl Corps 


Cavalry. 


Intantry. 


Artillery. 


1 
Total. ! 


Remarks. 


3,200 


30,800 


1,620 


35.620 




iM do. . . 


3,(500 


30,000 


1.600 


35,200 




3d do. . . 


3,200 


30,000 


l.COO 


I 34,800 




4th do. . . 


4, too 


30,000 


1,600 


1 36.400 




5lh do. . . 


4.800 


30,800 


1,600 


37.200 




Gth do. . . 


4,800 


30,0f)0 


1,600 


I 36,400 




Reserve Corps 


l.tOO 


11,200 


540 


13,340 




For Saxony 


900 
28,900 


7,000 
199,800 


10,160 


7,900 

! 

236,860 




Grand Total 



Vienna, April 14, 1814. 



ADDENDA. 



The following' private Letters, written at the time of Napo- 
leon's escape from Elba, by the author, at Vienna, may not 
be wholly uninteresting ; and they are therefore added to 
the work. 



[The Letter here inserted will show how entirely the Prince Metternich 
agreed in the Duke of Wellington's military views upon the important sub- 
ject of the new campaign, which absorbed public attention.] 

Vienne, Mai 17, 1815. 

Je vous remerciede I'interessante communication de Lord Welling- 
ton. II y a un mot sur le 5me page que je ne puis lire. Si vous 
etes plus heureux que moi, veuillez m'ficrire ce que c'est que I'endroit 
illegible. 

Les idees de Milord Wellington sont entierement les miennes ; et 
je crois pouvoir repondre que le Prince de Schwartzenberg les parta- 
gera egalement. 

II propose un grand mouvement concentrique ; et il veut que pour 
que ce mouvement ne soit pas risquant, on attende que I'ensemble 
des forces soit a la disposition des generaux. 

Voila egalement ce que nous voulons. II veut que les armees se 
placent a telle hauteur qu'elles puissent se preter la main en cas de 
revers. 

II ne propose, en un mot, rien d'eccentrique ; et je I'aime aussi peu 
en fait de questions militaires, qu'en toutes autres. 

(Signe) Metternich. 



The following Letter is annexed, to show likewise the entire accord- 
ance of opinion between Prince Schwartzenberg and the Duke of 
Wellington, as to the proposed plan of the campaign in 181.5. 

Vienne, Mai 18, 1815. 
Je vous prie de me permettre, mon cher Lord, de convenir avec 
vous demain d'une heure de conversation avant que vous n'ecriviez 
h. Mdord Wellington. Je vous mettrai avec grand plaisir au fait de 
ma maniere de juger les operations; et je vois, par une lettre que j'ai 
recue aujourd'hui du Prince de Schwartzenberg, que je ne me suis 
pas trorape sur notre conformite de juger la position des choses. Le 
Prince de Schwartzenberg me mande qu'il a recu des lettres fort in- 
teressanles du Due, et qu'il lui a repondu fort en detail: il ajoute que 
leur maniere de voir est la ineme, ainsi done ce qui doit se faire, a 

Z 



290 ADDENDA. 

lieu, et on peut attendre a des succes veritables. J'ai re9U un rapport 
du General Steigentesh de Moral, en date du 11 Mai, infiniraent 
curieux, pour les nouvelles de I'interieur de la France. Comme il est 
le duplicata d'un rapport adresse par lui au Prince de Schwartzenberg, 
il est hors de doute que le Due de Wellington est informe de son con- 
lenu. Je viens de le faire passer a I'Empereur Alexandre, et deraain 
je vous le communiquerai. 

(Signe) Metternich. 

A Son Excellence 
Lord Stewart. 



The following Declaration, drawn up by the Plenipotentiaries of the 
Allied Powers in Congress at Vienna, was ultimately decided on, 
and promulgated on Napoleon's escape from Elba, and is added as 
a most interesting document : 

Les Puissances qui ont signe le Traite de Paris, reunies en Congres 
a Vienne, informees de I'evasion de Napoleon Buonaparte, et de son 
entree a main armee en France, doivent a leur propre dignite et a 
I'interet de I'ordre social une declaration solennelle des sentimens que 
cet evenement leur a fait eprouver. 

En rompant ainsi la Convention qui I'avoit etabli a I'lle d'Elbe, 
Buonaparte detruit le seul litre legal auquel son existence se trouvoit 
attachee. En reparoissant en France avec des projets de troubles et 
de bouleversemens, il s'est prive lui-raerae de la protection des lois, et 
a manifeste a la face de TUnivers, qu'il ne sauroii y avoir ni paix ni 
treve avec lui. 

Les Puissances declarent en consequence, que Napoleon Buona- 
parte s'est place hors des relations civiles et sociales, et que, comrae 
ennemi et perturbateur du repos du monde, il s'est livre a la vindicte 
publique. 

Elles declarent en meme tems, que fermement resolues de mainte- 
nir intact le Traite de Paris du 30 Mai 1814, et les dispositions sanc- 
tionnees par ce Traite, et celles qu'elles ont arretees ou qu'elles ar- 
reteront encore pour le completer et le consolider, elles employeront 
tous leurs moyens, et reuniront leurs efforts, pour que la paix generale, 
objel des voeux de I'Europe, et but constant de leurs travaux, ne soil 
pas troublee de nouveau, et pour la garantir de tout attentat qui 
menaceroit de replonger les peuples dans les desordres et les malheura 
des revolutions. 

Et quoiqu'intimement persuades que la France entiere, se ralliant 
autour de son Sonverain legitime, fera incessamment rentrer dans le 
neant cette derniere lantative d'un delire criminel et impuissant, tous 
les Souverains de I'Europe, animes des memes sentimens et guides par 
les memes principes, declarent, que si, conlre tout calcul, il pouvoit 
resulter de cet evenement un danger reel quelconque, ils seroient 
prets a donner au Roi de France et a la nation Fran^ais ou k tout 
autre gouvernement attaque, des que la demande en seroit form^e, les 
tecours necessaires pour retablir la Iranquillile publique, et a faire 



ADDENDA. 291 

cause commune contre tous ceux qui entreprendroient de la compro- 
mettre. 

La prisenie Declaration insdrie au Protocole du Congres rliini a 
Vienne dans sa Sdance du 13 Mars 1815, sera reivdue publique. 

Fait et certijie veritable par les Pldnipopeniiaires des huit Puissances 
signataires du Traiti de Paris. A Vienne, le 13 Mars 1815. 

Suivent les signatures dans I'ordre alphabetique des Cours : 



AUTRICHE. 



^ Le Prince de Metteunich. 

) Le Baron de Wessenberg. 
ESPAGNE. P. Gomez Labrador. 

Che Prince de Talleyrand. 
r-o ATVTr^c J Le Due de Dalberg. 
FRANCE. ^ Latour-Dupin. 

(^Le Cte. Alexis de Noailles. 

C Wellington. 
GRANDE J Clancarty. 
BRETAGNE.i Cathcart. 

[_ Stewart. 

!Le Cte. de Palmella. 
Saldanha. 
LOBO. 

PRTTSSF ^ ^® Prince de Hardenberg. 

) Le Baron de Humboldt. 

i Le Cte. de Rasoumowsky. 
RUSSIE. < Le Cte. de Stackelberg. 

( Le Cte. de Nesselrode. 
SUEDE. Loewenhielm. 



Extract of a Letter. 

Vienna, March 13th, 1815. 

If I had had my will, or any responsibility, I should certainly have 
dispatched a messenger to England as soon as the news of Napoleon's 
flight reached this capital, in order to have put you in possession of 
the sensations this event has occasioned here, with the speculations it 
has given rise to, and the probable effect it will have on our still 
pending operations in Congress. 

Before I send off this letter, however, it is probable that many of 
my hypotheses may be at an end, by the destination of this singular 
man being ascertained. Nevertheless, to give you the conversation 
now current here, cannot be entirely uninteresting. It happened that 
Lord Burghersh's aide-de-camp. Captain Aubin, arrived in Vienna on 
the day of one of the fetes at court. He was the first proclaimer of 
the startling news ; and Metternich was so alarmed, that he would 
willingly have kept it secret, at least for that night, in order not to 
throw a sudden gloom over the reprisentations du Theatre Royal at 
court. However, as the populace in the town, and the cabarets had 
got possession of the intelligence, all notion of keeping the matter 



292 ADDENDA. 

concealed was soon at an end. A conference was sitting the same 
day, with reference, I believe, to the mode of dealing with the King 
of Saxony. At this meeting the event of the escape came under dis- 
cussion ; and I understand there was an idea of a meeting of the 
eight Powers, to come to some sort of a declaration or sentiment of 
general and united hostility on the event. 

Whether it was afterwards considered that this had better be de- 
ferred until it was known where the game was to be found, or 
whether it was deemed imprudent to sound the tocsin too soon, I know 
not ; but I understood the above notion was given up, and the Duke 
of Wellington, Metternich, and Talleyrand, set out to conduct their 
negotiation with the King of Saxony at Presburg yesterday, as if 
nothing had occurred. It is almost difficult to describe to you the 
various impressions produced on the circle at court by the intelligence 
of the day. Some, with a degree of seeming indifference and jest, 
expressed blame and surprise that the English could have let him 
escape from Elba, the custody of him at that island having been con- 
fided to them. Others blustered and rejoiced at it, as an auspicious 
accident, that must bring all disagreeable differences to a close. Others 
again dreaded the possible breaking out of a civil war in France, and 
of the renewed bloodshed and tumult, of which Napoleon's appear- 
ing in France would be the forerunner; and finally, others speculated 
on Buonaparte's having made common cause with Murat to rescue 
the kingdom of Italy. 

It is however too true, that the present apparent Quixolical expedi- 
tion from the island of Elba occasions a general and indescribable ex- 
pression of fear in every quarter, that their best efforts cannot con- 
ceal. I understand that all the great men laughed on reading Ix)rd 
Burghersh's dispatch ; but next to the smile, I believe apprehension 
and alarm existed to an inordinate degree. Lord Wellington did not 
see the Emperor before the ball and play took place at court. The 
Duke, I understand, was very much satisfied with the Emperor of 
Russia's expressions. It seemed a moment for a general rally, and 
renewed pledges of union against a common danger. If the phoonix 
should again rise out of its ashes in Europe, whatever were the diffi- 
culties among ourselves, the Emperor declared that we must unite 
more firmly than ever against any new efforts made by Napoleon ; and 
that w-e ought now to exert every nerve to carry into the speediest 
effect all the remaining stipulations relative to the Treaty of Paris. 

When the Emperor approached Talleyrand, and observed on the 
curious fact of the bird having escaped from his cage, which he be- 
lieved would not have occurred if France had made the payments as 
stipulated by treaty, Talleyrand is said to have asked him jocosely, if 
His Imperial Majesty would pay in March what was not due till May. 
I think Talleyrand has been particularly cheerful since the news. I 
know not Mr. La Bernarchere's sentiments, ihe right-hand man of the 
French Chancellerie ; and D'Albcrg has been ill. I believe they all 
fear the party against the government in Franco, if Napoleon should 
go to the south. In this party, however, there is a schism, unless Napo- 
leon can manage to reunite it. The Empress Maria Louisa has been 



ADDENDA. 293 

deeply affected, and has declared that Napoleon must be frantic to 
compromise in such a manner the interests of his son, without a solid 
hope of success. Her servants, &c. on hearing the intelligence, gave 
loose to extravagant demonstrations of joy, leaping, and hurraing, and 
saying that Buonaparte would be emperor again, &c. 

As to the course Napoleon has pursued, or his plans, there are vari- 
ous conjectures afloat. Naples appears the most likely point where, 
if acting in unison with Murat, a great force might soonest be col- 
lected. But is it probable that Murat would connect himself with 
him now? It would be the living acting with the dead. And Murat 
has certainly a better chance with Austria favorably disposed, and 
with the other powers in a degree passive, than if he were to join in 
battle-array against them ; besides the uncertainty as to what Napo- 
leon might bring into action, and with a knowledge that he must, in 
all J nts, yield to his superior direction. Treachery so great as to be- 
lieve Murat would seduce his old chief, and deliver him up after he 
fell into his possession, to secure his own object, can hardly be im- 
agined ; and yet some think this more probable than that Murat would 
consent to make common cause in Italy with Napoleon. 

The Austrians are naturally alarmed at the idea of the scene of 
war being in Italy ; and yet many say that if Buonaparte should land 
there, it would be the best means of their becoming extricated from 
their engagements with Murat; to which the Emperor of Austria, in 
his own handwriting, stands already pledged. 

Next to the speculations as to Italy, Napoleon's return to France is 
the most prevalent conjecture ; and on this head all seem to agree 
that it would be a most fatal and dangerous attempt, in which much 
blood must probably flow, and a civil war in the country ensue 
With respect to the immediate effect which the event may produce 
on our proceedings at Congress, I think the first impression w-as, that 
it would tend to accelerate them, and bring every point to a conclu 
sion. However, I am not of this opinion. It is not to be expected 
that an indecisive and theoretical mind like m}?^ friend Metternich's, 
leaning on events, would come to a straight-forward arrangement. 
Upon Italy, for instance, when there is such an enemy as Napoleon 
again in the field, and as regards all other unsettled poinl«, I doubt if 
our approach towards a general pacification will be narrowed. Tho 
arrangement as lo Parma might become more questionable if Napo- 
leon, by treaty, was not actually confined to Elba, which evidently 
appears not to be the case. 

However, I do not see the necessity of a change ; for, after this 
excursion, it is not very likely that the powers of Europe will allow 
him to return to the quiet possession of Elba ; and if he should close 
his career el.sewhere, all danger will cease with him. The arrange- 
ments of Italy, especially the question of Naples, must at present 
stand still in the hands we have now here. The Auslrians are rein- 
forcing, and I believe collecting their army as one of observation. 

I understand by letters frem Paris, that the point of the Valteline, 
&c. is acceded to by France : there will be therefore no remaining 

Z2 



294 ADDENDA. 

difficulty in winding up the Swiss Cantons when we have directions 
so to do. 

The Austrian and Bavarian differences are still so heterogeneous, 
that, without the hand of a master, I do not think they will speedily 
be brought to a settlement. Bavaria has been more yielding on the 
point of Saltzburg, and in proportion more tenacious as to that of 
Planau, which was thrown out for her : but the king of Prussia has 
made such strong objections to the latter, and the remonstrances of 
Baden and Wirtemburg are so loud, that unless there is proper fore- 
sight to plan the best arrangement for all parties, and decision enough 
to say it shall be so, when it has been so laid down, I doubt whether 
the adjustments will ever be arrived at. The arrangements for Ger- 
many do not get on ; and Count Munster complains of the Prince 
Royal of Wirtemburg, who has set himself up as the champion of the 
Mediatizes, and he is opposing violently all efforts for the German 
constitution. 

The reports which Schwartzenberg received last night brought the 
intelligence of Buonaparte's landing at Cannes, near Grasse. He first 
made an attempt to re-embark at Antibes, where he was prevented, 
and then went to Cannes. His Polish lancers made M. de Monaco 
prisoner, and he was much examined as to the esprit reigning in 
France. He was then suffered to depart; and, going to Nice, gave 
the information above detailed. These reports came to the Emperor 
of Russia from Schwartzenberg, while at a party at Prince Ester- 
hazy's ; and the Emperor, the King, and all the ladies, got the maps, 
and were planning over the table the various probable enterprises of 
the great wild beast, as they all now term him ; and tiiey seemed all 
to be affected with the same alarm as the e.?cape of a ferocious 
animal would inspire. 

The French mission here now appear much terrified. I hear they 
have only two couriers by whom they dare send dispatches. When 
Talleyrand was told of the possible collusion between the French 
ships of war and Napoleon before he left Elba, he is said to have 
actually trembled. I think, however, Mr. Nicholson Stewart's report 
to Lord Burghersh on this head is possibly the tale of those who are 
secret adherents to Napoleon. 

I have urged the Duke of Wellington verj'^much to send Hardinge 
to Genoa, to communicate on military points, between Lord WiHiam 
and him, and from thence to go on to the most advanced troops, and 
join any French corps, if aiding the royal cause, and to report direct 
to the Duke. I am sure this arrangement would be attended with 
advantage, and I hope to carry it into effect. I fear Colonel Campbell 
has got into difUculty by all I learn, and his conduct is much animad- 
verted upon : this I lament, as I accomplished his recommendation. 

A'ieima, March 16. 

Our news from Paris last night of the 9th has quieted a pretty 
general ferment that prevailed. The Duke of Wellington adopted 
my plan, and sent Colonel Hardinge off last night. He goes by th« 



ADDENDA. 295 

way of Zurich, and from thence towards Grenoble, or any other di- 
rection that is most advisable. He will correspond with Paris, to for- 
ward to London, and with the Duke here. You will, I am sure, pre- 
vent his being superseded. If this thing should last, . . . and 
at all events if Hardinge is up before the curtain drops, he may be 
of use. 

I see no progress here in other points ; a great deal of talk, but no 
acting. The arrangement of armies, planning commands, &c. is 
without end. I would rather be able to state the progressive marche 
of congress, or of some probable term to our labors. But how does 
this stand ? Prince Metternich places 160 articles — all, as he says, 
arretles, in the hands of the redacteurs. They find, on examination 
of them, that the sole points that are completely finished are our 
treaty on the Slave Trade, and the line between Prussia and Saxony. 
The limits on the side of Poland, between Austria and Prussia and 
Russia, are still loose. All the arrangements of Germany are un- 
settled ,• even the conclusion of the affair of Genoa cannot yet be put 
in treaty; and Switzerland is again postponed. Italy likewise opens 
rather a new face : Prince Metternich argues, that although Napoleon 
may have broken his treaty for himself, it still holds good for all the 
other parties. It is circulated also, most absurdly, and I know not on 
what grounds, that the English ministry are very zealous in Murat's 
interest. 

March 19 th. 

Since writing the foregoing pages, two days since, the aspect of 
affairs has much changed, and general alarrh, almost leading to unac* 
countable despondency, has taken place. Our accounts from Paris of 
the 11th mention Napoleon's entiy into Lyons; the different troops 
that have joined him — Garyan and La Beroudiere's corps; also the 
defection of the garrison at Metz, the garrison of La Force having 
inarched for Paris, &c. All these reports you will probably have 
alrendy received more accurately. 

Consternation has been produced, and I think the Duke of Welling- 
ton, who saw things in a good light at first, has changed to the other 
extreme. All unite in urging his immediate departure for Belgium, 
to consolidate the mass of acting force in that quarter. Prince Tal- 
leyrand appears to feel his going as his only salvation. I am quite of 
opinion he should do so, when the military cabinets here are agreed 
upon a common system of action. Several and repeated conferences 
have taken place. Knesebeck, Schwartzenberg, &c. have assisted 
the Emperor and King, and the Duke has been of immense service. 
Orders are gone to all the armies. General Nugent sets out for Italy 
to-day, and active measures are taken. The Duke's absence from 
hence, when once the outline of military arrangement is fixed, will 
not be important. I am satisfied Lord Clancarty will carry on such 
business as it is possible to accomplish, while Buonaparte occupies 
every head, and issues forth from every mouth. All our illustrious 
allies are pressing hard for subsidy, and we are to have a new treaty 



296 ADDENDA. 

of Chaumont. I understand the Emperor of Russia, with \m usual 
address, has circulated doubts as to our last declaration against Napo- 
leon, evidently to liberate himself from carrying on an eternal war 
against France. If she chooses to be governed by a military chief, or 
even republic, who would execute, on their part, the treaty of Paris ? 
I hope some clear understanding may be insisted upon on this most 
important point. It is surely not to be endured that there should be 
a doubl, from our declaration, whether we are called upon not lo 
make war in France until appealed to by the King, much less that 
we should agree, after such a paper, to let Napoleon reign in Europe, 
when we have pledged ourselves to have neither " paix ni treve avec 
lui ;" and yet last night I heard frequently the language, that if the 
Bourbons were put down — if the army, and ultimately the nation, 
received Napoleon, that our declaration was not ratified, and might 
be arrested, &c. In short, we begin now to be exposed to the same 
vapors we breathed so much in the winter of 1813 and the spring of 
1814. The French embassy, by their fears, will give great encour- 
agement to the alarm. Prince Talleyrand has already announced, if 
things go bad, he will never go back to France, but will reside in 
Germany. It is very well to take this resolution when the time 
arrives, but to circulate these sort of declarations at the present 
moment is very prejudicial. 

Lord Wellington was deeply affected by poor Packenhara's death: 
there never was a greater loss to the British army. The Duke 
received papers from Talleyrand by his courier, with an intimation 
that we had failed at New-Orleans. Going out to dinner in a hiury. 
he put them into his red box, and the two days following he waa 
busy; on the third by accident he looked into the box, found the 
newspaper of the 8th, which announced the misfortune, and \\hich 
for two days he had had shut up, ignorant of the contents. I question 
much if this failure — the non-ratification — your riots on com — and 
Buonaparte's resurrection, will not give you work enough at home. 
But I have no question of any crisis being replete enough with 
events, &:c. to puzzle or annoy you. 

March 27, at night, 1816. 
I have only time for a few words. The news received this night 
is as bad as possible. The accounts are of the 20th. The King was 
on the point of leaving Paris ; — the Melun camp all broken up, and 
there is little doubt of the success of Buonaparte in all quarters. 

Vienna, March 29, at night, 1815. 
I was not in the way when the last messenger was dispatched, and 
therefore missed the opportunity of writing. To-day's intelligence has 
confirmed Napoleon's entry into PariK — his nomination of his ministry 
— the King's fliglit to Lisle — his safe journey as far as Peronne, and 
all the other details, which you will have heard before this reaches 
you. Prince Mettornich read his accounis at the conference to-night, 
up to the 21st. Nothing can be worse ; and there is a gloom here 



ADDENDA. 297 

quite indescribable ; it is a most wonderful change in one short month. 
It may be divided into three acts ; — Buonaparte lands, his attempt is 
ridiculed, and it is supposed the measures of the police and the first 
troops that meet him, will put an end to him. — His entry into Lyons 
next announces that the whole French army are with him, and 
opposed to the nation. — The last act of his arrival at Paris shows that 
nearly all France is under his influence ; and we must not deceive 
ourselves in thinking we have an easy task before us. It is true the 
nation are unaccountable in their acts and feelings ; for Ney's renew- 
ing his oath of fidelity perplexes sadly a well-regulated honorable 
mind ; and one is lost in amazement at the repeated instances of 
infidelity in the military chiefs. 

You will hear of the attempt to carry off young Napoleon from 
the King's palace at Schonbrunn. Every thing was arranged : young 
Montesquieu is believed to have been charged with it; and carriages, 
&c. were to have been in readiness near the Imperial Gardens. This 
plot was discovered, and the soi-disant King of Rome is now separated 
from the Empress Maria Louisa, and lodged in the palace here. 

I am rather out of sorts at all I contemplate. The accounts from 
France of the 14th are certainly very critical. It appears clear the 
cause of the Bourbons will not be upheld but by foreign aid, and by 
the vigor and decision of England ; and your own sterling courage 
and animated feelings on this head, will do more than any other appui. 
The intelligence from Italy is likewise alarming. Switzerland seems 
to be behaving well, and the Pays de Vaud and Geneva are showing 
great determination. 

Your return to the head-quarters, if things go on in their warlike 
shape, will be absolutely necessary : the different parts of the con- 
federacy will be disunited without it, and all seem to look for it. We 
have as yet no accounts from Hardinge, but we expect them daily. 
Adieu. 

The remainder of the author's letters, and all other documents and 
anecdotes of the congress, and the campaign of 1815, will be proba- 
bly introduced in a future work. These letters have been added at 
this moment chiefly to show the eflfect created by Napoleon's escape 
from Elba. And having now placed the readers of these pages in full 
possession of what passed at Vienna, as to military points, at the above 
epoch, this short series of letters is concluded by adding the first report 
received from Sir Henry Hardinge, at Brussels, which will demon- 
strate what was passing there, and will put on record, in an extraor- 
dinary manner, what the first elements and materials were in March 
27th, of an army which, imder the Duke of Wellington, on June 18th, 
achieved the battle of Waterloo, entirely defeated Napoleon, and gave 
a second time peace to Europe. 

Brussels, March 27th. 

I am arrived here, my dear general ; and I do not think it likely 
that Napoleon will make a push in this direction ; for although we 
are not well prepared, either in the number or quality of the troops, 



298 ADDENDA. 

yet I should conceive he will attempt to negotiate, and notwithstand- 
ing the declaration of the congress, consider its sentiments as no 
longer applicable to him, having been reinstated without bloodshed, 
or a civil war, by the unanimous choice of the people ; in whose 
internal affairs foreign powers have declared they are not entitled to 
interfere, he being ready, on the part of the nation, as its chief, to 
guaranty the Treaty of Paris, and to abide by all public diplomatic 
acts of the interregnum. This I suppose to be the course he will take 
in preference ; and I therefore do not in the least enter into the 
alarms of those who expect him at the head of his imperial guards 
immediately in Brussels. The dread of such a visit has been so 
strong and universal, that the greater part of the Enghsh have hurried 
away to the Hague. 

The force, I have said, is small, not amounting to 10,000 British, 
and including Hanoverians of the legion and landwehr, about 28,000, 
of which 10,000 are regiments for garrisons ; and, in point of quality, 
the British are mostly composed of the 2d battalion, who, as young 
soldiers, at their outset in this country, got somewhat discouraged by 
the Bergen-op-zoom failure ; and the Hanoverians, in point of ad- 
vancement in discipline, about as far advanced as the Portuguese 
levies the first year of their service. In short, this army has not 
10,000 formed soldiers. The Belgian regiments are composed of 
officers and men who have served under Buonaparte, and who are 
not in a loyal temper, and therefore almost worse than nothing. They 
are sent to the rear, and may be sprinkled in the garrisons, until by 
reinforcements and steady measures the army and people gain confi- 
dence, when I have no doubt they may be usefully brought forward. 
There are also 25,000 Dutch troops on their march, in a raw undis- 
ciplined state ; and if the Duke personally takes the command of this 
army, and undertakes any operation at present, I should almost fear 
he would compromise his reputation; for they cannot move, and far 
outnumber the made troops. 

No very material augmentation can, I understand, be expected 
from England, and that it will be the middle or end of next month 
(April) before any American troops can arrive. 

The Russians call themselves 80,000 men, and promise for any 
co-operation 40,000 good troops, at the disposition of Holland and 
England, in defence of their frontier. The enemy have marched 
some bodies of troops in this direction ; but I believe they are chiefly 
the garrisons which the King drew out to protect Paris, and which, 
after betraying him, are on their march to resume their former points. 
The Prince of Orange is very active and very popular : his plans are 
however uncertain. The Dutch have the greatest confidence in his 
military talents; and His Royal Highness is not said to be pleased 
with the idea of the Duke's being likely to supersede him in the com- 
mand. Sir Hudson Lowe and Barnes are very anxious for the Duke's 
arrival. Colbome appears somewhat sick of his situation, and dreads 
any crisis of aflairs under the present state of things. The army is 
not unlike Lord RanclifT's description of the French pack of hounds — 



ADDENDA. 299 

pointers, poodles, turnspits — all mixed up together, and running in 
sad confusion. Sir Charles Stewart came here this afternoon in con- 
sequence of an express which Lowe sent off the day before yester- 
day, with the news (confirmed) that Buonaparte was at Arras ; and 
the King is expected from the Hague to-morrow. 

The King of France is at Ostend ; and it would seem that he trusts 
his sentiments of future plans to no one, having taken (and very 
naturally, from the numerous treasons he has experienced) a suspi- 
cious turn of mind. He has, it is said, brought away, in cash and 
valuables, about five millions sterling ! Every one, it is said, lost their 
head, excepting the Due d'Orleans, who had a good deal of popu- 
larity in the army ; but, from the jealousy of the King, every advice 
and assistance of his is said to have been discountenanced and 
neglected. He has, by universal consent, the best abilities ; and if 
there is such a thing in France as personal attachment or party to the 
Bourbons, he possesses it. But I won't enter into farther conversation 
on this subject, as I must reserve a page for my own operations since 
I left Basle. 

I made my way through the Pays de Vosges to Nancy, where the 
troops and people had declared for Buonaparte, and hurried from 
thence to Chalons, still hoping to outmarch Buonaparte, and to place 
myself with some royal army, and not quite crediting the rumors I 
heard from his partisans, of his near approach to Paris. At Chalons 
I was induced, from a wish to get information, and a necessity of 
eating, to stop at an inn, where I was very unwillingly obliged to 
dine with some French officers, who were in great glee at the return 
of Buonaparte. They had information by express of his being at 
Paris. I therefore thought it quite time that I should leave such com- 
pany, and considering the declaration of the congress a declaration 
of war of Europe against Napoleon, and that the flight of the Bour- 
bons gave me no chance of acting upon my instructions, I determined 
to make for the frontier before I should be detained. I should tell 
you, that at most places I was brought before the civil and military 
authorities, and underwent a good deal of inquisitional examination. 
I was compelled to drive two stages on the high road to Paris from 
Chalons, because, when my horses were put to, these troublesome 
rascally officers asked the road I was about to take. About midnight 
we got the postilions to drive by a cross-road to Rheims, and thence 
to Mezieres, where I was again detained ; thence to Levan ; and so 
across the Duchy of Luxembourg to this place. I found the people, 
where there were no military, indifierent enough as to the success 
of either party; but certainly in general preferring Napoleon, or per- 
haps the change of masters, by which those who are not very well 
off speculate that by chance they may be better. Buonaparte appeara 
to have acted, and to be now acting, upon the old revolutionary prin- 
ciples of 1793. On his advance from Lyons, he was always one or 
two marches in front of his troops, liis partisans raising the mob of 
the villages through which he was to pass ; and when the multitude 
were in the fermentation desired, he used to make his appearance, 



300 ADDENDA. 

cajoling them in the most familiar terms ; and by such means ne may 
be said to have entered Paris, by the aid of the rabble whom he 
picked up on the roads he passed along. 

Large parties of troops were, however, always in his front, and 
which, it may be supposed, he contrived by means of emissaries dis- 
patched to the chief towns and cantonments of the troops, with 
regular orders of march, signed by Davoust or Bertrand, ordering the 
troops on certain days to be at fixed places, so that at various places 
he knew he would meet with support by the junction of such 
deserters as had obeyed these orders, which were very generally and 
very artfully distributed throughout the country. 

Ever your most affectionate and attached, 

H. Hardino£. 



THE END. 



STEREOTYPED BY J. HOWE. 



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